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This dissertation argues for the study of director Mike Nichols by elucidating his aesthetic, 
historical, social, and political importance.  He ushered in the turn from ―Classical‖ to ―New‖ 
Hollywood, and studying his work illuminates unacknowledged similarities and differences in 
both periods.  Furthermore, looking at the cultural significance of his oeuvre deepens our 
understanding of the cultural revolution of the 1960s, as well as key events in the ensuing five 
decades of American social history.  By analyzing the methods for crafting scenarios that 
Nichols carried forward to the cinema from his seminal work in radio and theater, I generate new 
insight into the representation of the interpersonal on-screen, particularly through the lenses of 
gender and sexuality.  There is no scholarship devoted to Nichols‘s study, and I look at what his 
exclusion from debates in Cinema Studies tells us both about his films and about the dominant 
approaches and theoretical paradigms used to interpret the cinema, particularly regarding 
concepts such as character, performance, dialogue, the psychological, the human, and the social. 
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Chapter One: The Avoidance of Mike Nichols 
 
 ―I think it‘s a strange mistake to take the kind of work I do seriously, to think of it as important or lasting.  Plays are 
forgotten.  Film crumbles.  We all tend to make the mistake of thinking film is forever…. There was a time when I 
really thought about this.  And I concluded: ‗The biggest kind of schmuck wants to be remembered.  And the next 
biggest kind of schmuck wants to remember you.  And the least schmuck of all simply gathers information to take to 
his grave.‘‖ – Mike Nichols (Gelmis, 282-283)   
 
―The history of films is in great part the history of our attitudes toward our bodies, as they have been expressed and 
as we have attempted to imitate the fleeting film images.‖ – Leo Braudy (217)   
 
  In 1975, Leonard Probst interviewed director Mike Nichols as part of his exploration of 
―the nature of the superstar‖ (which, according to him, was a new type of star, self-conscious and 
ahead of the public).  Nichols had already been a household name in America for almost twenty 
years.  He had been half of the wildly successful comedy duo, Nichols and May, during the 
1950s, had become the most successful comedy director in American theatrical history, and had 
directed the landmark films Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? (1966), The Graduate (1967), 
Catch-22 (1970), and Carnal Knowledge (1971).  Probst begins his interview with Nichols by 
asking if he is possibly correct in observing that Nichols‘ films are ―very heavily social but not 
political‖ (109).  Nichols responds:  
Yes.  I think that‘s possible and accurate.  When I worked with Elaine May, our concerns 
were with personal behavior, usually between men and women because we were one of each.  
We tended, as individuals, and together, to be more concerned with behavior than with ideas 
purely political.  That is not to say I don‘t have strong political feelings, but that my work, it 
seems to me, is more concerned with things interpersonal than political.  Political things tend, 
in movies and plays, and God knows, in sketches, to be general rather than specific.  I‘ve 
always been interested in specific things between people.  
 
Nichols‘ investment in the social goes some way towards explaining his films‘ consistent 
investment in understanding the ontology of cinematic characters.
1
  Nichols‘ quote directs us to 
                                                 
1
 It has become commonplace among academics to assert that ―everything is political.‖  While this is surely true, it 
can be an unhelpful generalization when discussing the representation of people in screen fiction.  It can degrade the 
importance of particular identities that have historically grounded power relations, as well as reduce subtly 
interesting human actions into a hunt for their points of origin.  Nowadays we also make use of the term ―socio-
political,‖ popularized in the 1960s through journals like Partisan Review and The New Left Review, to denote the 
convergence of the two domains.  While it may be true that concerns we often call political (such as the consent of 
  
2 
consider behavior as expressive of the social, of the interpersonal as behavioral—and for 
behavior as the space of the interpersonal—calling attention to the phenomenon of expressivity, 
its role in communication, and, ultimately, the possibility of knowing other people.    
  After more than forty years and over twenty feature films, Nichols remains a prominent 
and respected Hollywood director who continues to comment on the American social vista.  
Needing two individuals to create an interpersonal scenario, Nichols‘ attachment to representing 
the interpersonal on-screen also hints at a reason his work has been neglected, for it speaks to 
both an interest in the microcosm of the social and in the possibility of representing 
psychologies—an unpopular view in the contemporaneous and burgeoning field of cinema 
studies.  As cinema studies settled in the academy in the 1960s and early 19070s, it was on 
avowedly political territory.  The concepts of the individual and the ―human‖ were not estimable 
at this time in academia, but rather, were thought to smack of a bourgeois sensibility.  The desire 
to demonstrate cinema‘s political significance—and the concurrent desire to prescribe 
filmmaking procedures seen as more efficacious for a progressive politics—resulted in the 
derogation of Hollywood as the product of capitalism and, in turn, chastised its devices as 
promulgating an unhealthy attention to the individual.  Such attitudes diminished the field‘s 
capacity to engage and value the complexity of representing interpersonal behavior: in short, the 
cinematic character (as individual, not just social type) and her social relevance.  As there are no 
individuals without minds and no minds without individuals, engaging the vicissitudes of 
psychological realism is a primary formal concern for Nichols.  In his films, socially relevant 
meaning emerges from the meeting, and meting out, of performance and character, identity and 
action.   
                                                                                                                                                             
the governed and the distribution of wealth) are basic to the movements in the twentieth century (such as civil rights 
and feminism) that we might properly call social, I do not want to assume contiguities to the detriment of elucidating 
the particular ways that Nichols reveals the cultural negotiation of this discourse. 
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  This is true of even those Nichols‘ films that tempt us to call them political, such as 
Primary Colors (1998) or Catch-22: when he aims at the political, it is through the specific.  His 
most recent film, Charlie Wilson’s War (2007), is typical in this respect; it features great 
performances, a narrative centered on human relationships embedded in a very real American 
socio-political moment, and is uneasy to locate generically.  That the story involves events that 
contributed significantly to America‘s current predicament with Afghanistan and its post-9/11 
atmosphere, and that the film was produced and exhibited during wartime, might lead one to 
nominate this film as ―political‖ in earnest.  But Nichols historicizes the nation‘s largest covert 
war through an interpersonal relationship between two individuals, Joanne Herring (Julia 
Roberts) and Charlie Wilson (Tom Hanks).  Employing two of Hollywood‘s most commercial 
stars, Nichols‘ film is a story of people effecting change by working within an imperfect system.  
Just to make sure we do not misread Nichols‘ agenda, in a scene where Joanne makes public 
recent footage of the conflict in Afghanistan, she demands to know what the government will do 
in response to its greatest threat since the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Congressman Charlie replies, 
―Well, I don‘t think making another movie about it is going to help if that‘s what you‘re asking.‖   
The primary aim of this dissertation is to analyze Nichols‘ cinematic works, and, despite 
his critical neglect, this project is timely.  I ground Nichols‘ cinema firmly in the 1960s; this 
period marks his emergence as a cinema director, and his most lasting influence as the pioneer of 
what came to called ―New Hollywood.‖  The 1960s, of course, witnessed a great many important 
changes in American culture, and cinema culture was certainly one of them, a topic receiving 
increasing amounts of attention.
2
  As I will explain below, the study of the voice in cinema plays 
                                                 
2
 See, for example, Mark Harris‘ Pictures at a Revolution: Five Movies and the Birth of New Hollywood (2008) and 
Geoffrey Nowell-Smith‘s Making Waves: New Cinemas of the 1960s (2007).   
  
4 
a crucial role in our understanding of Nichols‘ consistent concerns.3  Similarly, my focus on 
Nichols as an actor‘s director speaks to the growing area of scholarship on film performance, as 
does my examination of the constitution of cinematic characters through his films.
4
  Moreover, 
Nichols himself is beginning to garner notable attention.  Collector‘s edition DVDs have 
appeared (and again, this is partly exemplary of the broader interest in the 1960s), and the 
Museum of Modern Art conducted a retrospective of his cinematic work in 2009.
5
   
 However, this study is also anachronistic, even nostalgic.  As digitally-created characters 
and the concept of the ―post-human‖ impart other developing fields of inquiry, Nichols‘ films 
provide the window through which to look at the category of the human in realist fictional 
cinema.  The knowledge we will acquire about what makes Nichols ―Nichols‖ will arise out of 
close readings of his films.  Shockingly, this is the first sustained treatment of his films, which 
are some of the most important in American cinematic history.  To point out that Nichols (a 
name which from here on functions metonymically for the author of the corpus of films for 
which we can attribute responsibility to him) has not been analyzed does not in and of itself 
warrant an examination of him; perhaps he is better ignored.  I do not think so, and, accordingly, 
in this introduction I will justify his study and my approach.   
                                                 
3
 Current interest in this area is demonstrated by Jacob Smith‘s Vocal Tracks: Performance and Sound Media 
(2008), Mladen Dolar‘s A Voice and Nothing More (2006), Sarah Kozloff‘s Overhearing Film Dialogue (2000), and 
Michel Chion‘s The Voice in Cinema (1999).  These studies fall within the larger, and rapidly expanding field of 
Sound Studies. 
4
 This is perhaps the largest area of timely inquiry.  I believe the best of recent work on cinematic performance is 
Andrew Klevan‘s Film Performance: From Achievement to Appreciation (2005) and George Kouvaros‘ Paul 
Schrader (2008) and Where Does it Happen?: John Cassavetes and Cinema at the Breaking Point (2004). 
5
 There has been a broad cultural light (both nostalgic and critical) shined on the late 1960s recently in America as 
Barack Obama‘s journey to the presidency led many to look back to the 1960s as the origins of the African-
American civil rights movement, and because of the increasing parallels between the wars in Iraq and Vietnam. Not 
surprisingly, this discourse has illuminated Nichols‘ role as American commentator, especially evident in the 
attention paid to the fortieth anniversary of The Graduate.  Besides the special edition DVD, there have been 
lengthy profiles of him in Vanity Fair, Entertainment Weekly, Newsweek, and Time.    
  
5 
 Most historical chronicles of cinema fail to reference Nichols‘ work.6  Other histories, 
mostly those specific to American cinema, include Nichols, but only as foundational to the post-
studio revivification of American cinema commonly called ―New Hollywood.‖  They 
acknowledge Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?‘s ground-breaking foul language, which brought 
the classical Hollywood Production Code down, and The Graduate‘s mammoth success with the 
youth movement of the late 1960s.
7
   Until now, though, no one has sought to analyze his films, 
even those films with obvious historical importance.  In this introduction, I will sketch a possible 
explanation for what I can only imagine is a purposeful circumventing of his films—that is, not       
just his neglect, but his avoidance—by elucidating relevant values associated with particular 
American aesthetic, historical, and intellectual histories in the hopes of finding Nichols by 
investigating the culture that avoided him.   
 Sigmund Freud once said that the finding of an object is, in fact, its re-finding (288), 
rightly pointing out that we have to know that something exists, and that it was lost, in order to 
discover it again.  As the juxtaposition of the quotes in the epigraph above suggests, my analysis 
here is not simply for the sake of remembrance.  As one of America‘s most popular, influential, 
quintessential, and enduring filmmakers, Nichols is an ideal source of cultural information for 
thinking about an American history of ―attitudes toward our bodies.‖  As we will see, the 
narratives of his films demonstrate America‘s changing attitudes towards sexual difference, 
sexual identity, and ethnicity (particularly Jewish ethnicity), but to do so they place our attention 
on characters‘ faces and voices, directing us to contemplate fictional characters as expressing, 
                                                 
6
 For example, David Cook‘s A History of Narrative Film (2004) and Kristin Thompson and David Bordwell‘s Film 
History (2002).  
7
 See Jon Lewis‘ American Film: A History (2008), Contemporary American Cinema (2006), ed. Linda Ruth 
Williams and Michael Hammond, Paul Monaco‘s History of American Cinema: The Sixties (2001), David Cook‘s 
Lost Illusions: American Cinema in the Shadow of Watergate and Vietnam, 1970-1979 (2000), and John Belton‘s 
American Cinema/American Culture (1994).  Cook is typical for citing the cultural impact of Nichols‘ early work 
before adding in a pejorative tone: ―He has since become a mainstream industry figure‖ (100).  Mark Harris details 
the production history of The Graduate, but does not examine the text itself. 
  
6 
self-presenting, emoting, and uttering.  In turn, Nichols opens up discussions of concepts that 
have been historically neglected by cinema studies, such as the representation of emotion, 
performance, dialogue, and comedy—precisely those subjects with which, we shall see, Nichols 
is most concerned and innovative.
8
  For example, rather than follow the conventional shot 
sequence of establishing shot to long shot to medium shot to close-up, the visual trajectories of 
many of Nichols‘ best films begin (and end) with facial close-ups.  However, we should not 
mistake this choice as a decision to omit an establishing shot.  Nichols establishes the diegetic 
settings of his films as the mind of his character, and establishes his formal concern for 
considering the relationship between bodily expression, behavior, performance and the 
spectator‘s attribution of—and belief in—a character‘s inner life.  If cinema is a language, on-
screen behavior is an important part of our vocabulary for understanding it.  As speakers of the 
cinema, and the languages of bodies, and of English, what do we mean by ―psychologically 
realistic‖ characters?9 
In the following pages, I will first give a brief biographical account of Nichols‘ life.  His 
experience as a European émigré resonates with strong national-cultural myths of immigration 
and ―Americanness,‖ and is thus relevant to my insistence on placing him in specifically 
American cultural, cinematic, and critical genealogies.  Second, I will situate Nichols within the 
context of the American cultural upheavals of the 1960s,
10
 which brings together radical changes 
in American social and political culture wrought by the expansion of citizens‘ rights with the 
                                                 
8
 I want to identify several Hollywood directors making important films in the 1960s, and whose work shares 
relevant affinities for this study: Robert Altman (finally hitting his stride), Hal Ashby, Peter Bogdonavich, Arthur 
Hiller, Stanley Kramer, Sidney Lumet, Paul Mazursky, Alan Pakula, Sidney Pollack, and Herbert Ross.  
9
 I want to make it clear that, because I am focused on the constitution of the human character, I am not talking 
about the work accomplished by other cinematic components, such as music and mise-en-scène, for suggesting the 
presence and state of a character‘s mind.  For example, filmmakers such as Jean Renoir, Ang Lee, or Douglas Sirk 
often brilliantly use mise-en-scène to specifically contribute to the impression of characters‘ psychological attitudes. 
10
 When referring to ―the 1960s,‖ I, like Andrew Sarris, Arthur Marwick, and many other scholars, designate a 
period extending into the early seventies.   
  
7 
radical changes in American cinematic culture wrought by the expansion of film to include the 
European ―new cinema.‖11  Third, I will delineate attitudes toward realist fictional cinema 
propagated by European, and then American, cinema scholarship of the 1960s to begin 
accounting for scholars‘ avoidance of Nichols before concluding that, by establishing a middle 
ground between notions posited as antithetical, Nichols clarifies theoretical treatments of 
psychological realism.  Throughout this dissertation, I will have reason to turn to the writings of 
Stanley Cavell, and so, in the final section, I will sketch a background picture of his views that 
are relevant to this look at Nichols.   
 
A Brief Biography 
  On November 6, 1931, Mike Nichols was born Michael Igor Peschkowsky (the name 
Nichols was derived from his father‘s patronymic).  Nichols‘ father was a quite prominent 
Russian doctor (his patients included Sol Hurok of the Russian ballet), and he was also Jewish 
(Gussow, 1973).  To escape Bolshevik persecution, he fled Russia to Germany (Playboy, 63), 
where he met Nichols‘ mother, also Jewish, and a celebrated ―German beauty‖ (Lahr, 253).12  
Nichols‘ maternal grandmother translated Oscar Wilde‘s Salome for Richard Strauss, and his 
grandfather, Gustav Landauer, was a writer, activist, and leader of the German Social 
Democratic Party whose best friends included Martin Buber and B. Travern (Lahr, 261).  
Landauer‘s ―brutal execution‖ by the Nazis caused the family to flee to America.  It was 1939 
and Nichols was seven.  He and his younger brother fled first from Berlin knowing ―just two 
English sentences—‗I do not speak English‘ and ‗Please do not kiss me.‘‖ (Lahr, 253).  The 
family eventually all immigrated, and his father established a practice in New York City.  
                                                 
11
 I borrow this term from Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, who uses it in Making Waves: New Cinemas of the 1960s.   
12
 Nichols‘ parents shared what we might now refer to as an ―open‖ marriage (Lahr, 259), a fact that may very well 
be relevant to Nichols‘ parodies of social mores where sex and the sexes are concerned. 
  
8 
Besides being removed from his native homeland and language, Nichols had been permanently 
denuded of all body hair at the age of four due to a bad vaccination.  He would lose his father at 
twelve (Lahr, 253), the same year Nichols would be certified a genius (R. Jameson, 10).  His 
mother was a depressive, and, following his father‘s death, the family descended into 
―humiliating poverty‖ (Lahr, 260).   In 2009, a New York Times profile underlined the lingering 
effects of Nichols‘ hair loss: ―He wakes up every morning in his Fifth Avenue apartment, 
collects himself and, wearing a wig and paste-on eyebrows, plays a character called Mike 
Nichols‖ (McGrath, 1). 
  ―He was Igor Peschkowsky,‖ his future collaborator, Buck Henry, remembers of their 
time in grade school together; ―He did not speak English.  He wore a cap all the time‖ (Lahr, 
260).  By high school, Nichols had mastered English and wore a wig, but, by all accounts, was 
still very much an outsider.  Nichols recalls: ―The refugee ear is a sort of seismograph for how 
one is doing… I heard what they thought of me—‗nebbish,‘ ‗poor boy,‘—and what they thought 
of each other.  A thousand tiny victories and defeats in an ordinary conversation‖ (Lahr, 261).  
Perhaps it should not surprise us he would later turn to radio performing, and that understanding 
his films‘ depiction of ordinary language is crucial to their appreciation. 
  Things began to change for Nichols when, at seventeen, he departed for the University of 
Chicago to become a psychiatrist (Playboy, 63), and where he says he made his very first friend 
(Lahr, 262).
13
  That friend was Susan Sontag.  They were lifelong friends.
14
  She told John Lahr: 
                                                 
13
 Erving Goffman received his PhD from the university the same year Nichols left.  While I have not discovered 
any biographical connection, Goffman created a dramaturgical theory of the self based on understanding human 
actions in their specific contexts (time, place, audience, and the social actor‘s awareness of himself as audience and 
performer).  Hence, the self is an effect of one‘s immediate environment.  Human beings present themselves to 
others in relation to cultural values, norms and expectations.  Presenting a self is, thus, a form of communication, 
and one which only occurs within a given cultural context.  We learn to act a certain way as we learn our cultural 
world.  Success comes, for Goffman, when a performance, or ―presentation,‖ is convincing. We will see this is very 
similar to Cavell‘s theory of language, in which learning what to say when is identical to learning of our world.  
These theories also coincide with the rise of ethnomethodology, as initiated by Harold Garfinkel in 1967.    
  
9 
―I adored him from the start.  He was totally alive and incredibly verbal.  We talked about books, 
about feelings, about how to get free of our pasts.  Because we were interested in theatre, we 
were interested in observing people.  I would happily have become his girlfriend physically, 
except I was intimidated by the hair problem‖ (262).15  Sontag also started her career as a film 
director in the 1960s after watching, and admiring, Nichols do it (Gussow, 1969).   Another of 
Nichols‘ college friends, future-publisher Aaron Asher, talked of their community, saying ―[We 
were] refugees or first-generation Jewish intellectual guys… We were all freaks.  We were way 
ahead of the country.  There was sex.  There was dope.  There was a subculture‖ (Lahr, 262).16  
It was also at the University of Chicago that he first met Elaine May. 
  After dropping out of college in 1953, moving to New York to study The Method with 
Lee Strasberg (who also helped Nichols financially [Time, 1970]), and subsequently realizing he 
did not actually think The Method was a very good one, Nichols returned to Chicago in 1955 to 
help begin the Compass Players (which evolved into Second City), a theater troupe devoted to 
developing material through improvisational means where he and May quickly drew attention.  
Their new, socially conscious style of comedy became a phenomenon on television, radio, and 
albums, eventually producing legions of fans, and a hit Broadway show.  Celebrated as ―an 
extemporaneous potpourri of irreverent and often hilarious social satire unlike anything ever seen 
                                                                                                                                                             
14
 Sontag and Nichols performed in plays together at university and the pair became a mainstay of the New York 
intellectual scene in the sixties, as well as celebrities in other circles.  One anecdote which gives some indication of 
their social stature comes from hostess extraordinaire Elaine Kaufman, who recalls Sontag and Nichols bringing 
Jackie Kennedy to a party after the death of her husband to ―cheer her up.‖ (Kaufman, 128).   
15
 Lahr also writes that ―Thirty years later, Sontag confessed to Nichols that she couldn‘t accept the scars from her 
mastectomy: ‗I have this thing, and every time I take a bath I‘m horrified.‘  He said, ‗Susan, now you know how I 
have felt my whole life.‘‖ (262). 
16
 Another classmate of Nichols‘ was Paul Ekman, the nation‘s current leading scientist of facial expression.  We 
will return to his work in chapter two.  When asked if he began studying the face at the University of Chicago, Paul 
Ekman replied, ―Yes, that‘s right. I read Freud's New Introductory Lectures in a humanities course on rhetoric, and 
studied it as rhetoric. It‘s actually spectacular rhetoric. A wonderful writing style in which he anticipates perfectly 
every question that will come to your mind just about when it will come to your mind. So I got very interested in 
Freud. At the University of Chicago in those days, you had to have some area that you specialized in. Susan Sontag 
was my classmate, [Mike] Nichols and [Elaine] May. I mean, it was an extraordinary [pool of] talent ...‖ 
(Conversations with Paul Ekman).   
  
10 
or heard before on an American stage,‖ their five best-selling albums became ―collector‘s items 
among the cognoscenti for their ruthlessly funny satire of everything and everyone from 
marriage and motherhood to [Albert] Schwietzer and the Pope‖ (Playboy, 63-64).  Their sketches 
were often perceived as edgy and provocative (particularly their sexual content), but, as we will 
see in chapter four, their work was often just as progressive on a formal level.   
  Nichols and May, the act, broke up at the height of their fame in 1961 (we will delve 
further into their history in chapter four).
17
  In 1962, after flailing in summer stock in Vancouver 
as an actor and having a directorial flop with The World of Jules Feiffer (with music by Stephen 
Sondheim), Nichols was given a chance to direct Neil Simon‘s Nobody Loves Me.  Working 
closely with Simon, the play would become Barefoot in the Park (1963), beginning what is, Lahr 
informs us, ―the most successful commercial partnership in twentieth-century American theatre‖ 
(274).
18
  He quickly followed with The Knack (off-Broadway) (1964), Luv (1964) (the farce no 
one appreciated until critic Walter Kerr stepped in to save it—and Nichols‘ reputation), and The 
Odd Couple (1965) to become ―the hottest comedy director in American theatrical history‖ 
(Playboy, 64), racking up three Tony Awards for direction in four years.  Then, in 1966, his 
friends Elizabeth Taylor and Richard Burton insisted he direct them in the film adaptation of 
Edward Albee‘s lightning-in-a-play Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? (1963). Nichols felt 
protective of the play, wanted to prevent it from being mangled, and so, agreed.  By November 
of that year, Newsweek‘s cover story, ―Mike Nichols: Director as Star,‖ sang his praises as 
―America‘s highest-paid, most sought-after director, its only star director of the moment‖ due to 
his ―four hits running simultaneously on Broadway,‖ as well as ―the hit movie of the year‖ in 
                                                 
17
 They re-teamed for John F. Kennedy‘s 1962 birthday bash, performing alongside Marilyn Monroe‘s famous 
rendition of ―Happy Birthday‖ (Sarris, Confessions, 52). 
18
 Between 1963 and 1984, Nichols ―chalked up a dozen Broadway hits in a row, half of them with Simon‖ (Lahr, 
276).  As more and more films were adapted from Nichols‘ plays, and included his directorial additions, Nichols 
became the first Broadway director to receive a share of author‘s royalties.   
  
11 
Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? (95).19  Significantly, and as a point I will explore, Newsweek 
declares Nichols ―one of those absolute American success stories—a fellow who is recompensed 
enormously for being himself‖ (95).   Nichols spent some time enjoying his success, and 
garnering a reputation for it: ―[In the 1960s] he was a certified Beautiful Person, intimate of 
Lenny [Bruce] and Jackie [Kennedy], chum of Gloria Steinem… Twice married, once divorced, 
once separated, he was the most eligible married male in Manhattan‖ (Time, 68).  However, 
come 1970, Nichols confessed: ―The accounts of such rounds were beginning to sound like 
Evelyn Waugh parties in a dirigible during a war‖ (68).   
  In an open letter to the New York Times in 1967 (which he later chose to print with his 
collected works), playwright Edmund Wilson pleaded with Mike Nichols to be the future of a 
specifically American theater.  Wilson cites Walter Kerr‘s praise of Nichols‘ production of The 
Little Foxes (1967) starring Anne Bancroft:
20
 ―Its one unmistakable message… is that we can 
have an American National Theater any time we want to‖ (237).  Kerr‘s (and Wilson‘s) fear or 
―panic‖ was that Nichols would not choose to manifest it.  Wilson goes on to suggest a number 
of projects he deems specifically American before pleading with Nichols not to ―succumb‖ to the 
―fleshpots of Hollywood‖ (250).  These examples of the architecture of Nichols‘ public persona 
indicate more than just his popularity, critical respectability and financial viability.  They 
connect his success as a performer, theatrical director, and director of film, not as a chronological 
chain, but as a locus; one centered around performance as stylistic marker of American-ness.  
  Following the success of Virginia Woolf? (1966) and The Graduate (1967) (for which he 
won an Academy Award as Best Director), Nichols beat out Orson Welles (who nevertheless 
                                                 
19
 It is difficult to overstate the success of Virginia Woolf?  Critics compared it to Citizen Kane (Orson Welles, 
1941), it was the second highest grosser of the year, and it received thirteen Academy Award nominations.   
20
 The Little Foxes was adapted from Lillian Hellman‘s play for film in 1941 by William Wyler, a director whose 
work intersects with Nichols and to whom I will return in chapter six.  Nichols shared a romantic relationship with 
playwright Hellman during this period (Wilson, 497, 807) 
  
12 
agreed to perform in the film) to adapt Joseph Heller‘s Catch-22.  Although the film, made in 
1970, is undoubtedly Nichols‘ most visually stunning, its elliptical narrative and tone of 
bitterness caused it to flounder when it premiered on the heels of Robert Altman‘s more 
entertaining M*A*S*H (1970).  Nichols followed up with his masterpiece, Carnal Knowledge 
(1971).   Sporting the recently-invented X rating, the film did not shy away from discussing sex, 
features the first unsheathing of a condom in a Hollywood film, and brutally depicts the paranoia 
and anxiety feminism was inciting in some men.  The film was the subject of considerable 
controversy, which eventually reached the Supreme Court and resulted in the ―community 
standards‖ criteria for determining obscenity in Hollywood (Probst, 109).   
  Nichols next took over directing The Day of the Dolphin (1973) from Roman Polanski, 
which furthered Nichols‘ investigation into language and human communication by looking at 
the possibility of teaching dolphins English.  This film failed critically and financially, as did his 
next film, the farce The Fortune (1974), which chronicled two very close male friends who 
decide to break the Mann Act (an actual law), which forbids the transport of women across state 
lines.  After this string of disappointments, Nichols abandoned filmmaking for seven years.  He 
produced the television series Family (1976-1980) and continued to direct on Broadway 
(including his most critically successful play, David Rabe‘s Streamers [1976], a story about 
homosexual-baiting in the military).   
  When Nichols returned to filmmaking in 1983 with Silkwood, the true story of a woman 
who took on corporate nuclear power, he evinced a new, more conventional style.  Although it 
still featured stellar performances, interesting framing, and highly verbal, intelligent dialogue, 
Silkwood did not evince the same expressionism and formal convention-breaking as his early 
period.  It did, though, demonstrate expert traditional filmmaking, and while Nichols still favored 
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long takes, he multiplied his use of editing.  Heartburn (1986), Biloxi Blues (1988), Working 
Girl (1988), and Regarding Henry (1991) follow suit.  The expressionism and avant-garde 
techniques of his two films made for the Home Box Office cable television network, Wit in 2001 
and Angels in America in 2003, demonstrate a return of the original stylist.  And Closer (2004), a 
bookend to Carnal Knowledge, revealed he had not lost his ability to bottle the contemporary 
zeitgeist in the form of romantic conflicts waged by the sexes in the darkest of comedic lights.   
  We will look more closely at the shifts in Nichols‘ stylistics in chapter six.  Nichols 
would refer to Silkwood and his departure from ―long takes and the sort of hubris of not cutting‖ 
as an ―awakening,‖ a sign of maturation and his education in film grammar (Smith, 29).  Nichols 
has said, ―I don‘t think The Graduate and Carnal Knowledge were any different from what I‘m 
doing now [in 2000]… All movies are pure process.  A commercial movie isn‘t less process than 
an art movie.  You can‘t make your decisions about a film on the basis of ‗Is it important 
enough?  Is it serious enough?‘  It‘s either alive or it‘s not for me‖ (Lahr, 283).  But Lahr 
observes: ―the fact remains that the early pictures said new things in an ironic, challenging way, 
and the later work ruffles no feathers‖ (283).  One possibility omitted from Lahr‘s description of 
Nichols‘ reputation is whether it matters that Nichols can capture the ambivalence of women‘s 
place in the 1980s work force, can comment on the urgency of nuclear disarmament, and can 
introduce homosexual protagonists into mainstream cinema (as in The Birdcage [1996]) without 
ruffling feathers.   
  Lahr‘s description expresses a frustration that Nichols failed to live up to his early 
promise, but I believe this to be an egregious misinterpretation of both his early and late work.  A 
thread running throughout this dissertation will be Nichols‘ devotion to being ―middle-brow.‖  
We have already seen that his comedy with May garnered respect amongst the New York 
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intellectual literati, while also producing best-selling albums.  Their routines flaunted the 
significance of ―brows‖ by reference-hopping between Batman, Dostoyevsky, Anna Mae Wong, 
Proust, and Noel Coward, and they appealed to New York‘s intellectual elite even as they did 
television spots for Jax beer.  When Nichols and May were labeled high-brow, he said, ―I object 
to the whole thing about ‗intellectual‘ comedians… These days you can be an intellectual in 
twenty seconds just by saying certain names: Nathanael West, Djuna Barnes, Dostoyevsky, 
Kafka.  Intellectual used to mean a process of thinking, or a body of knowledge‖ (Nachman, 
348).   
  In terms of his cinematic work, Nichols has been vocal about his influences—and they, 
too, come from varying ―brows.‖21  He fired Haskell Wexler from The Graduate for making 
disparaging remarks about Fellini, whose 8 ½ (1963) he screened ten times before filming began 
(Gelmis, 281).  He admires the films of Ingmar Bergman above all others (Smith, 24); it is in 
―certain Bergman pictures, or occasionally, for [him] a Fellini picture,‖ that he finds ―truth‖ 
(Probst, 123).  And the first American film to ―rock his world‖ was George Stevens‘ A Place in 
the Sun (1951) (Gelmis).  Still, in his book, Director as Superstar, Joseph Gelmis describes 
Nichols‘ unique power to attain large budgets and complete artistic control in a time when 
Hollywood did not usually make such deals.  As Gelmis Notes: ―most of his personal pantheon 
of film directors—like Bunuel, Renoir, Bergman, Fellini, Welles—were never popular with mass 
audiences or the Hollywood moneymen.  For so modest and astute a sensibility, the irony is 
acutely discomfiting‖ (266).   
                                                 
21
 These brows were not fully established for cinema until the 1960s, and often aligned the low-brow with the 
popular in terms of financial success and/or accessibility.  For more on these hierarchies, see Paul Coates‘ Film at 
the Intersection of High and Mass Culture and Lawrence Levine‘s Highbrow/Lowbrow: The Emergence of Cultural 
Hierarchy in America.   
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  Nichols‘ interest in the interpersonal extends to his filmmaking practice.  From his 
improv days (where he improvised thirty to forty scenes a night for forty-eight dollars [Gelmis, 
265]), Nichols developed an appreciation for the sense of a working ensemble.  As Gelmis says, 
―The basis of Nichols‘ career is his concept of community—a collaborative interplay between 
friends and colleagues.  He is not a loner.  He is not a hustler.  He is, in fact, disquieted by being 
in vogue, being considered a Midas and a success‖ (265).  ―I don‘t think when I‘m alone,‖ says 
Nichols: ―That‘s why I‘m a director.  I‘m turned on by somebody else.  A director works with 
other people‖ (Gelmis, 266).  However, Nichols has also made it very clear that he considers his 
films his own: ―I really need to control [my work].  Every aspect of it, every nuance of the 
reading.  How long every second of every shot is… Partly because that‘s the job and partly 
because I just have to‖ (Lahr, 255).  His cinematographer of thirty years, Robert Surtees, says, 
―Mike was the boss.  Nobody was going to come to the set and question what he did.  They 
wouldn‘t dare; he wouldn‘t stand for it.  Which was nice for me.  The only man I had to please 
was Mike Nichols.  The director runs the show… The picture is what the director makes of it‖ 
(Gelmis, 266).   
  When asked why he keeps directing both theatre and film, Nichols replied: ―Mostly for 
the pleasure of rehearsing.  I love rehearsing more than anything in the world, with the possible 
exception of cutting a film‖ (Gelmis, 269).  Nichols again professes to appreciate the process, the 
activity of creating.  In 1966, with mostly theatrical experience under his director‘s belt, he 
talked about his own creative process: ―There‘s a secret about directing and it‘s this—you‘re 
trying to help people… I don‘t mean to come on, but you can‘t beat Aristotle, who said that one 
of the great joys of life is to give order to things.  That‘s why we have theater.  You can control it 
more than you can life‖ (Nachman, 352).   
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  The subject of our final chapter is Nichols‘ status as an ―actor‘s director.‖  There we will 
look at his work with actors, particularly his collaborations with star Meryl Streep.  He regards 
one of the primary duties of a director to be the creation of character, a task he sees as 
synonymous with the creation of actor behavior; Nichols did not mince words when he declared 
in 1966: ―A director creates behavior‖ (Playboy, 72).  He elaborates: ―the things that happen 
between people casually while they‘re just standing around are so extraordinary that if I can 
create that kind of behavior—I don‘t mean simply bizarre, but unique and revealing of 
character—if I can do that, I‘m a director‖ (Playboy, 70).  Significantly, he does not see his work 
as creating behavior that suggests a psychology, but rather the opposite.  Psychological 
consciousness comes first:  ―Turning psychology into behavior is one of the director‘s jobs‖ (my 
emphasis, ―Introduction to Birdcage,‖ ix).  Nichols explores finding ―ways to express the 
underneath without words; sometimes it‘s the opposite of the words, or a tangent of the 
words…unexpressed undercurrents that are palpable‖ (Smith, 29).  We will see that the 
particular ways his films reflect upon the representation of behavior shifts the emphasis back 
onto the spectator, and her desire to interpret behavior as legible on a psychological level.   
  However, it is not the goal of this introduction, or indeed the dissertation, to point to or 
demonstrate Nichols‘ intentions.  That would be impossible, as he would be the first to admit.  
When asked ―at what point does an audience ever know what the director, the writer, or the 
‗guiding consciousness‘ had in mind?‖ he replied: ―Never.  You don‘t know in a novel.  You 
certainly don‘t know in a play…And no one will ever know what a film director or a screen 
writer had in his mind.  It either hangs together and joins your life and becomes part of you and 
you trust it, or it doesn‘t‖ (Gelmis, 287).  That, however, does not mean Nichols refrains from 
discussing his work.  He has no qualms sharing his interpretations, for example, about the 
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ambiguous ending of The Graduate, but is quick to point out that, ―[his] opinion really doesn‘t 
have much more validity than anyone else‘s‖ (Gelmis, 288).   
 
Characters: Performing Actions 
 
 Nichols‘ interest in characters‘ behavior and psychology motivates my look at the 
concept of performance—broadly conceived to encompass its etymological and theatrical senses.  
Within Cinema Studies, psychological realism is a term that has found greatest application in 
scholarship on performance.
22
  ―Performance‖ is an ambiguous term that can apply both to the 
activity of performing and the resultant object.  That is, it is often used to refer to what the filmed 
actor did before the camera during production, but it can also refer to what we, as spectators, see 
on-screen as the work of the actor (which is articulated through the filmic language of shots, 
frames, selected takes, perhaps augmented by looping or other sound effects, etc.).
23
  
Compounding ambiguities, it is also correct to say that the character on-screen ―performs‖ an 
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 See work by Klevan, James Naremore, Roberta Pearson, Virginia Wright Wexman, and Richard deCordova.  That 
psychological realism is a culturally and temporally relative style has been proven in the work of Pearson and 
Wright Wexman.  Klevan illustrates a way of conceiving performance which does not begin with the actor, but with 
the filmic scene or character as locus of expression; his aesthetic object becomes that which is expressed by the 
scene holistically.  Klevan recognizes that the actions performed by a character on-screen do not exist elsewhere 
(even in the actor‘s pro-filmic space).  He does not provide anecdotal evidence of a star performer‘s moods or 
techniques, but neither does he diminish his sense of the importance of the human figure by treating it as just another 
object within the mise-en-scène; it is a privileged object which interacts with other objects.  Through him, we see 
that actions performed on-screen can function as meaningful in several registers: as a textual action performed by 
the character in the diegetic world, as a textual action performed by the actor to create this character, and as an 
action performed by the actor which contributes to our understanding of the actor as actor/star persona.   
23
 Valuable and insightful work on the cinematic stardom can be found in works by Richard Dyer, Lucy Fischer and 
Marcia Landy, Naremore, Wright Wexman, and DeCordova.  Stars are often understood in specific, and contingent, 
historical contexts, celebrity cultures, and cinematic practices.  Naremore observes in his book, Acting in the Cinema 
(1988), that theorizing cinematic acting has been neglected (2).  Since cinematic acting contributes to the production 
of cinematic characters, Naremore‘s observation contributes to our understanding of the scholarly neglect of 
Nichols‘ films.  In attending to character, I largely set aside concern for specific actors‘ technique.  As spectators, 
we do not have access to knowledge of a performer‘s technique, merely the information that appears on-screen. 
Wright Wexman asks, ―If some movies feature actors who meld their identities with the personas of the characters 
they play, how could we, as spectators, know this? And, why should we need to know? … Would it matter?‖  We 
can build on Wright Wexman‘s questions to recognize that good performances tell us how something is, not whether 
it is.  Thus, we need not worry about notions like authenticity or the actor‘s experience in our immediate look at 
performance.   
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action.  As an element of a film, characters are often thought of as content, not form.  But in a 
Nichols‘ film, even the form by which an actor is represented is in the service of character—like 
the wonderful rack focus in The Graduate, where Elaine‘s face comes back into focus as she 
emerges from her confusion and figures out that Ben was sleeping with her mother.
24
  As we will 
see, Nichols‘ films isolate the cinematic articulation of characters‘ actions, guiding the spectator 
to reflect upon their performativity and expressivity.   
In her conception of gender as performative, Judith Butler makes a valuable distinction 
between a ―role‖ and a series of actions.25  We speak of an action as ―performed‖ whether we 
perceive it done by an on-screen character or our neighbor, and Butler utilizes the longstanding 
Western notion that ―we are all actors‖ to look at ―constituting acts not only as constituting the 
identity of the actor, but as constituting [human] identity as a compelling illusion, an object of 
belief‖ (155).  In this way, an important simultaneity is at work in which acts are ―both that 
which constitutes meaning and that through which meaning is performed or enacted‖ (155).  
Even if we begin with the assumption that a theatrical or cinematic character is performed, Butler 
instructs us not to conflate our thinking about characters as entities with characters as constituted 
by actions in our efforts to understand their ontology.  Throughout this dissertation, I shall start 
with a concentration on the actions by which cinematic characters are constituted, borrowing a 
page from George Santayana, who wrote that ―the acts are the data and the character the inferred 
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 It is tempting to call Nichols‘ work, especially his early work, expressionist.  Though it bears strong traces of 
expressionism, I find this designation too strong, for his films are too suspicious of the extent of behavior‘s 
expressive power. Billy Wilder intimated that, ―Mike‘s scenes have a kind of inner content, which the audience feels 
and follows‖ (Lahr, 279).  Other directors have attested to the influential nature of Nichols‘ emphasis on character.  
Steven Soderbergh is a disciple, co-commentating with Nichols on the DVD editions of his films.  Steven Spielberg 
professed his admiration for the handheld camera in Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?, the lighting in The Day of the 
Dolphin, the terror of Silkwood, and describes The Graduate as a ―visual watershed,‖ claiming that he ―had never 
seen long lenses used [to] illuminate a character moment‖ (Lahr, 280).  
25
 Like Butler, others, such as Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merlau-Ponty, collate performance‘s basic notion of 
doing something with its theatrical connotations of doing something to reveal not the essential, but the ordinary way 
in which social agents constitute social reality through language, gesture, and all manner of symbolic social signs.   
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principle, and a principle, in spite of its name, is never more than a description a posteriori, and a 
summary of what is subsumed under it‖ (111).  But how do we infer the unifying principles of 
what call a character?  How do we understand the expressions and actions which constitute it?  
What are the effects of our perceiving a unity?   
 By looking at what a character does, not only are we looking at what a character is, but, 
retroactively, we are asking how cinematic characters have functioned aesthetically, historically, 
culturally and socially.  Such questions open up a discussion of what we mean by ―psychological 
realism‖ in the cinema and so, of the relation between on-screen, fictional human characters and 
―real‖ humans.  Investigating expressivity through the stylistic conventions of cinema, such as 
the facial close-up, dialogue, and actor‘s performance, reminds us that we do not perceive mental 
activities such as emotion or intention, but attribute them to the character based upon the beliefs 
derived from our experience—and imagination—of the characters‘ expression.  In ―reality,‖ 
when we perceive other people expressing themselves, we can react in many ways; we can 
doubt, deny, believe, or ignore the expression‘s claims upon us, just as the expresser can emote, 
suppress emotion, or dissemble.   
For example, in a pivotal scene of what is, in many ways, the quintessential Nichols‘ 
film, Carnal Knowledge, the spectator is presented with a close-up of Susan (Candace Bergen), 
dressed in black, laughing against an almost entirely black background.  This shot of her facial 
expression, almost floating in space, lasts for over one hundred seconds.  The spectator might 
begin by identifying with Susan, and, following normative cinematic grammar, understand 
herself to perceive mirth.  Slowly, though, Susan‘s expression becomes strange; it rends itself 
from the expressed as we no longer see an expression of happiness, but a grotesque portrait.  
This moment enjoins the spectator to consider the ties that bind the expression of emotion with 
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the process of expressing and the object being expressed, opening up their relationships as topics 
for our deliberation.  By pointing to the limits of the image‘s powers of representation, Nichols 
creates a negative space for the spectator to contemplate how characters‘ actions become 
meaningful as socialized forms of intersubjective communication.  
   
Nichols as Cinematic Author in the American 1960s  
―[T]here is no incompatibility between the exploration of inner space and the rectification of social space.  What 
some of the kids understand is that it‘s the whole structure of modern American man, and his imitators, that needs 
rehauling… That rehauling includes Western ‗masculinity,‘ too.‖  
                      Susan Sontag, ―What‘s Happening in America (1966)‖  
 
  What is perhaps most striking about Nichols‘ description of his films as social is that it 
comes at the tail end of a cultural revolution in America frequently thought of in political 
terms.
26
  Indeed, scholars such as Nowell-Smith have recently argued that contemporary 
American culture is rooted in this moment: ―the 1960s are to be seen mainly as a great step 
forward in the process of modernization which continues uninterrupted up to the present‖ 
(Nowell-Smith, 9).  Popular culture embraced sex, drugs and rock ‗n‘ roll, liberating itself from 
religion, which lost ―both its attraction and its coercive power‖ (9).27  Not least of all, the country 
had been enjoying almost unparalleled and constant economic growth since the end of the 
Second World War.  Nowell-Smith believes that, ―In these respects, an unbroken line can be 
seen to connect the 1960s to [the 2000s],‖ and that the proliferation of screens today (in color, 
too) mark ―a huge change in the phenomenology of everyday life which has crept up almost 
unnoticed and where, again, if a starting point can be located anywhere, it must surely be the 
1960s‖ (9).   
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 For a definitive detailing of the 1960s as a time of cultural revolution, see Marwick‘s The Sixties (1998).     
27
 I should clarify that I am talking about those organized religions which had enjoyed real social and political 
power.  There was a fascination with Eastern religions and spirituality that proliferated during the 1960s, but these 
were often valued precisely for their differences from religions already ensconced in American culture.  
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  The 1960s was not only a cultural revolution, but demonstrated culture‘s political reach 
into the intimacy between the personal and political in new ways, a particularly important 
development for a nation founded upon a charter of citizens‘ individual rights.  In chapter two, 
The Graduate will motivate a look at the context of the The Free Speech Movement which began 
at the University of California at Berkeley.  It signaled a new, passionate generation and aided 
the Civil Rights Movement, which achieved equal citizenship under the law for racial minorities.  
This was quickly followed by the advent of second-wave feminism, the early assertions of gay 
and lesbian rights (then called ―gay liberation‖), the national debate over abortion, and a vocal 
group of citizens outraged over what they saw as its government‘s shameful involvement in 
Vietnam.  The hyper-masculinity associated with the soldiers participating in Vietnam not only 
intensified attention to the male body as spectacle of masculinity, but as reports came back of the 
atrocities some American soldiers were committing, exemplified a form of conventional 
masculinity at its most indefensible.  In her essay, ―What‘s Happening in America (1966),‖ 
Sontag comments on the promise of the radical activities of ―those youth who are sincerely 
making a fuss‖ (199) and objects to intellectuals, like Leslie Fiedler, who:  
called attention to the fact that the new style of young people indicated a deliberate blurring of 
sexual differences, signaling the creation of a new breed of youthful androgens. The 
longhaired pop groups with their mass teenage following and the tiny elite of turned-on kids 
from Berkeley to the East Village were both lumped together as representatives of the ‗post-
humanist‘ era now upon us, in which we witness a ‗radical metamorphosis of the Western 
male,‘ a ‗revolt against masculinity,‘ even ‗a rejection of conventional male potency‘. (199)28 
 
In Europe, radical movements radiated outward from anxiety over class differences, while in 
America, race, gender and Vietnam were the major impetuses for socio-political dissent.
29
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 In 1966, Fiedler published the revised version of his famous Love and Death in the American Novel, which looked 
at the American novel‘s departures and derivations from the European novel—a perspective also relevant to cinema.  
29
 I am not implying that class difference is not a basic cause of unrest in America; indeed, that fact will be crucial to 
my reading of The Graduate.  I am merely pointing out that the rhetoric of the time was far less concerned with the 
unequal distribution of wealth in America than with the unequal distribution of civic rights and possibilities.  For 
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Second-wave feminism and the civil rights movement both implicitly and explicitly engaged the 
issue of who, and what, would count as human in America.
30
  However, since these groups of 
citizens were always capable of being liberated, but were suppressed by a white patriarchy, the 
onus of change lay with the definition of ―man‖: who had the founding fathers meant when they 
said it was self-evident that all men were created equal?   
An important strand running through the following chapters is Nichols‘ treatment of 
contemporary American gender and sexual difference.  As we will see in chapter five, his film 
corpus is an extension of his description of his work with May; that is, his films have been 
concerned largely with the performance of gender.  Similarly, his collaborations with star Meryl 
Streep engage the self-presentation of womanhood in the American 1980s as well as its portrayal 
in Hollywood.  Most frequently, though, Nichols body of work is entrenched in, and contributes 
to, the re-working of contemporary American masculinity.  His casting of Dustin Hoffman in 
The Graduate has been called ―One of the most significant casting choices in American film… It 
ushered in a whole era of leading men; it opened up avenues for leading men that just didn‘t exist 
before.‖31  One is tempted to say that one year earlier, in 1966, when Virginia Woolf?‘s George 
and Martha (who Albee named after the first couple of the nation) killed their fictional son—the 
idea (qua idea) of the blonde and blue-eyed boy-future—they did a thorough job of it.  Nichols 
                                                                                                                                                             
more on this, see Marwick, as well as Richard Rorty‘s ―Back to Class Politics.‖  The relevance of the discrepancy of 
attention to class in Europe and America will become clear when we look at theories of cinema developed amidst 
the radical political and cultural events in Europe of the late 1960s, when students and workers were the high-profile 
protestors, struggling to achieve alternative economic structures.  Class issues simply did not obtain the same 
urgency in America; socialists and Maoists were visible, but had nothing like the force of their European cousins.   
30
 1968 also witnessed the announcement of the double helix, which revolutionized understanding of DNA.  For a 
look at the cultural impact of the widespread dissemination of such technology in this era, see Marwick.  Also, in his 
account of ―pivotal artworks from the 1960s that outlined the genesis of robotics in art,‖ Eduardo Kac points out 
that, ―The first commercial robots appeared in the early 1960s in the United States and in about twenty years had 
developed a stronghold in industrial facilities around the world‖ (60).   
31
 Steven Soderbergh said this in his commentary on The Graduate 40
th
 Anniversary DVD edition, which he shares 
with Nichols.  Similarly, James Monaco called it ―the single most distinctive turning-point figure in the 
transformation of the Hollywood male star in the 1960s‖ (147).  This is no small feat when we consider the reigning 
champs were such Aryan triumphs as Paul Newman, Robert Redford and Steve McQueen.   
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chronicles many of the nation‘s most pressing social developments through a masculinity in 
crisis: the youth movement‘s dissent in The Graduate in 1967, the crushing anti-war sentiment in 
Catch-22 in 1970, and the reality of gender enmity in Carnal Knowledge and The Fortune in the 
early 1970s.   
By the 1980s, he gave us the ambitious, morally upright and sexy heroines of Silkwood 
and Working Girl, who induced enough anxiety in the men they encountered (and, in the case of 
Working Girl, women acting like men) to reveal that it was not only the women that needed to 
change if their fragile place in the workforce was to be secured.  Biloxi Blues, Regarding Henry, 
and Wolf (1994) display similar anxiety over the development of the 1990s‘ sensitive ―New 
Man,‖ a fear over the loss of traditional masculinity resulting in speech loss, impotence, or even, 
lycanthropy.   Nichols also chronicles the increasing visibility of homosexual males over the 
decade through The Birdcage and Angels in America. 
  The 1960s also introduced European New Wave cinema into American culture, 
compelling Sontag to call film in 1966 ―the most alive, the most exciting, the most important of 
all art forms right now‖ (11).  That same year, Nichols made his cinematic directorial debut and 
echoed her claim, saying that film is the home to artists doing ―the most extraordinary things 
right now‖ (Virginia Woolf DVD).  La Dolce Vita (Frederico Fellini, 1960) made a cinematic 
splash in 1961, but it was not until the mid to late 1960s that foreign film was suddenly not so 
foreign.  In fact, 1966 was also the year the New York Film Festival began (which never showed 
more than one or two American features in one year until 1970).  The films of Jean-Luc Godard, 
Robert Bresson, Francois Truffaut, Alain Resnais and Ingmar Bergman set the tone within 
festival circles, and, in a few years, the films of Jean-Marie Straub and Daniele Huillet, Nagisa 
Oshima, and Jean-Pierre Gorin and Godard would be standard art cinema fare.  Andrew Sarris 
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recounts how ―Film Festival‖ fever hit the United States with predictable reactions and 
counterreactions … As habitual moviegoers disappeared by the millions, serious scholars of film 
increased by the thousands‖ (188).32   
   In 1961, Sontag describes a distinction between the films of Marcel Carné, Frederico 
Fellini, and Ingmar Bergman as ―analytic‖ and those of filmmakers like Godard and Bresson as 
―expository‖: ―The first kind could be described as psychological films, those concerned with the 
revelation of characters‘ motives.  The second kind is anti-psychological, and deals with the 
transaction between feeling and things; the person is opaque‖ (―A Note,‖ 245).  Sontag points 
out that distinctions were being drawn at this time not just on the basis of realism, but on 
differing attitudes toward narrative and character.  A film by Godard or Bresson, for instance, 
might involve ―sketchy,‖ seemingly unmotivated characters.   
  Nowell-Smith observes, ―The old cinema was not only rejected, but denounced‖ (3) and 
asserts that one of the ―advances‖ made by ―theory‖ enabled ―new cinema‖ to be seen as 
intellectually and politically valuable: ―The first breakthrough was to see Hollywood (and by 
extension other conventional cinemas) as a fundamentally inexplicit cinema, that is to say one in 
which the marks of enunciation are suppressed or naturalized and stories are told which appear to 
be telling themselves rather than being developed from a position which the audience can locate 
and, if necessary, challenge‖ (4-5).  In his recent analysis of ―new cinemas of the 1960s,‖ 
Nowell-Smith follows Gilles Deleuze to nominate the 1960s as the dissemination of a movement 
begun with Italian neo-realism in the 1940s, a change from emphasizing the spectator‘s 
experience of space to time ―above and beyond the forward movement of the action‖ (6).   
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 Referring to the ―reigning Antioniennui of the period,‖ Sarris later reflected upon the ―prevailing mood‖ of the 
sixties as ―absurdist despair‖ (Politics and Cinema, 184-186) and reminds his reader of the plethora of middle-brow, 
low-brow, popular or failed art that was, even then, in danger of being forgotten in order to point out that not 
remembering such art removes exalted works from their proper context.   
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  However, Nichols‘ films of the 1960s satisfy this criterion despite being made from 
within the Hollywood system (without foregrounding time to the extent of, say, Hiroshima, Mon 
Amour [Alain Resnais, 1959]).  From the events of Virginia Woolf?, unfolding in almost ―real 
time,‖ to The Graduate‘s long, contemplative shots, and Carnal Knowledge‘s extended close-
ups, actions are posited for examination in time, as activities, not just plot points.  Nevertheless, 
these films, which ostensibly departed from Hollywood convention, helped to save Hollywood.
33
  
Virginia Woolf?‘s story of ―frank‖ sexuality, complete with expletives previously unuttered by 
Hollywood on-screen characters and filmed in Fellini-esque black-and-white, appealed to the 
audience acquainting itself with the influx of European films and became the first picture 
released by Hollywood without approval by the Production Code Administration since its 
inception in the 1930s.  The Graduate became the top-grossing picture of the decade (Lewis, 
258), tapping into a need for new American visual sophistication, and appealing to the newly 
empowered youth audience.   Along with Arthur Penn‘s Bonnie and Clyde (1967), The Graduate 
indicated a future for American cinema: ―Years before American critics began touting an auteur 
renaissance, a golden age of Hollywood run by audacious film directors exercising creative 
autonomy unheard of in the old Hollywood, these two films revealed just how far movie 
directors might go stylistically and thematically and just how far the American moviegoer, circa 
1967, was willing to go with them‖ (Lewis, 272).   
  Another byproduct of the changes in cinematic culture produced by the influx of 
European cinema was an increase in public attention to the director (Nowell-Smith, 4).  
Hollywood filmmakers had often been a significant factor in selling their films, but following the 
advent and popularity of Fellini, Antonioni, Godard and the like in America, the auteur enjoyed 
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 Finances were grim for Hollywood at this time, and the 1960s saw the sale of the studios. For an account, see 
Lewis, Belton, and Monaco. 
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a new status, and Nichols was the first to benefit from this shift in Hollywood.  We will look 
more closely at Nichols‘ early reception in our consideration of The Graduate in the following 
chapter, but it is relevant here to point out that, initially, he was positioned by critics ―between‖ 
European and American cinema, a debatable American auteur.  Sarris gave him the mock-
moniker ―Michelangelo Nichols‖ (Confessions, 327).34  By the time Carnal Knowledge was 
ready for exhibition in 1971, its poster was entirely black, with ―Mike Nichols, Jack Nicholson, 
Candace Bergen, Arthur Garfunkel, Ann-Margaret and Jules Feiffer‖ written on it uniformly in 
white before the film‘s title in red.  Seen one way, the poster suggests an ensemble group of 
filmmakers (which accords with Nichols‘ true Stanislavskian and Brechtian roots, which we will 
discuss in later chapters); but seen another way, Nichols has top billing.   
  However, it was not long before the cultural revolutions of the 1960s shifted the 
definition of a true auteur away from a director with a degree of control and consistency, to one 
with an explicitly political agenda.  Directing ―serious‖ films which borrowed from European 
new cinemas, yet refusing to turn away from psychological topics associated with the 
―commercial‖ terrain of American Hollywood cinema, Nichols became a placeholder around 
which critics struggled to determine the ―traditional‖ or ―reactionary‖ from the ―progressive‖ or 
―political.‖  Eventually, Nichols‘ interest in the individual and his talent for making money were 
regarded as antithetical for an auteur worthy of regarding.   
 
Hollywood as Paradigm 
 
 Although cinema has been an object of study since its inception,
35
 its crystallization into a 
scholarly discipline in the 1960s meant that theoretical debates no longer occurred only in the 
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 Sarris promulgated the auteur theory in America, which made great strides toward reconciling the notion of an 
author with the industrial practices of the Hollywood studio system.   
35
 See, for example, Hugo Muensterberg‘s The Art of the Photoplay or Dana Polan‘s Scenes of Instruction.  
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pages of journals written for an interested and educated public, but were finding their way into 
the institution of academia—and with them came a paradigmatic view of Hollywood.36  ―[W]ith 
the arrival of ‗film theory‘ in the late 1960s and early 1970s,‖ as Nowell-Smith puts it, ―concepts 
were developed which could be used coherently to define the ways in which the new cinemas 
differed systematically from cinemas which preceded them (and co-existed and even survived 
them)‖ (4).  Perhaps the most significant mindset for our study of Nichols‘ films is the view that 
Nowell-Smith encapsulates: ―on the whole the 1960s was a period when Europe led, other 
countries followed, and the USA looked on‖ (14).  If American cinema was only a distant 
observer, we begin to see how those working in the area were excluded.  In order to arrive at an 
idea of Nichols‘ place in American film culture of the 1960s, we must outline the state of 
American cinema at that time.   
  By the end of the 1960s, as a firm line was drawn between these two ―types‖ of cinema, 
measuring Nichols‘ work in relation to European cinema makes his name a catachresis: Nichols 
was evaluated against theories constructed to exclude him.  Thomas Elsaesser tells us that ―the 
relation between mainstream cinema and the avant-garde in the late 1960s and early 1970s was 
radically and absolutely antagonistic in both theory and practice‖ (177).  Similarly, Robert Stam 
writes, ―The terms ‗Hollywood‘ and ‗dominant cinema‘ became code words for all that was 
retrograde and passivity-inducing‖ (14).  Avant-garde and new cinema were taken to alter 
communication between spectator and screen while at the same time creating (and condemning) 
a paradigmatic vision of ―classical Hollywood‖ which was theorized as allowing the spectator to 
believe in a shared world between him or her and a film‘s characters—that is, an objective world.  
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 I want to point out that this was a fertile period for many academic fields, but particularly the study of texts.  
Roland Barthes‘ ―The Death of the Author‖ was published in 1968, S/Z in 1970.  In 1967, much of André Bazin‘s 
most important work was translated into English and published in collected form.  Substantial portions of Bertolt 
Brecht‘s work was untranslated until John Willett‘s edited collection in 1964.  
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The new cinemas of Europe and concomitant theoretical work in journals like Cahiers du 
Cinéma and Screen argued for a politicized cinema which broke with (Hollywood) convention.
37
  
Nick Browne notes the major change in Cahiers: ―The contesting… of Bazin‘s description of the 
relation between the image and the real and the spectator and the filmic image—of transparency 
to things themselves and an opportunity for selection—is explicitly conducted in the language of 
a politics of illusionism‖ (8).38  Browne observes that, ―In general, the transformation of the 
traditional Cahiers, the general expansion of recognition and writing on cinema, and the 
emergence of these departments arose at roughly the same time—in the late 60s and the early 
70s—in both France and the United States‖ (6).   
  Thus, the argument went that unlike European new cinemas‘ skepticism of the notion of 
―reality,‖ Hollywood presented only a false illusion of ―reality‖ to the spectator, thereby 
fostering identification and emotion, and rendering her passive.  This condition related, 
symbiotically, to the fact that Hollywood offered its spectators narratives, complete with clear 
conflicts and resolutions.  Such a position supposedly disables the spectator‘s ability to think 
rationally, distracts from her awareness of her socio-political victimization by class conflict, and 
makes her amenable to ideological manipulation.
39
  I want to take an excursion into the status of 
the concepts of realism and psychological realism as they were treated in cinema studies of the 
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 Jean-Luc Godard‘s 1967 ―Manifesto‖ illustrates that although America was the principle target other national 
cinemas were seen as ―conventional,‖ and therefore worthy of destruction: ―[T]he American industry rules cinema 
the world over.  There is nothing to add to this statement of fact.  Except that on our own modest level we too should 
provoke two or three Vietnams in the bosom of the vast Hollywood-Cinecitta-Mosfilm-Pinewood-etc. empire‖ 
(quoted in Hillier, 18).  Godard was a preeminent French Nouvelle Vague filmmaker and writer for Cahiers who 
became increasingly political over this period.  Godard‘s work, and particularly his Tout Va Bien (with Jean-Pierre 
Gorin, 1972), is often held up as a model of the desired political cinema.  
38
 In his 1972 essay, ―Godard and Counter-Cinema: Vent d’Est,‖ Peter Wollen provides an actual list of the ―virtues‖ 
and ―sins‖ of counter and Hollywood cinema, respectively.  Psychological realism, evident in the ―sins‖ of 
identification and transparency, and fiction, do not fare well.   
39
 For example, Stephen Heath‘s ―From Brecht to Film: Theses, Problems‖ and Colin MacCabe‘s ―The Politics of 
Separation.‖  The most influential was Laura Mulvey‘s ―Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,‖ whose ―full 
meaning,‖ as Peter Wollen asserts, ―is lost unless it is read as an anti-Hollywood manifesto‖ 
(http://www.cinema.ucla.edu/strobe/wollen/e.html). 
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1960s as these accounts offer the most potent explanations for why, and how, a full consideration 
of Nichols has been avoided.  This is because what realism means retroactively affects what is 
meant by ―psychology‖ in the phrase ―psychological realism.‖  For that reason, we will turn to 
salient arguments in debates over realism in the 1960s to indicate the ways in which such 
arguments bled into the theorization of psychological realism. 
 Elsaesser has remarked that at this time ―film theory became avant-garde theory‖ in the 
United States, going further down the formalist road than the European journals from which it 
borrowed, like Screen, which argued for a return to Brecht‘s theses of ―non-linearity, anti-
illusionism, spectatorial distanciation, and epic modes of narration‖ (173).40  Screen primarily 
sought to theorize realism in terms derived from Althusserian notions of ―ideology‖ which cast it 
as an intentional force which ―works to produce subjects from individuals,‖ ensuring ―the 
reproduction of the social order presented in a determined way‖ (Browne, 8-9).  Screen 
mobilized Brecht—who was seen to formulate methods (mostly for theatrical performers) to 
evacuate psychological realism from his characters—to oppose ―Classical Hollywood films,‖ 
which posed ―characters in terms of internal determinations linked to individual personalities,‖ 
advocating that ―heroes take shape in a world which eliminates their existence as individuals‖ 
(Gardies, 13).  Furthermore, according to this view of Brecht, psychologically realistic acting 
mistakes physiology for psychology—an error regarded as a bourgeois convention.  He implies 
that the discovery or understanding of psychological conditions is less important than the 
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 One key proponent of formalism in America was Annette Michelson, the editor of Artforum and arbiter of the 
1960s American avant-garde sensibility.  Here, the attention was not on a European avant-garde, but on American 
directors like Stan Brakhage and Hollis Frampton, who sought to entirely disrupt narrative structure in favor of 
conceptual cinema—perhaps even the dream of an apolitical cinema.  Still, Michelson‘s writings were instrumental 
in valorizing formalism as synonymous with political and derogating Hollywood cinema—especially its 
characters—as mimetic or emotional.  We will return to her arguments in chapter three.  Of course, Artforum‘s 
views were not unchallenged.  Avant-garde filmmaker and theorist Yvonne Rainer complained: ―How can we say 
which type of film will make ‗people‘ think, or make them active, and which will not?... What is important is to get 
things out in the open by whatever means‖ (84).   
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transmission of facts illuminated by the science of Marxist history.
41
  Brecht‘s theories which 
placed the spectator in a skeptical position in front of, and in contemplation of, the on-screen 
world, were read as advocating elaborate techniques to prevent viewer identification.  From the 
actor‘s perspective, this meant that she ought not aim for psychological realism.42  The 
enlistment of certain of Brecht‘s views fostered the mistaken impression that psychological 
realism was relatively easy to achieve in cinema, if not a fundamental condition of the medium 
(which differed from theatre—Brecht‘s metier), and bound psychological realism to illusionism, 
converting it into a demerit.
43
  We will revisit Brecht‘s attitudes toward politics and 
psychological realism in our look at Carnal Knowledge in chapter three, and at Angels in 
America in chapter six.  
  It is in this way that, problematically, being anti-illusionist (even to the point of 
didacticism) became equated with being politically progressive.
44
  By 1980, prominent scholars 
working in this tradition, like Christopher Williams, felt licensed to assume a reader opposed to 
―depth,‖ in the cinema and to denigrate the ―beloved ‗human‘ aspect, the ‗humanity‘‖ of works 
from Shakespeare to Chaplin, deeming them ―simply petty-bourgeois and nothing more‖ (168-
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 For a fuller articulation of the logic behind this point, see Colin MacCabe‘s Introduction to Diary of a Young Soul 
Rebel.  
42
 For an example of the magnitude of Brecht‘s influence at the time, see George Lellis‘ Bertolt Brecht, Cahiers du 
Cinéma, and Contemporary Film Theory, in which he observes that, ―One might well argue that much of the 1970s, 
politicized writing in English language journals like Film Quarterly, Screen or Jump Cut was directly influenced by 
changes in Cahiers du Cinéma‖ (4).  Lellis illustrates that, while Cahiers discussed Brecht prior to the changes in 
French intellectual thought post-1968, it was not until then that his Marxist, materialist ideas were embraced.  
Browne states that ―in the 1970s the most prominent and decisive editorial voice by which the project of ideological 
critique of film was advanced in English was that of the British journal Screen‖ (5).  Cahiers‘ ―principal interlocutor 
and antagonist is the figure of dominant ideology as instituted by the bourgeois apparatus of cinema‖ (Browne, 2), 
and it sought to expose and undo the values which supported and allowed ―conventional representation,‖ defined 
through the question of how social life is represented at the ideological level, making it ―a politics, not a poetics, of 
representation‖ (Browne, 2).   
43
 While Brecht‘s theoretical work primarily dwells upon the theatre, he was invested in other media, particularly 
cinema.  He saw theatre and cinema as intimately related.  Indeed, he worked in Hollywood for a number of years.  
For more on Brecht‘s consideration of the relationship between theatre and cinema, see Bertolt Brecht on Film and 
Radio. Ed. And Trans. Marc Silberman, (London: Methuen, 2001).  
44
 In classical cinema theory, realism was frequently counterposed to fantasy, as in Siegfried Kracauer‘s Theory of 
Film.  This binary is still active, in, for example, Realism and Popular Cinema, eds. Hallam and Marshment.  
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169).  A victim of the academic turn from ―humanism,‖ Chaplin was chastised for giving us 
close-ups and emotion, which Williams equates with the ―need to be ‗human‘, i.e. petty-
bourgeois‖ (169).  In an almost direct paraphrase of Brecht, Williams declares,  
What cinema really needs is external action, not introspective psychology… By concentrating 
on ―external‖ action alone and reducing everything to processes, no longer recognizing the 
hero as the mediator, or man as the measure of all things, it demolishes the introspective 
psychology of the bourgeois novel and so lays waste whole stretches of ideology.  This 
external standpoint is appropriate to cinema and makes it important.  Film can freely adopt the 
principles of non-Aristotelian dramaturgy (i.e. one that does not rest on empathy and 
mimesis). (169)
45
   
 
Brecht did not wholly undo the standard depiction of characters‘ actions as having causes; he 
was intent on highlighting those causes as predetermined by class structures, making the 
character into a recognizable type and a kind of social puppet.
46
  Stam observes that, for Brecht, 
―individual psychology is an appendage of social process,‖ and is boring to him for that reason 
(7).  Brecht claims that, ―In modern society, the motions of the individual psyche are utterly 
uninteresting‖ (quoted in Stam, 7).  Though he would not deny the fact viewers see human 
figures on the screen, he would view their actions as having physical, not mental dimensions—
sorely limiting the category of the cinematic ―human.‖     
 As the preeminent value serving capitalism, Brecht opposed privileging the individual, 
which he took to require opposition to psychological representations: ―What the film really 
demands is external action and not introspective psychology… Great areas of ideology are 
destroyed when capitalism concentrates on external action‖ (50).  Our question is whether the 
two are so easily divisible.  Certainly, the individual and capitalism have been long intertwined 
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 Williams makes the classic mistake of implying that Aristotle argued that drama was valuable for allowing the 
spectator to purge dangerous emotions.  Empathy was not inherently valuable for Aristotle; empathy was useful for 
the spectator because withholding emotion was dangerous, a point Williams would do well to remember given the 
repressive nature of the 1980s.    
46
 For examples of Brecht‘s writing on typage, which derives from his theorization of the verfremdungseffekt (or 
alienation-effect) and gestic acting, see ―Short Description of a New Technique of Acting,‖ ―A Short Organum for 
the Theatre,‖ and ―Alienation Effects in Chinese Acting.‖  
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in American literature (perhaps the best example of this is Horatio Alger‘s rags-to-riches stories).  
Brecht was thought to advocate a style of character, ―typage,‖ that sought to exorcise the 
individuality from a character, leaving a human type that could be read as socially relevant 
without inviting empathy and displaying the spectacle of the personal.  It strikes me as odd to 
postulate that we do not empathize with types of people, or regard them as spectacle.  Of course, 
we can—and do.  Building on such theoretical scholarship, Film Studies applauded movies that 
instructed their spectators to think about social types, typically construed in terms of race, class, 
and gender.  While a great many notions of identity are obviously excluded from this list, we will 
see that Nichols‘ investment in the interpersonal provides a space to consider social histories of 
concepts, such as marriage, silence, communication, and sex.  Such concepts are not separate 
from broader social types, but nor do they reduce to them.  It might very well be argued that 
Brecht simply set up a ―straw man‖ since we never have access to the kind of ―person‖ on-screen 
Brecht sought to avoid, and that it is the nature of cinema to provide the sights and sounds of 
something only resembling a person in a series of images of actions—despite its concreteness in 
representing this face and this voice.   
  While I have indicated that claims were made about realism in scholarship from the 1960s, 
and ways that such claims implied things about psychological realism, as a specific topic of 
serious scholarly debate, psychological realism was generally avoided.  When it was discussed, it 
was sheepishly acknowledged as a sticking point.  In Screen‘s special issue devoted to Brecht in 
1974, René Gardies points out that to hypothesize the absence of the psychological from a 
character is ―absurd and would negate the very nature of the psychological, which is inherent in 
all behaviour‖ (Browne, 13).  We can begin to see that, despite much of the rhetoric, the notion 
of Hollywood‘s version of realism as illusionism and Brechtian devotees‘ version of realism as 
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social mirror were discursive ideals based upon more or less psychological realism, not its 
presence or absence as nefarious stylistic.  Nichols advances this view by agreeing that there is a 
great deal of ideological power being negotiated when it comes to the representation of any 
event, and psychological events should be no exception.   
  Nowell-Smith blames cinema studies of the 1970s for ―thoughtlessly cast[ing] aside‖ the 
need to attend to classical theories of aesthetics, which supposedly ―dealt in concepts that were 
‗indeterminate‘ and could not be brought within a rational schema‖ (16).  In the binaries offered 
by theorists of 1960s European political cinema, such as surface/depth and reality/illusion, 
concepts like psychological realism, emotion (its expression on-screen and in the spectator), 
performance, the interplay of the individual on-screen character and a character type, etc. might 
indeed seem indeterminate.  This aversion neglected the affective power cinema wielded for 
shaping America‘s social landscape.  Accordingly, not all American scholars were as devoted to 
the politics of breaking realistic conventions, and by the mid-1970s, significant American 
scholarship on cinema departed from the models provided by Cahiers and Screen.   
  Denying cinema access to psychological categories of belief, desire, and intention does 
not aid a project seeking to comment on the doings of men and women as politically effectual in 
society.  Predictably, Cinema Studies has since backed away from paradigmatic treatments of 
Hollywood and cynicism about the political reproval of narrative causality.  Dana Polan has 
convincingly argued that ―the model of conventional texts is a myth,‖ that, in fact, ―all texts 
dominate‖ (89).  Polan even reminds us that Brecht was a ―social realist,‖ and shows Brecht was 
invested in pushing the boundaries of art, and particularly realism (as realism is proof of a 
constantly changing attitude toward the world).  According to Polan, Brecht‘s realism is a ―form 
of knowledge, a picturing of reality‖ which demonstrates a difference between the world as is 
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and the world as possibility.  Furthermore, ―The function of distantiation techniques is not so 
much to remind the spectators that they are watching a play or a film (since they already are 
aware of that) but to break down the socially unquestioning way that people watch spectacle‖ 
(Polan, 95-96).  In fact, Polan reads Brecht‘s theory of art as one that relies initially on 
identification, ―insofar as Brecht‘s political art includes the presence of the familiar world and 
yet presents a more attractive world‖ (98).  More recently, Williams returned to the topic of 
realism with a very different take, no longer celebrating the ―Toutvabienest anti-illusionism‖ he 
previously championed: ―Realism is not a singular or univocal style… Nor can it meaningfully 
be divided into two distinct, antagonistic entities—illusionistic realism on one side and formal 
and intellectual consciousness-raising anti-realism on the other‖ (―After the Classic,‖ 217).  
Here, he enables us to continue thinking about realism as an open term involving a series of 
questions rather than dismissing it as a dogma of Hollywood.  Thus he sees realism as an 
appropriate venue for working through types of skepticism.  Williams goes on to advocate a 
theory of realism which adequately accounts for beliefs in psychology (particularly emotion, a 
point of importance for chapter three).   
  In his 1971 book, Films and Feelings, Raymond Durgnat laments the trend against a 
critical appreciation for the depiction of interpersonal relationships in favor of the supposed 
objectivity of ―cerebral notations‖—a dismissal he attributes to ―the same root as the rejection of 
actor for director‖ (155).  He blames this move explicitly on the introduction of academia into 
the cinematic mix, where ―academic criticism‖ is based on the ―idioms‖ of anti-humanism and 
emotion.  Durgnat argues that ―academic criticism‖ overcomplicates issues of form when it 
neglects the ―simple empathy-sympathy‖ dynamic that is fundamental to the spectator‘s 
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experience in which ―people look at people‖ (173).47  Five years later, in The World in a Frame, 
Leo Braudy, writing mostly on American film (though still in relation to European cinema), 
observes that, ―The one aspect of serious art that has been firmly denied to films is the ability to 
create a complex character‖ (183).  This is relevant to what he perceives to be the mark of 
contemporary American cinema: ―In the films of the 1970s, character, and therefore acting as 
well, has taken on the central importance in film‖ (200).   
For Braudy, a film‘s necessary engagement with exteriors, with characters‘ visible and 
audible actions, allows it to ―add what is impossible in the group situation of the stage or the 
omniscient world of the novel: a sense of the mystery inside a character, the strange core of 
connection with the face and body the audience comes to know so well, the sense of an 
individuality that can never be totally expressed in words or action‖ (193).  But Braudy sees 
urgency to the topic beyond the noting of an aesthetic evolution: ―Unlike the films of the 1940s 
and 1950s, the films of the 1960s and 1970s [we can assume he refers to American films] do not 
tell us that the society preserves individualism, but that it warps and distorts it‖ (175).  
Describing a move away from genre formulas, traditional heroics, and toward the everyday, he 
goes on to imply that the advent of the soundtrack, and so character‘s verbal language, subtends 
this phenomenon: ―It is difficult not to conclude that the progress of films from the 1930s to the 
1960s has involved a growing repulsion from and fascination with the body, especially in its 
interaction with the mind‖ (217).  Braudy eventually declaims that ―The most striking efforts 
made by films today are to explore human character and personal relations in ways prevented or 
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 While I have created a paradigmatic vision of French and British criticism by focusing on the influence of Cahiers 
and Screen, it would be remiss of me not to point out an important exception in Jean Mitry.  Durgnat‘s objection to 
the isolation of cinema‘s elements into style and content—―‗style‘ is just as emotional, just as fundamental, just as 
much a part of the film‘s ‗content‘ and ‗soul‘ as the characters, the psychology and the events in the plot‖—is 
reminiscent of Mitry‘s assertions about film as a primitively emotional medium of expression (197).   
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warped by the methods of the past.  Innovations in form and directorial control are less 
interesting than innovations in content and acting‖ (258).   Concluding his book, he contends that  
the historical frame of the changes has always been the increasing humanization of the images 
we see on the screen, as the characters and the stories move closer and closer to what we 
consider to be our own lives…Without the opening up of films in the 1960s, the discovery 
that the old fantasy selves were no longer useful and new explorations of character were 
needed, the political atmosphere of the late 1960s would have been very different, it if would 
have existed at all. (258)   
 
Braudy directly connects American politics of the 1960s with the contemporaneous changes in 
the depiction and status of cinematic characters.  But how does my positioning of Nichols as a 
contemporary Hollywood auteur interested in psychological realism illustrate the drive towards 
―the increasing humanization of the images we see on-screen‖?  What sort of representation of 
behavior qualifies as psychologically realistic?  What theory of character, psychology, and 
humanness allows Nichols to achieve such an effect?
48
  Do I mean that Nichols‘ films are 
interested in the operations of the human mind?  In the representation of those operations?
49
  
This strikes me as a poor set of questions; it is unclear that asserting whether a character is 
psychologically realistic or not makes good sense.  Even madness is psychologically realistic, 
and so, to imply there can be a psychologically unrealistic character is mistaken.
50
  A surrealist 
masterpiece like Un Chien Andalou (Luis Bunuel, 1929), that would evade being labeled 
psychologically realistic by anyone‘s standards, gives us fictional human characters doing things 
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 Since it is partly the project of this dissertation to decipher what we can, and cannot, mean by ―psychology‖ in 
relation to a cinematic character, I want to make clear that I use the term here in something of a layman‘s sense.  I 
mean it to encompass such intensional propositional attitudes that we describe in phrases like, ―she utters,‖ ―he 
feels,‖ ―I intend,‖ etc.  
49
 Consciousness is obviously an issue here, for one might be tempted to say that images such as brain scans 
represent the mind.  I believe this is a confused claim—though not necessarily false—as it is unclear what the 
correlation is between areas of the brain which ―light up‖ and conscious experience.   
50
 The evaluation of a performer‘s skill seems relevant here, as we often recognize psychologically unrealistic 
actions in terms of a failure of convincingness, or ―bad acting.‖  When we call a character inconsistent or 
implausible, we are often addressing the writing, acting, directing, costuming, etc. that goes into the character‘s 
creation, signaling a breakdown in the perception of the character.   
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on-screen.  Thus, questions about characters‘ minds are more helpfully posed in terms of what 
we can and cannot know about their actions.   
  Speaking of the plays of great writers (e.g. Racine, Shakespeare, Moliere), Bazin asserts 
that, ―[w]hat is specifically theatrical about these tragedies is not their action so much as the 
human, that is to say the verbal, priority given to their dramatic structure‖ (106).  Bazin, writing 
on behalf of a largely visual medium, suggests that it is the borrowing of this verbal quality 
(―which refuses to let itself be captured in the window of the screen‖) that inspires some to rank 
theater aesthetically higher than the visual cinema (107).  In ―Theatre and Film‖ (1969), Sontag 
concurs with Bazin: ―The history of cinema is often treated as the history of its emancipation 
from theatrical models.‖  She complains that films, such as Carl Dreyer‘s Gertrud (1964), are 
labeled theatrical for their ―talkiness,‖ a charge that connotes artifice, inauthenticity, and an anti-
cinematic sensibility, ―a sensibility [thought to be] both pretentious and reactionary which [is] 
out of step with the democratic and more mundane sensibility of modern life‖ (103).  However, 
she continues with an uncharacteristically personal claim: ―My own view is that films with 
complex or formal dialogue, films in which the camera is static or in which the action stays 
indoors, are not necessarily theatrical‖ (106).  Sontag‘s assertions indicate that, by 1969, ―talky‖ 
films had a achieved a sort of avant-garde status, returning from their exile as anti-cinematic.   
  Bazin‘s equation of the verbal with the human suggests that to find the limits of the 
verbal is to find the limits of the cinematic human.  If Bazin seems to be moving too fast, I think 
we can parse it out like this: unlike the photograph‘s relationship to its source, the source of the 
sound recording is not the object which made it, but noise or words—a consequence of an action, 
such as the playing of an instrument.  If we are, then, thinking about the verbal in cinema, we are 
thinking about the portrayal of human actions.  Thinking about actions requires us to consider 
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concepts related to agency, such as the beliefs and desires which inspire the action, or the 
motivations and intentions made legible by its being done.  Perhaps this logic sheds light on why 
Nichols‘ films so often hinge upon characters speaking and hearing each other, and why (as we 
will see) listening to Nichols‘ characters is so often crucial to the spectator understanding them.  
A body can be photographed in an instant, not necessarily appearing to be doing anything; but 
for a vocal utterance to be legible, duration must be captured, and capturing duration is 
frequently cited as a feature basic to cinema (even if it shares that feature with other sound 
recording technologies). 
Nichols‘ films ask us to think about the process whereby what we are hearing and 
looking at becomes who we are hearing and looking at.  Caught between the dictates of social 
conformity and the desire for self-direction, his heroes struggle to act, and one of the key 
through-lines of this dissertation tracks Nichols‘ engagement with boundaries of self-
presentation and performance.  His films consistently require the spectator to think about a 
character‘s action as performed in a rather theatrical sense: done for the benefit of others, with 
the expectation that they will acknowledge the action in an effort to negotiate social pressures.  
But his films also invite the spectator to think of these actions as performed in the etymological 
sense, as the doing of the action, its form and context.  In this respect, his films dwell—as does 
his comedy with May—on the nature of utterances.  Perhaps it is fitting, then, that Nichols burst 
onto the cinematic scene with Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?, a highly reflexive story about a 
garrulous academic couple, George (Richard Burton) and Martha (Elizabeth Taylor), who have a 
secret, something that is talked around, alluded to, and, finally, confronted, without ever being 
stated.  The couple ―performs‖ a series of improvised episodes for their guests, inviting the 
spectator to consider the boundaries of conversation and dialogue, of cinematic performance and 
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self-presentation.  Adapting Edward Albee‘s play, Nichols added a line for Martha: ―Truth and 
illusion, you don‘t know the difference.‖  In the end, the film asks how real the child is—to 
George, to Martha, and to us.  Nichols returns again and again to campus settings, binding 
questions of characters‘ ontologies to their epistemic quests. 
Although the following chapters will closely attend to these issues in specific works, in 
order to give a sense of his corpus‘ preoccupation with these issues, I will briefly describe some 
films which, unfortunately, I will not be analyzing in any detail in the following chapters.  
Between The Graduate and Carnal Knowledge (the subjects of chapters two and three, 
respectively), Nichols made the surrealist and visually stunning Catch-22 (1970), the twenty 
million dollar adaptation of Joseph Heller‘s satirical novel—and Nichols‘ commentary on the 
Vietnam War.  (With this film, Nichols was the first director to earn a one million dollar 
paycheck.)  The hero, Yossarian (Alan Arkin), is a bombardier in a seemingly endless war tired 
of working for a military-industrial complex, caught in a linguistic loop hole.  The titular ―catch-
22‖ is named in the first scene, as Yossarian pleads to be sent home as mentally unfit to fly: ―Let 
me get this straight. In order to be grounded, I‘ve got to be crazy. And I must be crazy to keep 
flying. But if I ask to be grounded, that means I‘m not crazy anymore, and I have to keep flying.‖   
 Nichols followed Carnal Knowledge with the campy treatise on language acquisition and 
humanness, The Day of the Dolphin.  It tells the story of a scientist, Dr. Jake Terrell (George C. 
Scott), who teaches English to a dolphin, Fa.  Day of the Dolphin offers its viewer long takes of a 
beautifully lit Fa swimming in his aquarium, the frame of which visually echoes the cinema 
frame, and much attention is paid to the recording of the dolphin‘s speech.51  Fa is thus cast as 
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 Aquariums are a favorite visual trope of Nichols.  For example, an aquarium serves as a visual metaphor for the 
feelings of containment Benjamin Braddock suffers in The Graduate.  Aquariums receive the most contemplation in 
Closer; characters meet, and deceive, each other in the prominently featured London aquarium.  Also, The Day of 
the Dolphin surely alludes to a Nichols and May sketch about talking dolphins, ―Dolphins.‖ 
  
40 
cinematic, but he is also a performer; Jake rehearses him to perform dialogue and actions to 
prove to the scientific community his dolphin-mindedness.  After systematically working 
through issues of language acquisition (Did Fa already have a voice in order to acquire a new 
one, or did he acquire one in order to get fish? Can Fa teach another dolphin to speak?) and 
psychoanalytic stages (Fa hankers after his mother figure, Jake‘s girlfriend), Jake and Fa come to 
know and love each other. Released in 1973, at the height of Watergate anxiety, things go sour 
for Fa and Pa (as Fa calls Jake) when the U.S. government learns of the tape recordings of Fa‘s 
abilities, and decides to employ Fa to plant bombs on Soviet submarines (which is, ironically, not 
related to Fa‘s ability to speak).  In the end, Pa is forced to command Fa to return to the sea, 
allowing Fa to demonstrate his ―humanity,‖ when he does not want to listen to, or understand, 
Pa‘s language.   
  In Working Girl (1988), the voice of Staten Island native Tess (Melanie Griffith) goes 
unheard in the corporate world of 1980s Manhattan.  In order to get her scheme—which will 
save the company by acquiring a radio station—heard, she must acquire the upper class language 
of her boss, Katherine (Sigourney Weaver); so she conducts her own Eliza Doolittle 
transformation by dressing herself up in Katherine‘s finery and by listening to cassettes of 
Katherine‘s speech.  Biloxi Blues is about a writer (Matthew Broderick) articulating his memory 
of training for WWII, which ends before he is deployed; the bookish hero is clearly not a soldier 
at heart, and so, his attempts at military success and male camaraderie are more an effort of 
performing than training.  In Regarding Henry, the protagonist must re-learn to speak after 
suffering a near-fatal stroke.  Primary Colors illustrates (and parodies) campaign politics through 
the consistent metaphor of performance—particularly as it transpires in television commercials 
and news pundits.  The central conflict is precipitated by the manipulation of the recorded voice 
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of the main character, Jack Stanton (John Travolta).  Wolf‘s protagonist is a book editor; one of 
Closer‘s is a novelist.  While dying of cancer, renowned professor of John Donne‘s metaphysical 
poetry, Vivian Bearing (Emma Thompson), tells her story largely in monologue in Wit.  
  
The Aesthetics of Omission
52
 
 ―The construction of a plot we call invention, but that of a character we dignify with the name of creation… 
[Characters] have individuality without reality, because individuality is a thing acquired in the mind by the congeries 
of its impressions.‖   
                  George Santayana  
 
    Bearing in mind his films‘ attachment to issues of language and performance, and in an 
effort to fully understand Nichols‘ participation and position in American culture, this 
dissertation will have cause to reference ideas formulated by American intellectuals such as 
William James,
53
 J.L. Austin, and Susan Sontag.  I will also rely on the work of media scholars 
such as James Naremore, Jacob Smith, and Virginia Wright Wexman, as well as on the theories 
of improvisational performance developed by Viola Spolin.  However, most relevant will be the 
work of Stanley Cavell.
54
  It is no coincidence that Cavell writes extensively on cinema (and 
largely on American film), or that he takes a theoretical approach to Nichols‘ The Graduate 
when other scholars treat it like a punching bag.  Interested as he is in language, performance, 
and the category of the human in cinema, Cavell‘s philosophy finds application in Nichols‘ films 
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 I borrow this phrase from Braudy, who uses it to denote the sense of the unknown rendered by the visible and 
audible cinematic character.  
53
 The ―most influential American philosopher of the beginning of the 20th century‖ (Blackburn), William James 
defines the ―social self‖ as ―‗the recognition‘ we get from others, that, in this potentially plural way, ‗we are in part 
constituted by others‘‖ (Goodman, 92).  Russell Goodman observes that ―James expands his discussion of the social 
self to include not only the ‗images‘ people have of us, but the behavior that is responsible for those images‖ (92).  
Goodman clarifies that James is not simply inventing a version of behaviorism here: ―[H]is claims concern the 
introspected feelings of these ‗bodily activities‘ [behavior], rather than the activities‖ (94).  We will delve further 
into James‘ look at ―how much our mental life is knit up with our corporeal frame‖ in chapter two by looking at his 
work on the emotions (quoted in Goodman, 109).   
54
 Cavell is often credited as the modern philosopher most intent upon recovering specific lines of American 
thought, particularly the work of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau.  For example, see Giovanni 
Borradori‘s The American Philosopher.  She cites Cavell, along with Richard Rorty, as working to correct common 
philosophical histories which elide (or miscast) important American traditions of inquiry.   
  
42 
in a variety of ways.  Although this will become evident in the following chapters, I would like 
to point out Cavell‘s compatibility with issues we have already seen surface in Nichols‘ work, 
and to lay the groundwork for more.  Through Cavell, I will argue that to deny the existence of 
the character‘s inner life misses something important: the spectator‘s response to the character‘s 
behavior as indicative of a mind.  The presence of a character‘s ―inner life‖ exists only if the 
viewer acknowledges it.  But is she obligated to acknowledge it?  Is it her responsibility?  This is 
a question Nichols poses again and again, and in each case the viewer is obliged to answer ―yes.‖   
 Cavell‘s work provides inroads to responding to the long and well-pedigreed school of 
thought that holds that psychology cannot be represented.
55
  Nichols once said, ―If the picture‘s 
any good, then it means that you guess about the characters as you do about people you know‖ 
(Gelmis, 288).  Cavell is not only Nichols‘ contemporary (and himself historically avoided by 
cinema studies); he shares Nichols‘ interest in aesthetic performance, and in the potential 
knowledge to be found in an exploration of how we use ordinary language, be it that of English 
or cinema.  A secondary aim of this dissertation is to contribute to the current, and growing, 
interest in Cavell‘s work on film.56  For example, I generate new insights into his writings on 
ordinary language philosophy by looking at the case of silence as utterance in the next chapter, 
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 See, for example, Roland Barthes‘ S/Z.   
56
 For example, Doubting Vision: Film and the Revelationist Tradition by Malcolm Turvey (2008), The Virtual Life 
of Film (2007) by David Rodowick, Film as Philosophy: Essays on Cinema after Wittgenstein and Cavell (2005), 
ed. by Jerry Goodenough and Rupert Read, and Reading Cavell’s The World Viewed: A Philosophical Perspective 
(2000) by William Rothman and Marian Keane.  Although Cavell himself has always made clear that cinema offers 
an avenue for considering a range of questions already properly deemed ―philosophical,‖ much of the work 
engaging Cavell currently is part of the trendy ambition to ―connect‖ the disciplines of film and philosophy.  I hope 
to illustrate the value of applying Cavell‘s work for enriching our understanding of specific films, while also 
utilizing Nichols‘ work to clarify Cavell‘s arguments.  An important part of my strategy for doing this is to connect 
his work on other subjects, particularly Must We Mean What We Say? (1969), to his theses on film.  Although The 
World Viewed was published in 1971, its ―final, or immediate, stimulus to consecutive writing came in early 1968 
when I read some essays by André Bazin‖ (xxiii), the same year of Nichols‘ largest success with The Graduate.  It 
was published only two years after Must We Mean What We Say?, where Cavell already devoted large sections of 
text to films (such as Fellini‘s), with particular attention to expressivity, performance, and intention. 
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and I revise conventional understanding of his writings on cinematic performance in the last 
chapter.   
  As we saw, critics in Cahiers and Screen created a schema that paralleled the character-
as-individual with social individuals and the character-as-type with social groups.  Cavell, 
however, argues that it is impossible for any fictional on-screen human to avoid confronting the 
notion of a type:  
 The idea of a type…is raised as a way of grasping the particular ways in which the human 
being is fictionalized—which is to say, molded—by film.  The creation of a fictional 
presence (like the presence of nature) is not an achievement of the medium of film (as it is an 
achievement of novelists and playwrights and actors on a stage), but is given by the medium 
itself. (WV, 209-210).   
 
In Cavell‘s philosophy of language, the individual comes to self-knowledge by recognizing her 
place as a speaker in the context of a linguistic community: ―individual identity is not something 
which can be achieved and maintained in the absence of participation in a community of 
individuals‖ (Mulhall, 72).  If anything, as we will see, not saying, not expressing or doing, 
hence not attempting to participate in one‘s community, will bring the harshest narrative 
penalties in Nichols‘ corpus.   
  Similarly, Nichols describes a style of character-building that creates both an individual 
and a type.  He describes a film and a performance as ―great‖ according to the same logic: they 
ask questions of the spectator which are both individuated and applicable to the spectator‘s 
community.  Recently, he said 
When you‘re talking about inside and outside, I‘ve always thought that great actors, and 
therefore, great plays or films, are inside and outside at the same time.  The very greatest actor 
is both living it and also simultaneously saying to you about the character, ‗do you know 
anybody like this?  Do you notice this about these people? About such a person? Not these 
people, but such a person?‘  And it‘s a very difficult thing to do unless you can do it, and it 
goes with greatness that they are both inhabiting someone and showing them.  It‘s not for 
nothing that many of the greatest actors started as comics; say I who started as a comedian 
with Elaine May, Nichols and May, we were about making fun of people… Well first of all, 
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we were not making fun of people, we were in fact making fun of ourselves.  Everyone 
always thought, ‗I know someone just like that‘ and we were thinking, ‗Well, that‘s me. I was 
the schmuck in the back seat of the car. Who do you think it could have been?‘ (The Graduate 
DVD Commentary)   
 
While it is a sign of greatness, and so, presumably difficult to achieve, Nichols sees no 
contradiction in suggesting a common ground for the perception of characters as both types and 
individuals.  He applauds work that encourages the attribution of psychological attitudes and 
social identity to a character.  This is reminiscent of Santayana, who maintained that ―all 
[humans] are equally fit to be types‖ (114).   
  Lee Hill observes, ―[Nichols‘] work, as seen as much as one can, as a whole, has been 
about individuals trying to go about the business of living with as much dignity, good humour 
and hope as they can muster. The world appears to conspire against these efforts. It is in this gap 
between reality and desire that Nichols finds a brand of humour and tragedy that is uniquely his‖ 
(my italics, www.sensesofcinema.com).  This dissertation hopes to show that in Nichols‘ films, 
―outer‖ variance and ―inner‖ constancy, as well as the spectatorial perception of outer and inner, 
are necessary if a character is to accomplish its task of creating meaning and of guiding us 
through its world and relating thought, action and feeling to that world (and for us to apply it, 
metaphorically, to our own).   
  In ―More of The World Viewed,‖ Cavell extends his approach to studying performance to 
the evaluation of directors: ―Good directors know how to mean everything they do.  Great 
directors mean more—more completely, more subtly, more specifically—and they discover how 
to do everything they mean.  The gestures of bad directors are empty—they speak, as it were, 
nonsense‖ (WV, 188).   Cavell began his philosophical career with an interest in theories of 
action, an interest which extends into theories of mind and language, and which came to guide 
his treatment of the subject of performance in film and theatre.  Cavell‘s work on cinematic 
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performance is perhaps his best known, due in no small part to its place in anthologies like Leo 
Braudy and Marshall Cohen‘s Film Theory and Criticism reader and Movie Acting: The Film 
Reader.  Unfortunately, such anthologies only include the portions of his work that consider 
performance from early sections of his first book on cinema, The World Viewed [WV].  Cavell 
actually elaborates this concept of performance throughout that work, and, indeed, the book 
concludes in a neglected look at the ontology of the actor in its final chapter.  Published in 1971, 
in The World Viewed, Cavell is in large part reacting to the contemporaneous critical reaction to 
Hollywood cinema I described above.  He views ―the absolute responsibility of the artist for the 
actions and assertions in his work‖ as ―an instance of the human being‘s absolute responsibility 
for the intentions and consequences of his actions‖ (188).  He builds on this point to clarify his 
discussion of human on-screen performances in The World Viewed, where he did not mean his 
analysis to be interpreted as commenting only on issues of the actor‘s (or world‘s) presence 
and/or absence.
57
  He explains:  
My impatience with the idea that photographs and paintings never really project or represent 
reality (when, that is, they obviously do) expresses my sense that, as elsewhere, a fake 
skepticism is being used to deny that human responsibility.  We may need freedom from this 
responsibility, but the denial of its claims is no route to that freedom, except within the 
bounds of comedy or religion.  Film is a moving image of skepticism: not only is there a 
reasonable possibility, it is a fact that here our normal senses are satisfied while reality does 
not exist—even, alarmingly, because it does not exist, because viewing it is all it takes. (188-
189).  
 
Cavell‘s language here strikes me as clearly referring to a passage in the final pages of The 
World Viewed where he comes ―back to the idea of acting on film‖ to comment on the non-
theatrical sense of ―actors‖ (153):  
Earlier, I objected to calling the subjects of film ‗actors‘ at all.  But obviously they are actors 
the way any human being is.  The ontological fact that actions move within a dark and 
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 Cavell had been read as ―simply‖ Bazinian in this respect, and, therefore not contributing new insights (Rothman 
51).  In ―More of The World Viewed,‖ he owns that he could have been clearer, especially about the relationship 
between his and Bazin‘s and Erwin Panofksy‘s treatment of presence and ―reality itself‖ (183-184).   
  
46 
shifting circle of intention and consequence, that their limits are our own, that the individual 
significance of an act (like that of a word) arises in its being this one rather than every other 
that might have been said or done here and now, that their fate (like the fate of words) is to be 
taken out of our control—that is the natural vision of film. (153) 
 
He connects being present to a world whose existence cannot be verified but must be accepted to 
our perception of ―actors,‖ that is, humans, on-screen because we see that they act, and that their 
actions are subject to the same criteria of intention and consequence as our own.  We might see 
him as expanding Bazin‘s assertion that in the theatre speech acts constitute the human, for the 
cinema, to include all actions as fundamental to our perception of humans and a dramatic 
structure.  In this way, the rejection of realist fiction is not (or, at least, not just) a rejection of 
capitalist values and unthinking spectators, but a means of refusing stories centered on human 
actions—those that invoke psychological concepts like intention and which extend into accounts 
of responsibility.  In a point to which we will return in chapter six, Cavell ends The World 
Viewed by suggesting that it is the paradoxical modern desire of humans to ―act without 
performing‖ (a desire which, by definition, cannot be satisfied), a phrase I take to relate to a 
fantasy in which our actions are not subject to others‘ interpretations and have only our intended 
consequences (153).   
  In his engagement with skepticism, Cavell connects the problem of knowing other minds 
with the problem of defining the human—as we have seen, a timely question for the 1960s—but 
which remains relevant today as movements for and against life-support, corporations, 
euthanasia, homosexual marriage rights, the female sex slave trade, torture, artificial intelligence, 
athletic enhancement, and animal rights all rhetorically predicate themselves upon a shifting 
definition of humanness.  Cavell looks to American history to point out two cases in which 
defining humanness was or remains contentious: slavery and abortion.  Given this history, and 
the very real possibility of failing to see humans as human, Cavell calls into question the validity 
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of running with the idea that the category of human is basically obvious or uncomplicated: ―in 
the case of a human being, it is not yet obvious whether we know what it is to know what a 
human being is—what sort of behavior, for example, would manifest that knowledge?‖ (Mulhall, 
129)  For Cavell, our knowledge of others as human fluctuates, succeeds and fails.  It is here that 
the cinematic character (which is distinct from a simple filmed human) proves such a useful and 
important metaphor within Cavell‘s work.  
  In his essay on performed characters, ―The Avoidance of Love,‖58 Cavell asks, ―What has 
discouraged attention from investigations of character?‖ (268).  He looks askance at the critical 
avoidance of discussing characters, and offers this summation:  
I think that one reason a critic may shun direct contact with characters is that he has been 
made to believe or assume, by some philosophy or other, that characters are not people, that 
what can be known about people cannot be known about characters, and in particular that 
psychology is either not appropriate to the study of these fictional beings or that psychology is 
the province of psychologists and not to be ventured from the armchairs of literary studies. 
(268) 
 
Cavell rebuts the worry of non-psychologists that they may feel unauthorized to discuss 
characters as endowed with psychologies by asking, ―[W]hat is the relevant psychology? Of 
course, to account for the behavior of characters one is going to apply predicates like ‗is in pain,‘ 
‗is ironic,‘ ‗is jealous,‘ ‗is thinking of…‘ to them.  But does that require psychological expertise?  
No more than to apply these predicates to one‘s acquaintances‖ (268).   
 He goes on to argue that this schema holds in relation to fictional characters as it does for 
other people, and points out that ―calling the existence [of characters] ‗fictional‘ is incoherent (if 
understandable) when used as an explanation of their existence, or as a denial of their existence.  
It is, rather, the name of a problem: What is the existence of a character… what kind of 
(grammatical) entity is this?‖ (332)  Cavell asserts that, ―It is an incontestable fact that in a 
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 In this essay, Cavell restricts his discussion to dramatic characters, but makes it clear in ―More of The World 
Viewed‖ that his later thinking on cinematic characters stems from this piece.   
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motion picture no live human being is up there.  But a human something is, and something unlike 
anything else we know‖ (emphasis in original, 26).  This is usually taken as part of a 
commonplace theoretical commitment to delineating medium specificity, which, in this case, 
takes the form of a comparison between the stage and screen actor‘s art on the basis of physical 
and temporal presence.  Given that Cavell is an ordinary language philosopher whose views are 
firmly rooted in the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, I think we would be remiss indeed to 
assume that he is only talking about a visual spectral presence.  In this respect, I will draw on 
Cavell‘s work in order to better understand what Nichols‘ films do with dialogue, and, in the 
process, depart from standard readings of Cavell‘s claims.  
  In his exegesis of Cavell‘s philosophy, Stephen Mulhall relates Cavell‘s writings on the 
notion of the cinematic human and the concept of identification.  Identification relies upon our 
perception of characters as sharing some degree of humanness with us, and since the justification 
of claims about others‘ minds cannot be based in the employment of our senses, ―I must do more 
than simply identify what is before my eyes, I must also identify with the creature I see‖ 
(Mulhall, 131).  We are now in a better position to ascertain what Cavell really meant by the 
―human something,‖ or, at least, to understand what he means is more complicated than it may 
initially have appeared.  Cavell writes, ―If it makes sense to speak of seeing human beings as 
human beings, then it makes sense to imagine that a human being may lack the capacity to see 
human beings as human beings‖ (Claim of Reason, 378).  Elucidating Cavell, Mulhall writes 
that, ―The concept of reading [another‘s behavior] captures the immediacy of our relation to the 
other‘s mind in so far as it brings with it the idea of seeing: I do not infer from my perceptions of 
the other‘s behaviour that she possesses a mind, I see her behavior as expressive of mind‖ (127-
128).  What Mulhall and Cavell point out is that identification is a process intrinsic to the 
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recognition of humanness, which opposes its often-pejorative use in cinema studies to denote a 
passive psychic state for the spectator of Hollywood cinema.  Cavell labels this phenomenon, 
which stems from the need to distinguish human from non-human, ―‗empathic projection‘, on the 
understanding that the phrase is no more than a label for something that must be the basis of my 
claims to read the other‖ (Mulhall, 131).  That this italicized something becomes the space upon 
which we can project our ability to recognize humanness, the space whereby it is possible for us 
to believe we are perceiving a human, is significant for understanding Cavell‘s schematization of 
the on-screen human.   
  Cavell does not deny the validity of objections to the idea that characters simply ―are‖ 
like people because they share a degree of perceivable embodiment; nor does he seek to uncover 
how psychologies might be correctly said to be somehow ―in‖ the image.  There is no need for a 
fantasy of pure expressiveness.
59
  Rather, Cavell claims that to not perceive character‘s actions as 
expressive is to deny expressivity itself, and that we can, based upon our own experience of our 
bodies and efforts to communicate, agree that to deny expressivity is wrongheaded.  If we do not 
perceive characters as human, it is not their humanity that is denied, but our own. 
  Cavell objects to a traditional view of skepticism which considers only a first-person 
view to force us to choose between the existence or non-existence of other minds.
60
  What is 
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 Karen Hanson notes that Cavell‘s claim that the attribution of existence is essentially relational accords with the 
view of American philosopher C.S. Peirce, who claims that ―reality means a certain kind of non-dependence upon 
thought… while existence means reaction with the environment, and so is a dynamic character… exist in its strict 
philosophical sense [means] ‗react with the other like things in the environment‘‖ (quoted in Hanson, 196).  Thus, 
―human existence depends on thought, ours and others‘, and ours of others‘, others‘ of ours‖ (Hanson, 196).   
60
 For Cavell, Descartes‘ Cogito does not obtain without acknowledging others and being acknowledged—it does 
not make good sense to say one exists if there is no occasion to say it, no one to whom to say it, no one to hear it.  
The act of asserting it presupposes someone to hear it, someone willing to hear it, and to attend to it as meant.  In 
Cavell‘s corpus, this interdependent view of articulation and proof of existence finds its first full reading in his work 
on the remarriage comedy, and we will find it present in The Graduate, itself a 1960s version of remarriage comedy.  
Cavell argues that we can learn of this concept of acknowledgment via its fictional operations, since characters‘ 
words and actions make claims on us and elicit responses from us.  This amounts to saying we respond to characters 
as we do other people (whether or not it is to the same degree is another question for another time).  While we might 
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missing, for him, are our responses to others‘ expressive behavior—thus, in our close readings of 
Nichols‘ films, we will often restrain our analysis to thinking about the spectator‘s experience of 
the text.  For Cavell, perceiving expressive behavior in others, perceiving criteria, makes a claim 
upon the perceiver to acknowledge or refuse the perceived.  Cavell believes we can develop 
criteria for expressive behavior (which does not tell us what the use of such criteria are, much 
less whether the behavior corresponds to another‘s inner mental state), but there are no criteria 
for determining or detecting the presence or absence of our responsibility to acknowledge 
expressive behavior.  It is thus not entirely up to us to decide upon whose bodies we will confer 
our concepts of humanity; rather, we first have to accept a body as one capable of giving life to 
my criteria: ―My condition is not exactly that I have to put the other‘s life there in her behaviour, 
and not exactly that I have to leave it there either: I have to respond to it, or refuse to respond—I 
have to acknowledge it‖ (Mulhall, 113).   
  Cavell‘s attention to our responses is reminiscent of Santayana‘s claims about expression: 
―In all expression we may thus distinguish two terms: the first is the object actually presented, 
the word, the image, the expressive thing; the second is the object suggested, the further thought, 
emotion, or image evoked, the thing expressed‖ (124).  Santayana goes on to clarify that ―the 
thing expressed‖ does not inhere in ―the expressive thing;‖ expression is not a property of the 
word or image, but ―depends upon the union of two terms, one of which must be furnished by the 
imagination; and a mind cannot furnish what it does not possess.  The expressiveness of 
everything accordingly increases with the intelligence of the observer‖ (125).61  Meaning, here, 
                                                                                                                                                             
complain that the lines between psychology, mind, human and character are blurred by his desire to take seriously 
characters‘ actions, that is, in part, the point.  
61
 Santayana sheds light on one way that ―common speech‖ sometimes confuses the use of these terms, ―regarding 
(very unpsychologically) the thought as the source of the image, not the image as the source of the thought.  People 
call the words the expression of the thought: whereas for the observer, the hearer (and generally for the speaker, 
too), the words are the datum and the thought is their expressiveness—that which they suggest‖ (179).   
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is a function of the interaction between work and spectator.  Our choice to attribute a mind (or 
state of mind) to a character depends upon our understanding of what it is to express and what 
modes of expression we take to be available to the cinematic character.   
As we will see, Nichols‘ films function reflexively with regard to their characters‘ 
actions, pointing to their own portrayal and design.  As articulated above, cinematic characters 
are constituted by actions, a fact which invokes questions about the limits of those actions.  
Considering the theories of action under which Nichols‘ cinema operates is to think about a 
theory of mind: in what way are the characters beliefs and desires made available for the 
spectator‘s interpretation?  This is precisely the subject of chapters two and three, which 
considers the possibility of a cinematic character‘s vocal and facial inactivity—the microphone 
and close-up allowing a range of expressions unavailable to other art forms.  We will look at two 
of Nichols‘s best films, both of which were derided by critics who failed to recognize Nichols‘ 
commentary on his protagonists‘ ability to express: The Graduate in chapter two and Carnal 
Knowledge in chapter three.   
The former looks at Ben‘s silences as a space between communication and confusion: is 
he self-presenting? Or is he uttering? Or is he dumbstruck? To what extent can we say that he is 
doing any, or all, of these things? Carnal Knowledge demands analogous considerations of its 
spectator.  Its main character, male chauvinist Jonathan (Jack Nicholson), suffers from both 
emotional and sexual impotence, and his story is told in facial close-ups.  Apprehending the 
movie‘s view on facial expression is crucial to understanding its sexual politics—especially 
urgent in 1971.  These films reward the spectator for actively doing the work of acknowledging, 
and furthermore, they indict those characters who refsue to locate humanity in other characters‘ 
expressive ambiguities.  In these analyses, we will see that Nichols does trade in broad 
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―political‖ types, such as ―man,‖ ―woman,‖ and ―youth,‖ but through the window of a 
psychologically complex character.  That is, we come to see how such political identities are 
internalized as motivations, intentions, emotions, desires (or lack thereof, as in Jonathan‘s case).   
Chapter four looks back to Nichols‘ origin as an improvisational performer with Elaine 
May in the nation‘s first improvisational theater.  We consider the similarities and differences 
between their live theatrical performances (and the theory of improvisation supporting it) with 
their successes on radio, television, and recorded albums.  Their ground-breaking comedy relies 
on the listener‘s willingness to grasp, and to mock, conventions of ordinary language; rather than 
tell jokes with punch lines, they open up a path for sharp social observation by calling attention 
to the shared knowledge of how people talk.  Nichols and May produced copious amounts of 
comedy routines for the radio, and then for albums.  Looked at this way, Nichols‘ career is 
founded on portraying language use as aesthetic object, and his experience as a performer is 
rooted in reproducing, representing, and manipulating the ―space between‖ words, a basis that I 
will show extends into his cinematic work.   
  Their routines impacted the stylistics of American cinematic dialogue.  New Hollywood 
needed new dialogue it seems, and chapter five looks at their influence on Nichols‘ own films.  
By beginning with Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?, which is not just the beginning of Nichols‘ 
corpus, but the beginning of New Hollywood, we will learn that Nichols‘ films‘ advanced 
Nichols and May‘s ear for social commentary on their most popular topics: American middle-
class attitudes toward sex, gender, marriage, and romantic love.  Nichols said in 1966, with only 
the highly verbal Virginia Woolf? under his film director‘s belt, that, ―[t]he words of a play are 
only the top of a large iceberg, and since there is so much beneath the surface, I think it‘s 
important to be accurate about the portion that shows,‖ and supposes that the spectator finds the 
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conclusion of Virginia Woolf? to be moving ―by virtue of not being explicitly stated‖ (Playboy, 
68-69).  Looking at Virginia Woolf‘s attitude toward a couple‘s on-screen communication also 
lays the groundwork for reading Nichols‘ later film, The Birdcage, which reflects changing 
cultural definitions of marriage and updates Cavell‘s arguments about the comedy of remarriage. 
Finally, chapter six accounts for the stylistic phases in Nichols‘ career by examining his 
special relationship with Meryl Streep (who has made more films with Nichols than any other 
director).  Together, they made four films, two of which reflect on cinematic performance: 
Postcards From the Edge and Angels in America.  Attending to Bazin‘s writings on a tradition of 
American directors such as William Wyler and George Cukor, as well as to the manner in which 
Streep‘s stardom has been constructed paradoxically (the persona of having no persona), this 
chapter considers Nichols‘ changing stylistics against the backdrop of the American social 
history that popularized he and Streep‘s collaborations. 
 If it seems that we will often be reading Nichols‘ corpus with various structuring 
absences in mind, this is not a coincidence.  Nichols says he and May initially became known 
from their days at Second City for performing what they called ―People Scenes.‖  He explains 
that their scenes were about individuals‘ behavior and nothing else: 
It‘s what has always interested me: the things that go on between people, especially the 
unstated, less than immediately visible things that go on between people.  And there‘s 
something about a group of people looking at something, all apprehending something 
unspoken that is very exciting to me.  It‘s what I love in the theatre at its best, and it‘s what I 
love in movies.  It‘s like you describe the space around something and the thing in the middle 
that is not referred to is apparent as a result.  It‘s what they say about Morandi, that he paints 
the space between the bottles. (Rose, 1998)  
 
In this statement of method (to which we will return), Nichols professes to being fascinated with 
figuring out why, and how, what is avoided is articulated, or at least acknowledged, through the 
very act of avoidance.  He even describes the existence of the unsayable as the raison d’etre of 
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performance: ―Because the essence of [theater and movies] is that there are things that cannot be 
spoken.  That‘s why you act the whole thing out‖ (Rose, 2005).  Nichols has echoed this idea 
specifically as his love for cinema, taking the notion of a structuring absence to its limit: ―a lot of 
people are sitting in the dark sharing something that can‘t be put into words.  And since all of life 
is basically not mentioning the main thing—that we‘re going to die—we‘re used to the idea of 
something bigger than anything going on but unspoken‖ (McGuigan, 64).   
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Chapter Two: The Sound of Silence in The Graduate 
 
You find ways to express the underneath without words; sometimes it‘s the opposite of the words, or a 
tangent of the words…unexpressed undercurrents that are palpable. – Mike Nichols  
 
[A]s the prestige of language falls, that of silence rises. – Susan Sontag 
 
 
Following his adoration as half of Nichols and May, and his string of unqualified 
successes on stage, and then on-screen with Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? (1966), the 
reception of The Graduate (1967) marks the beginning of the shift in the critical estimation of 
Mike Nichols.
62
  Not coincidentally, The Graduate is Nichols‘ biggest financial success.  In a 
decade full of cinematic watersheds, it was, at the time, ―the most profitable movie that had ever 
been released‖ (Scwartz, 1).63  It remains popular to this day, lodged in the American Film 
Institute‘s ―100 Greatest Films‖ list at number seven, and it would be impossible to compile a list 
of all the music videos, commercials, films, sitcoms, etc. that have paid homage to The 
Graduate.  Histories of American cinema, such as Jon Lewis‘ American Film and John Belton‘s 
American Cinema/American Culture, cite the film, along with Bonnie and Clyde (Arthur Penn, 
1967), as instigating a renaissance in Hollywood filmmaking known as ―New Hollywood.‖64   
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 I will focus on the critical reception as a film director in this chapter, but it is also true that 1967-1968 saw several 
theater critics react violently to Nichols‘ continued success.  In 1968, Nichols became one of the few people to ever 
receive a Tony Award and Oscar as Best Director in the same year (for Plaza Suite and The Graduate), a fact that 
seemed to have overexposed his celebrity.  William Goldman wrote a sarcastic piece calling him a ―culture hero‖ 
that ―does not do much to hide the flawless side of his nature‖ (267).  Goldman relates that Nichols‘ string of 
theatrical hits and style (particularly evident in The Little Foxes [1967]) made him ―the most successful new figure 
of the sixties,‖ an emergence comparable only to Kazan‘s in the 1950s (409).  But Goldman is disturbed by the 
amount of Nichols‘ success.  He ends this way: ―Nichols wins alone.  This doesn‘t really matter.  What counts is that 
there is a new culture hero in the land.  And we have made him.  He reflects us: our time, our taste, our needs, our 
wants.  And what we want is Nichols.  And what Nichols is, is brilliant.  Brilliant and trivial and self-serving and 
frigid.  And all ours‖ (268). 
63
 The Graduate premiered at the end of 1967, but was seen mostly in the winter/spring of 1968. There is some 
disagreement about its status as the highest earner, as opposed to The Sound of Music [Robert Wise, 1965], but what 
seems clear is that it broke attendance records (Monaco, 184 and Cook, 12).  It played for two years (Harris, 418).  
64
 Arthur Penn also directed Nichols and May‘s career-defining Broadway show, Mike and Elaine on Broadway 
(1960).    
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Belton and Lewis focus on the film‘s financial take as demonstrating a cultural 
moment—and a youth movement—interested in depicting previously un-depicted sexual 
relationships on-screen.  With the arrival stateside of films like La Dolce Vita (Frederico Fellini) 
and L’Avventura (Michelangelo Antonioni) in 1960 and Jules and Jim (François Truffaut) in 
1962, sexuality and emotional complexity were no longer the exclusive purview of literature and 
theater.  In 1960s America, the ―foreign film‖ became increasingly synonymous with the ―art 
film,‖ in part precipitated by the influx of quality cinema exhibited for the first time in film 
festivals (the New York Film Festival, for example, began in 1966).  Dudley Andrew writes: 
―Unquestionably, the ‗events of 1968‘ mark a key moment in cultural history because they were 
directed at institutions.  In film culture… contemporary criticism ordained a new canon of 
acceptable works‖ (128).  However, with hindsight, we can suppose there was something 
unacceptable about The Graduate, for, despite its inclusion as part of American cinema‘s history, 
cinema studies has not seen fit to closely analyze the text itself.
65
     
In this chapter, I examine The Graduate‘s form and content in the social and historical 
context of the American 1960s in order to better understand its position as the avant-garde of 
New Hollywood.  I begin by looking at the film‘s reception by contemporaneous critics who 
initially praised the film before turning on it, charging it with duping the American public by 
trussing up the same old Hollywood peplum, and evading the most pressing social and political 
issues of the day.  The critics derided the film for borrowing European filmmaking techniques, 
and for reviving a theatrical sensibility at odds with a properly cinematic nature.  I argue that in 
order to cast the film in such a derogatory light, critics neglected the film‘s most important 
moment: the long, final, ambiguous shot of Ben (Dustin Hoffman) and Elaine (Katherine Ross) 
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 I, regretfully, am eliding what occurs in the classroom as part of the disciplinary history of cinema studies.  The 
Graduate may well be taught and analyzed there.   
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sitting on a municipal bus after fighting off the older generation.  For many critics of the day, the 
film effectively halts after Ben succeeds in convincing Elaine to abandon her new husband.  Yet, 
I suspect the audience members who returned again and again to this film did not fail to see the 
last chilling moments.  In fact, the power of the concluding shot to retroactively impact the 
entirety of the film is crucial to any adequate account of it.  In an effort to make sense of it, we 
must pay close attention to the fact that this ending is dialogue-free.  My reading highlights the 
film‘s aural complexities in an effort to combat its negative critical reputation, and to discern 
why youths gravitated toward it.  Tracking silence‘s role in the film allows us to see it in a 
specifically American context (not just as a symptom of the influence of European cinema in the 
1960s), and to form a response to the charge that the film‘s long takes and attention to language 
are theatrical, and not legitimately cinematic.  Most importantly, it is only by attending to the 
film‘s sounds of silence that we can understand the ambiguity of the film‘s conclusion.   
As artists like Lenny Bruce and Bob Dylan were finding their unique voices—and 
effecting cinema through documentaries like Don’t Look Back (D.A. Pennebaker, 1967) and The 
Lenny Bruce Performance Film (John Magnuson, 1967)—the eloquent voices of Bruce, Sen. 
Robert Kennedy and Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. were silenced.  King‘s death incited major 
race riots across the country.  Police brutality at the August Democratic National Convention in 
Chicago provided media with footage of the consequences of citizens exercising their rights, 
rendering too obvious the treatment of dissenters.  Looking at The Graduate‘s position in the 
history of American culture brings to light the fact that we can see (or, rather, hear) in it a study 
of the efficacy of the voice in the political and social realms, but this approach also demonstrates 
that the film invites us to re-think how a voice can resound philosophically and aesthetically.   
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Ben‘s struggle is not so much a clash between competing interests—his own and 
adults‘—but rather a struggle to be heard.  As evidence, I will demonstrate the importance of the 
role played by silence in the film, which is to say, to the performance of silence—a complicated 
layer entirely neglected by extant criticism.
66
  I will show that it is only by attending to the film‘s 
use of silence that we begin to comprehend the political value of the text.  Ben is frequently 
silent, and, as with any character‘s (in)action, this silence is addressed both to other characters 
and to the spectator on distinct registers.  Attending to the presence of silence in The Graduate 
not only clarifies the film‘s reception in the late 1960s, but further indicates ways it reflected and 
contributed to this volatile period of American history.  My reading will, in turn, shed some light 
on the attention being paid to silence, and communication in general, in American culture of the 
late 1960s.   
The Graduate begins with the title character, Benjamin Braddock, staring pensively 
ahead: sitting on board an airplane, then standing still as he slowly glides along an airport‘s 
moving sidewalk to the rock/folk tune ―The Sound of Silence,‖ performed by Simon and 
Garfunkel.  There is, perhaps, no cinematic moment more in counterpoint with the cultural 
revolution in America in 1968, the year of The Graduate‘s major exhibition.  History was 
unfolding rapidly as groups (e.g. African-Americans, students, dissidents) who had only recently 
decried their lack of a social voice began to shout.  Internationally, Paris and Prague glimpsed 
major structural changes in political regimes, while, farther away, Neil Armstrong walked on the 
moon.  The United States‘ commitment of soldiers to South Vietnam swelled massively—a fact 
that made the war—and conscription—too urgent to be ignored any longer by the populace.  
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 Silence has been one of Hollywood‘s biggest formal taboos since its inception.  In Silent Film Sound, Rick 
Altman demonstrates that silent cinema was never actually silent.  That we say a fully-scored picture has ―wall-to-
wall‖ sound, reminiscent of carpet floor covering, suggests that Hollywood‘s efforts to prevent silence from rising 
up are a form of anti-realism, a covering of reality.   
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Photographs returning from the ravaged land, like those by Eddie Adams, further compelled 
Americans to confront the actions of the soldiers representing them.   
Historian Arthur Marwick classifies the 1960s a ―mini-renaissance‖ whose emphasis on 
individual expression transformed ―artistic standards and values, and ideas about society and the 
individual‘s relations with it‖ (6).  He summarizes the most high-profile features of the period:  
black civil rights, youth culture and trend-setting by young people; idealism, protest, and 
rebellion; the triumph of popular music based on Afro-American models and the 
emergence of this music as a universal language, with the Beatles as the heroes of the 
age; the search for inspiration in the religions of the Orient; massive changes in personal 
relationships and sexual behaviour; a general audacity and frankness in books and in the 
media, and in ordinary behaviour; relaxation in censorship; the new feminism; gay 
liberation; the emergence of ‗the underground‘ and ‗the counter-culture‘; optimism and 
genuine faith in the drawing of a better world.
67
 (1) 
 
To his list we must add the Vietnam War and the partisanship that tore through America with the 
organization of anti-war protests.  Marwick points out that the 1960s are not just of interest to the 
history of minority groups who were chipping away at the racist, sexist, bourgeois culture (from 
the Black Panthers to the Situationists to the counterculture proponents of be-ins): ―the full 
significance of the sixties lies not in the activities of minorities but in what happened to the 
majority, and how it happened‖ (Marwick, 15).   
The character of Ben illustrates a popular conception of this ―majority‖: the heterosexual 
son of white, upper-middle class suburbanites.  (That he is played by Dustin Hoffman, and often 
perceived as Jewish, is an issue to which we will return.)  Anxious and unsure of his future, he 
wants nothing more than to be left alone in his room; not knowing what to do, he avoids doing 
anything.  (His parents want him to go to ―graduate school‖—to learn to be a graduate?)  But at 
home, Ben finds himself in a sea of the controlling older generation who are not invested in 
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 The late 1950s saw the rise of ―the Beats,‖ popularized by figures like William Burroughs, Alan Ginsburg and 
Jack Kerouac, who were fundamental to the emergence of a notion of ―counterculture,‖ and its association with 
mind-altering drugs and Buddhism.   
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hearing about his desires.  The elders prefer to project their own onto him—and whether it be a 
choice of libation or the sexual advances of the wife of his father‘s business partner, Mrs. 
Robinson (Anne Bancroft), he accepts (despite their physical intimacy, we never learn her first 
name, or, indeed, the first name of any adult character).  Eventually, Ben meets Mrs. Robinson‘s 
daughter, Elaine (Katherine Ross), who, in the words of one critic at the time, is ―the classy 
embodiment of a college man‘s most extravagant fantasies‖ (Brackman, 35).  Ben realizes she is 
a better match for him than her mother— not because they are the same age, but because they are 
able to converse, which he desperately wants, but is unable, to do with Mrs. Robinson.  Not keen 
on being thrown over for her daughter, Mrs. Robinson attempts to squelch Ben and Elaine‘s 
relationship by having her daughter marry another man.  Arriving just past the knick of time, Ben 
nevertheless convinces Elaine to defy her parents and run away with him.  Together they fight 
off the wedding party, jump on a passing bus, and ride away together, silently realizing what 
they have done.   
As the nation was being pulled in many directions, what do we make of the fact that The 
Graduate appealed to the American public‘s cinematic cravings; that Ben became a lightning rod 
for a generation of anti-authoritarian cinema-going youth?  What was The Graduate, and its 
politics, for them (and for us, now)?  As a top-grosser made within Hollywood, the film confuses 
the boundaries between ―mainstream‖ culture and its others by not looking at a minority group or 
a fringe issue, but by examining the situation of a character built to be an emblem of an average 
modern, American youth.  Critics sought to disabuse The Graduate‘s fans of their passion by 
taking the film to task for not confronting the problems facing a particular minority group or a 
social issue they deemed worthy, such as the threat of conscription, drugs, or sexuality.  (While 
Ben‘s affair is an adulterous one, it is not difficult to see it, too, as a marker of suburban middle-
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classness.)  How are we, then, to understand the film‘s extraordinary popularity?  Just as Ben 
tries to defy the expectations placed on him by ―the establishment,‖ is The Graduate that 
impossible thing: a genuinely popular countercultural text produced by Hollywood?  Or does it, 
in its own tacit ways, reaffirm conventional fantasies?  Had the counterculture become, 
paradoxically, dominant?  
We might surmise, given the numbers of youth who embraced The Graduate, and the 
feelings of intimacy it engendered in them, that it did not avoid urgent social issues, but 
presented a story sufficiently abstracted to allow issues to be projected onto Ben (thus, ironically, 
aligning the spectator with the adults of the film who consistently project their desires onto Ben).  
We learn almost no specific information about Ben.  We are told he went to a ―big Eastern 
college‖ and was an award-winning student, but we never find out his area of study.  The film 
does not make explicit why he and Elaine become close, or what business their fathers run 
together.  Ben cannot articulate why he needs to rebel against anyone over thirty, and, as an 
audience, we do not demand it of him.  When Mr. Robinson (Murray Hamilton) confronts Ben 
for sleeping with his wife, and then his daughter, he asks, ―Is there something I‘ve said that‘s 
caused this contempt, or is it just the things I stand for that you despise?‖  Without mentioning 
what precisely Mr. Robinson might stand for, the film is confident that we take his meaning; Mr. 
Robinson functions metonymically for patriarchy, upper middle classness, whiteness, age: in 
short, the establishment.  That the middle-aged are the antagonists in a coming of age tale might 
already alert the canny spectator that the story may not end in happy delirium.   
The Graduate is in many ways a simple film; it has no subplots and few special effects.  
It is composed of ten scenes rendered in lengthy takes, and (at the time of release) had no major 
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star performers to recommend it.  Upon its release, the film‘s unusual and striking visual 
compositions received much attention.  Richard Jameson claims:  
Students of film history and film style can cite milestones till the cows come home, but 
for the millions who never gave a thought to matters like camera placement or shot 
duration or the focal length of lenses, no other film in going-on-seven-decades had so 
decisively or deliciously made so many people notice the kinds of selection and design 
that can go into making the movie experience. (12) 
 
Visually, the film borrows from expressionist film history, and, accordingly, much of its imagery 
contributes to the spectator‘s understanding of Ben‘s interior life.  Ben sees his parents‘ world in 
black and white terms; it is colorless, simple, glossy, and, to him, unappealing.  Many of the 
film‘s interiors, such as his parents‘ and the Robinsons‘ homes, appear in sleek blacks and 
whites—a feature that gained import after color film, which had finally become standard in the 
1960s due to significant advances in color film stock (the separate Oscars for color and black-
and-white cinematography were done away with in 1967).
68
  Ben‘s parents also wear mostly 
black and white, while Mrs. Robinson dresses in predatory animal prints.  Filmed in Panavision, 
the Pabstian angles, overlap edits, surface reflections, use of rack focus, masking shots, telephoto 
close-ups shot from yards away, etc. all deserve analysis, but space prohibits that here.  Its 
monochromatic backgrounds (not just white, black, or gray, but even its shots of water) invoke 
ideas related to silence, such as emptiness or darkness, an idea highlighted by the opening lyrics 
―The Sounds of Silence‖: ―Hello, Darkness, my old friend.  I‘ve come to talk with you again...‖    
The story of Ben‘s maturation is the story of his anxiety with speaking, and his inability 
to articulate what he wants to say links his desire for change with his desire to speak.  His desires 
are sutured together, as is our perspective with Ben‘s.  Ben‘s strained efforts to speak are not 
indicative of an essential quality of his personality; after all, one of the few details we learn about 
him is that he was a champion debater.  His silence points to the existence of something beyond 
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his power to say.  And although members of the older generation fail to acknowledge his silence 
as an ―utterance,‖ as saying something, we, as spectators, do not.  The film‘s narrative trajectory 
relies on our desire—based on just these silent moments—for Ben to successfully rebel.   
To look at the act of utterance is to look at the constitution of character, for it is through 
actions that the character comes to be.  The Graduate challenges its spectator to contemplate the 
limit of what can constitute a character‘s utterance by exhibiting the limit case of silence.  (Let 
me be clear: I am talking about an action attributed to the character, not the actor.  The register 
on which the actor performs an act or delivers a line is a discussion for another time—
specifically, chapters four and six.)  The film presents silence as a place where how the spectator 
knows merges with what she knows.  In a film, the representation of silence is also its 
performance.  Unlike the visual image on the screen, with the aural image, there is no voluptuous 
suggestion of more just beyond the frame‘s edge.  The film reflects on the cinematic presentation 
of characters‘ utterances, opening up further questions of what counts as ―realistic‖ speech in 
film, as well as how we understand—or hear—the relationship between a character and her 
utterances.
69
  In this way, the film asks what it is that characters do when they utter, which is also 
a question of what characters are—for the spectator.   
 
The Critical Reception of, and Confusion about, The Graduate 
 
The Graduate premiered to positive reviews—even raves—(though there were 
exceptions, such as Time magazine‘s dismissive piece).  According to The New Yorker columnist 
Jacob Brackman, most critics were ―wild about [The Graduate],‖ including Stanley Kauffman, 
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 If there is a term regarding the aural that connotes what ―illusionism‖ or ―transparency‖ has for discussions of 
cinematic images‘ potential for reflexivity, I suspect it must be ―clarity.‖  This term would indicate the fidelity of the 
sound to our knowledge of its source.  Is it a coincidence that we also use this term to refer to arguments that we find 
intelligible?  We say that a phone line is ―clear‖ if what we hear ―really‖ sounds like our experience of a friend‘s 
unmediated voice.  This raises another problem of understanding the aural in visual terms, since the spectator 
typically will not have any experience of an actor‘s unmediated voice.   
  
69 
who calls it a ―milestone in American film history‖ (34).  In his final column for the New York 
Times (he was run out of critical town by his peers for failing to see Bonnie and Clyde‘s 
brilliance), Bosley Crowther calls The Graduate one of the year‘s best films and ―one of the best 
seriocomic social satires we‘ve had from Hollywood since Preston Sturges was making them‖ 
(quoted in Harris, 380).  In a most insightful review, a young Roger Ebert lauds the film as ―the 
funniest American comedy of the year… because it has a point of view.  That is to say, it is 
against something‖ (quoted in Harris, 381).   
Then, as 1968 wore on, the movie became, says Brackman, ―a cultural phenomenon—a 
nearly mandatory movie experience‖ (34).  The film‘s popularity compelled critics to return to 
the film to re-consider their early notices, for, surely, nothing so popular with ―the masses‖ could 
have deserved critical praise.  Writing in July of 1968 (over six months after the film‘s release), 
Brackman writes: ―the film seems to be asking what it means to be a promising young man in 
America today.  What does it mean to be twenty-one, with a high-quality education behind you 
and a brilliant future ahead of you?‖ (36).  He goes on to say that that The Graduate‘s set-up—
―What is Benjamin going to do with himself?‖—―is fine material for a story, because what was 
once a predicament confined to the sons of a tiny elite has become a mass predicament in 
middle-class America‖ (36).  Writing with the conviction that his readers understand the extant 
generation divide, Brackman believes that if Ben were not in such a predicament he would ―not 
even [be] recognizable as a youth,‖ for it would be ―preposterous‖ for Ben to share his parents‘ 
values (36-37).   
Brackman claims that, ―The Graduate, although it is terrific fun to watch, begins to fall 
apart under reflection‖ (38).  He motivates his twenty-six page reading—which remains the 
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film‘s most in-depth critical treatment—by detailing the film‘s financial accomplishments.70  He 
quotes Joseph Levine (president of Embassy Pictures, which released the movie), who, certain 
the ―receipts still haven‘t peaked,‖ said, ―It‘s absolutely incredible.  There‘s no way to describe 
it.  It‘s like an explosion‖ (34).  Connecting the dots, Brackman concludes:  
The Graduate seems to be telling us that the public has been underrated.  Due weight 
having been given to such factors as economic achievement, popularity at different age 
and social levels, and critical reception by mass and elite media, it is clearly the biggest 
success in the history of movies.  Whatever is authentic or meretricious in The Graduate 
must reflect what is authentic or meretricious in our sentiment about its themes, and 
perhaps even in America‘s current conceptions of itself. (34) 
 
Is The Graduate, Brackman goes on to ask, a source of pride or shame; is it earning its winnings 
or picking Americans‘ pockets?  His subsequent polemic is as interested in elucidating the 
meaning of the money as the meaning of the movie—an interest gradually shared by other 
critics.   
Although ambivalent about the value of the text, Brackman describes The Graduate as a 
phenomenon instrumental for giving American audiences license to feel the right to claim a 
cinematic culture: ―Though we all identify European movies by naming their directors, film 
buffs who refer to American movies that way have seemed a little pedantic… But The Graduate 
is, definitively, the Mike Nichols movie.  In fact, it has given everybody the chance to be a 
movie buff; that is, to talk about the director‖ (41).  The critic for the Christian Science Monitor 
wrote: ―[Nichols]… has [hereby] announced his candidacy for the upper chamber of filmmakers 
now occupied by Fellini, Truffaut, Antonioni, and others of their caliber‖ (quoted in Brackman, 
41).  Similarly, another wrote: ―Everybody asks why the Americans don‘t make movies the way 
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 This bit of gossip seems to perfectly encapsulate the shift in critical attitudes toward Nichols: In 1967, The New 
Yorker film critic Penelope Gilliat (screenwriter of Sunday Bloody Sunday [John Schlesinger, 1971] and ex-wife of 
John Osborne) dated him, and by 1968, the magazine published Brackman‘s lengthy diatribe (Harris, 334).  
Incidentally, Gilliat was one of the first critics to ―get‖ Bonnie and Clyde.  Mark Harris describes how The Graduate 
and Bonnie and Clyde were regarded companion pieces, ―allied as indictments of the status quo‖ (393).   
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Europeans do, right?  Okay, buddies, here‘s European moviemaking done right in the heart of 
American movieville‖ (quoted in Brackman, 41).  The irony that Europeans built the notion of 
the auteur from Hollywood directors aside, Brackman‘s observation helps us understand the 
importance of The Graduate‘s reception to Nichols‘ reputation.  Tracing America‘s insecurity 
about its culture back to the early nineteenth century ―when Continental literati scoffed, ‗Who 
ever read an American book?‘,‖ Brackman argues that, ―[a]t least since the end of the Second 
World War… American entertainment has been forced back into the shadow of European art‖ 
(42).  Thus, desperate for our own ―film genius,‖ Brackman places that mantle—―an immense 
task, granted‖—upon Nichols (42).  The Graduate and Nichols, were seen, to paraphrase John 
Kennedy‘s 1963 inaugural address, as the ―last best hope‖ for a respectable American film 
culture, which Brackman paradoxically measured by European standards.   
Of course, Brackman only places Nichols upon this pedestal to knock him off.  He is 
uncomfortable with the idea of any American auteur, for despite his admiration for the 
individual auteurs of Europe, auteurism smacks of elitism inappropriate to a truly American 
artist.  Was Nichols, Brackman wonders, influenced by the French New Wave or did he steal 
from it?  Is The Graduate original, homage, pastiche or derivative dross?  It is clear that, for 
Brackman (and his critical contemporaries), whatever the film is, and whoever Nichols is, must 
be established through a comparison to European films and their auteurs.   
Indeed, The Graduate pays explicit homage to European New Wave cinema, such as the 
cameo appearance of Eddra Gale (who played Saraghina in Frederico Fellini‘s 8 ½ [1963]) as 
Elaine‘s bus-mate.71   Ben and Elaine‘s conversation in his red Alfa Romeo (an allusion to the 
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 8 ½  meant a lot to Nichols, as did Seraghina, who inspired Nichols to talk about the importance of accuracy and 
detail in character types: ―When [Fellini is] on the button about Seraghina, I know he knew Seraghina and I know he 
re-created her accurately.  I don‘t mean literally, but accurately.  And when he got her accurately, I remembered her 
too, though I never met her‖ (Gelmis, 290).   
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car in Jean-Luc Godard‘s Contempt [1963]), resembles a wonderful scene in Michelangelo 
Antonioni‘s La Notte (1961) where two potential lovers talk in a car and all we hear is rain.  
Conceptually, The Graduate acknowledges Ingmar Bergman‘s films from that period: The 
Silence (1963) also begins with an extended close-up of one of its protagonists travelling (on a 
train rather than a plane).  It, too, delves into the impossibility of real spoken communication 
(through characters refusing to listen to one another, characters with different native tongues, 
characters ignoring each other), and even shares an oedipally tinged relationship, here between 
an actual mother and son.  Even bleaker is Bergman‘s Persona (1966), a film Nichols admits to 
watching obsessively before filming The Graduate.  It examines the act of utterance further than 
The Graduate through its two heroines, one of whom is an actress that goes mute (arguably of 
her own volition).  And the title of The Graduate‘s theme song, ―The Sound of Silence,‖ is also 
the English title of a play by Jean Cocteau, Le Bell Indifférent, adapted for the screen in 1957 by 
Cocteau and Jacques Demy.
72
   
With the release of The Graduate, Andrew Sarris sardonically refers to Nichols as 
―Michelangelo Nichols,‖ a nickname intended to suggest his bastardization of European art 
cinema for the American masses (Confessions, 327).  Sarris does not look kindly on the film‘s 
relationship to European cinema, accusing it of purloining its most interesting material.  Sarris 
attributes the existence of The Graduate specifically to the genealogy of 8½, Jules and Jim, and 
Eclipse (Antonioni, 1962), whose ―chic tendencies… allow their narratives to be eroded by 
lyrical essays on their own feelings‖ (Politics, 186).  He admits that his critical sensibility during 
the 1960s became divided into ―two branches, the historical—American cinema—and the other 
prophetic—the European innovators‖ (Politics, 184).  As an American film, The Graduate could 
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only be classical/historical or derivative; innovation and prophecy were beyond its reach, and its 
position was worsened for daring to be sincere and refer to the European avant-garde.   
In their piece for Film Quarterly, published in the spring of 1968, Stephen Farber and 
Estelle Changas begin: ―Mike Nichols‘ name is so magical today that even if The Graduate had 
been the worst movie of the year, people would be buzzing reverently about it‖ (37).  As it 
happens, they do not think it is the worst movie, but they certainly do not rave about it—
generally because they find it implausible.  They are confused because ―[Ben] is supposed to be 
a champion college debater, but he can hardly form a sentence‖ (37).  They complain that, even 
though ―Nothing is going on in his head… audiences cluck over him and rush to give him credit 
for understanding anxieties that are actually beyond his grasp‖ (38).  They blast ―audiences eager 
to believe that all young people are sensitive and alienated and that all old people are sell-outs or 
monsters,‖ for permitting ―Hoffman‘s mannerisms and Paul Simon‘s poetry to convince them of 
a depth in Ben that the part, as written, simply does not contain‖ (my italics, 38).  Farber and 
Changas demonstrate the failure of 1960s critics to attend to the film as performed, which is 
important for recognizing its silences as meaningful—regardless of how and whether they were 
indicated on the page of the shooting script.   
Farber and Changas‘ dissatisfaction evinces a desire for a ―counter-cultural‖ text to offer 
a solution, not just an indictment.  Like other critics, they mistake the film‘s popularity for the 
incitation of warm, positive feelings.  The Graduate does not show a youth finding a successful 
way to step outside his society—instead, it offers a cynical, dystopic cliff towards which 
disenchanted youths gravitated.  Farber and Changas cite, and mock, Nichols‘ statement that Ben 
and Elaine are ―not to be envied at the film‘s conclusion‖ (41).  Ultimately, Farber and Changas 
find the film ―hollow‖ and wonder if Nichols has any talent, saying ―we‘re not going to find out 
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as long as an evasive gimmicky hoax like The Graduate is trumpeted as a milestone in American 
film history‖ (41).  Critic John Simon calls Ben and Elaine ―just as specious in their heroism‖ as 
Bonnie (Faye Dunaway) and Clyde (Warren Beatty), and ―seethed at its ‗oversimplification, 
overelaboration, inconsistency, eclecticism, obviousness, pretentiousness‘ as well as its ‗rock 
bottom‘ music‖ (Harris, 380-392). 
Many critics took the film‘s success in a capitalist market to undermine the possibility 
that the film itself could maintain an anti-capitalist thrust, an opinion that compelled critics to 
literally re-write the text.  Thus, they saw it as one with a decidedly happy ending, stopping at 
the point Ben and Elaine lock the older generation into the church and flee.  Critics were 
inexplicably (and, really, inexcusably) blind and deaf to the film‘s final images, and so, its 
narrative arc.  Sarris believes that the film journeys to an ―idealism reconfirmed‖ (Confessions, 
327); another asserts that ―Benjamin‘s long search for himself arrives at its payoff‖ (Brackman, 
40).  Kauffman writes, ―For once, a happy ending makes us feel happy‖ (quoted in Brackman, 
39).  Following along, Brackman assumes the ending to be cheerful, and so, is free to claim that 
the film fails to earn that satisfaction by leaning too heavily on Hollywood conventions of young 
love and Ross‘ prettiness as explanatory projections.  He finds the ending ―deeply illogical‖ (39), 
which, he thinks, undermines any advances the film manages to make up to that point with what 
he sarcastically calls a ―healthy American quality‖: ―However unnatural what led up to it may 
have been, they will have a proper wedding night!‖ (38).  ―Nichols cannot,‖ Brackman bemoans, 
―let us leave the theater feeling that nothing has changed, so he gives us what he thinks we want‖ 
(39).
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 This view persists in much of the scholarship that mentions the film; for example, Edward Rielly writes in his 
book on American culture in the 1960s that, ―the film ends with the young lovers heading off for a life of love and 
truth apart from the corruption of their elders‖ (187).   
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Influential critic Pauline Kael rails against what she sees as The Graduate‘s conventional 
appeals to the spectator to emotionally identify; specifically, she condemns the simplicity of ―the 
high school and college students identifying with… Dustin Hoffman‘s Benjamin‖ (125).  She 
classifies the film as particularly American, precisely because of its character-driven appeal, and 
compares it to a ―television commercial‖ (Harris, 380).  Kael is uncomfortable with the affective 
power of the film, for, by inviting emotions (and laughs in particular), Nichols ―lets the audience 
direct him,‖ which she calls ―demagoguery in the arts‖ (127).  Worried by an analyst who tells 
her that his patients talk about ―characters in movies like The Graduate with as much personal 
involvement as about their immediate problems (125),‖ Kael gripes that ―this way of reacting to 
movies as psychodrama used to be considered a pre-literate way of reacting but that now those 
considered ‗post-literate‘ are reacting like pre-literates‖ (125).  In her schematic, cinematic 
literacy is constituted in the very moment one works through the desire to perceive a character, 
in this case, Ben, as human.   
Throughout her writing, The Graduate is often Kael‘s example of a film that she finds 
overrated, significant only for exposing a specific moral and political moment in American 
cinema.  Kael believes that ―to talk about a movie like The Graduate in terms of movie technique 
is really a bad joke.  Technique at this level is not of any aesthetic importance; it‘s not the ability 
to achieve what you‘re after but the skill to find something acceptable,‖ and so, one must talk 
about ―a film like this in terms of what audiences enjoy it for‖ (Going Steady, 97).  For Kael, The 
Graduate exemplifies movies people ―fall for,‖ and which become ―cultural and psychological 
equivalents of watching a political convention‖ (Going Steady, 124).  She claims that it panders 
to an educated youth, who ironically, likes the same old ―trash.‖  She says,  
The small triumph of The Graduate was to have domesticated alienation and the 
difficulty of communication, by making what Benjamin is alienated from a middle-class 
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comic strip and making it absurdly evident that he has nothing to communicate… ―The 
Graduate‖ isn‘t a bad movie, it‘s entertaining… What‘s surprising is that so many people 
take it so seriously. (126) 
 
Kael is correct to identify ―the difficulty of communication‖ and Ben‘s trouble communicating 
as major concerns of the film.  She is wrong, however, to think that these topics are not to be 
taken seriously.   
Kael resents the spectator who identifies with Ben, who perceives him as a ―real‖ human.  
Writing in 1971, Stanley Cavell wonders what, exactly, the cinematic spectator is identifying 
with, and claims that Ben jars with the traditional Hollywood balance of audience identification 
by ―soliciting an investment of feeling in every inflection… out of all proportion to any feeling 
of his own‖ (78).  He says this investment pays off during the film‘s conclusion, as,  
the film finds ways to acknowledge indebtedness to, and thereby invoke the power of, 
several huge moments in the history of films about young love.  Sustaining himself in 
flight—speeding when he can, running when he can‘t, and in between gliding on new 
currents of psychic resourcefulness—Hoffman takes upon himself the Belmondo figure 
created in Breathless and lightened in That Man From Rio: a real modern hero, equal to 
his demand for happiness. (78) 
 
Here, not comparing Nichols to European directors, but Ben to characters from European 
(French) films, Cavell resists the idea that The Graduate (or Breathless [Jean-Luc Godard, 
1960]) ends happily, and states merely that Ben deserves happiness.  Cavell suggests that Ben is 
a character seeking to learn about himself, and that the limits of his ability to act are his primary 
dilemma (and the main tension needing resolution for the film to conclude). 
Cavell is right to observe that the generational conflict in The Graduate is a catalyst for 
the narrative trajectory in which Ben will explore his desires and abilities.  He exclaims that 
―Mike Nichols‘ and Dustin Hoffman‘s graduate is a miraculous appearance of the myth of youth 
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itself‖ (78).74  Cavell‘s description is reminiscent of Northrop Frye‘s history of comedy, which 
is, in large part, predicated upon mythical oppositions of age and youth.  Frye suggests that 
comedies‘ happy endings are usually generated by the late discovery of information and the 
conformation of society to the desires of the hero, the hero having generally worked toward 
―redeeming what is at once society and a bride‖ (185).  Adhering to these myths would suggest 
Ben is triumphant, winning bride and conquering social restrictions.  However, the film, unlike 
its critics, does not assume that a male who has won a bride and arguably independent social 
status has also achieved a happy ending.   
The character of Ben is not inconsistent; it matters that he is a champion debater who 
cannot form a sentence, who has reached a stage of inarticulateness.  Insofar as rebellion is an 
effort to achieve a political or social voice (one cannot consent to being governed without a 
voice), and to get that voice heard, Ben‘s struggle speaks to potential activists.  If we stop 
reading the film after the showdown at the church and do not look at—and listen to—the 
couple‘s long, silent drive to nowhere, we do not experience the complete film.  This ending of 
The Graduate revises Ben‘s entire quest to win Elaine, which is the form his rebellion takes, and 
cannot be properly understood if the spectator is not—and has not been—attending to the film‘s 
silences.   
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 Cavell extends the myth of youth to a modern notion of romance.  He writes that ―[s]o far as we can grant that 
[Ben and Elaine will remain together], the film reinstates the myth of modern marriage, which is the modern myth of 
romance‖ (79).  Critics noted similarities between The Graduate and classic Hollywood romantic comedies that 
would be foundational to Cavell‘s development in Pursuits of Happiness of the ―comedy of remarriage‖ genre, such 
as It Happened One Night (Frank Capra, 1934) and The Philadelphia Story (George Cukor, 1940), where the hero 
also snatches the bride at the altar (Brackman, 40).  Beyond the coupling, separation, and re-coupling of Ben and 
Elaine, The Graduate has much in common with the generic features Cavell notes, such as the presence of a ―green 
space‖ (a device derivative of Shakespeare‘s romantic comedies), a location lovers go to work out their problems.  
In The Graduate the University of California at Berkeley occupies this space, a point we will return to later.  
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The Resound of Silence in the 1960s 
Cavell draws on the fact that the film maintains an emphasis on Ben‘s perspective 
(barring one significant moment on his date with Elaine), to conjecture that, ―[i]t may be that 
what we are meant to be given is a series of projections from the graduate‘s point of view‖ (77).  
Speaking of the montage that occurs after Ben begins his affair with Mrs. Robinson, Cavell 
writes: 
This is clearly going on in the well-realized passage radiating his new experience of his 
body, shown in punning cuts between the hotel room and his parent‘s house and the 
swimming pool: the progress of his first habitual exploration of one woman, the way his 
body has become marked and charted with the knowledge of hers, enclosing him within a 
new skin of mood and gesture and odor and boredom and bristle which he may feel at his 
neck as he lies in bed at home, in his mouth as he takes to smoking in his room, in his 
shoulders and groin and legs as he floats on the Abercrombie and Fitch rubber raft, in his 
hands and nose and teeth as he drinks beer from a punched can.  (77)   
 
Cavell‘s infatuation with the expressive nature of Ben‘s body attests to the film‘s fascination 
with Ben‘s expressive possibilities.  Cavell continues: ―But the primacy of his private life, which 
wants to be the subject of the film, is also denied by the film‖ (77).  Cavell is right to say that the 
film wants to represent Ben‘s ―private life,‖ but is wrong to suggest his private life is ―denied by 
the film.‖  We cannot assume a character‘s silence merely displaces our attention onto his body‘s 
expressiveness.  What the film denies is the spectator‘s expectation of her Hollywood-given right 
to perceive a character‘s actions as unproblematically revealing a character‘s ―private life.‖  
Though Ben‘s interiority cannot be taken as self-evident, the true subject of the film is our 
wanting it to represent Ben‘s ―private life.‖   
As I quoted in the previous section, Cavell posits that the spectator‘s affective experience 
is out of proportion with Ben‘s; yet, in this passage, Cavell describes the figure of Ben as highly 
expressive.  Is Cavell contradicting himself?  For how can Ben be expressive without expressing 
something?  Can there be a contentless expression?  Is Ben‘s the empty performance of a poser?  
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Is there value to expressing qua expressing?  Cavell‘s reading raises the question of which 
actions we take to be expressive.  Cavell‘s analysis appears in his book The World Viewed 
(though its earliest incarnation is in a lecture series in May, 1968), which sustains a consistent 
emphasis on the relationships between character, performance, and the ―sound of the human 
voice‖—particularly in terms of its opposite—silence (147).75  Cavell‘s previous work, Must We 
Mean What We Say?,
76
 argues that, since learning the appropriate contexts for using words is 
part of learning the language, people must mean what they say.  That is, we can justifiably 
surmise meaning from the way sentences are used, beyond their literal meaning.
77
  This chapter 
will taxonomize the divergent silences present throughout The Graduate to consider how far we 
can apply Cavell‘s theory to cinema: must Ben mean what he does not say? 78 
Cavell suggests that one reason for the success of The Graduate is its undeniably witty 
dialogue.  For Cavell, witty dialogue is among ―the best film dialogue‖ because it provides 
―natural occasions on which silence is broken, and in which words do not go beyond their 
moment of saying; hence occasions on which silence naturally asserts itself.  For the world is 
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 The World Viewed concludes with the chapter, ―The Acknowledgment of Silence,‖ in which Cavell turns (again) 
to the topic of the human voice to note: ―I think this issue now underlies all the explorations in film to which I have 
alluded‖ (147).  William Rothman and Marian Keane‘s reading of Cavell helps account for his fascination with 
dialogue along similar lines: ―In exploring the ‗silence of the voice,‘ movies are exploring the limits of ordinary 
language, which is what modern philosophy, as Cavell understands and practices it, is exploring as well‖ (234).   
76
 This book, which contains his seminal readings of Endgame and King Lear, devotes many pages to the subject of 
performance and performed characters.  Indeed, in the preface of the 2002 edition, Cavell tells us he wrote it 
concomitantly to The World Viewed and advises they be understood in tandem.  
77
 For example, he notes that we say ―The boy was responsible for breaking the window‖ but would not say ―The 
boy was responsible for finishing his homework in good time‖ (3-6).  Similarly, we know someone must mean there 
is something peculiar about my clothes if they ask, ―Do you dress the way you do voluntarily?‖ (9).    
78
 Cavell uses the example of a horn to claim that it matters little that on-screen characters‘ utterances are recorded: 
when we hear a horn, we know we are hearing a horn.  We might correct him to say we hear the sound of the horn, 
and so, he is mistaken to apply his reasoning to human onscreen performance because the character is never a 
possible referent.  A sound performed by an onscreen human character can be read on two registers: the character‘s 
and the performer‘s.  When we hear Ben talk, we can be aware that Hoffman is ―playing‖ his voice, performing Ben 
with it.  This awareness brings with it an awareness of Hoffman and that he has a voice which is not Ben‘s.  It is 
necessary to maintain this distinction, for it is not just a question of the spectator being asked to attend 
simultaneously to the actor and character, but is a question of hearing characters‘ utterances as meant.  It is also 
necessary to focus on utterances as constituted by (and constituting) the character if we are to allow the possibility 
that silence may be an utterance.   
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silent to us; the silence is merely forever broken‖ (150).  We can surmise that, at least for Cavell, 
filmic silence can be taken as both representational and as realistic.  But if the world is 
sometimes silent, it is not obvious that silence is meaningful.  It becomes meaningful in those 
cases when we expect the silence to be broken and it is not—as in the case of a character not 
uttering.   
 
Character, Dialogue and the Theatrical 
The characters‘ dialogue was primary in the production of The Graduate, often serving as 
the impetus or catalyst for other artistic choices, including Nichols‘ style of direction and the 
creation of characters‘ behavior.  Recently, Nichols has recalled his ―key memory‖ of rehearsing 
The Graduate.  Bancroft was struggling to find the character, and she approached him, asking 
him for his advice.  He says,  
She asked ‗Do you like my character[ization]?‘ And I said, ‗No, she‘s much too sweet.‘ 
Annie said, ‗Oh, really. What‘s she like?‘  And I said, ‗Well I can‘t tell you what she‘s 
like, but I can tell you what she sounds like.  She sounds like this, [snapping] ―Benjamin, 
will you drive me home, please?‖‘ She said, ‗Oh. Oh, I can do that. I know what that is. 
That‘s anger.‘ (The Graduate DVD)   
 
Nichols also tells of Bancroft‘s character being grounded in her reading of the line, ―I guess so‖ 
after Ben supposes she ―lost interest‖ in art.  For Nichols, the way she uttered that line ―was 
everything;‖ it revealed that ―[s]he just hates herself for having gone for the money, and she‘s 
punishing herself with everything she does.‖   
Nichols had great difficulty casting Ben.
79
  Eventually, he remembered seeing Hoffman 
as a handicapped, cross-dressing German in Harry Noon and Night and decided to test him.
80
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 In an interview with the New York Times in 1967, Nichols complained: ―It's the hardest thing I ever tried to cast… 
These people are so far removed from stock characters‖ (Bart).  When Hoffman worried that he was not the type to 
play a Californian suburbanite, Nichols said, ―Maybe he‘s Jewish inside‖ (Kashner, 425).  
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Similarly, Dustin Hoffman‘s vocalization grew out of Nichols‘ direction.  Nichols demonstrated 
for him his own habit of whimpering (Gelmis, 291).  The film‘s writer, and Nichols‘ frequent 
collaborator, Buck Henry,
81
 remembers that, ―[Hoffman] does a lot of Nichols in the film.  The 
―hmm‖ is a Nichols habit, which he didn‘t appropriate so much as I think Mike gave it to him. 
And a lot of the sort of disaffected readings are the way Nichols talks sometimes. Maybe in the 
present-day world he does it a few too many times, but it‘s not like anything else‖ (Schwartz, 4).     
The dialogue, as delivered in the film, also played no small part in the film‘s success.  
Henry remembers going to see it in a theater for the first time:  
I had heard it was a success, but I went to a theater to see it on 57
th
 Street. I was amazed, 
even a little appalled, at the fact that not only was the theater filled with people, but it was 
filled with people who had already seen it and knew the lines!  So I was sitting, I think, 
on the steps, because it was an overflow crowd, and all the key lines, the gag lines, were 
being spoken about ten seconds before they came up! So it was bizarre, to sit there and 
hear 500 or 600 people saying ―plastics‖ all at once…I realized what a success it was 
because people had seen it a number of times, which was before the tradition of kids 
seeing hit films over and over again really had started. (Schwartz, 3) 
 
Henry also connects the film‘s central concern with alienation to the film‘s dialogue and visual  
 
technique—especially Nichols‘ use of long takes:  
 
Characters are allowed to sit there and stand there and walk there, so that you can assess 
their mood and begin to feel the way the character feels—since the theme from the 
beginning was, what is it like to live under water? What‘s the feeling like? What‘s the 
alienated feeling that, if not all of us, a large percentage of us feel when we‘re 18, 19, 20 
years old and have to talk to adults who live in a different world that we don‘t understand 
and really don‘t want to, and that everything comes through a kind of barrier? So, the 
little guy in the fish tank is sort of a theme for the way the hero and the way ostensibly 
we feel, that feeling of being isolated from social behavior that‘s accepted. And also then 
it gives the excuse for the peculiar dialogue that‘s seventy or eighty percent of the time 
just a little off what people really say. It‘s not deconstructed so much as—I don‘t know 
what the word is. It‘s like, it‘s almost like it‘s translated. (Schwartz, 3) 
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 Significantly, for this role, Hoffman was compared to stonefaced Buster Keaton in Walter Kerr‘s career-making 
rave (Harris, 272).  Keaton starred in Beckett‘s Film (Alan Schneider, 1965).  
81
 Guild technicalities allow Calder Willingham to share screenwriting credit, although Nichols rejected his script 
outright. Nichols wanted a story ―about a man who is fighting, doing anything not to be sucked into the middle 
class‖ and Willingham could not deliver.   
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Henry‘s words invite us to think about how to classify utterances in The Graduate.  His idea that 
the film‘s dialogue is ―translated,‖ suggests it undergoes some sort of transformation.  The film‘s 
editor, Sam O‘Steen, who recalls people exclaiming that they saw the film twenty-five times 
(68), has said he cut the film for reactions—not for the lines (65).  Seeing how a line was heard 
by another character was more important than seeing how it was said.  That characters in The 
Graduate are never quite able to grasp the meaning of other characters‘ utterances bears out his 
account, which also speaks indirectly to the importance of silence as a case for such 
indeterminacy, and for attending to the performance of utterances, to how words are uttered.
82
    
The verbosity, long takes, and often static camera of Nichols‘ first film, Who’s Afraid of 
Virginia Woolf?, provoked strong charges of theatricality.
83
  The Graduate did little to dispel this 
reproach.  For example, the scene in which Ben wants to talk to Mrs. Robinson before having sex 
has no visible cut for over six minutes.  In his review of The Graduate, Sarris‘ scant praise for 
the film is reserved for elements that might still be regarded as less than cinematic (that is, 
distinctively visual), saying that, ―Nichols is at his best in getting new readings out of old lines‖ 
(Confessions, 261).  However, it is unclear that dialogue—and silence—is present in the same 
way in cinema and in theater.  In the 1960s, Anglo-American theater was undergoing its own 
radical transformations due to the production of work by writers such as Samuel Beckett, John 
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 That The Graduate brings together concern for the relationships between cinematic performance, characters, and 
sound is affirmed by one of the more brilliant meditations on these subjects‘ relationships, Todd Haynes‘ I’m Not 
There (2007).  This film makes direct reference to The Graduate when an aging bellhop, played by a little person, 
calls him ―Mr. Gladstone.‖  This is the alias Ben used at the Taft Hotel during his affair with Mrs. Robinson and, 
when he goes with Elaine, a bellhop walks by, also played by a little person, calling him by his alias.  
83
 For example, Sarris laments that ―Nichols has actually committed all the classic errors of the sophisticated stage 
director let loose on the unsophisticated movies‖ (Confessions, 261).  For more evidence, see Kael‘s essay, ―Filmed 
Theater‖ (Going Steady, 228-236).  Cinephiles, such as Sarris, were not the only ones complaining about Nichols‘ 
transition to directing films.  In an open letter published in the New York Review of Books in 1967, critic Walter Kerr 
and playwright Edmund Wilson pinned their hopes for American theater on Nichols. 
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Osborne, and Harold Pinter, who were invested in the cross-pollination of theater and cinema.
84
  
In this light, the opposition of theater and film appears somewhat tautologous.  Both Beckett and 
Pinter already had extensive experience in both cinema and theater.  Beckett wrote the reflexive 
film, Film, starring Buster Keaton in 1965.  Pinter wrote screenplays throughout the 1960s, such 
as The Servant (Joseph Losey, 1963) and The Pumpkin Eater (Jack Clayton, 1964), which starred 
Anne Bancroft.  Questions of silence were particularly relevant for these writers, and it was 
becoming an important theme in ―high-brow‖ American art more broadly, evident in works such 
as John Cage‘s 4’33” (a musical piece in which the performer does not play a note, turning the 
environmental sounds the audience hears for four minutes and thirty-three seconds into a 
composition).   
Beckett‘s views on language came to dominate American theater at the same time 
Nichols took over as its star director (as I chronicled in the introduction, in 1966, Nichols had 
four concurrent hits on and off Broadway).  As Nichols moved from being the most successful 
director of American theater to the most successful director in Hollywood, he was coming from a 
theatrical atmosphere of modern alienation stemming from Beckett‘s work—which is entrenched 
in philosophizing about silence, communication, and the act of utterance.
85
  Beckett‘s short play 
Krapp’s Last Tape premiered on Broadway in 1968, sharing the bill with The Zoo Story, written 
by Edward Albee, the author of Virginia Woolf?.  Krapp’s is explicitly about hearing recorded 
utterances—it theatricalizes listening to words (here, one‘s own past words, perhaps).  Krapp‘s 
director, Alan Schneider (who had directed Film), also directed the original Broadway 
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 The provocative British theater critic Kenneth Tynan was particularly instrumental in changing the state of Anglo-
American theater by first valorizing the works of John Osborne and Samuel Beckett.  In 1966, Tynan (who was 
something of an eccentric recluse) named Nichols on the list of his very few ―close friends‖ which appeared in the 
New York Times.  
85
 This is dissimilar to the attitude toward alienation in Europe, which was preoccupied with another important 
theatrical theorist and dramatist, Bertolt Brecht. 
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production of Virginia Woolf? (1962) of which Nichols was a great fan.  As will become clear in 
our examination of Nichols and May‘s comedy in chapter four, Beckett‘s plays, Act Without 
Words I and II, and Endgame, are also relevant to Nichols‘ art, as is his extensive work on radio, 
such as the play, Words and Music (which is reminiscent of a Nichols and May album, 
Improvisations to Music).  Although his landmark Waiting for Godot opened in 1956, Beckett‘s 
cultural recognition was strongest in the late 1960s, culminating in a Nobel Prize for Literature in 
1969.  
Nichols worked on—and with—plays by Beckett since he performed in Waiting for 
Godot during his youth in Chicago.  In 1988, he directed a production of Godot for Lincoln 
Center Theater produced by Beckett‘s own producer, Gregory Mosher.  Avowing ―I‘ve wanted 
to [direct] Godot since I first read it, in the 50‘s, when it was first published in the Grove Press 
edition‖ Nichols consulted with the reclusive Beckett on the production, and the latter wrote 
variations for Nichols‘ production and even gave Nichols special dispensation to tamper with his 
text should he so desire (Gussow, 1988).  Nichols did make a few changes; he justified them by 
saying, ―Beckett‘s Godot isn‘t placed in America; mine is‖ (Gussow, 1988).  Mel Gussow, a 
friend of Beckett‘s and a critic for the New York Times, said it was the biggest theatrical event of 
the year, and had been anticipated for years in the American theater community (Gussow, 1988).   
Nichols has also later worked with Pinter.  The friends collaborated on the film Wit 
(2001), which Nichols directed and in which Pinter performed.
86
  Pinter‘s dramas tend to feature 
ambivalent characters struggling over, and through, words and silences.  Pinter burst on the 
theatrical scene in New York in 1967 with The Homecoming (which returned to Broadway in 
2007).  Pinter‘s experimental play, Silence, was produced in New York in 1970.  In it, as in The 
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 The pair also developed Remains of the Day, which Nichols was to direct from a script by Pinter.  Eventually, 
Nichols decided to produce the film, and handed over directorial reigns to James Ivory, who chose a script by Ruth 
Prawer Jhabvala.   
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Graduate, silence is both a theme and a technique.  Initially, critics expressed frustration at 
Pinter‘s lack of narrative explanation—a complaint echoed in the critical charges of 
implausibility hurled at The Graduate (e.g., Ben and Elaine‘s affection for one another).  Pinter 
challenged univocal, comfortable notions of causation and motivation.  Discussing his 
screenplay for Accident (Joseph Losey, 1967) in 1966, Pinter said that, ―in this film everything 
happens, nothing is explained.  It has been pared down and down, all unnecessary words and 
actions are eliminated‖ (quoted in Cima, 46).  In ―Acting on the Cutting Edge: Pinter and the 
Syntax of Cinema,‖ Gay Gibson Cima describes Pinter‘s ―tendency to treat the stage as if it were 
a film screen‖ in the 1960s (43).     
Using silence on-screen and stage, Pinter was invested in allowing the audience a 
plurality of interpretations, and advanced the art of performing accordingly.  Making much of 
Pinter‘s use of silence in his study of Pinter‘s characters, William Free reckons: ―The fact that 
the leg moves and the lips speak is more important than what either say‖ (5).  In plays such as 
Oldtimes (in which the male protagonist is a filmmaker), Pinter, Cima argues, uses cinematic 
principles to escape overly determining characters‘ motivations (43).  Rooted in Eisenstein‘s 
theory of montage, ―Pinter often posits situation A, allows for a pause or silence, then presents 
situation B, at which time the actor must signal that the audience is to create situation C, a 
synthesis of A and B which does not necessarily exist on stage‖ (Cima, 48).  This ―requires that 
the actor cue the audience to go beyond its initial impression that the scene has stopped during 
the pauses and silences‖ (Cimea, 48).  Characters‘ actions collide to evince a third concept, one 
locatable for the spectator in the silences.  Pinter once said, ―between my lack of biographical 
data about [my characters], and the ambiguity of what they say there lies a territory which is not 
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only worthy of exploration but which it is compulsory to explore‖ (quoted in Cima, 49).  The 
same could be said of Ben.   
 Another aspect of Pinter‘s approach to characters‘ motivations is particularly relevant to 
our discussion: ―Instead of directly addressing the object of their desires, the characters in [a 
Pinter play] drive their action through one character to another. This oblique approach to 
interaction places the spectator at a remove from the third actor, the object of the action at any 
given moment‖ (Cima, 47).  We could easily say the same of characters in The Graduate (and, 
indeed, many Nichols‘ films).  For instance, Mrs. Robinson‘s desire for Ben is more about her 
bitterness towards her life choices, sexless marriage, and husband than it is about her attraction 
to the young man (how else can we explain her unsolicited statements to Ben, such as ―I‘m an 
alcoholic, did you know that?‖); Ben‘s relationships with Mrs. Robinson and Elaine are more 
about his desire to rebel against his parents than an affinity with either woman.  
The relationship between cinema and theater has been a topic of debate since cinema first 
emerged, and deepened as sound technology developed.  Indeed, when Hollywood converted to 
sound, it harvested directors, such as George Cukor, from Broadway.  This debate was rekindled 
in the 1960s (possibly as a result of the publication of a selection of André Bazin‘s writings, 
translated into English, What is Cinema?, which included an examination of the relationship 
between theater and cinema).
87
  In her 1969 essay, ―Theater and Film,‖ Susan Sontag objects to 
the way that ―[t]he history of cinema is often treated as the history of its emancipation from 
theatrical models‖ (100).  Sontag complains that films from The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (Robert 
Wiene, 1920) to Carl Dreyer‘s Gertrud (1964) have been derided as ―theatrical,‖ in part due to 
their ―talkiness‖ which is converted into a sensibility thought anti-cinematic, ―a sensibility both 
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 This volume also includes his famous pronouncement that, ―of course, cinema is also a language‖ (16), a 
statement that begs the question of what counts as an expression of cinematic language, and accordingly, what does 
not.  
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pretentious and reactionary‖ (103).88  She explains: ―Usually, the success of movie versions of 
plays is measured by the extent to which the script rearranges and displaces the action and deals 
less than respectfully with the spoken text‖ (105).   
Sontag, however, offers a different view, advocating ―that films with complex or formal 
dialogue, films in which the camera is static or in which the action stays indoors, are not 
necessarily theatrical—whether derived from plays or not‖ (106).  Thus, she does not see the 
―essence‖ of film in relationship to montage, perspective, or mobile cameras.  While she 
maintains that montage (for her, ―the relation of a ‗shot‘ to the one that preceded it and the one 
that comes after it‖) is the principle cinematic unit, she denies the claim that there could be a 
―peculiarly ‗cinematic‘ as opposed to ‗theatrical‘ mode of linking images,‖ and ―positing 
otherwise leads to overvaluing discontinuous film syntax‖ (108-109).  Indeed, if cinema is taken 
to be a visual medium based on juxtaposing images fundamentally conceived in light (a notion 
still locatable today, particularly with scholars of avant-garde cinema), then sound and silence 
fall outside the set of concerns aesthetically available to cinema.  But cinema gives us silence 
represented, at a distance that allows for its contemplation; in terms of the spectator‘s experience, 
silence occurs on-screen and in the exhibition space (unlike the shared silence occurring in the 
spectator‘s experience of a live play).   
Sontag writes in ―The Aesthetics of Silence‖ (1967) that, ―‗silence‘ never ceases to imply 
its opposite and to depend on its presence: just as there is no ‗up‘ without ‗down‘ or ‗left‘ 
without ‗right‘, so one must acknowledge a surrounding environment of sound or language in 
order to recognize silence‖ (11).  For this reason, ―Silence remains, inescapably, a form of 
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 It is important to note that the distinction between theater and film, for cinema theorists such as Siegfried 
Kracauer or Erwin Panofsky, is not just about aesthetic devices.  They argue that theater delivers artifice while 
cinema is committed to representing reality.  This reasoning, according to Sontag, advances a definite ―political-
moral position,‖ where cinema is offered as the democratic art: ―Cinema, at once high art and popular art, is cast as 
the art of the authentic‖ (102-103).  
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speech (in many instances, of complaint or indictment) and an element in a dialogue‖ (11).  
Sontag comments on the modern trend to expose the workings of language, commending writers 
such as Beckett and Franz Kafka, as ―the power of their language derives precisely from the fact 
that the meaning is so bare‖ (29).  Like Cavell, she argues that a timely fascination with striving 
for silence emanates from ―the contemporary ambivalence toward language,‖ which is manifest 
in artists‘ desire to reach ―beyond‖ art‘s capacities toward what quickly becomes an anti-art art 
movement (21).  Sontag discerns that ―the subliminal idea that it might be possible to out-talk 
language, or to talk oneself into silence‖ lies in Beckett (27).89  She quotes Beckett‘s view of 
what he believes it would behoove modern art to confront: ―the expression that there is nothing 
to express, nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, together 
with the obligation to express‖ (12).   
For Cavell, ―Talkies are capable of conveying the reality of the unsayable by showing 
experience that is beyond the reach of words‖ (Rothman and Keane, 238).  It is through an 
analysis of Beckett‘s Endgame that Cavell arrives at this conclusion.  Cavell applauds Beckett‘s 
ability to find endpoints of communication, ultimately facing its impossibility.  What Cavell‘s 
reading of Beckett indicates, and Sontag‘s essay corroborates, is a timely doubt about the 
possibility of communication.  Words were no longer imbued with transparent meaning, but even 
if authentic communication lay beyond the pale, that does not mean that we should disregard the 
ways speech is presented.   
In this way, The Graduate clearly shares concerns with its Anglo-American theatrical 
context, but rather than just advance a skeptical position on the possibility of communication, 
The Graduate explores the degree to which, by applying these ideas, breaking dialogic 
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 The desire to ―out-talk language‖ is evident in many Nichols‘ films, not least of Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?  
I will consider this film in depth in chapter five. 
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conventions in cinema could be seen as a political act.  The ambivalence of The Graduate‘s 
ending offers a bleak, and hopeful, position; for despite communication‘s impossibility, the act 
of speaking, the performance, still has value.  When Ben enacts his rebellion by pleading for 
Elaine to run away with him, the fact that he does not scream ―I love you‖ or some such 
protestation is telling.  He can only scream ―ELAINE!‖ because that is all there is to say; rather, 
it doesn‘t matter what he says as long as he says something.   
Colin MacCabe points out that the rejection of representation in favor of performance is 
―the key to much of the 60s aesthetics… at the core of the most innovative political movement of 
the decade: situationism… [and] the key term for the most important philosophy of the decade‖: 
J.L. Austin‘s How to Do Things With Words (76).  He continues: ―For [Austin], we are our 
performances‖ (78), a notion that is reflected in Nichols‘ emphasis on characters as the ―result‖ 
of a series of actions—and our attribution of intention to them.  Austin defines the ―performative 
utterance‖ (as an illocutionary statement in opposition to a constative statement) in order to 
question ―an age-old assumption in philosophy—the assumption that to say something, at least in 
all cases worth considering, i.e. all cases considered, is always and simply to state something‖ 
(147).
 90
  For Austin, ―performatives‖ are utterances which perform actions, ―cases and senses 
(only some, Heaven help us!) in which to say something is to do something; or in which by 
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 It is important to note that Austin‘s ―performative‖ does not require an estranged or absent referent, as might be 
(mistakenly) assumed (if considered inherent due to the idea of ‗performance‘ in the theatrical sense).  Judith Butler 
explains: ―Philosophers rarely think about acting in the theatrical sense, but they do have a discourse of ‗acts‘ that 
maintains associative semantic meanings with theories of performance and acting.  For example, John Searle‘s 
‗speech acts,‘ those verbal assurances and promises which seem not only to refer to a speaking relationship, but to 
constitute a moral bond between speakers, illustrate one of the illocutionary gestures that constitutes the stage of the 
analytic philosophy of language.  Further, ‗action theory,‘ a domain of moral philosophy, seeks to understand what it 
is ‗to do‘ prior to any claim of what one ought to do.  Finally, the phenomenological theory of ‗acts,‘ espoused by 
Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and George Herbert Mead, among others, seeks to explain the mundane 
way in which social agents constitute social reality through language, gesture, and all manner of symbolic social 
signs‖ (154).   
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saying or in saying something we are doing something‖ (147).  Provided felicitous conditions for 
success, performatives do not ―describe‖ a doing, they actually do it. 
Cavell‘s theory of utterances is an extension of both his mentor Austin‘s and the later 
Wittgenstein‘s efforts to revise philosophy‘s tendency to neutralize context when contemplating 
utterances.
91
  If a character in a Pinter play or a Nichols film continues to come into existence 
and definition by continuing to perform actions—particularly utterances—Cavell makes the case 
that ordinary language functions similarly.  Cavell argues that the precise words we use in a 
specific context matter because we learn our world and our words together (they ―abut,‖ to use 
his word).  It is by looking at their context that we can understand the work of performative 
utterances.  We learn the implications of a word as part of our learning a language (and he makes 
clear this only applies to one‘s native language).  As English speakers, for example, we have 
―undeniable knowledge‖ about when to use a specific word and at what specific time.  Cavell 
feels justified in applying his theories to characters‘ utterances since, in realist fiction, cinematic 
(and dramatic) characters speak our language (English)—not merely a representation of English.  
In fact, not only are we justified in believing characters mean what they say in just the way that 
we do, but we could not understand their speech any other way.  Still, it is unclear how 
characters‘ silence sits within this theory. 
Silence plays a crucial role for Cavell as the background against which dialogue finds 
meaning.  It is what characters break when they cannot help but speak, when words arise that are 
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 We might say that The Graduate invokes Wittgenstein in the narrative‘s turning point, Ben‘s date with Elaine.  He 
confesses: ―I‘ve had this feeling ever since I graduated, the compulsion that I have to be rude all the time, do you 
know what I mean?‖  She nods, says she does, and he continues: ―It‘s like I‘ve been playing some kind of game, but 
the rules don‘t make any sense to me.  They‘re being made up by all the wrong people—no, I mean, no one makes 
them up, they seem to make themselves up.‖  Ben‘s inability to articulate his feeling does not impinge upon their 
ability to communicate; she understands.  He explains his inarticulacy by appealing to a schematic in which no one 
makes the rules, which is to say that everyone is subject to the rules, inviting a connection to Wittgenstein‘s concept 
of a language game and his suggestion that noises and silence, if expressive, are subject to the rules of our language 
game (§ 261).  
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worth breaking it (―the result not of expression but of failed suppression‖ [159]).  In this schema, 
silence is granted the same status in aesthetic contexts that it has in reality: an omnipresent 
background against which the urgency to speak is measured.  Might we suppose that the lack of a 
concrete source of anxiety for Ben (for instance, Vietnam) means not that his rebellion is merely 
the empty trappings of rebelliousness, but rather, that his choice to perform rebellion has merit 
itself, having the consequence of directing the spectator to examine the context which urged him 
to rebel?  We will return to this question when we consider the film‘s final shot.   
 
Descending into Los Angeles 
The Graduate begins with a tight close-up of Ben‘s face, staring ahead as the camera 
zooms out to reveal he is on an airplane.  He, and we, are positioned aurally as we hear ―Ladies 
and gentlemen, we are about to begin our descent into Los Angeles.‖92  Regarding this opening 
line, Nichols said ―It‘s a statement of theme you don‘t really hear, even though its perfectly loud 
and clear.  It‘s my thesis, but it‘s invisible, which is just the way I want it… California is like 
America in italics, a parody of everything that‘s most dangerous to us‖ (Harris, 312-313).  In his 
chronicle of the film‘s reception, Pictures at a Revolution, Mark Harris claims that this setting 
was crucial, that the film‘s attack on Los Angeles was understood to be an attack on a 
specifically American middle class (122).   
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 In an interview, Buck Henry revealed the initial idea for the film‘s opening, which directs the spectator to attend 
to characters‘ utterances as the film‘s primary conflict even more strongly: ―We started with a sequence that we 
thought would actually be a thematic statement. Started with the idea that we were going to shoot a huge college 
graduation— The Graduate, right? And there would be this big graduation ceremony in an amphitheater somewhere 
(I don‘t know where we were going to find this place), and there would be thousands of people waiting to hear the 
valedictorian‘s speech. And Dustin would be giving that speech in his cap and gown, and he would be standing there 
up on the lectern with his speech… And while he [Hoffman] was talking, the wind would begin to blow the words 
away through the microphone. You wouldn‘t hear them until—and he didn‘t know what he was saying; he couldn‘t 
find the words, couldn‘t find what to say about that moment, that impressive moment. And then he would wake up 
from this dream in the airplane…. And of course we didn‘t need it because it‘s apparent what‘s happening from the 
beginning, I think. All those voices coming in, the hideous airplane voices and the ghastly terminal voices, and all 
that stuff‖ (Schwartz).   
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The film then alternates shots of Ben on the airport‘s moving sidewalk in a gray suit 
against white walls with shots of his gray suitcase moving along a conveyor belt toward baggage 
claim.  We hear a distant, mechanized voice instructing travelers to ―Please hold the handrails 
and stay to the right‖—which Ben is already doing.  In this world, conformity is a given; words 
do not even need to be said—a bleak context for considering language and utterances.  The 
soundtrack to this sequence, ―The Sound of Silence,‖ is a reflexive song whose paradoxical 
lyrics direct the spectator to extend the visual parallel established by the crosscutting, and to 
contrast the silence of the baggage with Ben‘s silence, to contemplate the difference between an 
object and a human character on-screen.   
The Graduate was the first Hollywood film to use extant pop/rock music as its 
soundtrack.
93
  In ―Rock ‗n‘ Roll Sound Tracks and the Production of Nostalgia,‖ David 
Shumway notes that The Graduate marks ―the emergence of the rock sound track as a formal 
feature‖ (36).  In ―The Sound of Silence: Film Music and Lament,‖ Reni Celeste positions The 
Graduate as ―a dividing point between traditional scoring and contemporary film‖ (113).94  This 
development enjoins the spectator to focus on the soundtrack for at least three reasons: first, 
because the ―The Sound of Silence‖ had already been a hit (it reached Billboard‘s top spot in 
1966), and invokes its own auditory history for the listener; second, because new Simon and 
Garfunkel music was also composed for the movie, and given the duo‘s popularity, elicited 
attention; and third, because it was pop music that accompanied a non-musical film, and so, was 
simply different from any other Hollywood film experience.  It is difficult to overestimate this 
development‘s influence on filmmaking or the experiential difference it provided from previous 
modes of scoring, for, ―unlike classically inflected scores of yore, rock sound tracks are meant to 
                                                 
93
 American novelist Thomas Pynchon began using popular songs in his work in 1963.  
94
 There are notable exceptions within the history of experimental cinema, particularly Kenneth Anger‘s Scorpio 
Rising (1963).  
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be heard‖ (Shumway, 36).  Beyond creating a lucrative sound track album (―Mrs. Robinson‖ 
reached number one in June of 1968) and ―arousing a feeling of generational belonging‖ crucial 
to the film‘s narrative, Shumway argues that The Graduate‘s music ―is meant to be not merely 
recognized but often to take the foreground and displace the [visual] image as the principal locus 
of attention‖ (37).   
 On the use of ―The Sound of Silence‖ in the film‘s opening, Shumway writes: ―In this 
minimalist visual context, the song claims a greater share of the viewer‘s attention, and its 
complex lyrics, while not likely to be comprehended completely, establish the theme of 
alienation that the narrative will explore.  In this instance, the song comments on the narrative‖ 
(37).   More than just commenting on the narrative, the song fulfills a function akin to a theatrical 
Greek chorus.  The visual ―silence‖ of the white background supports Shumway‘s claim for an 
economy of attention, enabling us to listen to the song‘s lyrics, but it also allows us to attend 
more closely to Ben‘s face.  Nichols‘ words speak to this view: ―[T]he more I heard ‗Sounds of 
Silence‘ [sic], the more it sounded to me, as it happened, like what the picture was about.  I had 
already thought of the airport scene, with the announcement.  But I kept thinking about the song.  
Then I decided we‘d get Simon and Garfunkel.  I wanted them because they sounded to me like 
the voice of Benjamin.  Full of feeling and not very articulate‖ (Gelmis, 285).   
 
Mr. Gladstone 
The narrative of The Graduate takes place over the summer after Ben has graduated from 
college.  Presumably, he must now enter the work force or return to school—he is nothing more 
specific than ―the graduate,‖ an educated youth who desires no trajectory other than a future 
different from his parents‘ present.  The Graduate casts Ben‘s view of his own situation as a last 
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chance for change, an anxiety later heightened by the song ―April Come She Will.‖  This song 
recounts the passing of a summer romance, relating not only to Ben‘s affair with Mrs. Robinson, 
but to the foreclosure of possibility.   
Just as the camera lingered on Ben‘s pensive expression while homeward bound, so it 
does in the next scene as he sits in his room, in front of his aquarium (complete with a proleptic 
scuba diving figure) and tries to explain to his father that he‘s worried about his future.  His 
father, intent on getting him to leave his room and participate in the lavish party he and his wife 
have thrown in Ben‘s honor (without, it seems, inviting anyone Ben‘s age), asks him, ―What‘s 
the matter?‖ with no real intention of listening.  Ben explains that he‘s ―worried… about [his] 
future.‖  Failing to comprehend, his father asks what he means, to which Ben replies, ―I don‘t 
know. I want it to be… different.‖  While Ben may be physically stagnant, through his pregnant 
pauses and stillborn utterances, the spectator understands Ben to be contemplating, and to be 
asking his father for counsel (even as his father refuses to listen).   
Ben acquiesces to his father, and goes down to the party, only to be assaulted by the older 
generation.  Seen only in grotesque tight close-ups of talking faces and groping hands, Ben‘s 
desire to escape this claustrophobic atmosphere is justified, heightening the spectator‘s growing 
sympathy for him.  In response to the generic questions posed to him—it is clear no one at the 
party really knows him—Ben simply mewls and sputters.  In a canonical moment, Ben is 
cornered by Mr. Maguire, who leads him outside to ―have a word.‖  Mr. Maguire says to him: 
―Now, I‘m just going to say one word to you.  Just one word…Are you listening?  Plastics.‖95   
Ben remains silent for a few beats until finally responding, ―Exactly how do you mean?‖  This 
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 ―Plastics.‖ was recently named the 42nd greatest American movie quote by the American Film Institute, and is 
included in Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations.  It is also an example of Nichols‘ hand in the performances and 
utterances.  Hoffman said, ―It‘s the lines that we learned word for word from rehearsal, but this is Mike Nichols‘ 
cadence.‖    
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exchange is funny because we know what Mr. Maguire means and what Ben means by his 
silence; that he is struggling for a reply only to decide that feigning ignorance is best.
96
  We 
come to this conclusion with him.  Ben‘s joke on this man is our joke on him—and silence is 
needed so we can share Ben‘s feeling.  We identify with him in silence (which, here, expresses 
his attitude of superiority, dismay, repulsion, condescension, helplessness, etc.).  Desperate to 
escape the determinist framework placed on his actions by the older generation, who treat him so 
perfunctorily, The Graduate begins with Ben trying not to act, not to speak, to test (if not thwart) 
the demands made upon him by the narrative, which requires he do something.     
Many have summarily read the character of Ben at the beginning of the film as lacking 
feeling, or as a Hamlet-esque character suffering from akrasia.  He is worried about his future, is 
often lost in thought, is maybe apathetic, possibly even depressed; but it is important to 
distinguish a lack of feeling from a feeling of indifference.  The film ensures that we are aware 
that Ben was active during his time at university.  One partygoer wants to ―hear all about that 
thing you won, that Hopperman award‖ (Ben tries to correct him—―Halpingham‖—to no avail).  
It is Ben‘s leaving university that appears to have stunted him into inaction.  At the party, an 
unknown female voice adamantly reads out Ben‘s accomplishments in a voice-off: ―Listen 
everybody; I want you all to be quiet… Be quiet, please! Captain of the cross-country team, head 
of the debate club, associate editor of the college newspaper in his junior year, managing editor 
in his senior year…‖  Her list is halted when Ben retreats to his bedroom, inside which he tries, 
again, to find silence, only to be interrupted by Mrs. Robinson.   
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 This reading attends closely to Hoffman‘s performance, and allows us to have a better appreciation for the arc he 
creates between the taut, resentful silences early in the film and the vacant, slack one at the end.  In response to the 
suggestion of a career in ―Plastics,‖ the meaning of his response—―Exactly how do you mean?‖—would be different 
if Hoffman sounded as though Ben was asking in earnest (even out of politeness), as opposed to his actual 
performance which suggests a career in plastics is so distasteful Ben has no choice but to practically evacuate his 
body, only managing the vaguest of inquiries. 
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The spectator recognizes her as the same guest who, significantly, did not run up and 
claw at Ben downstairs, but silently watched him from afar.  Like him, she appeared framed by 
the limbs of other guests, suggesting a connection between the pair.  Mrs. Robinson requests that 
Ben take her home.  Wanting to be left alone, Ben tries several ways to resist, only to be defeated 
each time.  When they arrive at the Robinsons‘ home, she forces Ben to accompany her inside, 
professing to be afraid of dark houses despite the obviously well-lit interior.   
Inside, Mrs. Robinson puts on a sassy, bassa nova style record and fixes them drinks 
before informing him she is an alcoholic.  She sits provocatively, and flirtatiously asks Ben what 
he thinks of her.  The spectator realizes what she is up to, as does Ben—culminating in the iconic 
shot of Ben framed by the arch of her leg as Ben asks, ―You‘re trying to seduce me.  Aren‘t 
you?‖  Mrs. Robinson denies any nefarious intentions, but, as she protests, she raises the level on 
her flirtatiousness.
97
   
Mrs. Robinson suggests going upstairs to see Elaine‘s portrait.  Significantly, this is the 
only activity to which Ben agrees without wrangling.  Despite forcing him to unzip her dress, 
Mrs. Robinson repeatedly, seductively, declares that she is not trying to seduce him—
demonstrating at every turn that she does not mean her words literally.  Desperate to leave as 
quickly as possible, Ben tries to make a break for it when she coerces him to return, asking him 
to bring her purse to her.  As he does this, she suddenly runs into the room, and closes the door 
behind herself.  Naked, she commands, ―Don‘t be nervous.‖  Mrs. Robinson informs Ben she is 
―available‖ to him, and the series of rapid cuts that follows—between Ben‘s eyes attempting not 
to look at her body and segments of her body—is not only funny; she is enacting exactly what 
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 Here, as later in the hotel when he begins to change his mind about intercourse, Mrs. Robinson expertly employs 
reverse psychology on Ben.  In this way, the exchanges strongly resemble a Nichols and May sketch—a fact we will 
return to in chapter four.    
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his parents do: demanding he listen without giving him a chance to speak.
98
  Ben is saved from 
articulating a response by the arrival of Mr. Robinson.  Ben rushes downstairs, to find an affable 
Mr. Robinson, who, like his wife, asks Ben, ―What‘s your drink‖ only to ignore his request—
Ben‘s words have no effect—and give him what he is having instead.  Mr. Robinson professes to 
thinking of Ben like a son, yet has trouble remembering his name.   
 The next scene depicts yet another celebration of Ben: his 21
st
 birthday party.  In the style 
of a circus ringmaster, Mr. Braddock is trying to bring Ben out into the family‘s backyard in his 
scuba suit—the gift his parents have given him and which Mr. Braddock announces cost ―over 
two hundred bucks.‖  Before Ben comes out, his father says, ―I have a few words to say,‖ to 
which a guest retorts, ―You always do!‖ (again, it seems Ben is isolated from his peers as all the 
guests are his parents‘ age).  Ben repeatedly implores, ―Dad, can we just talk about this for a 
second?‖ and ―I‘d like to discuss this.‖  Of course, when Ben says he wants to talk, he means that 
he wants his father to listen.  Yet, as before, his utterances are ignored and, as before, Ben 
kowtows.   
Through a masking shot which simulates the limited vision of scuba goggles, we see the 
adults cheering him on to jump in the pool.  But we do not hear them; we hear, as he does, only 
the sound of his own breathing through the scuba apparatus.  The adults appear absurdly 
animated in their muted state.  Our vision is blurred as Ben descends into the pool (with the help 
of his father who actually pushes him under the water), where he sits.  Remaining at the bottom 
of the pool, not moving, it seems Ben has succeeded in anaesthetizing himself, surrounded by the 
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 There is much evidence to support a reading of The Graduate as an Oedipal scenario.  Mrs. Robinson, aside from 
being one of his mother‘s friends, resembles her a great deal.  Both women have a similar hairdo and wear similar 
style clothes.  Mrs. Robinson, like his mother, addresses him as ―Benjamin‖ rather than ―Ben.‖  During production, 
Nichols told Hoffman, ―it‘s like he‘s fucking his mother‖ (DVD Commentary).   
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silence he so desired in the initial sequence.  But even this attempt is thwarted by the sound of 
his labored breathing.
99
   
Ben‘s time at the bottom of the pool is one of his most explicit contemplations of his 
expressive limits: he sits for an extended period, and as the camera zooms back and the water 
blurs Ben visually, the sound of his breathing anchors him.  It does not fade, which gives the 
impression that Ben is attending to this sound, too.  As the camera backs up, we hear Ben‘s voice 
beginning a conversation with Mrs. Robinson: ―Uh, I don‘t quite know how to put this…‖  We 
do not immediately know if we are hearing his thoughts or his fantasy.  It turns out to be an 
acoustic flash-forward, and, as his words sound, the visual track holds on Ben at the bottom of 
the pool.  Hearing his words over this visual image for some time until the visual track cuts to 
show Ben speaking into a payphone at the Taft hotel encourages us to perceive the scene to come 
as motivated by this moment, one in which he realizes that even if he is alone he will not find 
silence; he must seek another way to find himself.
 100
   
When asked about his use of sound in this moment, Nichols replied, ―It was meant to be 
that the thing which you are seeing now leads to the one you are hearing.  This boy in this diving 
suit at the bottom of the pool has been caused by this moment to call Mrs. Robinson‖ (Gelmis, 
283).  Here, the aural image takes precedence over the visual one.  Without attending to the 
film‘s sound in this way, Ben‘s decision to take Mrs. Robinson up on her offer appears 
unmotivated, if not incomprehensible, given his previous reaction of terror and disgust.  Even on 
the telephone, Ben does not expect her to listen to him, and he introduces himself twice.  Thus, 
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 Speaking particularly of this scene and its audio prelap, Nichols said, ―We wanted to make it subjective as much 
as we could. We wanted the audience to experience it as happening to them, to be Benjamin.‖  
100
 Ben frequently uses telephones, which functions here as the catalyst for the film‘s plot.  As a technological 
apparatus that allows one to hear someone not present, the telephone calls attention to the cinematic spectator‘s 
experience.  Hoffman appreciates that not every director has actors present for phone conversations, though Nichols 
did (The Graduate DVD audio commentary).    
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the event that compels Ben to act, the event that precipitates the entire plot, occurs first on the 
soundtrack, augmented by the visual and not subject to it.   
Both the sound of his breathing and the sound bridge position us to hear as Ben does.  
Ben‘s voice-off during the sound bridge in this scene is the film‘s first instance of inverting the 
traditional relationship between the sound and the sight of a character.  In ―The Voice in the 
Cinema,‖ Mary Ann Doane advises against too quickly seeing the traditional realism conferred 
by granting characters‘ speech ―as an individual property right‖ (which follows from the 
reductive name ―the talkie,‖ 34).  She argues that the use of devices such as the voice-off 
―accounts for lost space‖ and risks exposing ―the material heterogeneity of the cinema‖ by 
showing a voice ―no longer anchored by a represented body‖ (40).  The inversion of this risk 
posed by the spectator hearing Ben‘s voice in conversation while still seeing him in the pool 
threatens to expose the same heterogeneity in a different way.   
 After a bit of farcical business in the hotel, where Ben is nervous about booking a room 
for his first dalliance with Mrs. Robinson—and where he cannot even get a hotel waiter to listen 
to his request for a drink, though Mrs. Robinson has no such difficulty—Ben and Mrs. Robinson 
make it to the hotel room where she pragmatically goes about preparing for the business at hand.  
After almost losing his nerve, and after her suggestion (in another bit of reverse psychology) 
that, despite his accomplishments, he might be ―inadequate in one area,‖ Ben emphatically turns 
off the lights.  Ben‘s plunging of the film into darkness, and his affair with Mrs. Robinson, bring 
a return of the song, ―The Sound of Silence.‖  The visual track remains black as the lyrics, 
―Hello darkness, my old friend,‖ play. 
 As time passes, Ben‘s newly awakened (and futile) desire to speak to Mrs. Robinson 
becomes a sticking point in their relationship.  The pivotal scene, in which he confronts her, 
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begins as we hear Ben say in the dark ―Will you wait a minute, please?‖ 101  (The scene change 
has again been motivated and forecast by his utterance; he had been telling his mother to ―Wait a 
minute!‖)  In the dark of the hotel room, Ben switches on the light, asking, ―Mrs. Robinson, do 
you think we might say a few words to each other this time?‖  She replies, ―I don‘t think we have 
much to say to each other,‖ and switches the light off.  We see only silhouettes of lamps, backlit 
by a window with light beyond, but which casts none into the room.
102
  A fight ensues, and in a 
sense, this disagreement over speaking and silence is the first real conflict between the 
characters.  Ben wants to ―talk about anything, anything at all.‖  After Ben persists, Mrs. 
Robinson sarcastically suggests they talk about art.  She has nothing to say on the subject, and 
we learn, she, too, is a graduate; art was her college major.  She has accepted silence as a way of 
life (which is not to say she made peace with it; she is obviously angry), and her hope for a 
relationship with Ben relies upon sustaining it.   
After this exchange with Mrs. Robinson, Ben is unable to disavow the knowledge that he 
can only interact with her (perhaps with the older generation entirely) if he remains quiet and in 
the dark.  Significantly, Ben and Mrs. Robinson do not disagree so much about the value of 
talking as about the value of not talking.  Mrs. Robinson says ―I‘d rather not [talk].‖  She would 
rather he remain a sexual plaything.  This is crucial because Mrs. Robinson has been the only 
character to really talk to Ben up to now, but, retroactively, we understand talking to only have 
been her method of seduction.  Her sin is not that she is having a sexual relationship with Ben 
while married, but that she has lured him into bed under the false promise that they would talk.  
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 It is tempting to read the darkness in which this scene occurs as a visual analogue to the ―sound of silence,‖ but 
articulating it as such runs us into difficulties.  Something like the ―sight of imperceptibility‖ is faithful to the idea of 
the sense without the sensation.  Alternatives, such as the ―sight of invisibility‖ or ―sight of absence‖ belie 
problematic views of the precondition of the onscreen world. 
102
 This scene is still another example of how dialogue took precedence in the film‘s production.  During editing, 
Nichols felt the scene was too long, and since the visual was only a static silhouette, he was able to excise a ―great 
deal‖ of the dialogue without altering the image at all.   
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Initially, she showed more interest in what Ben had to say than his parents had.  Treating him 
like an object by refusing to talk to him (and to listen), she becomes, like his parents, an 
antagonist.   
In talking about not talking, the spectator gets a clue that the generation gap will not 
remain bridged by the two as Mrs. Robinson very grudgingly agrees to talk—not to listen—until 
Ben asks personal questions (about her daughter) and she tells him ―Don‘t talk about Elaine.‖  
Figuring Mrs. Robinson to mean that he is ―not good enough for [Elaine]‖ Ben is angered.  Mrs. 
Robinson reacts quite violently to the possibility that Ben might take Elaine out on a date.  She 
turns on the light and grabs his hair.  Ben calls her a ―broken down alcoholic,‖ and almost leaves 
until both calm down and Ben (having protested a little too much) agrees to stay.  The scene ends 
with Ben saying, ―Let‘s not talk at all.‖  Returning to the sound of silence and its visual 
associate, darkness, Ben and Mrs. Robinson sleep together for the last time.  In the next scene, he 
agrees to take out Elaine at the suggestion of his parents.   
Ben‘s date with Elaine begins in contrast to his interaction with her mother.  Ben speaks 
tersely to Elaine and takes her to a strip club without consulting her.  Humiliated, she confronts 
him, cries, and runs out.  Moved by her sincerity, Ben kisses her on the street and the pair go to a 
drive-through diner.  Here, amidst other youths, they talk.  We realize, as they do, that they are 
perfect for one another, not just because they converse, but because they talk about not talking, 
about the desire to be rude, to act out in order to refuse their parents‘ values.  Just as they begin 
to discuss this, the teenagers in the neighboring vehicles turn up their music (Simon and 
Garfunkel‘s ―The Big Bright Green Pleasure Machine‖), forcing Ben and Elaine to roll up their 
windows.  This demonstration of their desire to listen to each other suggests that Ben has found 
the ―right‖ girl, but also forecloses the possibility that we, the spectators, can hear the language 
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that constitutes their beginning to fall in love.  That the spectator only hears the blaring music 
objectifies Ben‘s transformation (as well as the transformative moment of realization as a trope 
of Hollywood romances—here, love at first sound).   
To suddenly be denied Ben‘s perspective is somewhat perplexing for the spectator; but 
the fact is that their dialogue cannot be represented, it can only be conveyed in silence.  Ben has 
found someone to communicate with, and, from our perspective, to be silent with.  For what is 
salient is beyond words; it is the fact that communication is happening that matters, not the 
particular words being uttered—and the film tells us what we need to know, which is that their 
words are doing something for them, and that they are having an effect on the other.  It is a 
fantasy of communication, which, as such, cannot be represented or performed.  What we do 
hear of the dialogue is Elaine admitting she shares Ben‘s desire not to talk about the same old 
things.  After only one night with Elaine—knowing only that he can talk to her—Ben decides to 
end his affair with Mrs. Robinson.   
The next day, as Ben arrives to pick up Elaine for a second date, Mrs. Robinson 
intercepts him and attempts to blackmail him into never seeing Elaine again (by threatening ―to 
tell [Elaine] everything‖).  Ben runs into the house and up to Elaine‘s room.  This time, rather 
than Mrs. Robinson undressed, he finds Elaine half-dressed.  He begins to tell her the truth, but 
falls silent, unable to confess.  Nevertheless, again proving her ability to understand even Ben‘s 
silences (and to read his facial expressions), she realizes the truth and tells him to get out.   
As Simon and Garfunkel sing ―Scarborough Fair,‖ we see images of Ben despondent, 
returned to a state of inactivity.  At one point, we find Ben motionless before a notepad on which 
he has seemingly begun to write a letter to Elaine, only to fill the page with scribbles of her 
name.  The film implicitly invites us to compare this to his later primal yell, ―Elaine!‖  While 
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sending a letter stating just that would be absurd and vague, to shout it is not; recalling a Pinter 
character‘s speech, it is all that is required.   
 
At Berkeley 
Now that Ben has found something he really wants to do—be with Elaine—he leaves his 
parents‘ home to travel back to a university, the University of California at Berkeley (where 
Elaine is enrolled).  In the scene prior to leaving, Ben informs his parents of his intentions to 
marry Elaine.  This is the only moment in the film when his parents listen to him.  Is it a stretch 
to think they recognize that he might now become like them?  The hysterical (in both senses) 
scream of joy that erupts from his mother confirms his desire is conventional.  Hence, if we 
cheer him on, it is because we recognize him now as a romantic leading man doing what a 
romantic leading man must do, obviating Mrs. Robinson‘s sexual role and compelling us to 
switch our generic expectations towards the imperatives of romantic comedy.  Thus, we 
conform, as spectators, along with him.   
At Berkeley, Ben sets about winning over Elaine.  He runs to catch up to the bus she is 
on, sits behind her and simply begins to talk to her.  He accompanies her to the zoo, where Ben 
discovers she is dating a tall, WASPish medical student named Carl (Brian Avery).  Later, Elaine 
confronts Ben.  Her mother has said that Ben raped her, though Elaine does not quite seem to 
believe this story.  As Ben begins to relate what actually transpired, Elaine screams, derailing the 
conversation into silence.  Elaine is not offended by Ben telling the truth (which she is already 
inclined to believe).  She screams because Ben is threatening to break their bond by 
demonstrating that he feels the need to convince her of the truth.  She leaves, but returns that 
night, asking Ben to kiss her.  It seems that even though Elaine understands Ben, she still 
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disallows him the right to speak.  Thus, since Elaine now resembles the older generation, Ben 
reacts in kind: yawning, he proposes they enter the institution of marriage, a classic marker of 
middle class membership: the only information we have been given about their parents (and so, 
that against which they are rebelling) is that they are married and their fathers are in ―business‖ 
together.  
It is striking that the institution of Berkeley should be the setting for Ben‘s ensuing 
stream of marriage proposals—this, following the Summer of Love in 1967.  And, as the film 
dwells on the correspondence of the filmic Berkeley to the extra-textual Berkeley, I, too, will 
dwell on this correspondence over the next several pages in order to discern the film‘s use of it.  I 
will sketch the radical political significance of Berkeley, as well as its, perhaps paradoxical, 
significance as a sign of middle classness.  Some critics, myopic to the impending university 
riots that would sweep the nation, saw the film‘s deployment of Berkeley as hackneyed.  It was 
the nation‘s largest university, and home to the nuclear weapons program, but most significantly, 
it provided the original home for the Free Speech Movement (FSM).   
 At the time of The Graduate‘s release, Berkeley was still synonymous with the FSM.  In 
1964, students felt silenced by Berkeley‘s administration when it decided to prohibit any 
activities it deemed ―political‖ from campus.  After six students were arrested, thousands 
gathered, surrounding police cars.  They set up a microphone atop one police car and held forth, 
orating on issues of free speech and individual‘s rights.  The FSM was formed by student groups 
of various (sometimes opposed) creeds as a principled response to the university‘s adminstration; 
not about saying anything in particular, but about the right to say anything, particularly.  From 
the moment of its inception to the proliferation of silent sit-ins, to Joan Baez‘s songs, the voice—
and what using it could do—was at the heart of the discourse claimed by youth.  Discussions 
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surrounding the freedom of expression conjoined with those concerning a student‘s civil and 
academic rights like never before.
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In 1979, Gloria Steinem wrote, ―If you had asked me a decade ago, I certainly would 
have said the campus was the first place to look for the feminist or any other revolution‖ (268).  
She recalls that, ―the populist movement to end the war in Vietnam was symbolized by campus 
protests and mistrust of anyone over thirty‖ (268).104  Students rebelled, knowing that to be 
prevented from voicing dissent is tantamount to robbing the voice of meaning.  Students directed 
their anger at efforts to silence them at the university as an institution, and focused on its 
increasing corporatization.  Mario Savio‘s seminal speech denounced the view of students as less 
than human, as raw material.
105
  The tension was intensified by the words of university President 
Dr. Clark Kerr.  In a televised speech, he said, 
The University is being called upon to educate previously unimagined numbers of 
students [i.e. the baby boomers]… to merge its activities with industry as never before…. 
The productions, distribution and consumption of knowledge is said to account for 
twenty-nine percent of gross national product and knowledge production is growing at 
about twice the rate of the rest of the economy. What the railroads did for the second half 
of the last century, and the automobile for the first half of this century, may be done for 
the second half of this century by the knowledge industry. (Berkeley in the Sixties, [Mark 
Kitchell, 1990])  
 
                                                 
103
 It is also difficult to underestimate the change in the constitution of American universities in the 1960s.  Searle 
writes that, ―In the early 1950s there were about a million and a quarter college students in the United States.  In the 
fall of 1969 we enrolled over seven million; in the fall of 1970 the figure was even higher‖ (170).  This was due in 
no small part to the social and legislative changes that opened doors of higher education to women.    
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 Incidentally, Steinem and Nichols dated briefly.  
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 John Searle explains how the corporatization of the university allowed students to link it with government and 
other institutions.  He breaks down the logic: ―the identification of the university as a source of evil is a part of a 
holistic ideology that goes as follows: the structure of power in America is a seamless fabric.  Within this fabric the 
tentacles (mixed metaphors are common in radical rhetoric) of the military-industrial-educational complex spread 
from the Pentagon through the White House and right down to the dean of students‘ office… Does the university not 
do contract research for the federal government?  Are not many members of its board of trustees themselves rich 
businessmen?  Does it not have an ROTC program on the very campus?  Indeed, do not many of its graduate 
actually go into—hideous thought—business?‖ (15).  In this last question, and in Savio‘s famous speech, it is 
difficult not to hear the echo of ―Plastics.‖ which so disgusted Ben. 
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The media focused on the competing rhetoric: the administration labeled students objects, 
whereas students were fighting for their right to be labeled humans, a right predicated on being 
heard.   
When Ben first arrives at Berkeley, he is dwarfed by an enormous American flag in the 
center foreground.  He sits beside the flag, and, in a long zoom, the camera pulls back and time 
lapses as students flock to the campus, giving the impression that the flag calls them forth.  
When Ben seeks accommodation at a men‘s dormitory, he is immediately asked if he is an 
agitator.  It is at Berkeley that he can tell Elaine he loves her, and that the spectator can hear their 
conversations.  Ben and Elaine could only, finally, fall in love at Berkeley.  His expression of 
love is connected to the university, to the FSM, to becoming self-aware, and to politics.  It is also 
through Berkeley that The Graduate makes its strongest play for political efficacy—and 
relevance to youth—in 1960s America.   
The Graduate appeals to Berkeley‘s history as an icon of revolution and counterculture, 
but this is only part of the story.  The enormity of The Graduate‘s success codified it 
immediately.  The Graduate did more than draw on the counterculture movement that had been 
brewing for years; it impacted the culture in the years that followed.  Indeed, revolutionary 
activity had lulled between the FSM and The Graduate‘s release.  In The Campus War: A 
Sympathetic Look at the University in Agony, John Searle (the first faculty member to join the 
FSM at Berkeley) tells us that at Berkeley, the freshman arriving in the fall of 1968 appeared to 
have enrolled in order to protest something (73).  We might well wonder, given The Graduate‘s 
popularity with youth, whether or not this resurgence was related to Ben‘s performance of 
rebellion (as high school students were applying to university).  After all, seventy-two percent of 
The Graduate‘s audience was under twenty-four, and only four percent over thirty (Monaco, 
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184).  The film, with its hip fashion and music, signaled to its contemporary spectator that it was 
happening right now, presently.  Even Katherine Ross‘ clothes were store bought (or, indeed, 
were the actress‘ own).  Hence, the spectator may assume Ben would have been a student on the 
East Coast during the FSM, both removed and impacted, implicated as a student, but not 
necessarily active.  (Harvard‘s big revolt came in 1969 and Columbia‘s in 1968 [Searle, 9].)   
―The series of student revolts that spread across the United States and Western Europe, 
beginning at Berkeley in 1964,‖ Searle declares, ―constitutes one of the most remarkable social 
phenomena of our time‖ (1).  He reminds us that Berkeley in 1964 is an originary moment, 
despite later events, such as ―May ‗68‖ in France, becoming more famous over the years.106  As 
he was writing in 1971, the student revolution sparked by the FSM was still threatening to grow 
(despite that fact‘s seeming impossibility), and the university was the site of deepest political 
struggle.  As he says,  
Now, a survey across the country would reveal that there is hardly a major university in 
the United States which has not been through at least one sizable student revolt.  Sit-ins, 
strikes, marches, the systematic disruption of classes, bombings of university buildings, 
the counter-use of police, tear gas, mass arrests, the closure, sometimes for weeks on end, 
of the university—all have become quite common.  In the 1968-69 academic year, I 
cannot recall a week during which a major student upheaval was not taking place 
somewhere in the United States.  The Cambodian ―incursion‖ of May 1970,107 sparked 
major disturbances on approximately seven hundred campuses.  Not only are the 
newspapers full of blow-by-blow accounts of the latest crises, but analysts and 
scrutinizers of the ‗now generation‘ offer us a bewildering variety of explanations, 
interpretations, and proposals.  Some regard current student activism as the rise of a new 
Nazism, others as the greatest hope for the survival of democracy. (2) 
 
Judging from his rhetoric, Searle is attempting to explicate the phenomenon to an older 
generation who purport to find radical students‘ behavior unintelligible.  He perceives three 
overarching themes to student revolts that strongly parallel Ben‘s evolution: the ―search for the 
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 It is, I believe, no coincidence that Searle is famous in philosophical circles (along with Cavell) for disseminating 
and advancing the work of J.L. Austin on utterances.  His seminal book, Speech Acts, was published in 1969.  
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 This was the moment also known as the Kent State shootings.  The Ohio National Guard shot and killed four 
students and seriously wounded nine others.  
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sacred‖ (something to care about that is larger than themselves), ―the creation of an adversary 
relationship,‖ and ―the rejection of authority‖ (6).108  Even students, ―lacking a coherent 
ideology,‖ Searle observes, nevertheless form a community intending to pursue goals.   
Reminiscent of Ebert‘s review, which praised The Graduate for being ―against 
something,‖ students were creating identities out of what they were not: ―the ingroup of US is 
defined by our shared hostility to the outgroup of THEM‖ (Searle, 6).  Though Searle‘s 
examination delimits this mentality to the university, ―THEM‖ also referred to industry, 
government, police, the older generations, the military, etc.  Searle‘s language indicates the 
extent to which The Graduate‘s representation of generational conflict was in the atmosphere: 
―So much has been written about the young, ‗the now generation,‘ ‗the generation gap,‘ ‗post-
modern youth,‘ ‗the second American revolution,‘ ‗the counter-culture‘… that one hesitates to 
say anything for fear that the sheer volume of stuff on the topic must surely have exhausted 
whatever one has to say, if only by random distribution of sentences‖ (39).  His writing also 
indicates that critics who thought the film carefully avoided confronting topics like drugs or 
Vietnam missed the point.  It was by abstracting from these issues and providing a look at 
rebellion and a dialectical portrait of the generation divide that The Graduate spoke directly to 
youth, allowing them to project whatever issue most suited them onto the narrative.  
 
Describing precisely Ben‘s automaton-like malaise in the film‘s opening—and 
suggesting that its audience in 1968 would have no problem identifying with his dilemma—
Searle diagnoses ―an empty sense of their own aimlessness‖ as a common trait among 
disaffected students (44).  He explains that attending an institution of higher education is no 
longer seen as a privilege for middle class youth in the 1960s, nor as a right: ―rather it is not an 
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 The treatment of causes and revolts as ―quasi-religious‖ aids Searle‘s explanation of the thrill of the process, the 
exhilaration of escaping conformity (30).  As he says, ―Life offers few feelings as intense as those of having fought 
and won a holy war‖ (29).  
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option or a matter of choice at all.  [Students] are in the university because there is simply 
nowhere else to go [save Vietnam]… From being voluntary members of a limited-purpose 
community of scholars, they have become compulsory members of what they regard as a campus 
city-state‖ (40).  Searle states that ―we have made the attainment of a university degree a general 
requirement for full middle-class membership in society.  From a system of mass higher 
education, we are drifting into a situation approaching universal higher education‖ (40).  
Viewing the university as a requirement was compounded by the country‘s unprecedented period 
of affluence and a new ―permissive‖ style of upbringing in the 1950s to produce students 
uninterested in careers and devoid of anxiety about making money to survive.  According to 
Searle, the ―declining economic pressure to go out and have a money-making career,‖ recasts the 
university from ―a transition phase that one passes through on the way to and as a means of 
achieving some other goal‖ into ―the terminus, the place where one lives, one‘s home‖ (41).   
  Searle describes the prior generation of students as ―frivolous conformists… secure in 
their identity,‖ and finds that ―the university reinforced their complacency‖ (161).  In contrast, 
this new kind of student, ―wants the university to help him locate or invent an identity, and he is 
much more concerned with social evils than his parents were.  He wants a university which is 
‗relevant‘… and which is ‗noncoercive‘‖ (162).  But the rub lies in this student‘s desire to form 
her identity both from and in opposition to the institutional setting of the university.  Searle, 
though, does not regard this paradox as unique in the nation‘s history, but gives compelling 
evidence for ways American universities have always been particularly vulnerable to revolt.  
Both the nation and its universities have historically celebrated questions of legitimacy:  
A favorite dramatic category of our culture is that of the man or the people against the 
establishment.  The whole liberal and humanist tradition (and I realize how inadequate 
these labels are) in literature as well as philosophy assumes that established institutions, 
such as the church and the state, can look after themselves, and that the task of 
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intellectuals is to protect the individual or class against their depredations.  In short, the 
dominant tradition in our culture is one of being against authority. (169) 
 
Speaking to a tradition of America reaching back to the moment it gave birth to itself by 
rebelling against England, first for religious freedom and then as a response to its refusal to listen 
(No taxation without representation!), Searle details the extent to which the dramatic role of 
rebel appeals to Americans.  He observes in the student protests a ―ritual of confrontation,‖ a 
focus on taking action, on doing and performing.
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  Searle describes a student taking on a role, 
but, in turn, the student denies that it is, in fact, a role.   
For Ben and the radical student it is the performance that counts.  The Graduate‘s ending 
could be construed as a cautionary tale: act now, before Elaine is married, or, indeed, before you 
become a ―graduate.‖  Furthermore, the film‘s youthful spectators may have sympathized with 
Ben‘s mistake: he tried to succeed at the system, but in doing so, he failed to become a radical—
hence he graduated without an identity.  In the narrative, he is making up for lost time, and 
despite initially lacking a clear enemy, he nurtures an enmity over the course of the film, not 
least of all in his interactions with Mrs. Robinson, to arrive at a definition of himself as against 
―them,‖ the older generation.  It is also at Berkeley that Mr. Robinson appears as patriarch to 
reclaim what is his, commanding Ben: ―Stay away from my daughter!‖  Mr. Robinson then 
whisks Elaine off to marry Carl, putting Ben on the path to action, donning his role as rebel.   
 
ELAINE! 
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 Deeply involved in protesting, and usually on the students‘ side, Searle also provides numerous accounts of 
students posturing, students who promised to protest even if their demands were met, or students disappointed when 
television crews did not arrive.  He writes: ―Many commentators have pointed out the element of role-playing in 
student revolts… The point to be stressed is that not only does the agent act out a part but also that his perception of 
reality is dependent on certain dramatic categories for him‖ (74-75).  He continues: ―At present there is no more 
rewarding role for students than that of the rebel.  The rebel student leader is one of the most glamorized and 
romanticized figures in America‖ (181). 
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In the final sequence of the film, Ben finally takes a stand and rebels—only to put 
himself even closer to marriage, and so, to resembling his parents.  He travels frantically from 
Berkeley to Carl‘s frat house (which looks like a veritable WASPs nest, or a place in which a 
group of male eloi from George Pal‘s The Time Machine [1960] wandered up and settled down) 
in pursuit of Elaine.  From there, he sets off to stop the wedding in Santa Barbara when his trusty 
Alfa Romeo, graduation gift and sign of upper middle class affluence, runs out of gas.  Using the 
skills he developed at university, Ben runs the final stretch to arrive at the church just a moment 
too late.
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  From the church‘s balcony, glassed in, Ben watches as Elaine and Carl are 
pronounced married.  The glass mutes their words (and recalls the scene involving his bedroom 
fish tank).  But this time, Ben decides to make himself heard.  He begins to bang on the glass, 
shouting ―ELAINE!‖ repeatedly.  He attracts the attention of the wedding party, and Elaine 
silently looks up at him.  The film‘s perspective shifts from his to hers and we see with Elaine: 
first, Mrs. Robinson, snarling and yelling, then Mr. Robinson furious, and then, Carl, spittingly 
angry.  But we do not hear them.  For the spectator, the effect of these perspectival images is 
very different from watching characters who are mute.  Knowing the sound of their voices, and 
seeing their faces so expressive, they appear not just mute, but de-voiced.  We understand this 
aural perspective as Elaine‘s, and her refusal of their utterances signals her maturation.  
   This sequence works from within its Hollywood parameters (we immediately 
understand this shot as Elaine‘s point-of-view) while also threatening to expose, to return to 
Mary Ann Doane‘s terms, ―the material heterogeneity‖ of the film (40).  Like Ben‘s earlier audio 
sound bridge, Elaine‘s (and our) perception of muted bodies ―cannot be understood outside of a 
consideration between the relationships established between the diegesis, the visible space of the 
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 Andrew Sarris writes: ―If there were one ‗in‘ (or actually ‗out‘) shot that characterized the spirit of the sixties, it 
would be the telephoto turgidity of Dustin Hoffman‘s Benjamin running toward the camera to rescue his fair Elaine 
in The Graduate, and not seeming to make any progress‖ (Politics and Cinema, 189).  
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screen, and the acoustical space of the theater‖ (Doane, 40).  The erasure of Carl‘s and the 
Robinsons‘ voices shifts focus onto the visual image as Elaine‘s aural perspective, but, 
cyclically, we only understand it to indicate her mental activity because the visual images are 
muted.  These shots illustrate the power of the subjective or point-of-view shot to be understood 
as extensive of a character.  Unlike the classical cinematic interior monologue, in which the voice 
serves as ―an extension of that body‖ and ―manifests its inner lining‖ (Doane, 41), here the 
others‘ silent voices display the ―inner life‖ of the character.   
We have seen that The Graduate offers several ways to consider silence, such as the 
silence constructed as humorous pause, the silence found in the rests and rhythms of song, the 
silence produced by scored versus unscored portions of the film, the words of a song about 
silence, the muted bodies of Carl and Mrs. Robinson at Elaine‘s wedding, moments characters 
regard Ben as silent even when he speaks, moments Ben has nothing to say to his parents, Mrs. 
Robinson‘s silence when she does not want to speak, and moments when dialogue is foreclosed 
from the spectator (as in Ben and Elaine‘s conversation at the drive-in).  Early in the film, when 
Ben refuses to articulate a response to his parents‘ queries, his silence constituted an utterance  
the spectator was positioned to recognize.  But his parents were unaware that his silence meant 
something.  Seeing Carl and the Robinsons as muted is a different case of silence-meaning; it is 
not exactly Carl‘s and the Robinsons‘ silence, but Elaine‘s silencing them that matters.  Her 
moment of epiphany, which we share, signals that even listening to one‘s antagonists‘ 
utterances—the utterances of conformists—is a threat to truly understanding them.  She hears 
―correctly‖ when she does not hear at all.  
Meanwhile, in what will be their final words to one another, Ben‘s continual screaming 
succeeds in making its claim upon Elaine.  She knows she owes him a response and moves 
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toward him.  Since Ben remains unable to articulate a specific question, she can only articulate in 
kind: ―BEN!‖  Ben runs down to her, and the pair physically fight off the crowd of conformists.  
(Ben succeeds in mocking the institution of the church by brandishing an aluminum cross to lock 
his foes inside the building.)  The couple, he in his torn clothes and she in her wedding gown, run 
away from the church and board a bus.  They stumble to the back seat, receiving stares from the 
decidedly older passengers, where they sit, laughing, and then, laughing less.  She looks to him 
for expression, acknowledgement, but he does not return her gaze.  Finally, they simply sit, 
silently staring forward.  They have nothing to say.   
This scene calls into question the righteousness and efficacy of Ben‘s rebellion.  We 
realize Ben‘s triumphant gesture, his speaking out, is not only inadequate, but not much of a 
rebellion at all.  The end is tragic, for the couple has done exactly what they set out not to do.  
Ben‘s parents, and, initially, Mr. Robinson, desired they marry.  Although the film does not tell 
us Ben and Elaine will marry (after all, she has just married Carl), Ben‘s persistent proposing 
ensures we are aware it has long been his aim.  Still (especially in the context of the Free Love 
movement), this choice feels like a mistake.  Ben‘s first utterance in the film (which is, for us, his 
first desire) is ―I want my life to be different.‖   
And, furthermore, we, the spectators, are implicated for relishing his performance of 
rebellion, for we could not really avoid knowing that his seemingly radical actions are thinly 
veiled capitulations.  In Storytelling and Mythmaking, Frank McConnell views the film‘s ending 
as an ode to the idea of class revolution, about Ben and Elaine‘s ―escape‖ from the ―restrictions 
and hypocrisies of the class to which they belong and from a world of soulless, life-denying 
‗plastic‘‖ (246).  McConnell astutely points out that this is something of a conundrum: ―The 
class to which Ben and Elaine belong, that great middle class which includes everyone, promises 
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everything, and reimburses nobody for the cost of membership (at least in the bitter version of 
this film), can absorb an infinite number of antiestablishment gestures, since with the serenity of 
its own affluence it absorbs any degree of revolutionary ‗heroism‘ into itself, trivializing it in the 
process‖ (247).   
The song, ―Mrs. Robinson,‖ was the only song written expressly for the film, and 
became, according to McConnell, ―virtually the theme song of the year‖ (247).111  McConnell 
focuses on the song‘s lyrics, especially the mention of Joe DiMaggio as ―the public hero 
precisely of Mrs. Robinson‘s generation,‖ to demonstrate that he ―represents all those lost, 
submerged values which in Ben Braddock‘s world have been commercialized, transformed 
symbolically into ‗plastic‘‖ (248).  McConnell accurately describes the final scene‘s ―ironically, 
desperately hinted vision of salvation‖ as instrumental for film: ―you run away, and you board a 
bus whose destination you do not know, enduring the puzzled, mildly frightened stares of the 
other [older] passengers.  And you have, really, no place to go‖ (248).  He asks, ―Where do you 
go after a vision of the end; after an understanding of the inevitable, universal entropy of 
civilization so complete and so unrelentingly intelligent that it understands and mocks even its 
own intelligence, even its own most carefully articulated hopes for survival and continuity‖ 
(248)?  McConnell‘s question implies that the final scene leads us to a place where we want to 
know what we cannot know: that the film asks a question to which the only answer could be 
silence.  And, indeed, that is the state of Ben, and Elaine, on the bus.  But what do we make of 
this last instance of Ben‘s silence? Does Elaine understand what it means?  Do we?   
There is no sense denying Ben and Elaine should speak at the end.  He owes her silent 
gaze on the bus a response, and the absence of a response adds to the ending‘s sense of tragedy.  
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 Inasmuch as the film seems to be playing with what can and cannot be expressed in language, is it too much to 
think that when Ben is whistling this song as he speeds to Santa Barbara, which logic defies he know, the film points 
again to the limits of the sayable?   
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For all their efforts to reach a place where they can express what they like, Ben and Elaine now 
have nothing to say—a lack intensified by the long duration of the shot.   As the expressions of 
laughter on Ben‘s and Elaine‘ faces fade with the horror and dread of what they have done, there 
is a brief moment in which Ben looks directly at us, and (in my experience this is the case) the 
spectator is suddenly aware of Dustin Hoffman looking into the camera filming him.  The 
production history backs up this reading: Nichols was especially mean to Hoffman and Ross 
before they boarded the bus, and he did not tell them he was planning to hold indefinitely.
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  It 
is possible, then, to thus interpret this moment as seeing a character (not human enough to die) 
dissipate.   
As Ben and Elaine sit on the bus staring bleakly ahead, ―The Sound of Silence‖ begins to 
play again: ―Hello darkness, my old friend/ I‘ve come to talk with you again…‖  Like Ben‘s 
earlier silences, which we have seen do something, we must discern whether or not this one does 
anything (and, if so, what).  And like the student protests entreating the country to listen, Ben‘s 
earlier silences were performative: he sought attention and acknowledgment.  Despite having 
Elaine to be silent with, Ben has instead returned to a state of silence.  But his silence no longer 
means the same thing.  As the shot continues to hold, it becomes apparent that this silence is the 
silence of absence, of a void.  Ben‘s final silence means something to Elaine, and to us, but this 
time Ben does not mean it.  It is the true silence of having nothing to say.  Ben is not mute, nor is 
he resisting speaking; he is struck dumb.  When Ben is silent in response to the offenses and 
inanity of his parents, Mr. Maguire, Mr. Robinson, his landlord in Berkeley, etc., it is a form of 
rebellion.  In the end, his silence, like McConnell‘s picture of the middle class, has evolved to 
                                                 
112
 Buck Henry recalls that, ―Mike didn‘t tell [Hoffman and Ross] what he wanted them to do… [Nichols] sat the 
camera there and he ran it on them, and I don‘t know whether it was one, two, or three takes, but they were pretty 
tired of doing it. And they sat down, and they did their laugh, and then after a while, I think, they‘re thinking, ―Is he 
going to say cut? … They have nothing left to act.‖ (Schwartz, 16). 
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conquer and absorb itself.  The silence of uttering becomes the silence of the unsayable (he does 
not lack words, and cannot invent new ones; rather he does not have anything to mean, thus he 
cannot say anything).   
If, as some critics thought, the major plot line followed Ben‘s efforts to extricate himself 
from an affair with a married woman, then he has not succeeded.  Might the ending be, as 
Brackman thought, simply a dampening of the joy of fighting the older generation with a cross, 
but still, all things considered, happy?  Or, is it happy because they seem to have succeeded in 
sloughing off their parents‘ materialistic lifestyles?  After all, even if married, he has left his Alfa 
Romeo on the side of the road and the pair are severing ties to their families, and riding a 
municipal bus.  Or, is it happy because he has successfully rescued Elaine from a loveless 
marriage?   
The ending is darker than these interpretations suggest.  Nichols has commented that ―In 
my mind, it‘s always been that in five miles she‘s going to say, ‗My God, I haven‘t got any 
clothes‘‖ (Gelmis, 288).  As it stands, Ben and Elaine‘s dumbness is not so much ambiguous as 
tragic; Ben has nothing to say, and moreover, is no longer compelled to try.  It is only if we can 
maintain the hope that he might speak soon that we can sustain a belief their silence might not be 
unhappy.  But what would he say?  In this way, the film not only makes a mockery of 
Hollywood convention by having Ben arrive too late to stop Elaine marrying, but also by 
refusing to end happily at all. 
The constant babble of the older generation (Mrs. Robinson, who did not want to talk, is 
the exception that proves the rule) is conjoined with the threat of making Ben into an object, of 
―drowning‖ him in objects, in middle class acquisitions.  Nichols himself has said as much:  
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[The Graduate] was about, I thought, when I began to think about it, it was about a 
person who was in danger. As he was drowning in objects, he was in danger of becoming 
an object. A person who thought he was an object. (The Graduate DVD Commentary) 
 
Connecting Ben‘s struggle to emerge from materialism to his struggle to emerge from silence, 
Ben‘s rebellion is directed at language and class.  In the end, he is trapped by both, unable to 
break the conventions of either.  He and Elaine are trapped in a state of capitulation; they have 
everything they want except the ability they desire most: to speak out and mean it.     
In March of 1969, Bob Geller, Director of Education for the American Film Institute, 
published a polemical response to the critical reception of The Graduate.  He takes to task the 
―whole bunches of top banana film critics‖ who are instigating a ―bombardment‖ of negativity 
for the film while ―legions of college English majors are clinically carving it up into scholarly 
theses‖ and ―hundreds of thousands of teen-agers across the land are elbowing their way into 
movie theaters to enshrine ‗beautiful Ben‘… just as passionately as their saged siblings of 
yesteryear immortalized Holden Caulfield in the 1950s‖ (423).113  He charges them with 
mistaking ―Ben‘s diffuseness of thought and action to be scripting and directing faults rather than 
a clear literary attempt to portray the shattering of sensibilities‖ (423).  On the contrary, Geller 
seems to understand this cynicism to be part of the zeitgeist, and cites it as precisely the reason 
for the film‘s popularity: ―What distinguishes Holden, though, from Ben is not a total 
dissimilarity of evasive actions and oblique gestures but rather the potential for plausible action 
proclaimed by Holden and denied by Ben‖ (424).   
In this way, Geller extends Ben‘s inactivity as synecdochal for other modes of rebelling, 
recommending that ―whole tramloads of students ought to be carted off on school time and at 
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 Editor Sam O‘Steen tells us that Nichols, in fact, wanted to direct J.D. Salinger‘s novel, but was unable to 
procure the rights, recalling Nichols said, ―[The Graduate] is as close to The Catcher in the Rye as anything I‘ve 
found‖ (55).  I believe we might also fruitfully compare Ben to the titular hero of Herman Melville‘s ―Bartleby, the 
Scrivener.‖  
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school expense to stare right back at Ben so that eventually all kinds of things about love and war 
and pot and escape might come spilling out in classrooms‖ (424).114  He finishes his defense of 
the film by reproducing in full an exemplary high school editorial: ―Dear Benjamin‖ (425).  In it, 
the authors begin: ―So you exist, huh? We‘re glad‖ (425).  They tell him they share his anxiety 
about the future, that they stand by him.  They write, ―[W]e‘re glad you didn‘t go in for the 
‗Understand the universe syndrome‘ and instead slid into understanding yourself‖ (425).  The 
high-schoolers, unlike the critics, do not see Ben as inexpressive or catatonic: ―[W]e understand 
that deadpan look you had most of the time.  We have to be deadpan, don‘t we, Ben?  Because 
we live within the sounds of silence, and feelings don‘t count for much‖ (425).  The letter ends: 
―And thank you for talking to us‖ (425).   
These youths saw—and heard—what the critics did not.  They not only perceived, they 
felt, the distinction between saying nothing and having nothing to say.  Their attachment to Ben 
challenged a theory of characters‘ utterances that attends only to speech.  The students know that 
Ben is not inactive in the beginning just because he is not visibly doing anything.  They are 
willing to follow along with Ben and understand that when he does not display or articulate 
himself to the older generation he is trying to figure things out on his own, to discover a way to 
make his life ―different.‖  But they also know that they share his confinement ―within the sounds 
of silence,‖ and that, in the end, to not utter is not to be private: it is to have nothing to say.  
The Graduate presents a fantasy that appealed to youths raised during an unprecedented 
period of affluence: while pursuing one‘s own personal desires, one might manage to rebel 
without doing anything more than performing silence.  However, this fantasy was forever, and 
irredeemably, changed when Richard Nixon poached silence for conservative ends, attributing 
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 Dustin Hoffman even went to Long Island and Washington, D.C. to address ―‗bodies of educators‘ on the subject 
of Youth today‖ (Brackman, 58).   
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his political victory over George McGovern for the office of president to the ―silent majority.‖ 
(He coined the term in 1969, but it was instrumental for his re-election in 1972).  In one fell 
swoop, Nixon depicted liberals—those most ardently working for change—as a minority 
identifiable by their speech, and made conservatives the new ―rebels.‖  He exposed silence as too 
vague a tool for leftist aims, casting it as a reactionary method of approval and consent.   
 
More Sounds of Silence 
I hope it is clear by now that this chapter trained its attention on The Graduate, not only 
because of its importance to American cinematic history, and to show it is not simply the 
Hollywood confection certain critics have imagined, but because it demonstrates a deep interest 
in the formal and thematic use of silence. As I mentioned in my introduction, Nichols professes 
to be fascinated by ―the unstated, less than immediately visible things that go on between 
people‖ (Rose).  In this quote, Nichols describes a method of depicting the fertile space between 
words.  It requires at least two people, which is to say, silence is interpersonal. This interest 
reappers across Nichols‘ corpus, for example, sound and silence figure prominently in Nichols 
next film Catch-22 (1970).  Foregoing a musical score and omitting extras (who tend to ―fill in‖ 
aural space with background chatter), Catch-22 utilizes the multiplicity of interpretations 
afforded by silence to achieve its surrealistic aims.  Editor O‘Steen tells us that its ―illogical 
cuts‖ were linked by sounds (85).   
Perhaps Nichols‘ other most fervent investigation of silence and speech occurs in 
Regarding Henry (1991).  When the spectator first regards the eponymous Henry Turner 
(Harrison Ford), he embodies a cut-throat, materialistic, upper class business man, an insensitive 
and predatory admirer of capitalism‘s emphasis on competitive individualism.  Attempting to be 
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a father, he delivers a ludicrous speech to his daughter, Rachel (Mikki Allen).  He takes her silent 
protestation to his appalling lecture as complicit, saying to her: ―Qui tacit consentire videtur… 
He who is silent, is understood to consent.‖  Following this scene, Henry is shot in the head 
during a hold-up and loses his ability to speak.  Rendered mute, he re-learns his language along 
with new values.  By the film‘s close, he has renounced capitalism, and, unemployed, has 
discovered how to be a father and husband.  In the final scene, Henry appears at Rachel‘s 
expensive private school to remove her, interrupting the headmistress informing the assembled 
students, ―You are all learning what it means to ask yourself why do I push myself; why do I 
struggle to be a harder worker, a better listener.  Well, look around you.  There are the answers to 
those questions: competition.‖  
The students who wrote to ―Dear Ben,‖ and objected to similar pressures, did not just 
attend to Ben‘s utterances.  They also articulated the importance of Ben‘s ―deadpan‖ face, 
another way of opening up an examination of characters‘ avenues of expression.  While The 
Graduate consistently emphasizes characters‘ facial expressions via extended close-ups, this 
technique is intensified in Nichols‘ 1971 film, Carnal Knowledge, the subject of the next 
chapter.  It begins with male protagonists enrolled in university, whispering to one another in the 
dark, and struggling to articulate their desires.   
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Chapter Three: Carnal Knowledge: Emotion, the Face, and the Crisis of Male 
“Performance” 
 
Both its critics and its admirers agree that Carnal Knowledge (1971) encapsulates the 
relationship between the sexes in early 1970s America.  A darkly comedic look at the male 
chauvinist in the midst of second-wave feminism,
115
 Mike Nichols‘ incendiary masterpiece 
literally puts facial movement front and center in its depiction of gender.  It tells the story of one 
man‘s objectifying lust for the female body from the neck down—largely in a series of facial 
close-ups.  This reflexive, and paradoxical, use of the facial close-up asks the spectator what it 
means to attribute an inner life to characters based on visible, facial expression, and motivates a 
deeper look into the question of what counts as a facial expression in screen fiction.  In this 
chapter, I argue that we cannot appreciate Carnal Knowledge‘s position in American cinema 
history, its cultural and historical context, or the relationship between the film‘s form and 
content, without examining its close-ups of facial expression.   
Like The Graduate (Mike Nichols, 1967), Carnal Knowledge concludes with a long take 
of its main character‘s immobile face.  And, like The Graduate, the ambiguity resulting from its 
reflexive consideration of the limits of its characters‘ capacities to express allowed critics to 
misread it.  As we will see, Carnal Knowledge not only casts the difference between having 
nothing to express and expressing nothing as a measure of humanness, but also identifies that 
difference as a matter of performance and perception.   
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 While, as Judith Walzer notes, there is no ―big-bang‖ theory of when second-wave feminism began, released in 
1971, Carnal Knowledge was by no means behind the tide.  Betty Freidan‘s The Feminine Mystique alerted the 
nation, in 1963, that not all women find bliss in domesticity.  In 1970, Germaine Greer considered the suppression of 
female desire in The Female Eunuch, the same year that Kate Millett‘s Sexual Politics made great strides toward 
understanding the depth of patriarchal attitudes in the history of Western literature.  Millett‘s essay, ―The Balance of 
Power,‖ also appeared in 1970, alongside a political cartoon by Jules Feiffer, the writer of Carnal Knowledge (and 
most famous for his leftist Village Voice cartoons), in The Partisan Review.   
  
125 
Bruce Babington and Peter Williams Evans call Carnal Knowledge ―the closest to a 
purely dystopic comedy of the sexes that a cinema committed to optimism has produced‖ (277).  
By following über-sexist Jonathan (Jack Nicholson), Carnal Knowledge satirically chronicles 
changing sexual mores in America from the 1940s to the time of the film‘s release.  From 
Jonathan‘s education on courtship among the tree-lined paths of Amherst College116 (and the 
traditional masculine competition to be the first to slough off virginity) to his embittered mid-life 
impotence, Carnal Knowledge pulls no punches in its attempts to look at the advantages and 
detriments attributable to the maleness, and male chauvinism, of this upper middle class lawyer.   
In order to understand the film‘s views on men and masculinity in 1971 America, we 
must consider the film‘s indictment of a Hollywood masculine ideal.  Jonathan deteriorates into a 
world of narcissistic, selfish fantasy—eventually only sexually excitable by myths of masculine 
power.  But it is not simply Jonathan‘s desire that the film punishes; it is his attachment to the 
ideal of the emotionally detached man (manifest in Hollywood‘s appreciation for Humphrey 
Bogart‘s detectives who put work first, the John Wayne loner, the blank but noble Gary Cooper, 
etc.). By looking at the case of a misogynist, Carnal Knowledge indicates ways that cinema 
studies has left its attitudes toward men on film uninterrogated (its own form of misandry).  This 
chapter conjugates Carnal Knowledge‘s representation of male chauvnism with its examination 
of facial expression in order to arrive at an understanding of the film‘s sophisticated take on 
interpersonal actions, as well as its intervention—through satire—into Hollywood conventions of 
representing men.  In doing so, this chapter rethinks the classic argument that men have enjoyed 
access to subjectivity in Hollywood history.   
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 This idyllic campus setting was made all the more nostalgic as campus riots waged nation-wide in the year of the 
film‘s release.   
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Fuelled by the celebrity of Nichols and Feiffer, and the growing stardom of Nicholson, 
Candace Bergen, and Ann-Margret, the movie premiered to favorable critical reviews.  Sandy is 
played by Art Garfunkel, whose voice was already famous as half of Simon and Garfunkel, who 
scored The Graduate.
117
  However, it was not just the film‘s star power that helped it capture the 
nation‘s attention.  The film‘s title suggests knowledge of the body through sex acts (a reference 
dating back to its biblical usage), as well as a more modern referent, namely, knowledge about 
the body: how we perceive others‘ bodies, our own, and their respective representations.   
The film also became a source of legal knowledge concerning the body in American 
cinema.  In January of 1972, the film was seized from an exhibitor in Georgia who was later 
convicted of distributing obscene material (in a decision later upheld by the state‘s Supreme 
Court).  In light of the landmark 1973 case, Miller v. California, which established the 
―community standards‖ test for determining obscenity regarding pornographic material, the U.S. 
Supreme Court overturned the decision in June of 1974.  Thus, Carnal Knowledge is a pivotal 
case for Hollywood history‘s freedom of expression.  The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the film‘s 
favor because, although ―ultimate sexual acts‖ were understood to occur, ―the camera does not 
focus on the bodies of the actors at such times.  There is no exhibition whatever of the actors‘ 
genitals, lewd or otherwise, during these scenes.‖  Despite not featuring visible sex acts, David 
Cook describes the film as ―epoch-making‖ in his volume devoted to American cinema of the 
1970s: it was the first Hollywood film to exhibit a condom; it spoke frankly about sexual desires, 
and featured both male and female nudity (324).
118
  Due to the attention drawn to actors‘ bodies 
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 The film marked the third occasion Nichols worked with Garfunkel; after collaborating on the soundtrack for The 
Graduate, Garfunkel featured prominently in Catch-22 (1970) as the naïve youth, Captain Nately.  Still, Carnal 
Knowledge was Garfunkel‘s first starring role (and his last until Bad Timing [Nicolas Roeg] in 1980).   
118
 In one scene, Bobbie (Ann-Margret) lies naked on a bed, looking very much like an American version of Brigitte 
Bardot‘s scene at the beginning of Jean-Luc Godard‘s Contempt (1963), in which parts of Bardot‘s body are isolated 
for the viewer. 
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by breaking conventions, the film sported the new X rating, which may have contributed to its 
decent box office take.
119
   
Second-wave feminism was largely focused on disinterring inequities suffered by women 
as a result of the ways that (previously unexamined) gendered assumptions were ingrained into 
the social, political, and cultural fabric of the nation, as well as how these unexamined structures 
impacted the lived experience of its citizens.  Often, ―men‖ was taken to be synonymous with 
oppressive forces.  In 1967, The Partisan Review published Susan Sontag‘s thoughts about the 
state of the nation.  Bringing together the burgeoning sexual and political revolutions in America, 
she names the white male unwilling to question gender norms and to experiment sexually for 
perpetuating the Western values for which he is responsible and which had proven to be ―the 
cancer of human history‖ (203).120  Sontag perceives that the moves toward androgyny and 
sexual freedom in England and Europe presented the opportunity for civil rights to be expanded, 
whereas, in America, where rights are supposed to be guaranteed, the moves produced guilt and 
anxiety (199).   
While fewer writers considered the possibility that men also suffered from gendered 
expectations, Gloria Steinem does in ―The Myth of Masculine Mystique‖ in 1972.  She argues 
that ―[m]en are made to feel [that] they must earn their manhood by suppressing emotion, 
perpetuating their superiority over women (and, in racist societies, over non-white men as well), 
and imposing their will on others‖ (135).  Nichols and Steinem were a couple in the 1960s.  In a 
Newsweek article on Steinem in May 1965, Nichols gives her his highest praise: ―She‘s the 
smartest, funniest, and most serious person I know‖ (Heilbrun, 126).121  One year later, Playboy 
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 It was the twelfth highest earner of the year, taking in $12.1 million (Cook, 99). 
120
 As I recount in the introductory chapter, Nichols and Sontag were friends throughout their adult lives.  
121
 According to Heilbrun, whom Steinem asked to write her biography, Nichols asked Steinem to marry him.  She 
declined, but later suggested she regretted her decision (118). 
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Magazine (itself evidence of America‘s increasing appetite for addressing issues of sexuality 
indivisible from the oppression of women) asked Nichols about the changing role of masculinity, 
contemporary struggles between the genders, changing masturbation laws, and homosexuality.  
Eventually, it inquires: ―Do you agree with those who view modern man not only as sexless but 
as loveless, emotionally alienated and spiritually bankrupt?‖ (74).  Although Nichols dodges the 
question, it seems prescient when we think of Carnal Knowledge and it indicates the timeliness 
of—and anxiety about—the changing status of the American male.122   
When Carnal Knowledge was described purely in terms of the battle of the sexes, 
Nichols responded, ―That‘s the form at the outside of it, but the concern of it is with the interior 
experience of the object‖ (my emphasis, Smith, 26).  The close-up, with its promise of access to 
a character‘s psyche, is perhaps a counter-intuitive formal choice for a story that displays the 
absurdity of a male character who just desires women, who just views women as objects of 
desire.  There are no subplots in Carnal Knowledge, no hint at problems in Jonathan‘s 
professional life.  His tragicomic flaw is that he cannot look at women otherwise; he refuses to 
acknowledge the ―interior experience‖ of women, and, as he is the main character, the spectator 
is required to evaluate his insistent blindness.  In judging Jonathan, the spectator must, for 
consistency, reflexively assess the criteria she uses for perceiving the ―interior experience‖ of an 
on-screen human object.   
Nichols once said,  
Carnal Knowledge was the only movie I‘ll ever make that was about only one thing all 
the time.  It was only talking about sex, nothing else.  Little bit of sex and the rest talking 
about it.  Right from the beginning I knew I had to find a way to abstract that, to express 
that it was an essay, a mannerist picture.  And it‘s about manners, [so] that‘s okay.  When 
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 Dating Steinem and being friends with Sontag, it is hard to imagine Nichols was unaware of the strong feminist 
avant-garde cinematic movement at this time, particularly in New York where Nichols lived and in whose culture 
Nichols remained visible through his theatrical work on and off Broadway.  For more on this movement, see Lauren 
Rabinovitz‘s Points of Resistance and Lucy Fischer‘s Shot/Countershot.   
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I read the script it was so monomaniacal, so much a magnifying glass on this one aspect 
of the behavior of a particular generation, I just looked for a style to fit that. (Smith, 34) 
 
Earlier in the interview, Nichols recounted his view on style: ―I figured out very early in life 
what I think style is.  I thought of it watching a play when I was in college.  It seemed to me 
then, as it does now, that style is beginning something in the manner which will make it 
necessary for the things that happen later to happen‖ (Smith, 28).  Almost forty years later, what 
remains most striking about Carnal Knowledge is not its frank discussions of sexual desire or its 
indictment of the objectifying power of the male gaze, but the peculiar formalism with which it 
raises these issues.  Carnal Knowledge is almost entirely composed of close-ups of its 
characters‘ faces, usually set against monochromatic or unfocused backgrounds; of extraordinary 
length, they often last well over a minute.   The frontality of these shots directly addresses the 
spectator; characters appear to look right at us.  We are not afforded the fantasy of sharing a 
character‘s visual perspective.   
If we take Nichols at his word, our task is to connect the film‘s stylistics, its long takes 
and facial close-ups, to the characters‘ frank discussions of sexual matters: how do whispers, 
speech, and facial expressions lead to this story with this ending?  How are close-ups about sex 
or sexual difference, and why was this form so provocative as to be considered ―obscene‖?  
What is it about the film‘s dialogue, facial close-ups, direct address, its disruption of the 
compositional rule of thirds, etc. that make it necessary for Jonathan to be impotent and alone?  
Was the Supreme Court right, after viewing Carnal Knowledge, to decapitate the on-screen 
―body,‖ to define it from the neck down and as a source of potentially lewd acts?  To answer 
these questions, we need to look at the representation of sexual difference on-screen, paying 
close attention to the movement of the face in close-up, and to the relation of the face and voice 
to the sexed—and sexual—body in America in the early 1970s.   
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Nichols‘ description of the film as ―mannerist‖ reminds us that close-ups are not a 
naturalistic way of viewing other human faces.
123
  Certainly the close-ups of Carnal Knowledge, 
which allow us to stare at a face for so long are not a socially accepted form of looking in 
America.  Strikingly filmed by cinematographer Giuseppe Rotunno,
124
 the film favors static 
compositions that reinforce our attention to their primary component, the face.  But, just as 
mannerist art preferred to comment on other art rather than, say, nature, Carnal Knowledge 
references Hollywood‘s history of representing characters as men and women in particular ways, 
focusing on the history of masculine facial expression in Hollywood cinema.  Predictably 
coming from Nichols and Feiffer, Carnal Knowledge‘s method is best described as satirical.  
Geoff King writes that, ―[t]he 1960s and 1970s were marked by the production of a number of 
prominent and biting black comedies and satires, usually understood as manifestations of a 
period of heightened social conflict and a questioning of established values and institutions‖ 
(95).  He cites Nichols‘ Catch-22 and The Graduate as excellent examples.  However, by 
satirizing the relationships between men and women in America, Carnal Knowledge confronts 
the deepest questioning of established values of the time.  Northrop Frye says of satire: ―Its 
moral norms are relatively clear, and it assumes standards against which the grotesque and 
absurd are measured‖ (quoted in King, 94).  As we will see, Jonathan‘s behavior is presented as 
increasingly grotesque, and the film culminates in an event which forces the spectator to 
recognize it as such.   
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 Nichols‘ Wit (2001) returns to extended facial close-ups to tell the story of a scholar of John Donne, often taken 
as a model mannerist poet.  We might also call Carnal Knowledge a ―comedy of manners;‖ it fits Christopher 
Faulkner‘s definition as it ―takes as its subject the amorous intrigues of a sophisticated social milieu‖ and ―is 
distinguished by dialogue notable for its witty repartee‖ (306-307).   
124
 Rotunno was Luchino Visconti‘s frequent cinematographer (notably on Il Gattopardo [The Leopard, 1963]).  He 
also collaborated with Frederico Fellini and with Vittorio De Sica in 1970 on I, Girasoli (The Sunflower).  
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When Nichols intimated that Carnal Knowledge‘s concern is the ―interior experience of 
the object,‖ he did not parse the film into form and content.  In addition, his comments on the 
film‘s style give us reason to think that ―carnal knowledge‖ refers just as much to the film‘s form 
as its narrative.  Thus, I turn to the film‘s simultaneous presentation of issues of emotion, facial 
expression, and the close-up shot not as a departure from the importance of gender, sexual 
difference, and sexual relations, but to consider the relation between the film‘s form and content 
in an effort to more accurately understand the film‘s subject.  The extended duration of Carnal 
Knowledge‘s close-ups calls attention to their presentation of expressing in time, indeed, as a 
way of experiencing time for the characters and for the spectators.  As we will see, the 
movement of characters‘ faces is crucial to understanding the film—a feature underscored by the 
film‘s invitation to compare its close-ups to ―talking heads‖-style comics, such as those which 
Feiffer produced.  The film‘s images of emotional time, or temporal emotion, enjoin the 
spectator to contemplate emotional expression as an activity, a constant performing.  This places 
the masculine valorization of a ―stoic‖ or ―stone‖ face in a very different light.125   
The film‘s visual style also foregoes a typical shot/reverse shot editing schema.  In fact, 
Nichols did not even shoot reverses (Smith, 34).  This is not to say that he did not shoot reaction 
shots, however.  William Rothman writes that, ―[w]ithin the frame of the reaction shot, the 
subject views the spectacle of the world, expresses a private reaction, and prepares the next 
venture into the public world‖ (74).  Carnal Knowledge frequently lapses into lengthy shots of 
characters reacting to other characters‘ actions, while denying us the visual image of the actions 
to which they are reacting.  Thus Carnal Knowledge‘s meditations on the reactive face blur the 
lines between acting and reacting, and emphasize a character‘s psyche through acts of expression 
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 As far as the case of Buster Keaton, often called ―stone face,‖ I concur with David Cook, who writes ―[Keaton‘s] 
‗great stone face‘ was actually capable of suggesting a vast range of emotion, and there was little that he could not 
express with his body‖ (182).  
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and self-presentation in relation to other characters; such shots become spaces to work out 
gender and emotion on the same plane, with the same tools.   
Nichols‘ instruction to look at characters‘ interior experiences suggests we ought to 
attempt to find who feels, not just who expresses, emotion.  Dissembling is rife in Carnal 
Knowledge.  But, more problematically, in a visual and aural medium that can only give us 
access to either concept through expression, can we differentiate between them?  There is no 
doubt that Hollywood‘s representations of men have functioned as regulatory mechanisms for 
the social category ―American men‖ by providing standards against which to appraise feelings 
and evaluate the susceptibility to particular emotional expressions (and perhaps even the 
emotions themselves).  In 1975, the year after Carnal Knowledge‘s vindication by the Supreme 
Court, writers like Jack Nichols objected to the history of Western thinking‘s twinned 
associations of masculinity with rationality and femininity with emotionality.
126
  It was also the 
year Laura Mulvey‘s landmark ―Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema‖ was published, which 
argued men had been represented in Hollywood as privileged with desire.  Carnal Knowledge is 
a ―man‘s film‖ that indicts men qua ―men,‖ men, as Mulvey might say, as desiring automata.   
In an essay written in 1972 to accompany his television series Ways of Seeing, John 
Berger observes that, all too often in the history of Western art, ―Men act and women appear.  
Men look at women. … Thus [woman is]. … an object—and most particularly an object of 
vision: a sight‖ (quoted in Fischer, 1989).   Who has access to emoting in this binary?  Is the 
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 For a broader historical account of Western belief in males as more rational and less emotional than females, see, 
for example, Be a Man!: Males in Modern Society (second edition) by Peter Stearns.  Stearns also points to a 
broader social attitude: ―Males are assumed to be completely sexual animals… an assumption that, at the very least, 
needs testing, especially since pre-nineteenth-century Western culture assumed that women, not men, were the 
insatiable sexual aggressors, with men as vulnerable creatures in need of protection‖ (7).  In his more recent book, 
American Cool, he tracks American emotional culture ―to the solidification of a cool culture in the 1960s (2),‖ a 
cultural shift to which, I believe, Carnal Knowledge responds.  Unfortunately, this attitude is still alive and well, and 
perhaps most obvious in the appeal Hollywood‘s marketing makes to gender identities.  For instance, the tagline for 
Ed Harris‘ western, Appaloosa (2008), reads simply ―Feelings get you killed.‖  
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emotional expression just appearance?  Is it an action?  Working from the fact that female 
characters in Hollywood have enjoyed greater freedom where the expression of emotion is 
concerned, Molly Haskell writes in 1973 that in the golden age of Hollywood ―[men] didn‘t have 
the luxury—or perhaps the burden—of emotional and occupational freedom‖ (359).  She says 
―we can only assume Gary Cooper would have been permanently demystified had he been 
caught with his psyche unzipped‖ (360).  It is in this context that she addresses Carnal 
Knowledge: ―Indeed, Carnal Knowledge might stand as the quintessential ‗now‘ film in its 
distortion (by simultaneously magnifying and degrading it) of the sex principle (male erection-
and-single-orgasm sex) as the only bond between men and women‖ (my emphasis, 360).  The 
paragraphs Haskell devotes to Carnal Knowledge remain the film‘s most in-depth scholarly 
treatment.
127
  Throughout her book, Haskell objects to the representations of women in 
Hollywood as inadequately corresponding to the complexity of American women‘s lives, 
particularly regarding their sex drives.  Hollywood men‘s inability to emote is not a problem of 
correspondence for Haskell, but simply a given.  For Haskell, men are not emotional; the bond 
between men and women is, then, de facto, sexual.   
In Haskell‘s terms, to label Carnal Knowledge the ―quintessential ‗now‘ film‖ is a 
devastating charge.  She claims: ―From a woman‘s point of view [she wrongly assumes only and 
all women are feminists], the ten years from, say, 1962 or 1963 to 1973 have been the most 
disheartening in screen history‖ (323).  She believes that the film is not simply about misogyny, 
but misogynist, even if that ―misogyny is furtive‖ (38).  Haskell finds the film‘s representation of 
women, with the exception of the Susan (Candace Bergen), ―in terms of (generally ugly or 
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 In 2008, Elaine Bapis published on Carnal Knowledge.  With factual errors about the film‘s stars, camera 
movements, and promotional material, compounded by inexplicable, even racist, assumptions about characters, it 
does not behoove us to attend to Bapis‘ reading.  However, it does demonstrate the perpetuation of misguided 
notions which suppose the film to be chauvinist, rather than about chauvinism.   
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castrating) sexual fantasies‖ offensive.  She believes that ―Ann-Margaret‘s splendid and original 
characterization of a woman increasingly demoralized by marriage,
128
 letting herself go, inch by 
added inch into catatonia,‖ is an ―image that purports to indict the men but that insidiously 
defends them‖ (360).  Her reasoning is that ―Nicholson[‘s character] is a bad but charming boy, 
whose ‗bad‘ness, when it is not an asset, is a product of wicked society and evil women, while 
his charm is all his own‖ (360).  Haskell writes that, because of his charm, he is a ―‗neat guy‘ 
[who] scores with the men if not with the women‖ (360).  However, Jonathan is not charming.   
By the end of the film, he is a social pariah, isolated and repugnant.  Even, if Haskell were right 
and Jonathan were charming, why does she find it so uninteresting for a film to comment upon 
society as ―wicked‖ by enforcing bigotry?  Furthermore, there are no ―evil women‖ in the film—
only actions from Jonathan which illustrate his antagonistic attitude towards women.   
Haskell takes Carnal Knowledge to task for its formal inventiveness, too.  She writes: 
―[j]ust as sexual achievement is often a matter of showing off for other men… so is filmmaking, 
and Carnal Knowledge is and remains closer to the locker room than to the bedroom (360-361).  
Leo Braudy expresses a similar charge: ―[l]ured by the discontinuities of verbal wit, [Nichols] 
attempts to hold his films together with visual tricks, but the result is a shambles of incompatible 
tones‖ (60).  Braudy, who praises European filmmakers in the 1960s for ―their emphasis on the 
actor and through the actor on the human face‖ (250), writes that Carnal Knowledge ―slides 
imperceptibly into exaggeration and stereotyping until the viewer feels betrayed‖ (60).  He 
describes the film as ―mere satire,‖ and accuses Nichols of ―[having] trouble sorting out the 
human from the satiric in [his] characters‖ (60).  Neither Braudy nor Haskell consider the 
possibility that the film‘s stylistics are indivisible from the film‘s claims about gender, that the 
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 Haskell is mistaken here.  We do not see the pair married. 
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film is commenting on the uses and abuses of Hollywood‘s tradition of severing heads (to 
paraphrase Béla Balázs‘ description of the close-up) from bodies.129   
Nichols himself addressed the charges that the film was sexist in 1976:  
Some people seem to have difficulty with implicit content. Certain men, like those in the 
film, treat women as sex objects, making the women unhappy and cheating themselves. 
There were a few dedicated women‘s libbers who accused the movie of advocating what 
it portrayed, perhaps missing the point because it was not explicitly stated in words. 
(Flately, 25) 
 
But we need not take Nichols‘ word for it, as my reading will show.  Still, given the large 
amount of attention representations of gender in Hollywood cinema have received in cinema 
studies since its inception, not coincidentally, around the time of the film‘s release, perhaps 
attitudes such as Haskell‘s and Braudy‘s explain the film‘s absence from such discussions.  Steve 
Neale writes that feminist film criticism throughout the 1970s was ―[m]otivated politically by the 
development of the Women‘s Movement, and concerned therefore with the political and 
ideological implications of the representations of women offered by the cinema,‖ and that ―a 
number of these books and articles [took] as their basis Laura Mulvey‘s ‗Visual Pleasure and 
Narrative Cinema‘‖ (253).  Neale‘s aim is not to quarrel with feminist film studies‘ claims about 
the representation of women, but to point out that, while considerable effort has gone into 
theorizing femininity on-screen, ―[m]asculinity, as an ideal, at least, is implicitly known‖ 
(264).
130
   
Mulvey‘s essay interrogates the ―socially established interpretation of sexual difference,‖ 
and so, places considerable weight on the representation of the human body (833).  Speaking 
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 D.W. Griffith is generally credited with filming the first facial close-up, of Lillian Gish.  For more on this history, 
see Roberta Pearson‘s Eloquent Gestures. 
130
 Neale‘s essay was published in 1983, though his concerns remain relevant.  For more on masculinity and 
Hollywood cinema, see Steven Cohan and Ina Rae Hark‘s anthology, Screening the Male: Exploring Masculinities 
in the Hollywood Cinema (1993),  The Trouble With Men: Masculinities in European and Hollywood Cinema 
(2004) edited by Phil Powries et al, and Detecting Men: Masculinity and the Hollywood Detective Film by Philippa 
Gates (2006). 
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paradigmatically, she claims Hollywood cinema employs this perception of on-screen figures as 
either male or female as an interpretive strategy, controlling the spectator‘s gaze, and so, she 
argues, the spectator‘s erotic desire.  In order to paper over the potentially threatening version of 
difference the female body poses to male spectators, Mulvey argues that Hollywood films 
visually govern the image of women by creating a viewing position of power for the spectator by 
aligning his gaze with male characters‘ gazes (who, she says, stand in for the camera).   
Like Berger, Mulvey situates looking in the cinema ―solely in relation to a structure of 
activity/passivity in which the look is male and active and the object of the look female and 
passive‖ (Neale, 260).  Thus, for Mulvey, Hollywood cinema predominately features male 
characters who desire, characters who gaze at female characters as bodies.  This kind of looking 
at the female body is not the kind of looking inherent to reading and interpreting, but an erotic 
looking that limits the female body to its existence as image, connoting only ―to-be-looked-at-
ness‖ (Mulvey, 837).   
Mulvey takes as given that, for a Hollywood male protagonist, desiring a beautiful 
woman is a fact of existence, a narrative motor that needs no explaining, contextualizing, or 
arguing.
131
  Connecting Haskell‘s and Mulvey‘s claims suggest not only that the typical 
Hollywood female character is meant ―to-be-looked-at,‖ but also bears the ―burden‖ of 
emotional expressivity.  This leads us to suppose that emotional expressions are ―to-be-looked-
at,‖ which helps explain the classic leading man‘s reputation as stoic, reluctant to express (and it 
must be reluctance, we cannot believe he is simply vapid).
132
  Neale argues that the image of 
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 This type of assumed desire is a common trope of Hollywood films.  It is the basic premise of Hollywood‘s most 
commercially successful film to date: Gone With the Wind (Victor Fleming, 1939).  Other examples are Cleopatra 
(Cecil B. DeMille, 1934), The Women (George Cukor, 1939), The Philadelphia Story (George Cukor, 1940), and 
The Apartment (Billy Wilder, 1960).   
132
 Of course, men‘s faces in Hollywood films are integral to its telling of stories.  Perhaps the need to negotiate 
between inviting the spectator‘s look and not presenting the male body as spectacle contributed to the fact that 
Hollywood frequently made stars of men who were not considered conventionally attractive, such as Humphrey 
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masculinity often associated with Hollywood cinema is ―marked not only by emotional 
reticence, but also by silence, a reticence with language‖ (257).133  His explication here of the 
classic leading man as the ―strong, silent type,‖ highlights the fact that ―strong‖ does not just 
connote the ability to lift heavy objects, but suggests a prized ability to not express emotionally, 
an ―emotional strength,‖ which, paradoxically, means to not emote.  (Might we suppose a subtle 
connection of masculine potency and non-expressiveness from the fact that we frequently call 
under-expressive performances ―wooden,‖ ―rigid,‖ or ―stiff‖?)  In this light, the female face in 
classical Hollywood was active—and typically more so than male‘s faces.  Facial expressions are 
things to be looked at as well, but, in this case, the stakes in looking are inverted.  Mulvey, 
Haskell and Neale suggest that it has been Hollywood‘s modus operandi for a man‘s face to 
resist moving, to not draw attention to itself, since the male body is not (supposed) to-be-looked-
at.   
The burgeoning field of cinema studies in the early 1970s (for which Mulvey‘s essay 
played a significant role) attended to the on-screen body as a site in which to locate signs of 
sexual liberation or gender roles, but was less interested in it as a locus of emotional expressivity 
(a fact I take to contribute to Carnal Knowledge‘s ensuing critical neglect).  The nation‘s critics, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Bogart and Spencer Tracy.  Or, to take an instance of Mulvey‘s, if he is moved, Tom Brown (Gary Cooper) covers 
his face with his hat in Morocco (Sternberg, 1930), presumably in an effort to retain his status as masculine.  This 
gesture functions to align our gaze with Dietrich‘s character; we understand him with, and through, her.  My claims 
about the range of emotional expression granted women in Hollywood is problematized by cases such as Greta 
Garbo and Dietrich, whose European and exotically beautiful faces were not only coded to attract sexual desire, but 
were subject to the admiring gazes of both sexes.  Neither woman was prone to facial contortions in the manner of 
the more histrionic American stars, such as Lillian Gish, Bette Davis, and Katherine Hepburn.  Michaela Kruetzen 
has claimed, in the case of Greta Garbo, that ―facial expression would only ‗distract from the face itself‘‖ as 
erotic/aesthetic object (Fischer, 2008, 379). Gish, Davis, and Hepburn were noted more for their skill than their 
beauty. 
133
 Neale links this trope of masculine ineptitude at using language to ―narcissism and to the construction of an ideal 
ego.  The acquisition of language is a process profoundly challenging to the narcissism of early childhood‖ (257).  
This connection could be seen to reinforce Mulvey‘s assertions about the representation of men in Hollywood as 
fundamentally narcissistic, based on the notion the male spectator identifies with the image of a human male figure 
in a power-grabbing move which reassures him his gaze is active (a fantasy that also ensures his position not 
passive).  Neale, though, amends Mulvey‘s nomination of the gaze as essentially narcissistic, arguing that a 
spectator with a socially constructed gender need not identify with an on-screen representation of that gender.      
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too, were trying to come to terms with the cinema‘s attitude toward gender.  Andrew Sarris, 
writing in 1973, recalls asking himself ―to define the cinema [of the 1960s] in three words.‖  His 
answer is ―Girls! Girls! Girls!‖ (195)—a sentiment that sounds like the slideshow Jonathan 
creates of his female ―conquests.‖  Sarris refers here to European New Wave cinema, those films 
most valorized by film critics and the political left.  Aided by hindsight, Sarris writes that, ―even 
by 1960 none of us dreamed that the day would ever come when our favorite actresses would 
bare their breasts on the screen as they had hitherto bared their souls. We didn‘t even dare hope 
for such a bounty from our sex goddesses‖ (193).  There is no hint that men might present 
themselves as desirable, much less the expectation they might ―bare‖ anything, whether their 
souls or bodies.  European films such as La Dolce Vita (1960), Blow-Up (1966), and Contempt, 
presented themselves as sexually liberated, despite consistently offering up to the spectator sexist 
presentations of the female body as object of desire.   
The few Hollywood texts reprieved by Cahiers du Cinéma and Screen, and by writers 
like Pauline Kael and Sarris (such as Young Mr. Lincoln [John Ford, 1939] and The Man Who 
Shot Liberty Valance [John Ford, 1962]), effectively positioned films with an appeal to 
traditional masculinity atop the Hollywood canon, relegating films that explored emotional 
issues to the bottom of the list as ―women‘s films‖ or ―weepies.‖  Emotional expressions, as 
performed by Hollywood actors, were labeled ―transparent,‖ a pejorative description (in a field 
which privileges the complexity of vision and visibility) and one which obfuscates the work of 
seeing them.  Hollywood was cast more explicitly as emotional, passive—and so, feminine—in 
essays like Peter Wollen‘s ―Vent d‘Est.‖134   But this binary is false; emotions are actions, 
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 George Lellis chronicles the intimate relationship the influential Cahiers critics shared with Brecht‘s ideology of 
distanciation and reflexivity, making clear that, in a significant way, these critics saw an opposition between reason 
and feeling (prioritizing the former).  Setting the concepts of passivity, emotion, and feeling in opposition to 
concepts like reason and rationality dates back to the roots of Western philosophy.  Stanley Cavell recently voiced 
  
139 
namely reactions.  As Dana Polan points out, as spectators of any cinema, we are positioned to 
react (though that is not all we might do).   
Cinema scholars in the early 1970s were busy questioning the value of emotionally 
engaging the spectator and of individuating characters.  Many of these scholars attached to 
certain theories of playwright Bertolt Brecht, who advocated a highly reflexive style of 
production and whose notion of character ―typage‖ is anathema to the individualism of 
emotion.
135
  Jerome Kagan explains that, since ancient Greece, emotions have been regarded as 
the domain of the individual (10).  In the close-up, the character‘s face occupies the world of the 
screen, and her experience becomes the sole visual source of narrative information; and so, the 
close-up relies on a fascination with the character as individual.
136
  For Brecht, both ―great 
individual emotions‖ and a ―rich inner life‖ are associated with exception and privileged 
minorities, threatening his vision of class and collectivity.   A great deal of what Brecht wants to 
expose is the understanding of postures, gestures, languages, accents, etc.—in short, ways of 
being—as essentially socially constructed.  His mistake was in assuming that the emotional 
experiences provoked in individuals, and the salience of those selected to express, are not 
socially circumscribed.   
                                                                                                                                                             
his resentment that philosophers so often suggest that ―feeling and passion always interfere with reason, 
philosophy‘s aegis.‖  He continues: ―The positivist revolution made this explicit—regarding all non-scientific 
assertions, that is to say religious, ethical, aesthetic assertions, as expressions of feeling and therefore not cognitive, 
not rational… The idea that passion and reason are antithetical to one another seems to me a libel on human nature 
and conduct‖ (2005, 17).     
135
 Thomas Elsaesser remarks that ―film theory became avant-garde theory‖ in the United States, going further down 
the formalist road than the European journals from which it borrowed, like Screen, which argued for a return to 
Brecht‘s theses of non-linearity, anti-illusionism, of spectatorial distanciation, and epic modes of narration‖ (173).  
For an example of the magnitude of Brecht‘s influence at the time, see Peter Wollen‘s ―Godard and Counter 
Cinema: Vent D’est.‖  For a chronicle, see George Lellis‘ Bertolt Brecht, Cahiers du Cinéma, and Contemporary 
Film Theory.  Lellis illustrates that, while Cahiers discussed Brecht previous to the changes in French intellectual 
thought post-1968, it was not until then that his Marxist, materialist ideas were embraced.  For an excellent analysis, 
see Dana Polan‘s The Political Language of the Avant-Garde.  
136
 For more on the history of Western thinking about emotion, see Jerome Kagan‘s What Is Emotion? and What is 
an Emotion?, edited by Robert Solomon.  According to Kagan, Western philosophical theories arose from social 
anxiety about ―each individual‘s ability to restrain actions accompanying emotions [which] might disrupt the 
community‖ (10).   
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Robert Stam makes clear that the aim of reflexivity shared by those who take up Brecht‘s 
theories is ―the substitution of distanced reflection for suspenseful and empathetic involvement.‖  
Stam describes how ―Brecht saw cinema, in fact, as a potential means of shattering the 
introspective psychology of the bourgeois novel by focusing on external action.‖  The 
extraordinary duration of Carnal Knowledge‘s facial close-ups certainly accomplish the work of 
directing the spectator to attend to external action, in this case, the character‘s and actor‘s facial 
expression.  Rather than avoid issues of emotion or feeling, Carnal Knowledge reasons about 
what we can (and cannot) know about emotions, the ―interior experience‖ we could perhaps call 
feelings and their expressions.  The duration of the close-ups highlights the movement of facial 
expression; facial expression here is expressing, an ongoing activity.  Moreover, if we believe 
certain behaviors are emotionally expressive and, at the same time, appropriate for the 
representation of particular genders, what becomes of emotion on film?  Is what counts as an 
expressive face different for male and female characters? 
If, as Robert Warshow does, we take Hollywood cinema to be American cinema, then 
understanding masculinity to entail an aversion to expressing should not surprise us.  From its 
earliest days, American masculinity advised against facial animation, situating men as socially 
surveilled, objects to-be-looked-at, and with a responsibility to control perceiving gazes by 
suspending facial movement.  C. Dallett Hemphill informs us that, unlike the class system in 
Europe, for men in early America, ―[s]tatus was a function of one‘s personal behavior, as an 
individual, and thus required self-discipline.  Self-discipline entailed, above all, control of 
physical drives and emotions, hence focus on the body and face‖ (39).  Hemphill connects the 
rise of middle-class capitalist culture to a ―revolution in gender relations‖ which dealt heavily in 
the ―management of emotion‖ specific to each sex (34-35).  In particular, America focused on 
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greater expressive self-control for men, a talent which would supposedly increase a man‘s ability 
to socially and professionally climb.  Thus, refraining from emotional expression (not from 
experiencing emotion) subtended the rise of American capitalism: ―Self-control could also serve 
as the sign (as well as the means),‖ Hemphill recounts, ―of one‘s [man‘s] successful self-
madeness‖ (34).   
Contrary to Peter Berger‘s pronouncement about the depiction of the sexes in art, the 
advice to men was ―to cultivate appearances, even, when necessary, to dissimulate‖ and ―to 
conceal one‘s actual feelings‖ (my italics, 36-37).  The most popular of the social-conduct 
literature, Lord Chesterfield‘s Letters to His Son, confided that ―the general rule is to have a real 
reserve with almost everyone, and a seeming reserve with almost no one‖ (37).  Undoing ―the 
traditional pieties that one‘s outward appearance should match one‘s inner state,‖ performance 
was embedded at the level of a man‘s interpersonal relationships as he was told to suppress (if 
not repress) emotional expression if he wanted to do his gender justice, be socially acceptable, 
and succeed in the professional sphere (39).
137
  While there were clearly expressive limits 
imposed on both sexes, Hemphill points out that ―[m]en had to suppress the expression not only 
of anger, but also of every other emotion, including distress and joy, and they were free to do so 
on the grounds that it was simply imprudent to display every thought and feeling… the period‘s 
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 Hemphill cites several books which focus on men‘s behavior qua appearance, telling men to cultivate a 
―convincing performance‖ (38).  Prominent politicians, such as John Adams, also advised similarly, paying special 
attention to the ―Muscles of [the] face‖ (38).  Women, Hemphill tells us, ―were not allowed the same degree of 
emotional dissimulation‖ (my italics, 41).  Hemphill does not valorize women‘s access to sincerity, but suggests that 
this was, in fact, a burden.  Since the marriage market was the space in which they had to worry most about self-
presenting, the expressions appropriate to women—such as blushing and looking disapprovingly at the speaker of a 
ribald comment—were her tools to deter unwanted advances, and to lure others.  These expressions (also meant to 
help men control their passions) were never to be feigned, for they were proof of her virtue and propriety: ―More 
than any other quality, a woman‘s face was to show her modesty‖ (42).  For both sexes, those expressions which 
were deemed acceptable needed to be appropriately moderate.  ―[A] number of authors,‖ Hemphill tells us, 
―condemned… ‗immoderate laughers‘‖ for distorting the face was thought to be unpleasant, and therefore, to be 
avoided (38).  However, the crime was worse for women since, in the words of one male author, ―[p]assion [as in 
the case of anger] is a prodigious enemy to beauty‖ (44).  
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strongest advice to mask one‘s feelings was directed to men alone.  More than women, men were 
implored to keep their faces as calm and unmoved as possible‖ (my italics, 44).   
Carnal Knowledge concludes with a scene in which Jonathan‘s facial expression is 
almost devoid of perceptible movement.  It is not a freeze frame; but rather, it is Nicholson‘s 
frozen expression that renders this scene ambiguous.  It has been an aim of naturalistic 
performance to inspire the conviction in the spectator that a character has an ―interior life.‖  But, 
if any facial arrangement counts as an expression, and if we take expressing to be intentional, can 
a character ever not have an ―interior life‖?  Carnal Knowledge reflexively comments upon 
Hollywood‘s—and America‘s—regulation of men‘s expression by directing us to consider what 
is at stake in the cinematic representation of facial expression.   
 
A Reading of the Film 
Although Feiffer originally sent Nichols Carnal Knowledge as a play (the pair had been 
friends since the days of Nichols and May), Nichols immediately saw it as a film.  Nichols and 
Feiffer worked closely on the script, awakening Feiffer to the excitement of writing ―dialogue for 
characters who spoke differently and could be identified from one another by the way they 
spoke‖ (Bishop Interview).  Feiffer remembers: ―[Nichols] made me defend, from the first scene, 
every line.  Why does [the character] say this?  Why does [the character] reply this?‖   
Carnal Knowledge begins with a male voice whispering the question, ―Would you rather 
love or be loved?‖ to another in the dark.  The voices demonstrate characters privileged with 
desire enjoying their privilege.  Their pillow talk, simultaneously homoerotic and sexist, 
continues to parse out various aims—breasts, legs, love, sex, and the space between all four.  
Jonathan wants ―big tits. A hundred different ways.‖  Sandy, sensitive only by comparison, says 
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―I want a companion.‖ His reason?  ―The other stuff I can get on the outside,‖ he says.  The 
initial question is posed by Jonathan, and refuses the possibility of a mutually loving 
relationship, establishing this characters‘ perspective on relationships as one of power, 
narcissism, and competition for subjectivity.   
Aside from the title credits, these are the first utterances, and images, of Carnal 
Knowledge.   The visual track is darkness, continuing Nichols‘ interest in the relationships 
between dialogue, silence, and darkness found in The Graduate and its theme song, ―The Sound 
of Silence.‖  Jonathan and Sandy discuss their criteria for finding a girl, which they describe in 
terms of ownership and property.  The opening question, voiced in the second-person, positions 
us, as spectators who listen, in the position of overhearing their conversation (a third-person 
position), and the lack of visual perspective denies the alternation of first and third person for 
which a typical shot/reverse-shot editing pattern allows. 
Though both men are virgins, in the opening dialogue, Jonathan describes falling for a 
girl until she let him ―feel her up.‖  Still, he continues seeing her for a while ―because she let 
[him] feel her up,‖ demonstrating the contradictory courtship rules of the late 1940s or early 
1950s (the film does not specify a year).  We later learn the first voice is Jonathan, the dominant 
friend to the other voice, Sandy, who amends his statements according to Jonathan‘s assertions.  
We learn that Jonathan would rather love (Sandy, of course, accedes).  Jonathan‘s paradoxical 
approach to loving women dooms him from the start: he wants to love a woman, and he wants to 
have sex with women, but he finds those desires irreconcilable.  We, as spectators, do not share 
in the intimacy of this ―pillow talk,‖ primarily due to the overtly sexist opinions underlying the 
boys‘ musings.   
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When the story begins, Jonathan and Sandy are both virgins, desperate to lose ―it‖—
presumably, a campy, nostalgic attitude following the sexual revolution and ―free love‖ slogans 
of the late 1960s.  This isolation of the audible word is broken by the image of an isolated face—
Susan‘s.  The boys‘ dialogue seems to conjure Susan‘s beautiful floating face, who walks out of 
the dark and past the boys as the camera backs up to reveal we are at a college mixer, replete 
with saddle shoes and sweater vests.
138
  The mise-en-scène of this scene, like so many shots to 
come of life on campus, invokes the movies of the 1940s and early 1950s, such as Knute 
Rockne—All American (Lloyd Bacon, 1940), Good News (Charles Walters, 1947) or The Affairs 
of Dobie Gillis (Don Weis, 1953).
139
 
As Susan walks past the pair, Jonathan assumes property rights only to relinquish them, 
making the magnanimous move to Sandy: ―She's yours. I'm giving her to you.‖  The spectator 
recognizes the voices of these men from the first scene.   Jonathan informs Sandy that ―There‘s a 
way to talk to girls,‖ implying that he believes there is a way to talk to men that is different than 
how he talks to women (presumably, the opening conversation about women).  He also advises 
Sandy perform for her: ―Tell her about your unhappy childhood but don‘t make it like an act.‖   
Sandy sets out to convincingly dissemble, but, as he nears his target, he stalls, stuck about 
three feet in front of her before detouring to pretend to spy something interesting outside the 
window and returning to Jonathan.  Roger Ebert writes of this moment: ―With the perception and 
economy that mark their entire film, Nichols and his writer, Jules Feiffer, have established the 
theme of Carnal Knowledge in this handful of shots: the film will be about men who are 
incapable of reaching, touching or deeply knowing women‖ (1).  We witness this hilarious scene 
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 We soon find out Susan is from neighboring Smith College, a possible inside joke as Gloria Steinem attended 
Smith.  She delivered a provocative commencement speech titled, ―The Politics of Women,‖ there in 1971, the same 
year she founded Ms. magazine.  Nichols shot Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? (1966) at Smith—reportedly at 
Steinem‘s suggestion (Stern, 146).  
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 For more examples, see The Movies Go to College by Wiley Lee Umphlett. 
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in a long shot without cutting, emphasizing the interpersonal space that gapes between Sandy 
and Susan, the space he needs to speak across, but cannot.   
Sandy attempts again, but just as he is about to retreat for the second time, she speaks.  
She says: ―I hate mixers.  It‘s such a phony way to meet people.‖  Since she does not suggest a 
better way, we can at least appreciate that Susan is trying by speaking.  Susan bemoans how hard 
it is to ―meet people‖ because ―everyone puts on an act‖ and ―you never know who you‘re 
meeting: them or the act.‖  Sandy is dumbstruck all over again by Susan‘s rather unconventional 
opening gambit.  He starts to walk away, but she stops him by speaking again, inviting this 
exchange:  
Susan: I think people only like to think they‘re putting on an act.  But it‘s not an act, it‘s  
really them.  If they think it‘s an act they feel better because they think they can  
always change it.  
Sandy: You mean they‘re kidding themselves ‗cause it‘s not really an act? 
Susan: Yes it is an act, but they are the act. The act is them.  
Sandy: But they‘re all so real.  
Susan: No.  
Sandy: You mean I‘m not real? 
Susan: No.  
Sandy: I‘m an act? 
Susan: It‘s alright; I‘m an act, too.  
 
Susan forces Sandy to admit he acts like a different person in different contexts.  ―So, which one 
is you?‖, she inquires.  Defeated, Sandy remarks, ―You ought to be a lawyer,‖ to which Susan 
responds, ―I‘m going to be a lawyer.‖  Sandy, overwhelmed, exclaims: ―A lady lawyer!‖  This 
scene conjoins the performance of gender and courtship with sexual possibility and self-
presentation.  Knowing other people is immediately posed as a problem once the visual track 
begins, a problem connected to sexual difference (the two men had no trouble interacting in the 
intimate space of total darkness).  Moreover, it is a problem that must be acknowledged and 
accepted for conversation to continue.   
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Susan objectifies Sandy‘s personality, his self-presentation—not unlike we do when 
watching characters at the cinema.  The characters are engaged in precisely the same activity as 
we, the spectators: attending to the characters‘ performed actions in an effort to infer who they 
are.  The spectator sympathizes with Susan because, like her, we are amused by Sandy.   She 
exposes Sandy‘s self-presentation as a performance, and instructs him to reconsider his 
assumptions about gender and social interaction.  Susan‘s willingness to break social convention 
and speak first (and coupled with her professional ambition) suggest that she also sees gender as 
―an act‖ rather than essential—a lesson Jonathan dearly needs to learn, but does not.  The shot‘s 
deep focus highlights Jonathan‘s presence, framed by a doorway in the background, watching 
but unable to hear.  This scene (like many to follow) foregoes a typical shot/reverse-shot editing 
sequence, which has the effect of drawing our attention to the space between the characters, to 
dialogue as an exchange, and to the space across which characters read and interpret each other‘s 
actions.  The phrase ―shot/reverse shot‖ tends to imply that the first one determines the second, 
whereas that is often not the case for Nichols‘ characters—certainly not in this case which breaks 
the convention of (and so, audience‘s expectations for) reverse shots.   
Susan‘s avowal that she is ―an act‖ foregrounds to us, as spectators, that she is a character 
constituted by actions.  She is, literally, an act—a series of them.  She is also ―acted,‖ in the 
sense that she is performed by Bergen.  Susan‘s speech describes identity (who ―Susan‖ is for us 
and for Sandy) as the result of performing, a context-specific activity intended to elicit a certain 
response, but nevertheless, dependent upon its interpretation by an audience.  Through Susan, 
who is clearly the intelligent voice of insight and the one capable of speech, the film argues for a 
middle ground between two senses of ―perform,‖ between its theatrical sense and its broader 
etymological usage connoting ―to do‖ (an action).  Susan does not argue that the actions of 
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―everyone‖ who ―puts on an act‖ are meaningless or contentless by dint of being performative.140  
Rather, her words highlight that actions are, in context, reactions—and still intentional.  The 
―act‖ we perform is, according to Susan, a conscious play between possible realities, one based 
on the narrative we tell ourselves about who we are, and another based on the narrative we seek 
to inspire others to create about us about the way we can be.  Just like Ben‘s silences in The 
Graduate, we understand what is meant by the former action by our own and other characters‘ 
reactions.  From Susan‘s (and our) third-person perspective, what Sandy does is who he is, 
though what he now does is predicated upon her address.  But Susan also indicates the 
importance of accepting one‘s own (second-person) position as addressed.  If who one is 
speaking to has an effect on one‘s self-presentation—here, Sandy hitting on Susan—then Susan 
also recognizes that his actions affect her, that her performance is contingent upon his.  Thus, 
performance means something to Susan, for she knows that people make choices every day by 
acting differently in different contexts.  No matter how consistent is the narrative you tell 
yourself, others may perceive an ―act‖—though, of course, it is no less real for that reason, but 
rather, is an unavoidable function of interacting with others.     
I am laboring on this scene because this speech serves as something like a compass, or 
even a thesis, for the film.  And since the narrative culminates in Jonathan‘s isolation, it is 
essential to understanding the film‘s view on interpersonal relationships.  Interpersonal actions 
exist both at the level of the individual, and through the individual‘s responses to the other, at the 
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 In many ways, Carnal Knowledge here foreshadows Judith Butler‘s seminal elucidation of the ties between 
gender and performance.  She looks at ―constituting acts not only as constituting the identity of the actor, but as 
constituting identity as a compelling illusion, an object of belief‖ (155).  In this way, an important simultaneity is at 
work in which acts are ―both that which constitutes meaning and that through which meaning is performed or 
enacted‖ (155).  However, Carnal Knowledge goes further by explicitly arguing these performances remain 
intentional.  The idea that ―everyone puts on an act,‖ to say that an action is performed, that it was done by someone, 
as opposed to simply done, reveals a belief that the action was intended.  Although ―performed‖ simply denotes the 
completion of an action, to say that an action was performed by someone carries an explicitly theatrical connotation. 
Thus, performance here is not code for a shifting self, but operates upon assumptions of self-presentation, selection, 
and self-control.   
  
148 
level of the social.  It is, in fact, through such responses that the individual accesses the social 
realm.  
Sandy and Susan begin dating, although Sandy is initially uninterested in courting her if 
Jonathan does not approve (i.e. also desire her).  Susan, clearly uninterested in Sandy sexually, 
enjoys spending time with him because ―[he‘s] the only boy [she] knows [she] can talk to.‖  She 
even tells him that if she is with a boy she really likes, she does not show how bright she is.  
(Sandy, of course, does not realize the joke is on him.)  Jonathan, who measures relationships in 
physical terms, mocks Sandy for failing to make quicker progress toward the sex act.  Unlike 
Sandy, Jonathan cannot imagine taking the woman‘s desires into account, and so, bursts into 
laughter at the idea of waiting for clearer signals from Susan.  Jonathan is positioned in the mise-
en-scène to suggest that he is Sandy‘s ―ideal ego,‖ or, at least, that Sandy views him as such.  As 
Sandy ritually prepares his face to be seen by shaving, the camera is placed at an angle to suggest 
that, when he looks in the mirror, he sees Jonathan showering, his toned and tanned body 
floating in the mirror‘s fog like a cartoon conscience.  Jonathan informs Sandy of the rules by 
which he should abide when courting Susan (for example, he should kiss her on the second date).  
This scene incarnates Mulvey‘s argument that, ―[a] male movie star‘s glamorous characteristics 
are thus not those of the erotic object of his gaze, but those of the more perfect, more complete, 
more powerful ideal ego conceived in the original moment of recognition in front of the mirror‖ 
(quoted in Neale, 256).  Sandy, who idolizes Jonathan‘s bravado and ―knowledge‖ about how to 
achieve satisfaction with women, gazes in the mirror and sees Jonathan.   
Sandy soon confesses that he thinks he is in love with Susan.  Jonathan wonders how if 
he has not ―gotten in yet.‖  Sandy declaims: ―That‘s not everything… She tells me thoughts I 
didn‘t even know I had until she tells them to me!  It‘s unbelievable.  I can talk to her.‖  He tells 
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Jonathan he even plans to start reading her favorite books (starting with The Fountainhead and 
Jean-Christophe).  Susan and Sandy talk about one another‘s aspirations, while she resists 
having sex with him.  Attempting to keep pace with Jonathan‘s rules, Sandy guilts Susan into a 
giving him a hand job, an event which upends Jonathan‘s competitive nature.  He wants to be the 
first to ―go all the way‖ with a girl, and he interprets Susan‘s action as a sign of her potential 
willingness.  Jonathan is excited by Susan‘s attitude, as he is able to funnel it into his sexist 
terms, believing that a girl who makes her own choices (i.e. unconventional choices) will be 
easier to persuade to choose to go to bed.  After Sandy tells Jonathan of her ―scandalous‖ 
willingness to please, Jonathan secretly seeks a date with her.  
If Susan and Sandy are able to converse, Jonathan and Susan‘s date is a stark contrast.  In 
an almost surreal sequence, when Jonathan picks Susan up for their date, they rapidly fire 
questions at each other without answering: ―How do you like Smith?‖ ―Where did you go to high 
school?‖ ―What are you doing with your summer?‖  They only operate in the first-person, 
disregarding conventions of ordinary language exchange and only addressing each other in the 
second-person, making claims upon the other while trying to avoid being positioned in the third-
person themselves.  Of course, even replying to a question with a question is still a reply, putting 
oneself in a second-person position.  Their distaste for the ―codes‖ of courtship becomes the 
subject of their conversation over drinks.  In an effort to woo Susan, Jonathan tries a meta-
courting tactic: ―Most girls I talk to, it‘s like we‘re spies in foreign countries and we‘re speaking 
in code.  Everything means something else. Like I say, ‗Would you like to take a walk?‘ And it 
means something else. And she says, ‗I can‘t, I‘ve got a French test tomorrow.‘ And it means 
something else.‖  Susan calls him out for playing into these rules, and he calls her ―sharp,‖ which 
she recognizes also ―means something else.‖  Jonathan claims to detest the ―codes‖—which 
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Susan sharply points out is, itself, code.  The pair bemoan the obfuscated relationship between 
words and referents, only to self-consciously propagate it.   
The dialogue‘s distrust of signs extends to the visual image.  We next see Susan dancing, 
first with one man and then the other, though the cuts which replace one man with another are 
matched so well as to visually disorient the spectator.
141
  Then the film jump cuts to an extended 
frontal close-up of Susan‘s face laughing.  We hear the voices of Jonathan and Sandy, and so, 
understand them to be to her left and right, as the direction of her gaze suggests.  The trio 
reminisce about their childhood struggles to understand words, from misreading ―misled‖ to 
sound like ―myzled‖ to mistaken auditions in church hymns, such as ―Round John Virgin‖ 
(‗round yon virgin) and ―Gladly, the Cross-Eyed Bear‖ (gladly, the cross I‘d bear).  Although 
Susan offers up her own anecdotes, much of the scene is comprised of the men competing to 
make her spasm with laughter.  They enjoy these stories of misunderstanding phrases, and the 
possibility that the sounds and sights of words are untrustworthy.  They share memories of when 
words meant something other than their speaker intended—when the expression and that which 
was expressed were comically incompatible.   
In this scene, Susan is dressed in black against a black background.  The shot, which lasts 
for a minute and forty seconds, compels the spectator to contemplate her emotional expression, 
particularly her facial expression, as primarily a visual object (her laughter, though, does occupy 
a ―gray area between spoken and gestured‖ [Smith, 26]).  Rather than the close-up serving to 
guide the spectator through the narrative by momentarily directing his attention or by giving the 
protagonists‘ faces in romantic, ―beauty shots,‖ here, the close-up not only tells the story, it is the 
story.  Unlike the traditional close-up shot (or, rather, the close-up shot traditionally conceived), 
Susan‘s laughing face does not elicit a laugh from us, confusing typical expectations of a close-
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up as a site of spectatorial empathy.
142
  In direct address (neither Sandy or Jonathan‘s 
perspective), her face appears odd and her animatedness absurd.   
Rather than allowing the spectator the fantasy of sharing the simultaneous first and third 
person perspective of a shot/reverse-shot pattern, we are positioned objectively to see the 
character‘s reactions, her being responsive to other characters, but not other characters‘ 
responses to her.   We will see that, throughout the film, the visual track will isolate characters‘ 
reactions.  For example, later, as Sandy and Jonathan play tennis, we watch Cindy (Cynthia 
Neal) and Bobbie as they sit watching on a bench, seduced and humiliated, respectively.  There 
are, at most, four characters in any scene (not counting extras), and when there are more than 
two, we typically just see two of them, never the four together.  This way, we are never focused 
on the interactions of a group, but always the characters‘ interpersonal actions.    
After a few weeks, Jonathan, alerted to the possibility of losing Susan to Sandy (or vice 
versa), pulls the ―unhappy childhood‖ act with Susan, and convincingly dissembles concern for 
issues other than sex—even feigning the ultimate Cold War era rebellion by confessing he 
―might be a communist.‖  Susan gravely comes clean: ―I might be a communist, too.‖  They have 
sexual intercourse in a dark barn; Jonathan‘s back, dressed in a dark coat, blocks portions of 
Susan‘s face, but, even segmented, her expression is isolated for our view.  It seems that the 
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 There is precedent in early American cinema for this.  Short films, such as Facial Expression of Lonely Haskell 
(Biograph, 1897) and Laughing Gas (Edwin Porter, 1909) were popular and evince a cultural appetite for cinematic 
representations of the laughing face. Jacob Smith has highlighted the importance of recorded laughter to the success 
of radio, the phonograph and early cinema, arguing that, ―that the performance of the laugh has helped bridge the 
gap between listener and prerecorded media texts, and it has served as an indication of authentic human presence in 
the media‖ (7).  He informs us that the earliest sound recordings that sold well were of people laughing—
particularly of Sallie Strembler, ―the laughing girl‖ (the marketing photos of Strembler in close-up with mouth open 
wide, ecstatic, strongly resemble the visual of Susan laughing).  Smith demonstrates that, since the beginning of 
these media, and ―[t]hroughout these different media contexts, the laugh has been presented as the ultimate 
expression of the human—often as the result of its connection to discourses about race, class, and gender—and its 
mechanical reproduction has served as a lightning rod for anxieties concerning the social dimensions of mass media 
performance and consumption‖ (17). 
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Supreme Court ruling, based on the fact that, ―the camera does not focus on the bodies of the 
actors‖ during sex scenes, implies the court‘s definition of ―bodies‖ does not include the face.  
As time wears on, Jonathan pressures Susan to drop Sandy; she refuses on the grounds 
that Sandy is ―helpless‖ and Jonathan ―stronger.‖  Jonathan grows resentful of the bond Sandy 
and Susan seem to share, and implores her: ―Why can‘t you be more with me like you are with 
Sandy?‖  Eventually, Jonathan delivers his ―final ultimatum,‖ and demands Susan ―tell [him his] 
thoughts‖ like she does with Sandy.  Amidst a throng of students, he demands she face him in 
order to do so: ―Look at me! Now, tell me my goddamn thoughts!‖  But she cannot.  The film 
has already told us, through Susan, that how one acts is determined by who one is with, so the 
fact that he would ask such a question not only goes against Susan‘s beliefs, but once again 
demonstrates Jonathan‘s inability to see others on their own terms.  He sees everything from a 
first-person perspective, whereas Susan, at least in her speech at the mixer, advocates a more 
second-person position which encompasses the need not only to act but also to react in order to 
acknowledge and communicate with other people.  What Jonathan really wants to know is his 
own thoughts.  Here, the film defines expression not as an inconsequential physical act, but as an 
expression of mind. 
At one point, Jonathan berates Susan for leading Sandy on (he is confident she will 
choose him) until she cuts him short by announcing, ―I feel like nothing.‖  Remembering her 
initial speech to Sandy, the spectator understands this to be the case because she is with 
Jonathan; his view of women does not allow her subjectivity.  What act can she perform when 
she is viewed as either a lack or as no-thing, an uninstantiated variable, or a schema without 
content?   
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 True to his word, Jonathan later phones Susan to break it off.  The disjunction of voice 
and body, and the elision of visual interpersonal space by cross-cutting between their dorms, 
allows Jonathan to tell her: ―I don‘t feel anything anymore.‖  Susan acknowledges they need to 
part ways, and we see her face clearly, tears streaming down it.  A cut to Jonathan reveals him in 
the dark, almost in silhouette.  We cannot see his face during this emotional event.  The scene 
then cuts to a close-up of Jonathan‘s face, seemingly catatonic; his expression is set, frozen in its 
refusal to express.  As spectators, we surmise he is broken-hearted, but there is no visible 
evidence of this.  We hear Susan and Sandy packing for a camping trip, and though the 
shot/scene lasts for fifty seconds, the camera remains still on Jonathan‘s impassive face.   
Not sensitive like Sandy, Jonathan cannot cope with his feelings.  He cannot articulate 
them to Susan, since he is intent on repressing them in order to not be like sensitive Sandy, but a 
man in the more socially acceptable sense.  His efforts to be manly are (if not the reason) the 
cause for Susan to select Sandy.  Trapped in a self-defeating cycle, he shuts down.   
 Now the film turns stylistically, too; it takes on a stricter ―talking heads‖ visual format.  
Jonathan‘s frozen expression is followed by the first of three whiteouts in the film, which, we 
learn, signal the passing of years.  We next meet Jonathan leering at a buxom figure skater in 
New York‘s central park ice rink.  Clad in clinging white, this Marilyn Monroe-cum-Sonja Henie 
skates against the white ice, displaying her body in figure skating poses.  Jonathan makes 
predictably lecherous remarks, and the film cuts to reveal him talking to Sandy, now married to 
Susan, fingering his wedding ring as he asks Jonathan for details of his sex life in the city.   
 In what will remain the film‘s dominant stylistic until its end, the scene cuts to a medium 
close-up of Jonathan, appearing to directly address us from the screen,
143
 though we know him to 
be addressing Sandy within the film‘s diegesis.  Jonathan launches into a monologue about how 
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the girls are ―after either your money or your balls, or your money and your balls. The women 
today are hung better than the men.‖  The film cuts to a direct address close-up of Jonathan, the 
framing of which is most explicitly like that of Feiffer‘s ―talking heads‖ comic strips.  He 
delivers a monologue revealing his anxiety about changing social mores: ―It‘s not as easy getting 
laid as it used to be.  I don‘t think I‘ve fucked more than a dozen new girls a year now.  Maybe 
I‘m too much of a perfectionist… ‖   He goes on to describe one promising girl‘s anatomy in 
detail (he would have settled for her if she just had ―two more inches here.‖  The film gives us 
sequences of characters speaking in similarly framed close-ups consistently from this point on.  
For example, the following scene is of Sandy, in close-up and static composition, clinically 
articulating the credits and debits of having a stable home life.  His cold speech ends: ―It‘s not 
glamorous or anything.  There are other things besides glamour.‖   
Next, we meet glamorous Bobbie, a model and actress, in a 360 degree rotating shot.  
Every bit as buxom as the skater,
144
 she and Jonathan are on a date, performing courtship to one 
another: she as a coy vixen shy about her age, and he the eager boy, willing to learn (somewhat 
reminiscent of The Graduate‘s sexual relationship between Ben and Mrs. Robinson).  She asks 
him: ―Do you like to be mothered?‖ He replies ―I‘d like to be smothered… by you,‖ and declares 
to her: ―I‘d marry you in a minute.‖  The two enter into a relationship, and, after some time 
passes, Bobbie suggests they ―shack up.‖  It is significant that when Bobbie asks this question, 
she teasingly addresses him as ―Sam,‖ and Jonathan answers in a Bogartesque accent, an allusion 
to the character Bogart played (Sam Spade) in The Maltese Falcon (John Huston, 1941).  
Jonathan, naked from the shower, is caught unawares, and his hemming and hawing exposes 
more than just his body.  His reticent accession to Bobbie‘s proposal reveals his self-presentation 
during their first date as dissimulation.  Bobbie calls him ―a real prick.‖  She later teasingly calls 
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him ―a dildo‖—a fake prick, suggestive of the impotency problem we learn Jonathan was 
suffering from before meeting Bobbie. 
Despite the fact that her job as a model and actress was part of what he found attractive 
about her in the first place (he crowed to Sandy that ―She‘s the girl in the airline commercial!‖), 
in the next scene, Jonathan tells Bobbie he does not want her to work (money will later be an 
issue, too).  Bobbie is incapable of being domestic, though, and sinks into a depression.  The 
posters and photographs of a radiant and smiling Bobbie adorning the walls of their apartment, 
and beside the bed, serve as a visual counterpoint to her current countenance.  After Jonathan 
strips her of her livelihood, work (he will not even let her ―canvass for Kennedy‖), and self-
esteem, she wants to get married (for security on all fronts).  She knows he is attracted to others 
(even suggesting Sandy), and they fight viciously; he rails on her sexual experience—exactly 
why he was initially attracted to her.   
The contradictions in Jonathan‘s behavior toward Bobbie, combined with his cruel 
treatment of her when she has caused no offence, prevent the spectator from seeing the film as 
siding with Jonathan.  He is clearly the villain, the cause of his and others‘ problems.  Bobbie 
tries to explain to Jonathan the source of her misery: ―I sleep all day because I can‘t stand my 
life: sleeping all day!‖  Unable to think outside of proprietary terms, he mistakes her desire to be 
acknowledged by him as a desire to own him.  He yells, ―You can‘t have me.  I‘m taken by me!‖  
Again, Jonathan betrays an essentialist view of selfhood.  Irrationally, he wants to own Bobbie 
and be rid of her, telling her ―I‘d almost marry you if you‘d leave me.‖   
In the middle of their fight, Sandy shows up with Cindy, a woman Jonathan set him up 
with, and a woman in control of her sexual desires—much to Jonathan and Sandy‘s fascination.  
Now the ―swinging sixties,‖ the men conquer their fear that Cindy is too ―masculine‖ for 
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knowing what she wants, and decide to try and swap partners.  Not a pawn, Cindy refuses the 
notion.  Sandy, meanwhile, finds that Bobbie has attempted suicide.  After the second whiteout, 
the narrative flashes forward to contemporary 1971.   
 
Ice Skaters and Frozen Faces 
 As the years stretch on, Jonathan‘s view of women grows ever more inhumane—and 
defensive.  That he does not view women as individuals, but as a social type available for his 
abuse manifests in his own ―home movie,‖ ―Ballbusters on Parade,‖ a slide show of the women 
with whom he has been sexually involved.  He exhibits his work to Sandy and his date, an 
eighteen-year-old hippie/druggie named Jennifer (Carol Kane).  Jonathan comments on the 
bodies and sexual proclivities of the women in the most demeaning way.  During the slide show, 
the spectator‘s point of view shifts to that of the characters‘, so that the projected images of the 
women‘s bodies become the film, forcing the spectator to confront the coldness of these images 
as Sandy and Jennifer do.    
Jonathan‘s acrimony towards the women who appear on his screen disgusts Sandy and 
Jennifer, who cries.  Jonathan is perplexed by her reaction.  He asks her, ―What are you crying 
for?  It‘s not a Lassie movie,‖ implying he would have more empathy for the abuse of an animal 
than women.  Jonathan‘s dehumanization comes in many forms throughout his narration: from 
objectification (―This was something I went with…‖) to racism (―This was my Jap in the 
sack…‖).  We even meet a ―sixteen year old [he] gave twenty bucks to one night in the village.‖   
 ―Ballbusters on Parade‖ reveals to Sandy that Jonathan slept with Susan.  The 
penultimate scene reunites the pair one last time for a walk in the contemporary, modern urban 
landscape of skyscrapers.  Pot-bellied and balding, Sandy professes not to care about Jonathan‘s 
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betrayal, because he has found his ―love teacher‖ in Jennifer.  ―In a lot of ways, she‘s older than 
me,‖ he earnestly confides to Jonathan.  It turns out Sandy, too, had been suffering from 
impotence.  Jonathan refuses to see Jennifer as anything more than ―a nice piece of ass,‖ 
frustrating Sandy‘s protests of sincerity.  Finally fed up with fighting for Jonathan‘s approval of 
who he sleeps with, Sandy ends their friendship.   
In the film‘s final scene, Jonathan patronizes a prostitute, Louise (Rita Moreno).  When 
she opens her door to him, he sighs: ―Women.‖  We understand they have met before when she 
responds, ―All ballbusters, right?‖  As he enters her apartment, he continues: ―When you think of 
some of the things he has to dip into, any guy with a conscience has a right to turn soft.  Am I 
right, Louise?‖  When she agrees—―You‘re always right, lover.‖—any suspicion we had she is a 
prostitute turns into certainty.  They continue their misogynistic verbal exchange until discussion 
of the financial transaction arises, and, suddenly, Jonathan bursts out in anger.  Louise, it turns 
out, has flubbed a line, exposing the fact that their entire sexist interaction has been carefully 
rehearsed to elicit a sexual performance from Jonathan.  Stepping into the role of ersatz writer 
and director, Jonathan corrects Louise before they begin again—a move that reflects not just on 
performance, but cinematic performance, where multiple takes are possible.   
As Louise gets back into the character of adoring subjugate, the film cuts to a frontal 
close-up of her face.  She looks directly at us (via the camera); we share Jonathan‘s position—an 
alignment that is disturbing.  As he lays back, he asks her what kind of man he is, her cue to 
deliver this speech, in a direct address close-up:  
A real man; a kind man.  Not weak kind the way so many men are.  I mean the kindness 
that comes from enormous strength, from an inner power so strong that every act no 
matter what is more proof of that power. That‘s what women resent; that‘s why they try 
to cut you down.  Because your knowledge of yourself is so right, so true, that it exposes 
the lies which they, every scheming one of them, live by. It takes a true woman to 
understand the purest form of love is to love a man who denies himself to her. A man 
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who inspires worship because he has no need for any woman, because he has himself. 
And who is better, more beautiful, more powerful, more perfect—you‘re getting hard—
more strong, more masculine, more extraordinary, more robust—it‘s rising, it‘s rising—
virile, domineering, more irresistible?  It‘s up…  
 
Louise delivers this monologue in a seemingly endless shot as the camera tracks down,
145
 
maintaining the proximity to Louise‘s face as she performs her submission to Jonathan, and us.  
The moving background to Louise‘s face heightens the impression of movement in her face, it 
draws our focus to her face, and draws out its movements.  In contrast, when the film cuts to 
Jonathan‘s immobile facial expression against a static background, the impression of stillness is 
reinforced.  Jonathan incarnates Mulvey‘s and Neale‘s descriptions of the Hollywood man here: 
he desires, objectifies women, and his expression is impassive. 
Jonathan‘s frozen expression dissolves into the final white-out, followed by the image of 
the figure skater, dancing on the ice.  This series of shots recalls the first time we saw Jonathan‘s 
expression frozen, after his break-up with Susan, which precipitated the first white-out and the 
vision of the figure skater.  This repetition instructs the spectator to connect Jonathan‘s current 
state of impotence (cured only by a grotesque performance of fantastic chauvinism) with the 
moment he first refrained from expressing (his hurt and anger to Susan and Sandy).  If we 
remember Jonathan‘s decision in the film‘s opening that he ―would rather be in love,‖ he clearly 
failed.  Is this image of the figure skater Jonathan‘s fantasy?  Did his pleasure, and Louise‘s 
speech, call forth this vision, the woman with the perfect body he can still desire, having never 
met her?  
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 The effect of this shot was created by filming in a descending elevator, the back of which was removed.  
  
159 
Tête-à-tête  
Jonathan‘s commentary to ―Ballbusters on Parade,‖ and the speech he writes for Louise, 
are so blunt and repulsive, I find it difficult to agree with critics, such as Haskell, who find him 
to be ―a bad but charming boy‖ (360).  If this is a charming man, what are the standards for 
manhood (and villainy)?  Roger Ebert, on the other hand, believes ―Carnal Knowledge is clearly 
Mike Nichols‘ best film,‖ because ―[i]t sets out to tell us certain things about these few 
characters and their sexual crucifixions, and it succeeds‖ (1).  He excuses the film from laying 
blame on the men in a more explicit fashion because, ―[Carnal Knowledge] chooses the tragedy 
form‖ (1), tragedy that results because ―[the characters] can't break through their patterns of 
treating each other as objects‖ (1).  Ernest Callenbach‘s review for Film Quarterly responds 
more to popular and critical responses to the film than to the text itself.  It begins:  
Carnal Knowledge seems to draw an unusual number of attacks for wrong reasons.  The 
film is a cartoon, so it is damned for not displaying deep psychological insight.  It is 
straight-line cynical Feiffer, so it is attacked for not being profound sociopolitical 
analysis ‗like the strips.‘  It is a work of some self-critical courage by two men who have 
lived the era they are satirizing, so it is put down for being facile.  (Said Nichols once, 
about his satirical skits with Elaine May: ‗We just take things we‘ve done ourselves, and 
exaggerate them a little.‘)  It is modest and reticent in cinematic style, so it is attacked for 
pseudo-Italian flamboyance.  Its concern, like that of all serious satire, is not merely with 
the foibles and follies of one era, but with anguishing tendencies in the human psyche and 
condition, so it is charged with being superficial. (56)   
 
Callenbach shares Haskell‘s sense that Carnal Knowledge captures the era; he calls it ―a very 
superior article of journalism,‖ and states that ―Feiffer and Nichols, with perfect homing instinct, 
have produced a freezing cartoon about the sexual chauvinism which is America‘s machismo‖ 
(56-57).   
Callenbach‘s description of the film as ―freezing‖ speaks to the film‘s coldness toward its 
characters, but also to the significance of movement as a question for the film.  He writes: ―[n]or 
is the film devoid of a level of mystery: those huge, amber-lit close-ups, which have been 
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complained of as witless directorial mistakes, surely have a direct stylistic origin in the 
repetitious panels of Feiffer strips—but they also remind us of the biological creatures who are 
going through these matings and mismatings, and of the pity and anguish of our carnality‖ 
(56).
146
   
Like Callenbach, the critic for the New York Times, Bosley Crowther, who called the 
teaming of Feiffer and Nichols, ―a nearly ideal collaboration of directorial and writing talents,‖ 
noted that the film ―evoke[s] the form of Feiffer‘s cartoons. It is, in effect, a series of slightly 
mad dialogues between two people—seen a lot of the time individually in close-ups from which 
all extraneous background detail has been eliminated—that almost always lead to new plateaus 
of psychic misunderstanding and emotional hurt‖ (1).147  The critical attention to the 
compositional similarity of Carnal Knowledge‘s close-ups to Feiffer‘s cartoon panels indicates 
one of the film‘s strategies to direct the spectator to consider how movement matters.   
Of course, characters in comic strips do not perform; they express the writer‘s artistry.  
The voiced and embodied characters of cinema are performed in the sense that an actor does 
things to create it, and in the sense we infer a character through our perception of the completed 
actions.  Unlike the painting or comic strip, which gives the face the iconic status of an object, 
the cinematic face is different.  As it exists in movement, because it moves, it can express.  
Through its reflexive attention to the performance of movement, Carnal Knowledge reunites the 
head with the body, reminding us that it is gazed upon, too.  The question of what-is-expressed 
now becomes a question of performing an action, or, more correctly, our recognition of that 
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 Even the U.S. Supreme Court a review which described Sandy as ―the nice but troubled guy straight out of those 
early Feiffer cartoons‖ in its decision.    
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 Feiffer‘s presence as a social satirist emerged alongside that of Nichols and May in the late 1950s.  In addition to 
his cartoons, Feiffer wrote the play, and then screenplay, of the satire Little Murders (Alan Arkin, 1971).  
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performance as expressive.  Two questions immediately appear: what is an expression and what 
is a performance of an expression in this sense?   
In the final scene, how are we to interpret the ambiguity of Jonathan‘s frozen face, 
evacuated of everything (except perhaps, given the narrative context, desire)?  The film has 
intertwined facial expression with gender performance, suggesting that a masculine face is a 
stoic one, but now exposes the stoic face as an impotent face.  Stoicism is a refusal of expression 
without an explicit reason.  Refusing to express is not impotence; the inability to express is.  But 
if we can describe any face on-screen as expressive (even a bored or pensive face), then there is 
no possibility of an inexpressive face on-screen.  If that is true, and we are forced to admit that 
Jonathan‘s face is expressive, then we must also admit that Haskell‘s reading has merit.  If he is 
miserable, and the film ends tragically, Haskell could argue we are positioned to pity him.  
Similarly, if he is contented by Louise, then he goes unpunished.  Can we, then, consider his face 
as non-expressive, as impassive?  To answer this question we must consider what counts as an 
expressive face on-screen by looking at the representation of facial expression in cinema against 
a broader history of representing the human face.   
 
Facing Expressivity 
In the earliest scholarly work devoted to the study of cinema, The Photoplay: A 
Psychological Study, Hugo Muensterberg declares that ―To picture emotions must be the central 
aim of the photoplay‖ (99).  Muensterberg‘s excitement about the cinema, and particularly the 
close-up, is grounded in his notion that the new medium will render inner, mental states and 
phenomena visible, and hopefully, legible.  He says, ―even memory, attention, and imagination 
do not tell the whole story of our inner mind.  The core of man lies in his feelings and emotions.  
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As soon as the photoplay moves along its own way, the expression of feelings and emotions will 
come to the foreground‖ (―Why We Go to the Movies,‖ 179).   
  Muensterberg lauds the close-up‘s potential—through duration—to represent interiority, 
particularly emotional interiority: ―The value of these formal changes [of the pictorial 
presentation] for the expression of the emotions may become remarkable.  The characteristic 
features of many an attitude and feeling which cannot be expressed without words today will 
then be aroused in the mind of the spectator‖ (108).  Here, the distinction between emotion and 
its expression, inner and outer, is almost lost.  For Muensterberg, the expression seen by the 
spectator on-screen is inseparable from her experience of it: visual perception and consciousness 
are ―fused.‖  He says,  
The visual perception of the various forms of expression of these emotions fuses in our 
minds with the conscious awareness of the emotion expressed; we feel as if we were 
directly seeing and observing the emotion itself…. It is obvious that for this leading 
group of emotions the relation of the pictures to the feelings of the persons in the play 
and to the feelings of the spectator is exactly the same.  (105)   
 
In effect, his argument prefigures recent scholarship on mirror neurons.
148
  Muensterberg‘s 
excitement does not extend to photographs of facial expression, and so, we can assume that the 
empathy he describes as primitive to the spectator‘s experience is predicated upon the image‘s 
capacity to capture expressive movement.  Influential theorist Béla Balázs, in his 1924 book Der 
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 Current psychology has moved away from the mind as its primary object and now focuses on the brain, leaving 
cinema as a privileged place for us to work out questions of our minds and the minds of others.  Still, many studies 
operate under the assumption that we do not reserve one mode of perception for the behavior of others on film and 
of others present to us in ―flesh and blood‖ (to use the phrase Bazin claims was invented to denote liveness, partly in 
response to cinema).  The current interest with what are being called ―mirror neurons‖ goes some way toward 
justifying this view, suggesting that we feel and act, on some primitive level in the brain, what we perceive in 
others‘ actions—even on film.  While such new science is compelling, it tells me nothing about my conscious 
experience of being emotional.  Kagan notes: ―A brain state and a subjective interpretation of a change in feeling 
that originated in a brain state are distinct phenomena‖ (5).  It also strikes me as dangerous to create pathways for 
treating a spectator‘s response as ―natural‖ or biological rather than culturally or historically determined.  Moreover, 
simply stating that we do perceive an emotional expression as inextricably correlated to our individual notions of 
what constitutes an emotional experience (conscious and corporeal), threatens to eradicate the space of the 
interpersonal that emotional expression requires in order to be understood as communicative, as expressive.  For 
more, see Mirrors in the Brain: How Our Minds Share Actions, Emotions by Giacomo Rizzolatti and Corrado 
Sinigaglia.  
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Sichtbare Mensch (The Visible Man), echoes Muensterberg‘s appreciation for the cinema‘s 
capacity, claiming it returns to us the impoverished face, long exiled by the dominance of the 
printing press.  Similar to Muensterberg‘s proclamation above, Balázs claims that, through the 
close-up, ―we have the impression of directly seeing the emotion itself‖ (105).149   
Both Muensterberg and Balázs neglect to address that the emotions expressed on-screen 
are performed.  The faces they write about are those of actors acting—which is to say, of 
characters‘ facial expressions.  The performer is not a mediator, but a creator.  It would be 
wrong to say that the actor ―mediates‖ because he does not stand between the spectator and the 
object; the character‘s face only seems to be the object, and it is this seeming—this ―act,‖ as 
Susan might say—that, ultimately, is the object.  Carnal Knowledge reinstates the significance of 
performance to understanding our perception of facial expression.  By directly addressing the 
spectator and by holding the shot for such extreme durations, Carnal Knowledge exacts the 
spectator‘s awareness of the characters‘ expressions as performed.  It reminds us that we cannot 
know, but can only interpret characters‘ faces.  It also highlights the dissembling of its 
characters; for instance, we are aware that Susan, laughing during her long close-up, is 
concealing from Sandy her affair with Jonathan.  
In order to indicate the importance of three key developments in the history of 
representing facial expression—the desire to capture ―authenticity,‖ the presence of movement, 
and the introduction of actors into the process of representing facial expression (proximity 
typically precluded theatrical spectators from attending closely to the face as representative 
device)—I will look briefly at the evolution of theorizing about emotional expression, whose 
emphasis shifted from conceptualizing an emotion as something had to something seen.  After 
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 In ―The Face in Close-up,‖ Jacques Aumont tracks the endurance of this view in cinema studies from Sergei 
Eisenstein to Béla Balázs to Gilles Deleuze, suggesting that the cumulative effect is that the face and the close-up 
became interchangeable.   
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surveying this history of perceiving emotional facial expression we will be better situated to 
appreciate the view advanced by Carnal Knowledge—particularly as a response to its place as 
inheritor of American/Hollywood tradition and to the influx of Brechtian-inspired European 
cinema to American in the 1960s.  It is partly the contention of this section to argue that this is 
the result of symbiosis rather than coincidence—that an explanation of the visual auscultation 
demanded by emotional expression is subject to the contemporary media available to the 
artist/thinkers.  I will begin with a brief look at the work of painter Charles Le Brun before 
analyzing what I show is the first study of facial expression on film, Charles Darwin‘s The 
Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals.  While Muensterberg celebrates a curious blur 
between the image and the spectator, expression and emotion, Darwin seeks to scientifically 
theorize by looking at expression more critically.  Published in 1872, his text anticipates the 
serial photography of Marey and Muybridge, and suggests a modern desire to see the expressive 
face—the moving, performing face—may have been significant to cinema‘s emergence.  
Darwin‘s project is to ask why an expression is what it is, in evolutionary terms; yet his use of 
photographic evidence provides an interesting place to begin asking why expression functions as 
it does for the filmic spectator. 
Muensterberg studied emotion at Harvard in America‘s first psychology department.150  
He was imported from Germany by William James, whose seminal ―What is an Emotion?‖ was, 
in part, a response to Darwin‘s book.  The Expression of Emotion is not only one of the first 
scientific works completed on the subject of emotional expression, but one of the first scientific 
books ever to supply photographs as evidence.  What did filmic media provide that enabled these 
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 William James instituted America‘s first psychology program at Harvard University, along with Muensterberg, in 
1892 as professor of experimental psychology.  James taught his first formal course in physiological psychology in 
1875-76, just three years after Darwin‘s text was published.  Together, their experiments consistently focused on 
emotion and often incorporated filmic evidence. 
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scholars to revolutionize the study of emotion, an area of philosophical and scientific inquiry 
largely ignored since Descartes?   
Darwin felt indebted to the recent development of instantaneous photography for 
capturing the ephemeral movements of facial muscles.  He begins his book by referencing Le 
Brun‘s lectures as ―the best known ancient work‖ on the subject (7), but he believed that the 
―naked eye was incapable of recording the kind of detail‖ necessary; nor could an artist‘s sketch, 
because of the inherent ―limitations and biases.‖  Darwin says: ―Painters can hardly portray 
suspicion, jealousy, envy, etc., except by the aid of accessories which tell the tale; and poets use 
such vague and fanciful expressions as ‗green-eyed jealousy‘‖ (83).  The appearance and 
significance of analyzing photographs is evidence of Darwin‘s yen for (to use his word) 
immediacy.  Like Muybridge and Marey, Darwin‘s excitement about capturing movement 
through photographs was not primarily aesthetic.  He confesses that he hopes to glean 
information from the ―great masters in painting and sculpture, who are such close observers,‖ but 
finds that, in ―works of art, beauty is the chief object; and strongly contracted facial muscles 
destroy beauty‖ (21-22).  Darwin aspires to determine what could be detected by the eye, and 
found photography to be the best way to go about this.  He believed that theorizing expression as 
a visual object would help explain the evolution of expression, and possibly speak to emotion as 
purposive, which is to say, eugenically explicable.    
Le Brun‘s seminal lecture, ―Sur l‘Expression Generale et Particuliere,‖ was delivered to 
the Academie Royale de Peinture et de Sculpture in 1668.  What made it seminal is that no artist 
before him succeeded in isolating the importance of addressing what happens during an 
expressive movement.  In her analysis of Le Brun‘s work, Jennifer Montagu comprehensively 
demonstrates that the representation of facial expression in the history of art has hardly been 
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viewed as a simple or given procedure.  She contextualizes Le Brun‘s work by pointing out that, 
―still in the seventeenth century, when facility in perspective and spatial construction, and the 
accurate proportion of bodies could be taken for granted in a competently trained artist, ability to 
render human expression was considered a quality worthy of remark‖ (1).  Because expressions 
are essentially movements—communicative movements—viewers‘ attempts to decode still 
images were far from reliable, given some faces‘ natural propensity toward frowning, grinning, 
etc.  Montagu summarizes the painter‘s dilemma for representing facial expression as movement 
using the example of a pendulum:  
if [the artist] wishes to show a pendulum in motion he should choose any position other 
than the vertical, for that is the one position at which it could be at rest; similarly, if he 
wants to show a body in movement, he should select a moment which the observer 
recognizes as one that cannot last.  In the case of facial expression this would mean 
avoiding the moment when it is at its apex, yet this is the moment at which it could be 
most surely recognized. (3) 
 
Here, the predicament of the painter in the pre-filmic era trying to produce resemblances to 
natural phenomena is that he must rely on an intellectual, rather than emotional, experience to 
communicate emotion through the symbols and patterns which are his tools.  Thus, the emotion 
depicted is an expression of the artist, not the face itself.  The painter‘s own observations provide 
the sole measure of authenticity, a source of anxiety for Le Brun, as he desired to depict 
expressions that were often ―too complex or fleeting to be easily analyzed in nature‖ (7).  He 
sketched numerous series of facial features, testing his theories under the rubric of realism he 
himself defined.  He favored the face because he thought, following Descartes, that ―if the 
passions were controlled from the brain, then the face, being the nearest part of the body to the 
brain, should be the most accurate index of the mind, and of all the features the eyebrows [are] 
closest to the seat of the soul‖ (18).  Le Brun‘s corpus is filled with drawings of anatomical 
observation, musculature, and even dissected heads— all in the service of authentically 
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representing facial expression.  And although his obsession with accuracy was not unique, the 
merit of Le Brun‘s lectures lies in deriving from scientific study a systematic theory on the 
origins and physiological workings of the passions.  His work intends to isolate the importance 
of moving from one expression to the next, and his obsession with representing the anatomical 
musculature of the face is explicable both as science and as art.  Scientifically, his attempts 
sought to further an understanding of how emotion functions; aesthetically, his attempts sought 
to further an understanding of how to enrich the viewers‘ experience by recreating expressions as 
―authentically‖ as possible.  Both aims were contingent upon the capture of movement.   
 Heinrich Wölfflin, the ―most important art historian in the twentieth century‖ (Mallgrave 
and Ikonomou, 40), became famous for his Prolegomena to a Psychology of Architecture, which 
―owes its inspiration to the contemporary infatuation with psychological aesthetics‖ (39).  He 
believed we could understand representations of others‘ emotions only because we had 
experience of them ourselves.  Wölfflin‘s tripartite ―anthropopathic theory‖ is this: every 
emotion has an expression, the physical manifestation of the mental act.  Then, when we witness 
the artistic imitation of the expression, we also experience the emotion.  Finally, we 
unconsciously transfer our emotional response back to the object.  There is no private language 
in a model where emotion is practically contagious.
151
  By extension, ―forms become meaningful 
to us only because we recognize in them the expression of a sentient soul.  Instinctively, we 
animate each object‖ (42).  Yet, art could not express the range of human content, as that is the 
privilege of the human form.  What, then, would become of this rationale once a medium 
emerged that could capture this range?   
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 This view of emotion is similar in many ways to Hume‘s, and allows Wölfflin to describe sympathy in moral 
terms, as the basis of ideal social relationships.  
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The Moving Face  
 Predictably, photography would alter the possibilities for analyzing and representing 
facial expression.  Capable of recording greater accuracy of detail than even the human eye, as 
well as the entire range of human behavior, subtler and subtler emotions could be regarded and 
understood as expressive.  Photography‘s ability to select a wider range of expressive events 
lessened the artist/photographer‘s dependence on peak instants to signal an emotional experience 
over time—but it did not do away with it entirely.  Photography‘s promise of accuracy also 
appealed to scientists.  Photographic close-ups of human faces constitute the majority of 
Darwin‘s evidence in The Expression of Emotion (along with full body shots of infants and 
sketches of animals).  However, Darwin does not simply inspect photographs of various 
expressions, but imagines the movements between photographs by looking first at a subject in a 
―relaxed‖ state and then at the same subject in an emotionally ―excited‖ state.  He then takes his 
imagined data as evidence.  These photographs were reproduced for the reader in the body of the 
text.  He is intent on isolating the characteristic movement of expression, thereby delineating 
them for analysis.  Beyond this, Darwin‘s impulse to look at expression as evolutionarily 
relevant suggests that he viewed emotional expression as purposive, which emphasizes the role 
of emotions as objects to be seen, rather than as mere byproducts of the soul.   
Darwin‘s evidence also adds a new layer of complexity to the study of representations of 
emotional expression in the presence of the actor.  Although the scientist could now assuage 
worries about the painter‘s ability to render the observed face authentically, as film satisfied such 
aspirations for realism, the photograph of an actor‘s performance of an emotional expression was 
regarded as ―immediate‖ (as opposed to the work of the photographer)—despite being doubly 
mediated.   
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Perhaps Darwin‘s desire to utilize photography‘s new brand of realism, as well as to 
extend its capacities to capture movement should come as no surprise, for even the etymology of 
the word ―emotion‖ suggests movement: From the Latin ―e‖ (out) and ―movere‖ (movement), 
the Oxford English Dictionary defines emotion as a ―moving out, migration, a transference from 
one place to another.‖  Allan Langdale describes Muensterberg as ―the first film theorist to 
seriously argue for the film medium as a model of the workings of the human mind.‖  I want to 
argue that Darwin did this, too.  Darwin implicitly draws a parallel between the face and its 
emotional expression, and a photograph and its object: an expression imprints upon the face as 
an object does on a photographic plate, but, unlike a photograph, it is doomed to remain fleeting.  
In fact the etymology of the word ―face‖ also suggests an affinity with the cinematic screen: its 
roots connote ―to shine‖ and ―to appear‖ (OED).   
Darwin‘s text evinces a desire to see the face in a way that only the filmic close-up could 
satisfy.
152
  Darwin helps explain this in evolutionary terms: ―Of all parts of the body, the face is 
most considered and regarded, as is natural from its being the chief seat of expression and the 
source of the voice.  It is also the chief seat of beauty and ugliness, and throughout the world is 
the most ornamented.  The face, therefore, will have been subjected during many generations to 
much closer and more earnest self-attention than any other part of the body‖ (326).  Beyond The 
Expression of Emotion‘s attention to the visual perception of emotion in the face, Darwin‘s 
                                                 
152
 Darwin‘s study demonstrates that the photographic close-up as a device to capture facial expression (not just as a 
photographic portrait) was not an invention (or convention) of Hollywood cinema, but had already captivated early 
modern culture.  The first commercially successful photographers, such as Julia Margaret Cameron (a friend of 
Darwin) and Oscar Rejlander, were most attentive to the face and capturing emotion (it is Rejlander who supplies 
Darwin with the bulk of his material and whose picture of a screaming infant went on to sell 300,000 copies).  The 
photographers Darwin commissioned often ―acted‖ as subjects themselves (or used their wives).  Rejlander was 
Darwin‘s primary photographer, and he, as Beaumont Newhall points out, ―was, at heart, an actor‖ (74).  Many of 
the photographs used are of people ―renowned‖ as actors (Darwin himself refers to them as actors and frequently 
offers his evaluations of their talents).  Darwin also collected commercial photographs whose origin was unknown, 
and even used photographs from a French physiologist who ―froze‖ expressions on his patients long enough to 
photograph them by hooking them up to electrical currents.   
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interest in emotional expression also tends toward the emotive subject‘s eyes—also seen anew 
for the first time with photography (especially given taboos for staring and close proximity in 
Western culture).  He observes that, ―When our minds are much affected, so are the movements 
of our bodies… From the continued use of the eyes, these organs are especially liable to be acted 
on through association under various states of the mind‖ (38).   
Darwin‘s use of photography allows him to shift from isolating and addressing the 
―reality‖ of emotion to its observation.  For Darwin, expressions do not exist independently of 
observation.  Noted theorist of expression Paul Ekman
153
 claims that Darwin‘s treatment of 
expression as a thing-to-be-seen was a reaction to Charles Bell‘s influential treatise on emotion 
that posited expressions as proof of humans‘ humanity, and thus of God‘s existence (and not 
their descendancy from apes).  This is perhaps one reason Darwin‘s text is about the expression 
of emotion in man and animals.  It is common for him to provide examples of both, though he 
does include chapters on the special expressions of animals (such as the wagging of a dog‘s tail) 
and the special expressions of man (in which he claims the expression unique to man is 
blushing).  Bell, and other creationists (like Le Brun), valued emotional expressions as 
communication.  While Darwin was not able to completely remove physiognomy and 
communication from his model, his study privileges the visible, outer expression of an emotion 
over inner phenomena, because it is in such behavior that he sees evidence of a regard for 
survival.  Darwin‘s ambivalence to discuss emotional expression as a means of communication is 
rare amongst theorists of emotion, but I believe it to be significant for film studies.  His implicit 
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 As I mentioned in the introductory chapter, Ekman was a classmate of Nichols at the University of Chicago.  He 
also edited the definitive edition of The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals. 
  
171 
distinction between expression as performance and communication shifts the theoretical 
emphasis from a subject having the emotion to another subject seeing the emotion.
154
   
Darwin‘s rationale that the spectator experiences the emotion she sees expressed, then 
cyclically transfers that emotion back onto the object as her interpretation of what the expression 
expresses, is reminiscent of Wölfflin‘s logic.  Although Darwin prefers the term, ―sympathy,‖ to 
―empathy,‖ (which distances him from the notion of a spectator‘s experience as imperative and is 
faithful to his view of emotional expression as strictly observable), it still poses a threat to the 
scientific observer.  Unlike Le Brun, Darwin seems to suspect movement and duration may be 
responsible for this potentially deleterious effect on the scientific observer (who has a 
responsibility to remain unmoved):  
The study of Expression is difficult, owing to the movements being often extremely 
slight, and of a fleeting nature.  A difference may be clearly perceived, and yet it may be 
impossible, at least I have found it so, to state in what the difference consists.  When we 
witness any deep emotion, our sympathy is so strongly excited, that close observation is 
forgotten or rendered almost impossible… Our imagination is another and still more 
serious source of error; for if from the nature of circumstances we expect to see any 
expression, we readily imagine its presence. (19)   
 
Darwin attributes sympathy (and hence, emotion) on the part of the spectator to duration here by 
claiming that it is through seeing the movement of expression that sympathy is fostered—which, 
I must point out, is the ―all-important emotion‖ he describes in The Descent of Man (published 
only a year previously) which made us social and moral beings and which distinguishes us from 
the ―lower animals.‖   
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 In 1888, acting theorist William Archer published the influential Masks or Faces? which strongly echoes 
Darwin‘s text by challenging classic questions about the visual perception of emotion on stage.  James Naremore 
cites Archer‘s work, which took Diderot‘s famous paradox (which stated that for an actor to move an audience, he 
must remain unmoved) to task, as seminal for this reason.  Archer argues that, ―If an actor can convincingly 
represent emotion, the critic, as a critic, need not inquire whether he experiences or mechanically simulates it.  But 
criticism is one thing, the psychology of art another; and to this the question at issue belongs‖ (79).  The danger here 
is not that we represent ourselves as surface in art, or that we derive pleasure from allowing our desire to access the 
―interior‖ of a character to overwhelm our knowledge that such access is beyond the limits of possibility, but 
whether or not we should worry about it.  Significantly, since Carnal Knowledge‘s most insistent close-up is of 
Susan laughing, the gesture of the laugh is absent from influential turn-of-the-century acting manuals (Smith, 27). 
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 Unlike James‘ ―What is an Emotion?‖, Darwin asked ―Why does an emotion look like it 
does?‖ which brings with it its own theory of ―what‖ emotion is.  As Robert Solomon points out, 
despite the multiple contemporary approaches in psychology and philosophy of new theories (for 
example, those of Antonio Damasio, Nico Frijda, and Stanley Schachter and J.E. Singer), the 
―roots remain Darwin and James‖ (57).  Darwin‘s work stands to gain import as scientific 
attention to the brain increases.  Inspired by Darwin‘s text, James argues that ―the bodily changes 
follow directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes 
as they occur IS the emotion‖ (Solomon, 67).  Put simply, the experience of the expression 
constitutes the emotion. For Darwin and James, a stimulus sparks the experience which generates 
an expression—an expression with evolutionary use-value.  Hence, expressing becomes a form 
of communication, making legibility its most salient quality.   
 Darwin emphasized that expressions occur as movements, and if James is also right and 
the expression is the emotion, then, transitively, filmic records (whether serial photography or 
cinema) capable of capturing expression should be the emotion.  As we saw above, the sentiment 
that cinema‘s moving pictures give us the emotion itself is precisely the cause of celebration for 
Muensterberg and Balázs.  This wish was already evident in Darwin‘s desire to arrive at claims 
that explain expression as a product of human evolution, and in Le Brun‘s desire to see 
expression as universal in order to accurately depict human experience in the abstract and to gain 
greater control over the viewer (in some sense, moving toward seeing the viewer as able to be 
universally affected).   
The realism afforded by photographs of actors‘ expressions suited Darwin‘s ambition to 
theorize expressions as things to be seen, but his work fails to consider the actor‘s face as another 
mode of representation.  This is a problem because it displaces the responsibility for the 
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expression‘s legibility from the artist (Le Brun) or from a juxtaposition of still images (Darwin 
or Feiffer) to the skill and desire of the performer.  The use of actors or subjects replicating 
expressions as scientific evidence suggests Darwin took the art of acting quite seriously—or, 
perhaps, that it is commonplace to perform expression.  As professional expressers, it makes 
commonsense that Darwin turned to actors for his study.  However, his use of actors also 
suggests he was concerned with expression qua expression.  That is, he measures a photographed 
expression‘s success, not on notions of expressive ―truth‖ or ―authenticity‖ based on descriptions 
of a subject‘s conscious experience, but on the descriptive consistency it elicits from viewers.  
Darwin even went so far as to evaluate actors‘ abilities based on their muscular movements— 
claiming one boy is particularly skilled (which means his expressions demonstrate a higher 
degree of legibility based upon his survey of viewers) because of the ―horse-shoe shape‖ his 
eyebrows make (a formation not every face can make).   In other words, he does not test people‘s 
ability to ―correctly‖ identify expression, but tests the expression‘s ability to excite agreement.155  
In this way, Darwin‘s methodology resembles Susan‘s take on self-presentation: no matter how 
consistent the narrative you tell yourself is, others perceive an ―act;‖ so you express yourself to-
be-seen differently in various context-specific ways, but the question of an ―interior experience‖ 
is left to others to acknowledge.   
In Carnal Knowledge‘s long takes, the performer/face has control, not the hand of the 
artist.  The film relies on Nicholson‘s remarkable skill to express the inability to express.  By 
freezing his face (in just that way), Jonathan performs inexpressivity.  Because emotional 
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 Darwin‘s view that an emotional expression can be considered ―true‖ by eliciting a certain amount of accord 
among its spectators is most evident in his use of photographs of galvanized patients.  He recounts showing a 
number of people a photograph of a man in ―his usual passive condition‖ and another of the same man ―naturally 
smiling‖: ―The latter was instantly recognized by every one to whom it was shown as true to nature.  [Dr. Duchenne] 
has also given, as an example of an unnatural or false smile, another photograph of the same old man, with the 
corners of his mouth strongly retracted by the galvanization of the great zygomatic muscles.  That the expression is 
not natural is clear, for I showed this photograph to twenty-four persons, of whom three could not in the least tell 
what was meant…(202).‖   
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expressions (and experiences) occur in time, duration is necessary for their representation.  
Nichols‘ actors have vast swaths of time to perform, and their faces take precedence in the shots‘ 
compositions.  Since the cinematic actor does not perform static actions, expressive legibility for 
the spectator is a matter of attributing intention.  It is a fact of intentional actions that they do not 
demonstrate intentionality.  We, as perceivers of the on-screen action, must judge them so.  A 
represented action whose intentionality we know for certain (if possible) would be overly 
determined, and no longer possessed of verisimilitude.  But what is essential for allowing the 
question of intentionality is movement; the actor must act, perform something: this is what is 
refused in Jonathan‘s final, frozen face.  The face no longer seems to be intended by an unseen 
hand.  The cinematic actor, of course, is still the artist constituting the face, and the visual 
confluence of expressive face and artist‘s face makes a compelling case that the expression we 
see is the one we are meant to see.   
According to Jerome Kagan, a person‘s judgment of her emotional status ―depends on the 
person‘s current state, the immediate context, and the event chosen for comparison‖ (22).  His 
claim holds true for our perception of an emotional expression on-screen as well (where the 
expression is our only source of data): we read a detected change in expression as a symptom of 
a change in a corresponding emotional state.  This does not, however, mean that we regarded the 
initial state as un-emotional, but, rather, that we constantly perceive and read expressions over 
time.
156
  By representing expressing, cinema avoids the pitfalls of representing expressions, and 
allows for a richer concept of expressivity, one which more readily allows the spectator to grasp 
a character‘s potentially complex reaction to her context and move beyond a semantic concept of 
                                                 
156
 Kagan argues that no English word can capture the lived experience of emotion, which are ―blends‖ of states we 
are usually able to name, and that ―[b]lends are coherent states, and not additive combinations of elementary states‖ 
(8-9).  He writes that, ―[e]motions are like the weather.  There is always some form of weather, but we award special 
status to the infrequent, distinct arrangements of humidity, temperature, and wind velocity called hurricanes, 
blizzards, and thunderstorms‖ (22). 
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emotions as singular nouns.  Cinematic expressions do not represent things; they are verbs that 
represent functions.  If Jonathan is literally and figuratively ―unmoved‖ in the film‘s final close-
up, then it appears as a noun to us, it makes no claim as time wears on it—leaving us, chillingly, 
unmoved as well.  The result is that Jonathan‘s face sinks into a death mask, evacuated of 
subjectivity—even if we understand him to desire Louise‘s submissive performance.  By not 
moving, it offers us nothing new to react to.  If we recall Susan‘s speech to Sandy at the Amherst 
mixer, to not react is to be taken out of context—it is to be an object isolated outside the realm of 
the interpersonal and society.    
This scene exposes the difference of performing body as one of knowledge.  There is a 
difference in Sandy and Susan, self-presenting at the college mixer, and Jonathan‘s knowledge 
that Louise is presenting herself, through her body, to him as submissive.  Unlike the former 
case, in which, as Susan points out, you can never be sure who you‘re meeting (―them or the 
act‖), Jonathan knows.  In this way, Louise‘s actions do not create a context in which he must 
react, or at least, a context which he does not control. 
Jonathan‘s insistence on his own masculine power manifests in his desire to experience 
others without concern for others‘ experience of him.  He is literally the desirous male character 
Mulvey describes as endemic to Hollywood (though the film denies us a position of perceptual 
fantasy that is the real subject of her essay).  His egoism leads him to ignore the demands of 
performing—unlike sensitive Sandy, who is constantly aware of his actions around others, of 
what he thinks he should be doing and, who, most tellingly, allows Jonathan to rehearse and 
direct his movements.  Eventually, though, we realize Jonathan‘s resistance to perform is not his 
privilege, but his tragic flaw: to not perform is to have nothing to express.  This fate is reinforced 
by Jonathan‘s increasing impotency until in the end, he literally has nothing to express.   
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The spectator knows Jonathan sees women as less than human, as only objects of 
potential pleasure, as having nothing to express.  The alignment of our gaze with his as we, 
together, stare at Louise shocks the spectator into an awareness of the difference between our 
own gaze and his.  Knowing she is ―only‖ performing, we perceive Louise‘s rather blank 
expression as she recites her lines as carefully controlled; she is just speaking lines she has been 
told to say and (presumably) does not endorse in order to conduct her business.  Her composure 
aims to expresses nothing—so that she can play her role, and become exactly what he wants her 
to be, an object.  When the film (finally) cuts back to Jonathan, miserable, alone, impotent and 
tragic, we understand that it is not Louise but he who has nothing to express, and the film 
dissolves to white.  Perhaps if he had heard Susan‘s philosophy at the mixer, he would have been 
warned that his refusal to acknowledge the ―interior experience‖ of another (to return to Nichols‘ 
term) would result in the loss of his own inner experience.   
Contrasting these two cases of expression—expressing nothing and having nothing to 
express—provides a way of understanding the theory of perceiving facial expression posited by 
Carnal Knowledge.  It casts all expression, even expressing nothing, as performative.  
Representations of facial expression become something to be interpreted and treated, as making 
claims and demanding acknowledgement.  As they were for Darwin, expressions are 
performative, things to be seen.  Darwin was not negligent when he employed actors; nor was he 
duped by their performative faces.  Carnal Knowledge demonstrates that the difference between 
having nothing to express and expressing nothing is the difference between seeing an object and 
a human, a difference it morally evaluates by casting Jonathan‘s fate as tragic.  Seen from this 
angle, Carnal Knowledge recalls that when Darwin theorized the significance of movement to 
facial expression, he did not indicate the possibility of a non-expressive face.  Darwin‘s primary 
  
177 
methodology was to begin with photos of ―relaxed‖ faces, faces that were presumed to not be 
expressing.  More accurately, they were judged to express nothing in particular.  Darwin tried to 
analyze the movement from expressing nothing to express something.  Surely in labeling these 
faces relaxed, he is not suggesting they had nothing to express—indeed, the fact we can perceive 
potential expressions in them makes them admissible as evidence and comparable to their 
emotionally ―excited‖ states.157   Darwin‘s purpose was to illuminate emotional expression as 
evolutionarily valuable, a product of the development of human history.  Just as Mulvey‘s essay 
argued that Hollywood decides, by allocating desire, who belongs to the category of the human 
(as subject), so, too, does Darwin‘s work.  Like Carnal Knowledge, his view suggests that a face 
with nothing to express would ipso facto be inhuman.  
The two cases Carnal Knowledge gives us—expressing nothing and having nothing to 
express—ask what it might look like to not consider facial expression as emotionally expressive.  
For Darwin and Carnal Knowledge, to not be-looked-at is to lack subjectivity.  Unlike the ideal 
of the reluctant-to-express classic leading man, eliciting perception is not a sign of femininity, 
but humanity.  Carnal Knowledge suggests that the successful representation of facial expression 
does not seek ideals of authenticity or certainty, but rather needs acknowledging by the 
spectator.
158
  Reflecting our own position as spectators, the characters spend the majority of the 
film sitting, facing front, looking at us, enjoining us to acknowledge them, which we do.  But if 
we refuse to acknowledge (the performance of actors as) characters as people endowed with 
minds, it is not an indictment of the film, but of ourselves, of our perceptual blindness.  If we 
                                                 
157
 The fact that we do not have a word that signifies a void of emotional experience reinforces this view.  ―Apathy‖ 
is often adjudicated as such, but feeling indifferent, bored, or even nothing is still to feel something, and not an 
emotional void.  To not feel is, in fact, to not exist, and so, to deny the feelings of others is to deny their existence.   
158
 This departs from the Hollywood tradition of realism which fosters the belief that the illusion is real.  It also 
differs from the Brechtian model which attempts to avoid the issue of the legibility of characters‘ emotional 
expression.  Brecht‘s desire to create situations in which the spectator sees characters who do not express themselves 
(as opposed to the actor or playwright) does not escape the problem; it denies it.  
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cannot tell the difference between having nothing to express and expressing nothing, we run the 
risk of objectifying the one who is expressing—even if it is nothing—which makes us no better 
than Jonathan himself.   
Jonathan‘s refusal to react to others, to acknowledge women, and finally even Sandy, 
leads directly to his impotence, his body‘s failure to react.  Louise‘s speech makes us cringe, and 
we expect some sort of reaction on Jonathan‘s face, but in this final close-up of impotent 
Jonathan, his body and his face are united in their failure: both have stopped working, stopped 
moving; both fail to express.  The chauvinist who ―has no need for any woman‖ has a 
paradoxical identity, for without women, he ceases to exist.  Similarly, a cinematic expression 
which does not move does not just cease to be cinematic; it ceases to express.  When the film 
cuts from Louise‘s face to Jonathan‘s, our cathartic desire leads us to expect a legible expression, 
but his impassive face renders us—chillingly—emotionally impotent.  Without movement on-
screen, there is no expression of emotion.  For it to have an effect on us, and other characters, it 
must be an activity.   
Just as Louise‘s performance is exposed as a performance, reflexively, we are reminded 
that we are watching performances by Nicholson and Moreno.  Thus, the film places us in the 
position of Jonathan—the one who pays to see a certain performance, a performance we believe 
will give us pleasure—and one to which we might believe we are not beholden to react, to 
acknowledge as human.  If Louise‘s performance is not performative in the sense of self-
presentation which Susan defined to Sandy, but is instead caused by Jonathan‘s desire and 
money, the film challenges us to consider our willingness to believe the actions we see 
performed before us are intended, as well as our desires and role in the creation of characters‘ 
performances.   
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Chapter Four: Listening to Nichols and May  
―Acting is Doing‖ – Viola Spolin 
 In the previous two chapters, we considered to what degree The Graduate (1967) and 
Carnal Knowledge (1971) require their spectators to hold characters accountable not just for 
their actions, but for their inactions.  In our readings of both films, humorous dialogue (e.g., 
―Plastics‖) was important.  This stylistic element would have (I presume) been especially 
notable, even expected, by contemporary audiences looking for traces of Nichols‘ celebrity as 
half of comedy duo, Nichols and May, who were famous for their improvised routines.  In the 
next chapter, we will examine Nichols‘ cinematic debut, Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? 
(1966), as well as The Birdcage (1996).  Both films explicitly engage (and adapt) the style of 
dialogue Nichols and May propagated.  In this chapter, we look both backward and forward by 
considering the concepts of performance, speech acts, and improvisation in the comedy of 
Nichols and May.   
 Returning to Nichols‘ own roots as an improvisational performer is not just a gesture 
meant to contribute to the aspect of this thesis that is an auteur study.  Nichols‘ work with comic 
genius Elaine May is the most important location for thinking about at how the style of dialogue 
which derives from improvisational performance techniques was disseminated throughout 
American culture.  We will look first at Nichols and May‘s beginnings in improvisational theater 
to examine the manner in which improvisation creates scenes out of its actors‘ use of language, 
and how this creation differs from traditional theater by dismissing (or supplanting) the role of 
the writer.  Then, by tracing Nichols and May‘s history from live performances to their work on 
radio and on recordings, the question of the relationship between improvised language and the 
representation of improvised language arises.  Finally, by analyzing specific sketches, we will 
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acquire an account of Nichols and May‘s reception as politically avant-garde, as well as insight 
into their aesthetic form. 
Edmund Wilson wrote in 1961 that the effect of hearing his first Nichols and May record 
was that ―people… sound immediately afterwards as if they were having Nichols and May 
conversations‖ (35).  If Nichols and May elucidated something real about language use at the 
time, their influence is still felt decades later (and after Nichols‘ impact on American cinema).  
James Naremore, trying to articulate the ―contemporary‖ style of cinematic dialogue (which he 
believes tempers the ―naturalistic‖ with ―a feeling of improvisational comedy‖) in his seminal 
book Acting in the Cinema, labels it the style ―made famous in the early work of Mike Nichols 
and Elaine May‖ (my italics, 281).   Virginia Wright Wexman observes that the signals that mark 
dialogue in films as modern derive from the improvisational tradition begun in America by Viola 
Spolin and her son, Paul Sills, who began the improvisational theater The Compass—which 
Nichols and May were responsible for bringing to national attention (and which evolved into the 
famed Second City Theater).  She writes that Nichols and May were ―perhaps the most brilliant 
improvisers from the early days of the group… [they] excelled at first line/last line‖ (188).159  
According to Tony Hendra, despite never being part of the Second City Theater proper, Nichols 
and May ―were the first proponents‖ of what became known as the Second City style (57).  
Wright Wexman writes that ―[w]here a Method performance seeks emotional ‗truth,‘ the Second 
City performance aims for acute social observation‖ (187).160  As we will see, Nichols and May 
became synonymous with this form.
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 Although Nichols and May were never actually members of Second City (for Wexman, ―Second City‖ refers to 
the evolution of improvisational theaters begun by Sills and Shepherd, including The Compass), their influence is 
still evident as that specific (and still popular) routine was originally May‘s invention (Coleman, 106).   
160
 Improvisation was employed in The Method school of acting, but only as a training tool, a way to uncover 
characters‘ subtext and ―inner life‖ in scripted dramas.  Coleman points out that Stansilavsky‘s Method was in the 
air during the 1930s as Spolin devised her practice, potentially molding her theories in relation (though his works 
were not all published in English until 1961).  Spolin distinguishes her theories from the Method by noting that ―[the 
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 In ―The Rhetoric of Cinematic Improvisation,‖ Wright Wexman writes that ―our belief in 
the reality of the character is strengthened by the naturalness of [improvised] dialogue‖ (30).161  
Similarly, Janet Coleman writes that the improvisational style of performance derived from The 
Compass has often been credited by actors and playwrights alike for ―helping them [to] achieve 
the lifelike dialogue that is the broad arrow of the contemporary [American] style‖ (34).  If the 
impression of spontaneity is a marker of realistic performances (those that currently strike us as 
seeming to act like we believe people act), improvisational theater went farther toward this ideal 
by actually having performers behave spontaneously.  The theory underpinning The Compass‘ 
improvisational style allowed for scenarios to solicit all sorts of affects, not just laughter.  
However, Nichols and May‘s succeeded by operating almost entirely within the comic mode.  By 
examining the evolution of Nichols and May‘s style and its relationship to the American social 
milieu, we will ask: why was Nichols and May so effective, and why did they arrive at this time? 
 
They Know From Funny: Representing Action 
Wright Wexman describes improvisation in terms of ―textual indeterminacy,‖ with ―roots 
in modernist movements such as Dadaism, aleatory music, and experimental fiction‖ 
(―Rhetoric,‖ 33).  I believe we can be even more specific and look to the confluence of an 
aesthetic movement in America that emerged in the 1950s, that invited improvisational theater.  
Whether the depiction of spontaneity was thrilling in the context of the Cold War because the 
Bomb could happen ―anytime,‖ or whether the representation of spontaneity satisfied a fantasy 
                                                                                                                                                             
Method‘s] work is in the head [and] in the past‖ (Coleman, 31).  Coleman puts it thusly: ―The objective of Method 
work… is building a character, while Spolin‘s aim is the emergence of character‖ (31-32).  Improvisation in the 
Method can be a solo enterprise, which, it cannot be for Spolin: ―Without the other player, there is no game‖ (47).   
161
 By ―naturalness,‖ I take her to mean something like the conventions of ordinary language as imagined by 
ordinary language philosophers, and opposed to the creatively crafted poetic or literary styles associated with art.  I 
worry, though, that in scholarship such as this we malign people‘s capacity to be spontaneously eloquent; people do, 
and often, make clever, witty remarks and jokes.   
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that the aleatory could be wrestled to the ground, there was a call for (the sense of) spontaneity 
and action in the arts.  This is perhaps best exemplified by Jackson Pollock‘s ―action paintings‖ 
and Jack Kerouac‘s On the Road (1957).  Daniel Belgrad‘s book The Culture of Spontaneity: 
Improvisation and the Arts in Postwar America details the emergence and trenchant presence of 
this sensibility in the works of these artists alongside others thinkers, like poet William Carlos 
Williams and philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, as well as the larger movements of bepop 
jazz, Beat prosody, and other kinetic arts which ―stood in direct opposition to the bureaucratic, 
rationalistic ethos of corporate liberalism‖ (Kercher, 6).  Incredibly, given its title, Belgrad‘s 
study does not include The Compass improvisation theater—―the first of its kind in the nation‖ 
(Coleman, xi)—or Nichols and May.162   
 Nichols and May emerged in America in the 1950s in the context of the larger modernist 
aesthetic move whereby the arts, to borrow Susan Sontag‘s phrase, sought to ―lay themselves 
bare‖ (29).  But in order to recognize the commentaries of modernist artists (such as Kafka, 
Beckett, and Joyce) on their respective arts (that is, what ―counts‖ as art within each aesthetic 
tradition), they must be recognized as having a medium.  Eric Bentley asserted that the actor‘s art 
is the art of commedia dell’arte, meaning the art of improvisational performance (Corrigan, 208).  
By breaking the ―fourth wall,‖ improvisation raises questions about what ―counts‖ as a 
performance, and what we call the actor‘s art.  What is the actor‘s medium?  The body?  How do 
we know when a body is doing what we call acting (in the theatrical sense)?   Traditional theater 
is often called the actor‘s medium, and is grounded in the belief that the actor‘s art consists of 
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 We should also include John Cassavetes‘ work as evidence of the cultural interest in improvisation.  Often called 
the father of independent American cinema, his first film, Shadows (1959), made heavy use of improvisation to 
achieve its dramatic form.  See George Kouvaros, Homay King, and Pamela Robertson Wojcik.  
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interpreting a script in performance,
163
 and if this is so, then improvisational performance 
threatens its audience with a theater without acting.  Further questions arise: what sort of 
knowledge do we need to have in order to know that we are watching a performance; that those 
on stage imagine themselves as fictional beings?  That there was once a script, or that the people 
stand on something we might properly call a stage?    What is the sort of action that lets us know 
we‘re watching a performance?  What is a character here?   
I will recount below how Spolin‘s theories of improvisational theater offered an idea of 
acting that replaces the art of seeming and interpreting one of doing.  Then, we will be positioned 
to better understand Nichols and May‘s career trajectory, from their start in The Compass their 
Broadway show and their television, radio, and album successes.
164
  It was their radio and album 
performances that garnered them their reputation as powerful and original artists.  Comics, such 
as Steve Martin, have been outspoken about the influence of Nichols and May‘s albums, 
professing to have listened to them repeatedly, for ―[t]hey were like music… I had never actually 
heard someone deliver irony just in the tone of their voice… There was something in the tone 
that was very, very new…What really distinguished them from what had come before is that they 
were still, that it was verbal… You could supply images and characters in your head‖ (―Take 
Two‖).  The irony to which Martin refers is not to be found in Nichols and May‘s characters‘ 
voices; that is, they do not perform characters who know things the other does not.  Rather, they 
include us, as listeners, with them, as ―in the know,‖ to share their contempt for the absurd or 
weak-willed men and women they present. 
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 I mean ―interpreting‖ necessarily broadly.  It might be argued that actors perform unscripted actions in scripted 
theater all the time—subtle emotions, sighs, laughs, etc. However, if we allow that to be included in our definition of 
improvisation, then why not include all of the actor‘s unscripted actions, such as her intonations and the speed of her 
gait?  I think we should reserve ―improvised‖ as a designation for theater which allows actors freedom to react to 
each other in an un-predetermined way, it requires a greater space of possibility than the limited freedom given the 
theatrical actor. 
164
 Obviously, radio is a medium serving many purposes, not least of all journalism and music; however, I use 
―radio‖ here to mean a medium of fictional storytelling.   
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In his Vocal Tracks: Performance and Sound Media, Jacob Smith writes of the 
importance of attending to sound recording in order to properly understand performance styles: 
―Just as twentieth-century acting has been discussed in relation to the cinematic camera and the 
development of the close-up, we should consider acting in relation to the closely held 
microphone, which had an influence on acting just as it did on styles of popular singing and 
public speaking‖ (82).  Later, Smith claims that ―given the importance of the voice and vocal 
training… radio and the microphone need to be considered as equally important factors [as the 
cinematic close-up] in the development of modern acting styles‖ (95).165  He claims ―[t]he 
microphone‘s ability to faithfully capture and disperse subtleties of vocal timbre and inflection 
opened up the possibility of new forms of performance that exploited the increased semantic 
significance of those aspects of the voice‖ (82).  In short, sound recording offered the power to 
represent ordinary language use, and created a ―frame‖ for representing human speech.  Gone 
was the clunkiness of replicating accents, timing, and idiom in novels or the worries of audibility 
in the theatre.  Since this is a written document, I cannot adequately convey one aspect of the 
recorded albums for which Nichols and May are best known: how Nichols and May‘s voices, 
while never sounding the same from sketch to sketch, nevertheless bears their signature.  Their 
characters‘ voices are measured against an imagined ―original,‖ and thus marked by repetition 
and absence.  Their work raises questions parallel to those well-known to Film Studies scholars 
concerning a photograph and its referent: what is the relationship between a recorded aural image 
and the original sound, which, unlike a photographed object, is always already a performed thing 
(in the sense that it is done)?  With an aural recording, the salient question becomes what is the 
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 Smith makes the case that Media Studies has yet to properly appreciate the cultural significance of radio.  For 
instance, Smith cites a national survey conducted in 1946, ―the year that American movie attendance reached an all-
time high‖ (95).  Respondents were given a choice to give up going to the movies or listening to the radio: ―84% 
chose to forgo movies, 11% to give up radio, and 5% were unable to decide‖ (95). 
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relationship between a performance and its representation, a question that prefigures Nichols‘ 
reputation as an actor‘s director (which we will contemplate in chapter six). 
 
Where Performance Suddenly Meets Writing 
 Nichols and May became household names in the late 1950s.  They met at the University 
of Chicago, which he attended and where she sat in on classes.  Nichols had joined a theatrical 
group, Tonight at 8:30, and one night he remembers seeing a girl glaring at him during the show, 
reflecting Nichols‘ own feelings about the terrible production.  This turned out to be May.  Each 
had heard of the other because they both had, in Nichols‘ words, ―big reputations on campus as 
being dangerous-to-vicious depending on the stimulus‖ (Sweet, 74).  At The Compass Theater 
they hit it off, preferring each other‘s to anyone else‘s company.  Nichols took a break from the 
burgeoning troupe in Chicago and headed east to study acting under Lee Strasberg in New York.  
According to Coleman, he parlayed his vast knowledge of classical music and Chicago radio 
experience into a job as ―chief announcer for America‘s first all-classical FM station,‖ which 
generated local celebrity and allowed him to support himself (55).  However, he soon realized 
that he preferred improvisational techniques to Strasberg‘s.   
May was one of The Compass‘ original players (along with names like Edward Asner, 
Zohra Lampert, Sheldon Patinkin, and Severn Darden).  She had studied under Maria 
Ouspenskaya (who, among other things, taught Strasberg Stanislavsky‘s Method).  Her father, 
Jack Berlin, had led his own travelling Yiddish theatrical company, in which May performed as a 
child.  She remembers ―playing little boys who…were all named Benny‖ (Rice, 61).  She also 
appeared, with her father, on a radio parody of Fanny Brice‘s famous ―The Baby Snooks Show,‖ 
playing a child named ―Noodnik‖ (Coleman, 38).  Her father died when she was ten.  Having 
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started school late (due to the travelling theater), she nevertheless dropped out at fourteen (―The 
only thing she ever liked to do in school, she has said, was diagram sentences‖ [Rice, 61]).   
The Compass officially opened on July 15, 1955, the result of a collaboration of David 
Shepherd and Sills.  By developing its material through improvisational methods, it was, at that 
time, unique in the world (Sweet, xv).  As Sills says, ―This was the first improvisation theater.  
People say it happened in Zurich back when or something. I don‘t know. But I think as a theater 
with a place on the street and a continuous history, it started with The Compass back on 55
th
 
Street‖ (Sweet, 13).  The Compass was not just arguably the first stable improvisational theater, 
but also, by building on Spolin‘s theories, the first self-conscious one.  As Spolin once said, ―The 
commedia dell‘arte improvised.  The socialist political theaters in Europe improvised.  They 
didn‘t read it anywhere.  They were working on what was happening in the streets‖ (Coleman, 
23).  Spolin highlights a move from doing improvisation to the confluence of doing and 
theorizing about improvisation, of her development of improvisation as a self-aware enterprise—
a view that we will see in the next chapter can be seen as participating in an American history of 
ideas.  In Something Wonderful Right Away: An Oral History of the Second City and The 
Compass Players, Jeffrey Sweet asserts that, as a classic ideal, theater tells stories of a shared 
community by telling stories of individuals, and that this lends theater a ―democratic spirit,‖ one 
that ―is rarely felt in the theater, but [that] is felt in improvisational theater more often than 
elsewhere‖ (xxxvi).  I want to briefly sketch the main aspects of Spolin‘s theory of improvisation 
that Sills brought to The Compass in order to get a better sense of Nichols‘ roots, as well as the 
American improvisational theater‘s aims and aesthetic sensibility. Two major aims driving this 
section are to discern what improvisation does with language that became so influential, and to 
figure out why it lends itself to the comedy of Nichols and May. 
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All Part of the Game 
The most glaring difference between traditional and improvised theater is the omission of 
the writer (or, at least, making the actor into the writer).  Nichols has said that what he found 
interesting about Compass is that ―[t]here wasn‘t even exactly a positive aim.  There was the 
negative aim of doing something without a playwright… you had a group of people who were 
not actors, really, and didn‘t have a lot of theatrical experience, but who were very intelligent 
and, in some cases, highly educated‖ (Sweet, 75).  Although Spolin resided in California during 
this time, she periodically visited The Compass, conducting intense workshops with the players 
(Coleman, 94-95).  Spolin believes, ―Acting is doing.‖  She writes, in the introduction to Notes 
on Improvisation, that ―The final revision of [my] book could only take place after I came to 
Chicago, observed [Sills‘] work with [The Compass], and sensed his vision of where it could go‖ 
(xiviii).  If Spolin owes The Compass a debt of gratitude, it is arguably Nichols and May to 
whom she owes the most as they were not only integral to the success of specific scenarios, but 
its most successful players.  It was Nichols and May who created a market for Spolin‘s book, and 
for The Second City.   
Drawing on the work of sociologist Neva Boyd (a woman whose belief in ―the 
constructive potential of play‖ motivated her to lead ―immigrants‘ children… in traditional 
games to help them adjust to the society in which they lived‖ [Sweet, xvii]), Spolin began to 
develop her ideas about improvisation in 1938 when she became the supervisor of drama for the 
Works Progress Administration during the New Deal.
166
  There, she organized a number of 
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 Spolin first utilized audience suggestion in 1939, that same year she wrote that ―the most dramatic material lives 
within our everyday lives‖ (Coleman, 107).  Sweet reprints a review of a show from Spolin‘s theater group from that 
year, in which the writer reeled from his experience: ―I certainly saw something!  There were about 150 people in 
the cast—Italians, Greeks, Mexicans, Negroes, and I don‘t know what other racial strains.  They were of all ages and 
of both sexes.  What they were doing was not exactly a ‗play.‘ … The important thing about it was that it was 
conceived, written and played by the people themselves‖ (xviii).  The reviewer goes on to extol both the form and 
content of the performance, exclaiming ―You knew it was [the interior of a poor man‘s home], not from the 
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improvisational theater groups, and devised a series of ―games‖ in which play was ―the catalyst 
for self-expression and self-realization‖ (Sweet, xvii).167  These were not ―games‖ in the sense 
that students/actors might ―win,‖ but rather a way of resolving a given ―theater problem‖ by 
working together, creating a performance solely by reacting to each other.  Spolin‘s text is most 
directly aimed at instructors of improvisational theater, warning them to be on their guard against 
premeditation, or ―indicating.‖   
Spolin uses the term ―indicate‖ to indict her actors for appearing to perform, rather than 
to do.
168
  This is a matter of credibility, to be sure, but it also speaks to her desire for performers 
to be ―present‖ in the moment of the event on stage.  Her methods seek to offer a theater to the 
spectator which exists in the overlap between the use of language in conventionally scripted 
plays and in ―real‖ life.  She teaches that the goal of an activity must not be ―superimposed on an 
activity instead of evolving out of it… When the goal appears easily and naturally… the 
performance… will be no different from the process that achieved the result‖ (12).  When two 
players begin a game, neither should start, or ―initiate,‖ the action, but should wait to react.  One 
of the most important skills an actor can take from learning the games is ―that How a problem 
[necessary to any future scene] is solved must grow out of the stage relationships… Pre-planning 
how to do something throws the players into ‗performance‘ [that is, not an authentic ―doing,‖ 
which the spectator may sense] and/or playwriting, making the development of improvisers 
                                                                                                                                                             
scenery—because there wasn‘t any—but from what the people said‖ and ―Looking for a job wasn‘t an imagined 
situation for them.  It was the grimmest of realities‖ (xviii).  In 1940, despite Hollywood‘s historical practice of 
ripping stories from headlines, another critic was bowled over by the idea that this mode could literally realize the 
notion: ―Today‘s news is tomorrow‘s play‖ (Sweet, xix). 
167
 Lawrence Epstein points out that the theatrical theories and originalities of Spolin (who was, like Nichols, born to 
Russian-Jewish immigrants), which emphasized spontaneity and group-formation are consonant with ―a Jewish 
sensibility‖: evolving ever new survival strategies for dealing with a potentially hostile broader society outside the 
group (181). 
168
 As spectators, we might think of this phenomenon as ―bad acting;‖ we think we see the actor reacting instead of 
the character.   
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impossible and preventing the player in the formal theater from spontaneous stage behavior‖ 
(35).   
By revealing the process of getting ―into‖ character before the spectator, Spolin‘s aim 
was to heighten the spectator‘s awareness of the actor‘s art and delight in sharing a reality with 
the actor prior to the actor‘s invention of an alternate one.  Allowing the character to arise on 
stage as the product of the actor‘s performance sidesteps the ―problem‖ of psychological realism 
posed by the strength of Brecht and Stanislavsky‘s names.  A character emerges which is not the 
expression of the writer or director, but the product of actorly interaction, of each actor‘s 
attunement to the other within the bounds of intelligibility provided by the dictates of ordinary 
language (even humorous utterances rely on the parameters of the ordinary).
169
   
Spolin‘s games form the core of her method; she writes: ―Any game worth playing is 
highly social and has a problem that needs solving within it—an objective point in which each 
individual must become involved… There must be group agreement on the rules of the game and 
group interaction moving towards the objective if the game is to be played‖ (5).  The games are 
designed to create a What, Where, and Who (these elements could come, if not from the 
teacher/director, then from the audience).  The main task is to figure out the How together, to 
confront a problem and to solve it.  (There are no exercises for creating a When; that rhythm 
results from the actor‘s interactions.)  Thus, Spolin‘s theory privileges the core of the actor‘s 
form: that which can never be adequately scripted, the way an actor performs (which is what 
other actors react to).  Inflection, rhythm, manner of walk, etc., the how with which an actor 
delivers the character, create a context for the lines (even through the lines).   
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 Of course, all statements can be said to do something in the sense that they convey information and speakers can 
usually expect a response.  The thinking is that improv performers, speaking spontaneously, create sketches out of 
ordinary language and gesture.  I do not deny that skilled performers can create a stylized dialogue.  It is even said 
that Nichols and May, performing on Broadway, did an entire sketch in iambic pentameter at the audience‘s behest. 
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The games are designed to be as simple as possible, encouraging the neophyte performer 
to always be aware of a problem, a desire to act, and to perform a strong action—all within an 
intense—and primary—awareness of other performers.  For instance, in ―Contact,‖ players may 
not begin speaking until they have touched each other in some manner.   Coleman reports that a 
―favorite‖ exercise of The Compass players was Spolin‘s ―how-to-do-it‖ or ―teaching‖ scene, in 
which one player must instruct a partner how to perform various activities, from asking the boss 
for a raise to frying a fish (94).  It is easy to imagine how such a set-up provides both actors 
strong actions to perform while also allowing commentary on social manners, morality, and 
authority by satirizing the ―right way‖ to conduct an activity.   
Sills places improvisational theater in an ―oral tradition,‖ as well as a democratic one, as 
actors begin a scene on equal footing (Sweet, 20-21).  Sills believes theater should deepen a 
society‘s consciousness of itself, and can do so by allowing actors to feel ―liberated and free to 
self-explore‖ in a ―space where work can be freely done, in which a person is free to become,‖ 
strongly echoing Freudian visions of the therapeutic space and the talking cure that occurs within 
it.  Sills does not believe this space can be achieved in solitude; it can only be created with, 
through, another: ―That‘s what this work is about: the finding of the self in a free space created 
through mutuality‖ (Sweet, 17-18).170   
In this way, Spolin claimed that her games blur the line between the senses of acting: the 
doing and the mimetic.
171
  Lee Strasberg criticized Spolin‘s games on just this point, asserting 
that, ―People [in her games] don‘t play, they behave‖ (Coleman, 27).  Spolin, on the other hand, 
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 For this reason, Sills exclaims his devotion to Nichols‘ old family friend, Martin Buber, extolling Buber‘s 
emphasis on mutuality as the only path for knowing a self (much less one‘s self).  Buber‘s work, such as Between 
Man and Man and Ich und Du (I and Thou),  is, according to Sills, in perfect harmony with his mother‘s.   
171
 Sills speaks often of attending to just this relationship, making it clear he privileges the sense of doing as the key 
to successful theater (Hendra, 63).  Sills never forgets that the techniques learned during improvisation (particularly 
its focus on remaining present to the characters‘ present) are relevant to performing scripted material, as it rarely 
advocates identical repetition for each performance.  The words and blocking may remain the same, but that does 
not entail that the actor‘s performance will.  
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believed that if actors recognize that they are humans on stage performing with other humans, it 
will undo the absurdity of the mind-set that actors are ―schizophrenics who have changed their 
own personalities for the sake of a role in a play‖ (236).172  Indeed, Spolin believed that anyone 
can learn to express herself on stage, and, in turn, can carry that awareness of self and others into 
the world.   
It is the interactions of the actors that delineates a space within which both actors can 
learn to invent characters, by working together.  A game teaches performers to treat the creation 
of a scene (which comes later, and is not a game) like a social contract; once one steps onto the 
space of the stage with another, one has promised to respond to the actions/claims made by the 
other.  The ―scene‖ is not authored by one person or even both people, but by their interactions.  
Spolin states that ―[t]he material and substance of scene improvisation are not the work of any 
one person or any one writer but come out of the cohesion of player acting upon player‖ (19).173  
Each actor must listen to the other.
174
  We might well sum up Spolin‘s approach to performance 
this way: acting is reacting.  The reason that games are the groundwork for an actor in Spolin‘s 
theory, is that they train her ―to be present to the moment‖ (iv).  It is clear that ―the moment‖ 
refers to the actions of the other actor, and so, Spolin does not allow for the possibility of solo 
improvisational performances; improvisation is about individuals being on stage together.  
Performers create characters as an activity—while performing the activity of creating characters.  
For Spolin, performing is a kind of writing for the actor, and, indeed, the basis of theatrical 
expression is the actor‘s need for self-expression (7).  Consequently, she recommends that ―[a] 
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 This is a popular notion that worked its way into many stories about actors.  Nichols refers to George Cukor‘s A 
Double Life (1947) as exemplary of this notion (Probst, 80).  
173
 While Spolin emphasized the need for social interaction, she worried over its self-destructive nature, too: 
―Having thus to look to others to tell us where we are, who we are, and what is happening results in a serious 
(almost total) loss of personal experiencing‖ (7).   
174
 ―Listen‖ was a technical term for Spolin. It, not seeing, denoted the direction to attend to another actor‘s actions.  
  
195 
healthy group relationship demands a number of individuals working interdependently‖ (9) and 
―[a] group should never be used to induce conformity but, as in a game, should be a spur to 
action‖ (10).  In this way, a game does not determine rules as much as parameters, and incites 
players to act because one is part of a group. 
 
The Compass Theater 
Sills and Shepherd began their collaborations with Tonight at 8:30, a student-run troupe 
at the University of Chicago (despite the fact that Sills had already graduated from the University 
of Chicago and Shepherd was never enrolled there).  Coleman points out, ―A vanguard theater 
does not ordinarily emerge from the theater department of an American university‖ (13).  
However, the University of Chicago in the 1950s was not an ordinary university, and much 
attention was paid to the burgeoning theater‘s literacy and intelligence (Sweet, 8; Coleman, 3-
12).  As I mentioned in the introduction, it was while enrolled at the University of Chicago 
during the revolutionary presidency of Robert Hutchins,
175
 that Nichols met Sills and began his 
career as a theatrical performer and director (moving away from his gig as a radio host).  In a 
production of Antigone, Nichols‘ friend Susan Sontag played Ismene (Coleman, 16).   
Armed with an inheritance, and degrees from Harvard and Columbia, socialist Shepherd 
dreamed of satisfying his desires for a theater that was both American and populist by creating a 
theater based on his devotion to the work of Brecht and his admiration for commedia (Kercher, 
122, Sweet, 1-10).  Frustrated that the only respectable theater in America, i.e. theater on the East 
Coast, was concerned only with mimicking mainstream European traditions, Shepherd took his 
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 Given this chapter‘s attention to language and dialogue, it is worth noting that, at the time, the University of 
Chicago was staffed by such luminaries as Bruno Bettelheim and Rudolf Carnap, and employed teaching fellows 
like Erving Goffman and Philip Roth.  The university was committed to teaching through dialogue, not lecture 
(Coleman, 5). 
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revolutionary ambitions west to Chicago.  He wanted an affordable theater (―Our top price will 
be less than a dollar and the house will drink and smoke during the performance‖), to ―break the 
three-act form‖ and ―[to not] use any sets or special lighting or curtains, and the casts will be 
small‖ (Sweet, xxii).  But perhaps his visions were on the way to realization when he wondered, 
―As we develop a new kind of play and audience, we may have to develop an entirely new style 
of acting‖ (Sweet, xxii).  Shepherd‘s desire not to deny the fact of an audience was a desire to 
engage social issues, and met its match in Sills, who was eager to put his knowledge of his 
mother‘s improvisational theories into practice.  Sills was also becoming a devotee of Brecht 
through the new writings of Eric Bentley.
176
  Sills is now widely acknowledged as—to borrow 
Sweet‘s words—―one of the most important and influential directors in theater‖ (11).177  The pair 
soon realized this improvisation was the method best suited to their aims, and so, re-tooled 
themselves to create an exclusively improvisational theater.  They found an off-campus space, 
and renamed themselves The Compass, reflecting the group‘s commitment to vanguard theater 
and to pointing in the direction of social attitudes.   
 It is important to remember that improvised material has no obligation to be funny or 
brief—associations common today.  Typical evenings at The Compass mixed scenarios 
(typically around 40-45 minutes long) culled from previously improvised material (from which 
key plot points were repeated) with ―live‖ improvisations, such as incorporating audience 
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 I must point out that Sills‘ and Shepherd‘s take on Brecht‘s work differs from later interpretations which regard 
Brecht‘s theories as advocating not just a reflexive style, but as an attempt to eschew the psychological from theater.  
Their view, although more complicated, is more faithful to the complexity of Brecht‘s various writings, which were 
just being published in English for the first time.  We might also see Bentley‘s hand in the affinity of Sills and 
Shepherd for the comedic mode.  He once wrote, ―To my mind, Brecht‘s theory of theater is a theory of comedy,‖ 
due to its emphasis on a requisite distance between actor and character created through performance (Coleman, 37).  
Whereas Brecht advocated that his actors also occupy the place of audience by judging and distancing themselves 
from their roles, Shepherd and Sills tried, as Sweet puts it, ―to extend this democratic impulse, attempting to break 
down the distinction between audience and performers by making the audience performers‖ (xxxvi).   
177
 Tony Hendra reinforces this rank, writing that, while Sills has never sought fame or fortune, he is nevertheless 
―one of the half dozen most important figures in modern American theater‖ (57).   
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suggestions or current political events into the drama.
178
  Most of the scenario-plays were 
directed by Sills, Shepherd, and May (Sweet, xxiv).  While short pieces like the ―Living 
Newspaper‖ appeared multiple nights, one day a week was reserved solely for audience-directed 
improvisations (Kercher, 125).  Bringing together the journalistic and the theatrical, the social 
critique that changed each night, that could tackle not just the news of the day, but the news of 
that day, meant that the performance was not just one of live bodies, but of live issues.   
 As The Compass evolved, it moved away from Shepherd‘s explicitly Marxist 
revolutionary ambitions towards Sills‘ more social concerns.  Sills told a reporter in 1955 that, 
―Compass, if carried to its logical conclusion, is a sort of ‗do it yourself‘ movement.  I‘d like to 
see neighborhoods all over the city form groups like this.  It‘s a search for a community‖ (Sweet, 
xxvi).  He highlights May‘s writings as helping him meet his ambitions, citing topics like blind 
dates, Hollywood, Joe McCarthy, attitudes toward marijuana, confidence-building courses, etc. 
as specifically American.  Steven Kercher notes that the fact that Compass Players freely 
―uttered obscenities and the undisguised names of national politicians confirmed that their 
enterprise was boldly out of step with the rest of 1950s cold war America‖ (127).  Coleman 
echoes this sense: ―material on topics of the moment—urban renewal, academic pretensions, the 
middle-class identity crisis—now came pouring out.  Because it was improvised, there was no 
language censorship‖ (107).  Thus, the Compass garnered a reputation for finding dark humor 
within social commentary.  One of the group‘s most successful, and perhaps exemplary, 
scenarios was May‘s invention: ―Georgina‘s First Date.‖  It follows a wallflower teenage girl 
asked on a date as a practical joke by one of her school‘s popular boys.  With an overzealous 
sister and mother, Georgina becomes, in May‘s words, ―so absorbed in her own effort to have 
                                                 
178
 Longer scenarios at The Compass were based upon a broad outline of a narrative arc in the form of notes tacked 
up backstage.  These notes were not descriptions of actions, but of characters‘ intentions and motivations—mental 
actions which demarcate the beginnings and endings of scenes.   
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‗personality‘ that she is unaware of what she is being used for‖ (Kercher, 126).  After being 
raped and humiliated, she returns home to tell her mother, who is waiting with bated breath, that 
she had a wonderful time.   
 Shepherd also saw their success as contingent, not just upon their social commentary, but 
upon the actor‘s artistry, and, again, looks to May—and Nichols: ―take the first Nichols and May 
record, An Evening with Mike Nichols and Elaine May. I mean, that‘s it as far as I‘m concerned.  
There‘s more crystallized character work on that record than anything else you can listen to‖ 
(Sweet, 7).  Although the original Compass Theater only survived for just over a year, its intense 
performances made a huge impact.  Shepherd went on to found different Compass Theaters in 
other cities (such as St. Louis, where Nichols and May appeared briefly), but, perhaps more 
importantly, new theaters that were invested in improvisational performance began to appear—
not least of all was Sills‘ The Second City in Chicago.179  
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 According to Hendra, ―[n]o other single enterprise produced so many of [the Boomer generation‘s] funny and 
talented men and women as the axis created by Paul Sills and David Shepherd between the years 1955 and 1960‖ 
(73).  Sweet observes that ―[t]he late ‗50s and early ‗60s saw a remarkable explosion of social satire with the 
appearance of Lenny Bruce, Mort Sahl, Jules Feiffer, Joseph Heller, and others,‖ noting that each was guided by 
methods related to improvisation (xlii).  He suggests that this kinship explains why these artists, and those of The 
Compass, collaborated so frequently.  Sweet praises The Compass/Second City for dealing with the moral and social 
implications of the Vietnam crisis as early as 1961, and with some chagrin notes the change in the satirical targets of 
improvisation theater: ―Whereas The Compass and early Second City people were more likely to tackle Ibsen, 
Pirandello, or Hemingway, today‘s [1978] Second City is more apt to take on Jaws [and] Let’s Make a Deal‖ (xliii). 
The names are too many to print here, but here is a brief list: Alan Arkin, Alan Alda, Barbara Harris, Paul 
Mazursky, Diana Sands, Anne Meara, Joan Rivers, Dan Aykroyd, Gilda Radner, Harold Ramis, Fred Willard.  If we 
look at the off-shoot companies, such as Elaine May‘s Third Ear, names like Gene Hackman, George Segal, Buck 
Henry, Rob Reiner, Valerie Harper, Linda Lavin, Godfrey Cambridge, and Diana Sands appear.  There are 
important distinctions to be made between The Compass Theater and The Second City Theater.  One is that The 
Compass was collaborative; every member had a voice.  Sills called the shots at Second City (Hendra, 61).  Another 
major change was the addition of scene introductions (though connections between scenes were to be avoided)—a 
presentational element that was added at Nichols‘ (who acted as consultant) suggestion (Bernard Sahlins, 36). One 
of Second City‘s first members, Roger Bowen, recalled: ―Compass seemed to have a theme—how society molds 
people into the shape it wants them to take.  Now this is interesting because it characterizes society as an intelligent 
force with direction.  Whereas the kind of picture you got of society at Second City a couple of years later was that 
society was a blind, meaningless, unintelligent automaton and people would just get lost in it. Second City was 
about alienation‖ (Hendra, 72).  A branch of Second City was also established called Playwrights at Second City.  
Its first show was The Explainers, an adaptation of Jules Feiffer cartoons.  One of these, ―Passionella,‖ was later 
reworked into the Broadway musical The Apple Tree, directed by Nichols in 1966 (and revived by Nichols in 2006).  
At one point, playing in Los Angeles, Playwrights attracted actor Paul Mazursky, who founded LA‘s troupe Third 
City and went on to have a successful career as a director in Hollywood.  Arkin, a student of Spolin‘s, directed 
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The Sudden Rise  
Nichols‘ and May‘s collaborations became an attraction, and they soon realized they had 
an act and went to New York.  There they auditioned for agent Jack Rollins, who had never been 
exposed to improvised performances before.  He was blown away by the pair: ―I knew they had 
something odd and wonderful, but I didn‘t know whether to laugh or cry‖ (Markel, 99).  Rollins 
was amazed by their ability to create on the spot.  They began landing television commercials, 
such as animated Jax Beer ads (which isolated their performances in their voice-overs) or (my 
favorite) General Electric Refrigerator ads, where they would improvise a scene, and then, in 
Rollins‘ words, ―like… sculptor[s],‖ remove elements until they were satisfied.  Hence, in what 
would become Nichols and May‘s standard practice, improvisation was first a method of 
divining material, not (necessarily) the product set before an audience.  A sketch would still 
change each time it was performed.  ―When we repeat an improvisation,‖ May once explained, 
―it‘s not by rote but by recreation of the original impulse‖ (Nachman, 345).   
 Perhaps, then, we should not call the bulk of Nichols and May‘s oeuvre ―improvisations‖ 
but ―sculptures.‖  Clearly, theirs was not the purest practice of Spolin‘s theories, but I would 
argue the term improvisation remains accurate, for even if the conclusion of a sketch was agreed 
upon prior to a performance, or even if they pre-planned events, the what might happen, they did 
not pre-plan the how it would happen, and so, the sketches remain properly called 
improvisations. What was said, when events were reached, each‘s reactions to the other, the 
duration of the sketch—these aspects were never predetermined.  
The duo then appeared at various clubs before landing a gig at the Village Vanguard 
opening for Mort Sahl.  Sahl, a Jewish political comic, was influential on a generation of other 
                                                                                                                                                             
Feiffer‘s Little Murders.  An improvisational offshoot of Second City also operated in New York‘s Greenwich 
Village from 1962-1966.  One of its members left to establish the successful improvisational company, The 
Committee, in San Francisco.  
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comics, particularly other Jewish ones.
180
  He was particularly interested in ―the rhetoric and 
logic of all kinds of official utterances, political or cultural‖ (Hendra, 35).  Sahl himself declared: 
―One of the great tools comedians don‘t use is the English language‖ (quoted in Hendra, 35).  
Nichols and May did not suffer from this problem.  Indeed, language was their primary tool.  At 
one point, they did a twenty minute improv in a nightclub inspired by Plato‘s dialogues (Rice, 
58).  In his examination of the history of American Jewish comedy, Lawrence Epstein looks at 
the verbal nature of Nichols and May‘s comedy, situating it at the intersection of ―an expansive 
linguistic tradition that prized and rewarded quick-thinking and a quicker tongue‖ and a Yiddish 
culture that broadly valued ―both self-mockery and the mockery of the powerful‖ (xiii).   
Sketches exemplifying this abound, but one of their most famous is a routine called 
―Mother and Son,‖ which occurs over the telephone (where two speakers have only the other‘s 
language with which to interact).  Even when the pair performed this sketch on television, as on 
stage, they never faced each other, but sat on stools facing forward.  Nichols plays a man 
phoning home to his mother (denoted Jewish by her accent and grammatical inversions).  The 
son, a busy scientist at NASA, cannot offer a satisfactory excuse as to why he has not called 
earlier.  After much back-and-forth, the mother exclaims: ―I sat by the phone all day Friday, all 
day Saturday, and all day Sunday.  Your father said to me, ‗Phyllis, eat something.  You‘ll faint.‘ 
I said, ‗No, Harry. No. I don‘t want my mouth to be full when my son calls me.‖  Eventually, the 
son swears that he is sorry, but the mother responds: ―Someday, someday, Arthur, you‘ll get 
married, and you‘ll have children of your own, and, honey, when you do, I only pray that they 
make you suffer. That‘s a mother‘s prayer.‖  Repeating how awful he feels, she says, ―Oh, 
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 For more on Sahl‘s influence, see Epstein.  For more on the history of Jewish influences on American comedy, 
see Kercher‘s Revel With a Cause, Carl Hill‘s The Soul of Wit, or Robert Warshow‘s ―Hope and Wisdom.‖  Kercher 
recounts several comics who remark upon how ―their Jewish consciousness contributed greatly to their identities as 
cultural renegades and facilitated the ironic distance necessary for their sharp and caustic humor‖ (2).  Wittgenstein 
once wrote simply that ―[t]ragedy is something un-Jewish‖ (1e).   
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honey, if I could believe that, I‘d be the happiest mother in the world.‖  Epstein notes that this 
routine is reminiscent of George Jessel‘s monologues, but that ―Nichols and May took the 
immigrant comic piece and transformed it by putting the mother onstage… Not only does [the 
mother] have a voice, but the focus is on her‖ (181-182).  Epstein argues this could be seen 
positively and negatively: positively, it reflects ―an increase in the power and influence of 
women in society,‖ while negatively it is a sign of the ―changing perceptions of Jewish mothers 
from warm and kind (like Molly Goldberg) into hectoring and intrusive‖ (182).  Epstein believes 
Nichols and May suggest that the changes might be connected, that the ―warm Jewish mother 
was deprived by marriage and family expectations from finding her true self, turning bitter and 
needy in the process‖ (182).   
For Epstein, Nichols and May‘s influence does not stop there. He argues that, ―[b]y 
performing this exchange on Broadway and on television, Nichols and May transformed a 
typical Jewish routine and made it apply to a contemporary American situation: the increasing 
tension between young people and their parents, a tension that by the end of the decade would 
develop into a widespread social phenomenon‖ (182).181  (Nowhere, of course, would that 
phenomenon be more obvious than in Nichols‘ The Graduate [1967].)  Epstein‘s point is that 
Nichols and May, along with Jewish comics of the 1960s like Lenny Bruce, Joan Rivers, Shelley 
Berman, and later Woody Allen, were integral in ―making Jews the heroes of the alienated,‖ 
rendering Jewishness ―more acceptable, even more attractive‖ than it previously had been 
(190).
182
  In fact, Epstein locates the 1960s as the pivotal era for Jewishness in America: ―Little 
                                                 
181
 Shepherd echoes this statement when he recalled The Compass‘ early reputation: ―It you want to see your parents 
under attack, go to Compass.  Especially if they‘re Jewish‖ (Sweet, 5). 
182
 Woody Allen was deeply inspired by Nichols and May and began his career by seeking the chance to write 
material for them (they, of course, do not employ writers).  Their agent Rollins persuaded Allen to perform himself, 
and, by 1963, he was considered the ―heir apparent‖ to Nichols and May (Kercher, 478).  By the time Allen‘s Annie 
Hall was released in 1979, ―Time estimated that whereas Jews made up only 3 percent of the American population, 
fully 80 percent of professional comedians were Jewish‖ (Epstein, x).  In her 1931 influential study, Constance 
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did the Jewish comedians before the 1960s know it, but American audiences would ultimately 
joyfully accept overtly Jewish types, language, and humor, and Jewish comedy would 
reconfigure the very shape of American humor‖ (xxii).  We will see in the next chapter how in 
Nichols‘ The Birdcage (1996), Jewishness comes to stand in for immigrancy writ large, as well 
as being a marker of comic difference. 
One of the most accurate descriptions of Nichols and May‘s performance style during 
their Broadway show days suggested that their art existed ―somewhere between Ruth Draper and 
the Marx Brothers‖ (Nachman, 341). We might also position Nichols and May within an arc that 
extends from the Marx Brothers‘ comic type—―the free soul who doesn‘t so much criticize all 
social mores as mock and ignore them‖—to Woody Allen‘s urban and neurotic social creature, 
living all too intensely within his cultural moment (Epstein, xvi).  The Marx Brothers made a 
spectacle out of elaborate verbal games, misfires, puns, and double entendres.  Nichols and May 
did not deal with this level of linguistic nonsense; they never aimed at jokes with punch lines; 
instead, their style of improvisation allowed them distance from social and aesthetic conventions 
of performing, but they used that distance to comment on their culture‘s attitudes, not to ignore 
them.  
After opening for Sahl, Nichols and May were offered a contract at The Blue Angel, 
where they developed their first following, and enough attention to secure a few guest spots on 
that new medium, television.  According to one interviewer, ―a single, unheralded television 
appearance [on Omnibus] in January, 1958, rocketed them to stardom‖ (Markel, 99). In a skit 
they called ―Teenagers,‖ the pair appear as teenagers attempting to ―neck‖ in a car while keeping 
their cigarettes lit.  The scene is really about the girl ―torn between a desire to keep her date and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Rourke barely touches on Jewish influences, perhaps because, as Epstein points out, Jews ―mostly entered 
[America] with large numbers … just when mass media developed‖ (xiv).   
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her virtue [which] is both hilarious and painful‖ (Markel, 98).  The boy, an early version of 
Carnal Knowledge‘s Jonathan, is interested only in sex and coutners her protestations that boys 
don‘t like girls ―like that‖: ―You‘re going to say that I won‘t respect you, right?  Well, let me tell 
you right here and now that I‘d respect you like crazy.‖  Their second sketch became, perhaps, 
their most well-known, in which a man valiantly confronts a Bell Telephone operator about the 
dime lost inside the phone. The day after their appearance,―[t]he C.B.S. switchboard was 
promptly swamped with calls demanding to know their names.  The next morning they 
awakened to find themselves blanketed by nightclub, television and movie offers.  Their guest 
fee was upped to $5,000, or $4,864 more than they had been making the night before‖ (Markel, 
99).  Three years later, they would be making $30,000 per television appearance.  Despite never 
improvising a sketch‘s subject matter on the spot, the press made much of the fact that Nichols 
and May generated their own material through improvisational techniques, that they never wrote 
anything down—a fact that unnerved television producers (Markel, 99; Person to Person 
interview). 
A few months after arriving in New York, the pair were famous enough to guest on the 
comic TV game show What’s My Line? to promote their Broadway revue, An Evening with Mike 
Nichols and Elaine May.  The host said: ―They have become so famous, and properly so, in these 
short months where they‘ve gone straight up into the top of the clouds.‖  Nichols commented on 
their ascent up the ladder to The New Yorker: ―We were nothing, and suddenly we have money, a 
career, and a psychoanalyst apiece‖ (Person to Person interview).  Both cop to being serious 
about their treatment—perhaps a reason that psychoanalysts, and their patients, are the most 
recurrent topic in their routines.  Nichols confesses to having lived the high life for a brief period 
after their initial success, but he decided quickly to keep to a ―few close friends,‖ which included 
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British critic Kenneth Tynan, composer Leonard Bernstein, and photographer Richard Avedon 
(Markel, 99).
183
   
 
An Evening With Nichols and May 
An Evening with Nichols and May premiered on Broadway in 1959 to raves.  Arthur Penn 
guided the staging of the show as director; he was devoted to the pair‘s efforts to break the 
attitude of sex-as-vice (―Take Two‖).  Penn declared that it is ―from these kinds of artists that 
genuine social change takes place‖ (―Take Two‖).  He was amazed that Nichols and May were 
able to draw a young crowd to Broadway.  Jules Feiffer was less astonished, since ―Teenagers‖ 
was, according to him, the first time a performance addressed having sex as adolescents (―Take 
Two‖).  A 1961 interview calling them ―America‘s Newest Comedy Stars‖ likened the out-of-
town tryouts for their Broadway show to a coming hurricane.  In the first sketch, the audience 
sees a blank stage, and hears a husband telephoning from the wings, informing his wife his train 
was late again and making sure his martini awaits him at home.  Then, Nichols and May enter 
from opposite wings of the stage, arms outstretched in greeting, she with a martini and he with a 
briefcase, before stopping short in their tracks.  ―I‘m terribly sorry,‖ the male character says, ―I 
must be in the wrong house.‖  According to the press (and this writer is representative), it is this 
type of ―one-minute commentary on 20th Century suburbia‖ that ―blew the roof off‖ the theater 
and led to ―equally heady hosannas‖ on Broadway (Markel, 33).   
The press also focused on Nichols and May‘s amazing ability to appear ―in sync‖ with 
one another, frequently labeling it ―uncanny‖ or implying that they shared a mind—modeling the 
most mystical of Spolin‘s aims.  However, it was also apparent that the pair had their own 
strengths.  Nichols is usually depicted as the on-stage ―master of ceremonies,‖ (he did, in fact, 
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 Among many accomplishments of Tynan‘s, he was the first critic to champion Lenny Bruce.  
  
205 
introduce each new sketch), as well as the organized businessman.  May, on the other hand, is a 
―tornado of assorted talents‖ (Markel, 33), ―the teams‘ virtuoso actor‖ (Rice, 47), capable of a 
remarkable array of characters and voices she delivers in an evening.  In An Evening, they 
performed scathing takes on a wide range of issues such as ―female civic-mindedness, industrial 
bureaucracy, modern child-rearing… Christmas, the Presidential election,‖ and more, including 
―almost anyone‘s literary output‖: 
Their evaluation of the novels of Fyoder Dostoevski takes just ten seconds; May laughs 
hilariously for nine and a half seconds, Nichols says, ―Unhappy woman!‖ and the lights 
go out.  The painstakingly documentary nature of almost any Nichols and May scene that 
runs much longer than ten seconds tends to provoke a kind of laughter that, while 
voluminous, is distinctly uneasy. (Rice, 54) 
 
In an in-depth profile, The New Yorker writer, Robert Rice reports that, ―[s]ome people even find 
Nichols and May too precise to be funny at all, among them a number of ardent admirers who 
look upon the team less as entertainers than as important social critics,‖ before going on to cite a 
well-known (but unnamed) ―social critic‖ who ―recently asserted being moved by just three 
broadcasts‖: the radio announcements of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Franklin D. Roosevelt‘s 
death, and the television performance of ―Teenagers‖ on Omnibus (55).  
The tent poles of An Evening were the two act-closers.  While many scenes changed or 
evolved, the first act always ended with ―Pirandello‖ and the second act with a lengthy 
improvisation based on audience suggestion (typically May‘s exercise where audience members 
would supply a first and last line).
184
 ―Pirandello,‖ which, according to Rice, ―may be their 
definitive statement,‖ lasted around twenty minutes: ―It uses that skeptical Italian playwright‘s 
system of questioning the integrity of all human relationships to demonstrate that two small 
children who play at being their parents and apparently become their parents really are two 
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 Nichols tells us that this take on Luigi Pirandello‘s work was ―suggested by Edna Millay‘s Aria da Capo,‖ which 
is about ―the idea of the game that gets away from you [and which] is a central theatrical idea‖ (Playboy, 70). 
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actors playing a scene in which children become their parents—or, rather, really are Mike 
Nichols and Elaine May playing two actors playing a scene in which children become their 
parents‖ (Rice, 55).185  ―Pirandello‖ reflexively exploits the major conceit of improvisation—not 
needing an author—and alludes to Pirandello‘s most famous work, Six Characters in Search of 
an Author (which, of course, was written by one author).   
 
Language, Live  
 The final event of An Evening, the original improvisation, elicited much excitement and 
brought the experience of spontaneously improvised theater to a wide audience.  Nichols and 
May turned to May‘s exercise in which audience members were asked to provide a first line and 
a last line.  Edmund Wilson describes it as the moment of ―virtuosity,‖ and cops to going four 
times, and recounts them tackling ―Plato, Aristotle, Beowulf, and Chaucer‖ (of course, he 
recounts that every sketch altered with every performance, not just the finale) (36).  Nichols told 
him of having to take on the New English Bible: ―If your eye gives you trouble, take it out and 
throw it away‖ (36).  It was widely hailed a triumph and brought critics back again and again, 
who, not knowing what to make of this unique experience, valorized it—vaguely—for being 
―more live‖ than scripted theater.   
 Since scripted theater can be performed to seem as though the characters are suddenly 
happening upon their words, I want to seriously consider the critics‘ intuitions about how 
Nichols and May deal with language in the hopes of being clearer.  The final scene of their 
Broadway show displayed front and center for the spectator the actor‘s art of ―getting into‖ 
character, but unlike scripted theater, Nichols‘ and May‘s utterances exist in their present and 
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 For Nichols‘ own lengthy description of this sketch (and its humor), which he calls one of their best, see Sweet, 
79.   
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their characters‘ present.  Their utterances constituted the scene, functioning as actions, not 
unlike the class of utterances J.L. Austin would dub ―performatives‖ a few years later in How to 
Do Things With Words (1962).  What Austin found most exciting about these utterances was that 
they did not involve worrying about a sentence‘s truth and falsity in reference to an objective 
world, but rather, were cases where ―the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action‖ 
(6).
186
  Spolin‘s emphasis on each utterance as an action (like a throw of the ball) suggests that 
improvisation is the art which reflects on this type of language use.
187
  Improvisation presents 
characters‘ (ordinary) language as a series of Austinian performatives, where the linguistic 
action does something, and it is only by saying it that the action is done (and a scene comes into 
being).  Still, while the form of exchanging utterances is Austinian in this sense, we cannot 
forget that the players‘ utterances remain in a fictional context.   One can say ―I do‖ in the 
context of a wedding scene and not marry one‘s scene-mate.  Bearing this in mind, improvisers‘ 
utterances occupy a middle ground between Austin‘s genuinely communicative actions and 
traditional theatrical fictions.  The language spoken by the actors which constitutes (the verbal 
element of) the improvised scene is understood by the spectator to be performed in both the 
fictional/theatrical sense and in the sense that it has just occurred to the actor to say (like our 
linguistic interactions in life), and so, intended and received as genuinely communicative in 
order for the scene to continue.  Until one player says, ―I do,‖ her scene-mate does not know how 
the scene will play out.   Because there is no predetermined response, when one actor speaks, the 
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 There is, of course, much to say in terms of how all utterances are actions, but, though relevant, that is a 
discussion for another time.  Austin clarifies that for the cases he details, in order for the action which is both the 
object and form of the utterance to successfully occur, it must be uttered in the appropriate context.   
187
 I believe this quality is compounded by improvisation‘s dismissal of a script.  Doing away with the writer, and 
existing entirely of action on stage, there is no speculating what an unseen author intended, or comparing different 
performances of the same character, no imagining what appeared on the page and comparing line deliveries (except 
in one‘s head).   
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other must truly listen in order to formulate an appropriate response, and respond according to 
the dictates of ordinary language; otherwise, the scene will not be intelligible.
188
 
In a theatrical event the spectator believes to have been scripted, the thrill of an 
unexpected (or seemingly unexpected) moment is great, but we should not confuse that kind of 
spontaneity with what we call improvisation.  At improvised performances, as in The Compass 
or An Evening, we, as spectators, understand the spontaneity to be intended, and so, it presents 
the very picture of human freedom.  It gives the performer carte blanche, a more autonomous 
position than she has in life or in scripted drama.  The premise of improvisation is that the 
performer is free to act in any way she chooses (the only prohibition is on not acting).  An 
important point to remember about Spolin‘s theory is that it inherently seeks neither the comedic 
nor the aleatory (nor allied concepts like suddenness, or like ―accidental‖ or ―chance‖).  Many of 
her earlier scenarios were serious, as, occasionally, were those at The Compass.  Spolin‘s 
ultimate dream was nothing less than a world of ―accessible intuition‖ (of absolute freedom to 
act) where people were not subject to ―a culture where approval/disapproval has become the 
predominant regulator of effect and position,‖ a poor substitute for personal freedom (8).  Thus, 
she sought techniques that encouraged people to act spontaneously, believing this to be the best 
method of accessing intuition.  Spolin wrote that, ―Acting can be taught to the ‗average‘ as well 
as the ‗talented‘… It requires an environment in which experiencing can take place, a person free 
to experience, and an activity that brings about spontaneity‖ (4).  Spolin defines spontaneity as a 
moment when ―you don‘t think, you act‖ (370)189 and as ―the moment of personal freedom when 
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 I exclude the possibility of absurdist improvisation as successful. Improvised language does not lean toward the 
poetics of fiction, since it needs to abide by the rules of ordinary language so that other performers (and the 
audience) can immediately follow. 
189
 When questioned about improvisational theater‘s emphasis on spontaneity in relationship to André Bazin‘s 
assertion that ―the artistic impulse springs from the artist‘s desire for immortality,‖ Sills admits it is a paradox that 
interests him, and offers the view that most exciting contemporary art has a transient quality to it (Sweet, 21).   
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we are faced with a reality and see it, explore it, and act accordingly‖ (4). For her, people/actors 
should slough off repressive inhibitions and embrace being present to their own lives: ―Through 
spontaneity we are re-formed into ourselves.  It creates an explosion that for the moment frees us 
from handed-down frames of reference, memory choked with old facts and information and 
undigested theories and techniques of other people‘s findings‖ (4).  Thus, by working 
spontaneously, improvisation is a form of therapy for the performer.  While more oblique, this is 
relevant to the spectator, too, as ―[t]he response of an audience is spontaneous‖—especially in 
comedy where a laugh cannot be forced, but must erupt (39).   
Spolin‘s views here echo a tradition of thinking in the history of moral philosophy.  For 
example, explaining Immanuel Kant‘s views, John Rawls writes: ―Freedom is not contingency or 
lack of determinism.  The problem is to avoid predeterminism; that can only be done, it seems, 
by absolute spontaneity‖ (280).  For Kant, it is in spontaneity that we might find freedom—that 
value on which America most fervently placed its flag.  While Kant is interested in a freedom 
that allows pure reason, Spolin (like Rawls) pushes the idea that freedom is not the presence of 
possibility or contingency, but the freedom to act (recognizable where an action and its 
―opposite‖ are possible [Rawls, 280]).190  In a way, this freedom is related to what Nichols says 
makes for a good improvisation (which may delimit the actor‘s freedom if not the spectator‘s 
perception of it): ―if we‘re improvising a scene and you choose a position, if I want to make a 
scene with you, I‘ve got to take the opposite position.  If I agree with you, we don‘t have a 
scene‖ (Sweet, 75).  What an improvisation can do is to open up a space for possibilities in order 
to play with expectations by doing the opposite of what might be predictable (which places a 
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 I do not take Spolin or Rawls to include the possibility that the opposite of acting is not acting, but doing 
something that would yield diametrically opposed results.  Certainly, for Spolin, a performer who does nothing has 
ceased to be a performer and ended the scene. 
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burden on the performer to be aware of both possibilities at once); this also typically, and 
immediately, creates the necessary tension for a scene to be interesting.   
 
Nothing Goes Unheard: Nichols and May on Record 
As we saw in the case of the skit ―Pirandello‖ (and will see again in a moment in a sketch 
called ―Adultery‖), Nichols and May made no attempt to deny that part of the thrill of their 
performance style was to see two actors undergo countless transformations, building (and razing) 
numerous characters within one performance.  (In this respect, Nichols and May foreshadow the 
performance style of certain actors in Angels in America.)  Similarly, when they turned to 
recording albums, they offered their listeners several individual characters, who became more 
crystallized when heard in relation to surrounding characters, when listeners attended to 
similarity, incongruity, pitch, rhythm, tone, etc. between characters‘ voices.   
 Nichols and May released their first album, Improvisations to Music, in 1958.
191
  Its title 
introduces their method to its listeners, and given that improvisation was a term most associated 
with jazz music in America, serves to situate them in dialogue with American tradition.   On 
Improvisations to Music, the sketches are timed to background musical compositions, inviting 
the listener to consider their recorded, rhythmically-timed vocal performances as music. The 
sketches are structured like duets, where each partner has a verse before the voices join and 
overlap in an aural climax.  In the best of these, ―Bach to Bach,‖ Nichols and May play a modern 
couple, post-coital, pontificating about music, the middle class, and abusing psychoanalytic 
jargon by lamenting the difficulty of ―resolving‖ in a world where ―the woman‘s role is 
ambivalent‖ and in which ―there is no relating; there is proximity, but no relating.‖  The 
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 Spolin devotes a chapter to radio performance: ―Here the actor works on the problem of showing an audience 
only through the voice, and must be able to select those things which will allow the audience to see the story 
‗through the ears‘‖ (180). 
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humorous subtext is created by our impression of their pedantry, their use of psychoanalytic 
terms, and empty cultural references.  She says that a ―whole world‖ opened when she read Thus 
Spake Zarathustra, and although she is unspecific, he knows ―exactly what she means!‖.  By the 
end, they agree they have ―adjusted so rapidly‖ to one another, and we realize that this is how a 
modern, rigorously psychoanalyzed, couple, who were earlier complaining in bed about the 
―ambivalence‖ of the world, enters into a relationship.    
A recording of selected numbers from their revue, An Evening with Mike Nichols and 
Elaine May, was released in 1960.  It rose to number ten on the charts in 1961, and remained 
there for thirty-two weeks (Coleman, 270).  Nichols and May were also appearing weekly on 
NBC‘s very popular Monitor Radio Show.  It was estimated that, by 1961, the duo had already 
taped more than six hundred spots for Monitor, about three hundred of which were aired (Rice, 
57).  In their radio and television appearances, they mocked everything from the House Un-
American Activities Committee to the arms race with the Russians to integration (―it‘s a moral 
issue… which is so much more interesting than a real issue‖).192   
In their television appearances, the pair frequently appeared sitting on stools, each in 
medium close-up, facing the camera (and us at home) in long takes that never broke up their 
scene, never detracted from their faces or the words issuing from them by providing a new visual 
perspective.  Furthermore, split screens tended to be used so as to divide our attention equally 
between the two, and to allow us maximal freedom in attending to this scene as a scene between 
the two, not alternating images of them in the way a shot/reverse shot might suggest, nor ping-
ponging back and forth as though they were on stage.  For instance, the ―Mother and Son‖ 
routine quoted above, which originally aired on the popular Jack Paar Show, lasted over five 
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 Desilu Studios offered Nichols and May a contract to do a sitcom for television in the early 1960s, but they 
refused (Young, 146).  Clearly, after using television early in their career, they preferred to create their work aurally 
on albums and radio. 
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minutes with no cuts or camera movement; the pair faced forward (seeming to look at us).  In 
another appearance, the pair delivered their routine as voice-over while an animated screen 
appeared with only two sets of eyes, each of which, as the scene went on, became linked to a 
voice.  While visually arresting, the emphasis is really on words (and, presumably, they were 
prohibited from showing a couple sharing a bed). 
 Nichols and May‘s contempt for 1950s America, exemplified for them in its vapid 
clichés—the cocktail conversations, the pseudo-intellectualism, the attention to keeping up with 
the Joneses—appears directly in their albums‘ content, but what of their form?193  If the 
Broadway show located them in any space, the radio appearances and albums situated them in no 
space.  Typically, there is no aural reverberation that creates an impression of spatiality.  Nichols 
and May use no laugh tracks; listeners are not controlled by the sound of canned laughter.  While 
such stylistics abstract the work from immediately obvious contexts, it also creates an intimacy 
with the voices.  
 Space prohibits going into all the ways that their on-air work also reflects on middle-
class American lifestyles in the 1950s, but I do want to point out one consistent strategy for 
mocking gender roles the pair used, as it is relevant to traditions of radio and cinema.  Nichols‘ 
voice typically sounds nasal, and rather high, which is unconventional for leading men‘s voices; 
and while he is gifted with accents, May demonstrates a greater vocal range, all but 
unrecognizable between some tracks.  However, when playing women being hit on by their 
bosses—usually nurses and secretaries—May keeps to the lower registers of her already low 
voice, sounding the very epitome of what is characteristically called sultry.  Her mockery of the 
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 It would seem that the post-war, newly capacious middle class worked almost like an improvisation: if you 
perform certain actions in relation to your neighbors, then you were playing along properly.  I am tempted to offer 
this as one way of seeing the reputation the 1950s has acquired as coldly materialistic.  However, I am not certain 
that any period enjoys a more ―real‖ referent, or could not be said to be just as ―performative.‖ 
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notion of a sexy female voice strongly echoes that of Hollywood‘s Great Garbo, Marlene 
Dietrich, and Lauren Bacall.
194
  Amy Lawrence writes of these, and other, female Hollywood 
stars who were ―fetishized for their low voices‖ (88), arguing that such fetishization trumps these 
voices‘ ability to communicate, or rather, ―communicates the body as object, bypassing any 
attempts at female subjectivity or female control of signification‖ (149).195  The humor of all 
these sketches is that May‘s sexy females are never listened to by men, for instance, the doctor, 
who, immaturely, petulantly, continues to profess his love (even during surgery, and at the 
patient‘s demise).  Conversely, ―Sexy Voice,‖ sets up the listener‘s expectations for an 
―attractive‖ sounding woman only to be greeted by May‘s delivery of a gravelly, shrieking voice 
(as she performs the role of wife). 
Sickniks 
While the New York theatrical critics heaped praise upon An Evening with Nichols and 
May, the comic duo‘s albums and radio appearances brought them to national attention.  Jules 
Feiffer said, ―It never got smarter, it never got wittier.  In fact, the first thing to go was the wit 
after Nichols and May‖ (―Take Two‖).  Arthur Penn points out that their style of humor allowed 
itself to be appreciated on multiple levels—with both ―mob and snob appeal‖ (―Take Two‖).  
However, Nichols and May‘s anti-institutional stance, dissatisfaction with gender roles, and 
sexual content got them dubbed ―sick‖ by the mainstream media, most notably Time magazine‘s 
1959 cover story.  Time went as far as to coin the term ―Sickniks‖ to refer to the group of 
Nichols and May, Lenny Bruce, Mort Sahl, Shelley Berman (who was at The Compass with 
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 In her autobiography, Bacall recounts her training to keep her voice low to avoid being considered unattractive 
on screen and in her life.   
195
 We might do well to note that, unlike traditional theater that standardizes voices through training, radio and 
cinema valued unique voices, voices which suggested a personality, from Cary Grant‘s lilt to Humphrey Bogart‘s 
sideways mutterings, from Dietrich sultriness to Jean Arthur‘s alto.  
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Nichols and May), Jonathan Winters, and Tom Lehrer.
196
  Appearances on shows like That Was 
the Week That Was, where they mocked figures such as Roy Cohn (a figure who will return in 
Nichols‘ Angels in America), marked the pair as caustic and liberal, even on a satirical program.  
Nichols and May, though, were considered the ―high brow‖ of the Sickniks (the implication, of 
course, is that since nothing is wrong with society, to criticize it or to challenge its mores could 
not be other than mad, misguided, or perverted).   
The offended public objected in particular to the pair‘s willingness to discuss sex, as we 
saw with the post-coital couple in ―Bach to Bach.‖  Nichols and May‘s comedic eye was drawn 
in many directions, but they utilized almost any issue as a lens for looking at gender relations.  
Rice tells us that Nichols and May are better known for their sketches that ―deal accurately and 
candidly with what one man who has worked with them calls ‗the secrets of the family‘—the 
appalling (to them, at least) relationships that habitually exist between mothers and sons, fathers 
and daughters, brothers and sisters, husbands and wives, or, in short, males and females‖ (47).   
When understanding why Nichols and May shocked the public, we cannot underestimate 
the combination of May‘s sharp tongue, beauty, and obviously quick, well-informed mind.  This 
appeared in stark contrast to the comic stylistics of Lucille Ball, Doris Day, and Gracie Allen.  
John Limon writes of May‘s inarguable beauty, which combined with her wit to produce 
significant anxiety in society, since she was a ―laughing medusa‖ (56-57).197   
   In his examination of the explosion of humor contemporaneous with the ―Baby Boomer‖ 
generation, Tony Hendra observes that ―From a historical point of view, Boomer humor dealt for 
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 Wylie Sypher points out that laughing at ―obscene‖ jokes, the actions of the flesh, divides humans from other 
animals, who are ―never self-conscious about any fleshly act whatever‖ (28).  This fact reveals to Sypher that 
obscenity ―is a threshold over which [the human] enters into the human condition‖ (28).  What is ―dirty‖ is just as 
definitive as the ―sinful‖ or ―evil.‖  In this sense, characters possessed of ―sick‖ humor indicate a marker of 
humanity for the listener.  
197
 The sexism May faced is strongly evident in press interviews, which never fail to detail her beauty while 
implying her intelligence intimidates men.  This aspect of Nichols and May‘s reception has perhaps been the most 
critically attended to; for more, see Limon, Nachman, and Coleman.  
  
215 
the first time with subjects that had hitherto been completely off-limits in popular comedy‖ (2).  
Attacking attitudes towards notions of race and relationships between the sexes meant that 
―[s]tereotypes were no longer familiar cartoons but disturbing caricatures.  Titillation was not the 
object of this comedy—but rather the sexual attitudes that made titillation necessary‖ (3).  
Increasingly, due to figures like Lenny Bruce, the public looked to comics for cues on political 
issues.  Indeed, it was a rare outlet for hearing accounts and opinions on matters that differed 
from the government mouthpieces.  Hendra claims that ―Boomer humor was born in an era of 
anti-intellectualism [particularly as led by Senator Joseph McCarthy]… Boomer humor was thus 
from its birth political by the mere fact of being intelligent‖ (4-5).  In a radio appearance doing 
the routine ―Politician,‖ Nichols and May mock the increasing demand for politicians to be 
entertainers, their own reputation as political comics, and the contemporary need for politicians 
to be pseudo-comedians.  Nichols plays a generic politician looking for a good speech writer, 
and so, considers getting Sahl, ―the guy who wrote the Marx Brothers,‖198 or Carl Reiner—all 
while his wife keeps telling him to nail the jokes.   
The targets of Nichols and May‘s jabs were often those concerned with the spoken word, 
such as in Nichols‘ parody of Tennessee Williams, in which he plays a Southern playwright, 
Alabama Glass, author of Pork Makes Me Sick, about a man brought to suicide when he is 
―unjustly accused of not bein‘ a homosexual.‖  Many sketches were especially contemptuous of 
clichéd language, instances of language that are not the invention of the speaker, and thus, can be 
taken as less meant, at best as lazy and at worst as insincere, such as ―I can‘t stand to see you this 
way‖ or ―Darling, I‘m so ashamed‖ (Rice, 47).  For example, in one of their funniest stage pieces 
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 That guy was Sidney Joseph Perelman.  In ―The Distinctiveness of American Jewish Humor‖ Stephen Whitfield 
describes him as ―a Marx Brothers scriptwriter and New Yorker luminary with so freakish a command of English 
that, more than anyone else, he invested American humor with a linguistic turn. No wonder that the comic work in 
which he most re-Joyced was Ulysses‖ (10). 
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(which later appeared on the LP), ―Adultery,‖ an affair is seen through the lens of a couple from 
three national cultures: American, English, and French, with Nichols and May putting on 
elaborate accents for each couple.  The American couple is aroused by (and seeks satisfaction in) 
the overwhelming guilt, and the Brits by the indirectness of the interaction.  The French couple, 
it turns out, planned to have a threesome, but ―forgot to tell zee ‗usband,‖ thus rendering it a non-
affair since they plan to apologize to the husband—for not inviting him.  
 Still, Nichols and May received widespread devotion, perhaps because their comedy was 
often taken impersonally.  Nichols tells us that both he and May agreed that,  
 If you were in the audience and I did you exactly, you would say, ‗I know somebody just 
 like that.‘  That was always the reaction.  Elaine‘s mother always thought it was my 
 mother we were doing, and vice versa.  If you have a group of middle-aged Jewish ladies 
 and you do the mother sketch, they all say, ‗I know a woman just like that.‘ (Sweet, 87) 
 
This is another way of saying that people come to self-awareness through awareness of others, of 
moving out of the personal in order to find it.  This sort of thinking indicates, too, reasons why 
Nichols and May could get away with political humor, even if labeled sick, and still enjoy such 
commercial success. 
In her book Ordinary Pleasures: Couples, Conversation, and Comedy, Kay Young looks 
briefly at Nichols and May‘s album work.  She believes that the team ―got away‖ with scenes 
with sexual content, precisely because they only dealt in language: Nichols and May‘s ―routines 
ooze with a directness in language about sexual desire and fulfillment made wholly indirect 
through the absence of their bodies‘ interaction‖ (150).   While I object to Young‘s observation 
for too readily adopting the notion that recorded voices are somehow less corporeal than other 
traces of bodies, she is right to say that ―[w]hat Nichols and May make, then, is a comedy built 
on the joke that doubles their frame of reference, in their play between the stated and the implied 
scene they create‖ (151).  Nichols and May‘s comedy does often rest on our understanding of a 
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difference between the stated and the implied (the irony created by the difference of knowledge 
between what we know the characters know and what we know we know about the characters), 
but this is the result of playing within ordinary language, not the absence of their bodies (though 
surely had there been a visual track accompanying several sketches, they would have been 
dubbed ―sicker‖ still).199   
 When The New Yorker profiled Nichols and May, the piece began by addressing this  
 
quality as the crux of their reputation:  
 
 One surprising development in the entertainment business during the last half-dozen 
 years has been the ascent of a generation of young comedians whose public attitude is 
 indignation and whose subject matter is man‘s inhumanity to man—of which, if their 
 work is a reflection of their state of mind, they consider themselves to be outstanding 
 victims.  Gone is the time when being jocose about Bing Crosby‘s toupee, Jayne 
 Mansfield‘s structure, or the outcome of the daily double at Hialeah was fashionable; the 
 new comedy covers a bleak political-psychological-sociological-cultural range that 
 reaches from the way public affairs are conducted in Washington to the way private ones 
 are conducted in Westchester.  Of the members of the group of suffering entertainers—
 though it may be disrespectful to use the word ―group‖ to describe people who spend 
 much of their time being disrespectful to groups—the two who have devised the most 
 striking way of making their pain laughable are the team of Mike Nichols and Elaine 
 May. (47) 
 
Foregoing structured jokes, and with the emphasis already mentioned on historic gender roles, 
―[Nichols and May] unburden themselves most naturally and most often,‖ according to Rice, ―by 
turning everyday events into melodramas, by turning melodramas into everyday events‖ (57).  
These everyday events range from going to the dentist to cooking dinner, from running into old 
friends you don‘t remember to annoying seatmates on public transportation.  It is not just their 
subject matter that draws upon the quotidian; the speech acts that constitute these sketches draw 
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 I described above how their television appearances often focused attention on their voices, and prevented them 
from ―acting out‖ the events in their sketches.  Those that didn‘t, such as ―Teenagers,‖ was, as I detailed, taken to be 
far more provocative.  On stage, the pair did not heighten the visual elements of their stories through set pieces, and 
(staying true to Spolin‘s instruction) instead, mimed interacting with objects—a feature I will return to later. 
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upon conventions of ordinary language, representing them as a means of achieving 
(simultaneously) realism and comedy.   
Thomas Doherty describes Nichols and May‘s comedy as ―neurotically gendered tag 
team‖ (2).  There is no doubt that the bulk of Nichols and May‘s work on Monitor consists of 
characters talking.  The pleasure is in the mirroring of how people talk.  Thus, the topics need no 
consistent themes.  From the extraordinary way people speculate about celebrities‘ career 
decisions and love lives (―Anna Mae Wong‖) to elderly people‘s attitudes toward marriage 
(―Willya or Woncha‖) to trying avocadoes (―On the Train‖), the topics rarely matter; the listener 
is not going to learn anything about Anna Mae Wong or avocadoes.  Instead, she is going to 
learn about what sort of people say just these sorts of things about Anna Mae Wong in just this 
way (in this case, two people enact unwitting racism by wondering what happened to her career 
and whether she can stage a comeback by appearing with—and falling for—Sessue Hayakawa).  
―Anna Mae Wong‖ illustrates Nichols and May‘s tendency to steer clear of impersonating 
famous people.
200
  Celebrities are a prevalent topic, but the sketches are not about famous 
people, but about how ―average‖ people talk about celebrities, such as ―I Love Your Work,‖ and 
―Disc Jockey‖ (in which host Jack Ego‘s interview with burgeoning starlet Barbara Musk 
becomes a name-dropping competition involving Bertrand Russell, Albert Schweitzer, and God).  
    Whether live at An Evening or on the LP adaptation of the show, scenes, such as 
―Adultery,‖ clearly privilege Nichols and May‘s vocal performance.  This attention is reinforced 
by the show‘s visual sparseness, which prompted The New Yorker to label them ―[a] pair of 
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 When appearing on Monitor Radio, Nichols and May did occasionally perform as well-known persons.  
However, as in the case of ―False Teeth,‖ where the pair play an aged George and Martha Washington, the humor 
does not result from biographical interest, but from thinking of this couple as like any other old married 
curmudgeons. 
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hilarious mimes‖ (Goings on About Town section).201  Appearing on a blank stage, May and 
Nichols‘ create the space their characters need as they need it (one could not give form to a 
character in a vacuum).  The lack of visual text provided by a Nichols and May album (which is 
not to say these sketches are not visual, but that such visuals would be supplied by each listener‘s 
imagination) de-centers notions of visible, politicized identities by creating so many different 
types of men and women in such short periods of time solely by saying different things with 
different sounding voices—not by changing their visible bodily appearance through costumes, 
masks, make-up, or by using props (like actors in Commedia did).   
Indeed, Nichols and May‘s final scene is a track entitled ―Nichols and May at Work,‖ and 
ostensibly lets the listener hear the pair at work in the studio recording a sketch.  In it, Nichols 
informs May he has an idea; he will approach her as a son to his mother.  It turns out Nichols‘ 
idea is to play a teenage jock who confesses his deepest desire to be a nurse (a male nurse being 
a source of some humor in the 1950s).  They try it, and then, try to repeat this premise with 
differences (such as making the mother Jewish).  The track consists mostly of their hysterical 
laughter.  May clearly does not expect the son to harbor nursing ambitions, and Nichols, in turn, 
does not expect May‘s reaction of sincere and profound pride.  At one point, May threatens to 
kill Nichols if his laughter is audible over her lines because she swears she will never get through 
it again.  The listener realizes just how the scenes are composed.  Indeed, the Nichols and May 
fan will recognize this sketch, having heard it on Monitor, and understand the importance of 
                                                 
201
 Mime treats space paradoxically; it emphasizes space as absent, yet, at the same time, present to us, as actors and 
audience members.  I am tempted to suggest that Nichols and May‘s use of theatrical ―space‖ is analogous to the 
―ordinary,‖ the shared experience we all bring to the stage/world and which we can draw on together.  The blank 
stage becomes a visual analog for the ―ordinary‖ in Wittgenstein‘s sense, as that is precisely that which we know (is 
there), but we don‘t know how we know it, or what it is precisely.  We know the space is there—we can point at the 
stage—but we do not know what that space contains (or will contain).  Nichols later directed Gilda Radner and 
Whoopi Goldberg in their one-woman Broadway shows, Gilda Live (1979) (a filmed version was released in 1981) 
and Whoopi Goldberg (1984) (which brought Goldberg to national attention).  Both shows involve significant 
amounts of mime.  
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editing for them.  With ―Sexy Voice,‖ or the multiple intra-sketch characters of ―Adultery,‖ or 
―Nichols and May at Work,‖ Nichols and May demonstrate both how improvisation works—
how they sculpt scenes from a premise by tossing and catching different balls—and the 
importance of their art‘s recorded nature.     
 
 Between Doing and Performing  
 Earlier, we looked at Spolin‘s theoretical writings to more fully understand Nichols and 
May‘s career as improvisers, but we have yet to consider how the shift from live performances to 
mass-reproduced recorded scenes affects our idea of their social commentary.  So, before we end 
our look at Nichols and May and return to our examination of Nichols‘ cinematic work, and now 
that we have seen how Nichols and May disseminated improvisational theater to America, I 
would like to return once more to the basis of Spolin‘s theory in an effort to better understand 
precisely what we can take Nichols and May‘s legacy to be—and how Nichols‘ cinematic career 
builds on it.   
 For Spolin, improvisation follows from one central metaphor: ―The art consists purely of 
players tossing the ball to each other‖ (Coleman, 27).  The ―ball‖ (also referred to as the ―point 
of concentration,‖ or ―focus‖ in later editions) comes to signify the inseparability of 
communication and performance between performers.  Spolin writes that, ―the techniques of the 
theater are the techniques of communicating‖ (14).  For her, acting is not about whatever human 
behavior is about, but whatever communicative human behavior is about, about what 
communicative behavior is.  Sills also describes the form of improvisation in terms of 
communication: ―True improvisation is a dialogue between people.  Not just on the level of what 
the scene is about, but also a dialogue from the being—something that has never been said 
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before that now comes up, some statement of reality between people.  In a dialogue, something 
happens to the participants… a discovery.  As I say, you can‘t make this discovery alone.  There 
is always the other‖ (quoted in Hendra, 44).   
 Nichols and May always maintained parity.  Neither was the other‘s ―straight man,‖ 
neither was going to have the upper hand (at least, not consistently).  In what became, perhaps, 
their most well-known piece, ―The Lost Dime,‖ Nichols plays a man who dials the operator to 
complain that he has been robbed of his dime by a pay phone.  Kercher sees it as no coincidence 
that this scene became exemplary of their work, for it ―commented on the rigid bureaucracy of 
the phone company, yet what really drove it was the way May‘s character reduced her male 
customer into a pathetic, pouting child.  Here as in several other popular Compass scenes, the 
male character became a victim, comically infantilized and ‗emasculated‘ by May‖ (130).202  But 
it is not just its content that makes it an exemplary Nichols and May sketch; so does its form, the 
back-and-forth of their utterances.  Nichols complains to the operator, so she must find a way to 
refuse his claim.  He must then find a new way to lodge his grievance, she to rebuke this, and so 
on.  Similarly, in one of my favorites, ―British Ennui,‖ the sketch begins with Nichols playing a 
bored, posh Englishman. As his wife, May continuously indulges him by suggesting new 
activities, each of which he finds a way of declining.  This is how the ball is tossed to and fro, 
and how that tossing constitutes a scene.   
 In words remarkably similar to Spolin‘s, Wittgenstein wrote: ―In a conversation: One 
person throws a ball; the other does not know: whether he is supposed to throw it back, or throw 
it to a third person, or leave it on the ground, or pick it up and put it in his pocket, etc.‖ (1948, 
74e).  I find his ―etc.‖ significant for relating it to Spolin‘s text, for it suggests the infinite ways 
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 The Compass‘ Severn Darden later starred in The President’s Analyst (Theodore Flicker, 1967), which also casts 
―the phone company‖ as the ultimate symbol of bureaucracy. 
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the ball can be thrown and received (or not received).  This space of possibility is crucial for 
Spolin‘s players to exchange utterances in a spontaneous way.  Taking into account both 
Spolin‘s and Wittgenstein‘s similar descriptions of language use, despite the different contexts 
for that use, means that utterances exchanged by Nichols and May during an improvisation are 
neither referential in the way ordinary language is when spoken by ―real‖ people (again, the 
context of the stage is crucial), but nor are they simply fictional.  Improvised language occupies a 
middle-ground, a skewed vision of both these things, which perhaps suggests a reason Nichols 
and May drew upon it for their ends.  
In an interview, Nichols comments on the need for a strong premise if an improvisation is 
to succeed, referencing Aristotle‘s assertion that both tragedy and comedy are rooted in 
improvisation (Probst, 113).  If tragedy gives us what must happen, then comedy gives us 
surprise, chance, contingency, and ―all the changes in fortune that fall outside the necessities of 
tragic myth, and can present ‗character‘ for its own sake‖ (Sypher, 33).  This also hints at a 
reason improvisational performance likes comedy, why it tends to elicit laughter from its 
audience members; the performers are free to express, to pursue possibilities. 
Connecting Spolin‘s and Wittgenstein‘s ballistic metaphors shows us that the form of 
improvisation is based on (ordinary) language-use.  For Wittgenstein, words have functions 
within the contexts of what he terms ―language games.‖  Hanna Fenichel Pitkin explains that 
Wittgenstein‘s view of the role of utterances in a game is ―not making a true or false assertion 
about facts.  Rather it changes the status, the relationships, of the players.  Uttering such an 
expression is like making a move in the game, and the expression is just a device by means of 
which the move is made‖ (37).  However, in the aesthetic and performative context of 
improvisation, utterances are not just devices for making moves; they are the moves.  For 
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Wittgenstein, our knowledge of ourselves and our world comes to us through our language (and 
vice versa).  He calls this knowledge ―ordinary,‖ which is meant to delineate the knowledge we 
have as speakers of a natural language despite not knowing we have it (or how we got it).  It 
becomes, for him, the aegis of philosophy to figure that out, to ask what exactly we mean when 
we say certain things: in short, to describe and to examine ordinary language and its contexts—
which is precisely what Nichols and May do.   
Unlike the novelist, playwright, or poet who typically works alone, free to pursue 
signature styles, Nichols and May work together through conventions of ordinary language.  
Improvisation destroys all possibilities save one each time an action occurs.  In every sketch, 
Nichols and May demonstrate that they know how ordinary language works only to mock it.  
Even for Nichols and May characters who speak a special class of English, such as the 
academics in ―Dr. Wasserman and Professor Cole‖ or the rich of ―British Ennui,‖ the humor lies 
in the difference located between their English and what we know to be ordinary English.  In this 
way, they represent ordinary language use in absentia for the spectator.  An improvisation 
becomes a dramatization of speakers coming to these words, creating a reality.  Wittgenstein said 
as much with his ball metaphor, which implies that language-use (and so, language) occurs 
interpersonally.  And Sills seems to have had this in mind when he called improvisation, ―a kind 
of confrontation with an unknown.  What‘s between [the players] is unknown, unspoken, 
unsomething,‖ and that ―[t]heater is concerned with reality.  Now, reality is not to be defined as 
what is real for you alone.  Reality is shared.  And reality of the moment can occur only with 
spontaneity‖ (Sweet, 17).   
Earlier I described the final sketch of An Evening, where audience members were asked 
to participate.  The audience‘s clamoring to make suggestions could be viewed as a way of 
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enacting power over the performers, of setting constraints, of testing them, of limiting their 
freedom, enslaving them, and reducing their spontaneity—while (narcissistically) creating scenes 
of greater ―interest‖ or relevance to the audience.  Spectators become (literal) dictators, dictating 
objectives, styles, and tasks, to the performer.  Now, in this light, we can clearly see why Nichols 
and May‘s triumph might also be thrilling for the audience.  They seem to emerge victorious 
over the obstacle of ordinary language, creatively extricating themselves from its ropes, 
inventing a ―how‖ to do the task which surpasses what the spectator imagines possible, reveling 
in the supremacy of ordinary language and manners to transform meaning.  Audience 
participation means, too, that the evening‘s most spontaneous of improvisations still fail to offer 
true spontaneity, the sort that determines its own constitution.     
Wittgenstein also indicates a flaw in Spolin‘s dream of a world of accessible intuition and 
spontaneity.  The improvised scene occurs in (and largely as) language; thus, it must remain 
outside the realm of absolute spontaneity.  Hence, there is no rupture between live spontaneity 
and its semblance (recorded cases), though they are different in degree.  So, while Nichols and 
May could never achieve the sort of spontaneity Spolin (somewhat mystically) desires (language 
operates within the realm of inhibition, is part of that realm, not outside it), they are even farther 
from that ideal when mass reproduced—which is how most of the nation experienced their 
comedy.  In terms of our appreciation of them, this is not necessarily bad.  Knowing that a 
performer can say anything, and chooses to say this thing at this time allows us to see each 
choice as intentional.   
If the point of improvisation is finding pleasure in spontaneity, of seeing a scene created 
before you, of seeing the performer create a character (and without being asked to suspend 
disbelief as if in a classical drama she is still also the performer), then what is the pleasure of its 
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imitation on a Nichols and May album?  Or, as we will ask in the next chapter, in a Nichols film?  
Listeners and spectators can never know (that is, without having someone trustworthy tell them) 
that the performer/characters‘ actions that appear on-screen were unplanned during the recording 
or filmmaking process.  Can spontaneity even be imitated?  In our discussion of The Graduate in 
chapter two, we decided that, at the theater, we share silence with the characters, while at the 
cinema, we do not.  The same could be said of spontaneity.   
Etymologically, ―improvisation‖ denotes the unforeseen, unexpected.  For Spolin‘s ideal 
improvisations, audience and performer alike begin in a state of not knowing.  As spectators, the 
drama of seeing the drama crafted before us in real time relies on knowing (having been told) 
that we are seeing an improvised show.  Otherwise, we are free to imagine a script, and so, the 
actor‘s choices in performing a character in just this way.  During improvisation, unconstrained 
by a script, the actor is free to fully inhabit/create a persona, and so, the infinite domain of 
possibility is only ever delimited by the actions of another performer.  The form of the 
performance is not understood to convey a writer or director‘s wishes; the performance exists 
fully on stage, in the present before the spectator.  Since the actor‘s art is one of activity, always 
occurring in the present, improvisation is the style of performance that best seeks to match form 
to content.  By presenting actors/characters doing things on stage in both a mimetic and literal 
sense, improvisation relieves us of any nagging voice that we are being duped by this impression 
of characters ―in the moment,‖ of presentness to us (that the theater thrives on), while still 
mirroring and commenting on the real.
203
   
I have shown that Nichols and May‘s art functions through their meticulous 
representation of the minutiae of ordinary linguistic interactions—whether they portray children, 
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 Nichols‘ Broadway musical adaptation of Monty Python‘s The Holy Grail (Terry Gilliam, Terry Jones, 1975), 
Spamalot (2005), plays with the theater‘s ―presence‖ to the spectator by culminating in the ―finding‖ of the Holy 
Grail underneath the seat of an audience member. 
  
226 
mothers, lovers, or phone company personnel.  May once said that, ―comedy is almost entirely 
the doing of something in detail, step by tiny step,‖ and describes how creating a fuller and fuller 
picture of an event teeters on absurdity, but can result in a story that is both humorous and 
―closer to life‖ than broad dramas (Probst, 135).  When an interviewer asked how she knows 
something is funny, May responded, ―Somebody asked George Bernard Shaw that, and he said, 
‗When I laugh‘—this is not a direct quote.  I wish I had said that. And now I have‖ (Probst, 134).  
But, from her own perspective as a comic, she said, ―The nice thing is to make an audience laugh 
and laugh and laugh, and shudder later‖ (Rice, 67).  While ―when we laugh‖ may not be a 
helpful definition of the comic mode, or a useful description of how it functions, it is often 
turned to as a criterion for recognizing comedy.   
When thinking about humor, Wittgenstein returns to the metaphor of throwing a ball: 
―What is it like for people not to have a sense of humour?  They do not react properly to each 
other.  It‘s as though there were a custom amongst certain people for one person to throw another 
a ball which he is supposed to catch and throw back; but some people, instead of throwing it 
back, put it in their pocket‖ (1949, 83e).  Here, humor fails when one person fails to do 
something public with the ball thrown to them (and, one suspects, if it is not returned fast 
enough; a propos, Sills called Nichols and May ―the world‘s fastest humans‖ [―Liner,‖ Sahlins, 
2]).   
Nichols asserts that ―a laugh is just a very loud Yes‖ (I take him not to mean that a 
spectator must agree with specific comedic content to get the joke; one can laugh at a joke‘s 
delivery, for example) (Probst, 125).  For him, the expression of laughter reflects a judgment, at 
least that something is funny (not necessarily that the laughter signifies consciousness of why it 
is funny), and his view of laughter as a ―yes‖ concurs with Wittgenstein‘s view of humor: that 
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two people have to find it funny or communication hasn‘t happened.  The laugh, then, is an entry 
point for the individual‘s engagement with the comic text, and, by extension the comic artist—at 
times within and at times without, the subject‘s control.  This resonates with Austin because the 
meaning of the thing, its being funny, derives from its context.  It can only come to mean after it 
is acknowledged by the other and responded to; only then can it count as done, as funny.  For 
Nichols and May, via Spolin, there are no monologues in improvisation, no ―talking to oneself.‖  
As the actor‘s art, then, it is interpersonal; it requires more than one artist.   
  By analogizing the form of Nichols and May‘s scenes to Austin‘s cases of performative 
utterances, I do not mean to distract from their nature as fiction.  Indeed, if their reception 
indicates anything, it is that they were taken to produce fictions so realist as to be almost 
documentary: revealing how people really talk.  The perception of truth and falsity returns for 
fans of Nichols and May, who waited for their insights, their truths; and, in this sense, Nichols 
and May‘s work differs from the model of performative utterances, for the perception of truth 
and falsity still operates for the audience.  Nichols and May‘s humor utilizes (and through this 
utilization, points toward) the ―ordinary,‖ to represent—and simultaneously mock—how we talk 
(and think) about relationships between genders, classes, generations, political ideologies, etc.  
Nichols and May used spontaneity as an instrument to depict how seemingly organic 
conversations are fraught with normative rules and ideology, and how the unwitting implicature, 
of guilt, racism, sexism, mockery, etc., falls to those who—to our smug ears—should know 
better (and usually think they do).  But if we find the representation of such verbal affects at once 
hilarious and realistic, perhaps it is because we suspect that they are embedded in our everyday 
use of English.  Nichols and May prove that there is no such thing as one ―conversational‖ tone 
or ―natural‖ style of communication, and yet, their humor rests on the fact that we, as listeners 
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(and presumably not every type of person they portray), can recognize the aspects of an utterance 
as humorous; we can form an understanding of who a character is by our knowledge (external to 
the text) of what type of person talks like this, says these sorts of things, in this way.  Thus, they 
locate, and re-essentialize, identity in the voice.   
So often depicting two people talking past one another (―The Lost Dime,‖ ―About that 
Moustache,‖ ―Mother and Son‖), Nichols and May do not just raise doubts about the ability of 
language to communicate, but, by making grammar perspicuous and playing with implied 
meanings, their sketches resonate with the contemporary move in Anglo-American philosophy to 
pursue the study of ordinary language, as both method and subject.  According to Stanley Cavell, 
who builds on the work of Wittgenstein and Austin, ordinary language philosophers seek 
wisdom by asking what someone means when they use a particular word or expression. Making 
distinctions across different usages and parsing out the stated and implicit, Cavell writes that one 
can learn, ―[w]hat people had not realized was what they were saying, or, what they were really 
saying, and so had not known what they meant.  To this extent, they had not known themselves, 
and not known the world.  I mean, of course, the ordinary world‖ (Must We Mean What We Say, 
40).   
Nichols and May also ask what people mean when they say particular things, but with 
more attention to how doing this philosophical work reveals something about types of people 
(not just about how English speakers speak, and so, demonstrate beliefs).  For instance, on 
Improvisations to Music, what does a boss really mean when he tells his female employee that 
―GAA&P…is a family… that‘s the way we like the girls to feel‖ (―Cocktail Piano‖) or when a 
guy eagerly asks his date: ―Did you enjoy your meal?‖ in that way (―Tango‖).  Indeed, Cavell‘s 
examples of language frequently sound like they are lifted from a Nichols and May sketch, such 
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as when he cites one person asking another if she ―made a gift voluntarily‖ or if she ―meant to 
wear that today.‖  If we laugh, as Cavell rightly points out we might, it is because we know that 
someone uttering a phrase in just this way at a certain time does not mean the words literally.
204
  
Cavell‘s examples are, since he is building a philosophical argument (in print), relatively 
transparent.  Nichols and May trade more subtly in the juxtaposition of the stated and implied.  
On the radio and on albums, Nichols and May are free to isolate just this aspect of language use: 
the intonation, inflection, speed, and subtext—in short, that which lends meaning to the 
utterance, defines its context—become the tools with which they write.   
I suggest that Nichols and May‘s aims and effects comport with those of particular 
philosophers of language as a way of describing what we are doing as attentive and laughing 
listeners.  But by suggesting that Nichols and May are doing philosophy of ordinary language, 
and, that if we are attentive and laughing listeners, that so are we, I do not mean to suggest that 
Nichols and May‘s characters are doing anything like ordinary language philosophy.  If there is 
a tragic aspect to Nichols and May‘s comedy it is that none of the characters they portrayed 
could ever hear themselves, and so, could never learn from the other.  The parity between 
characters (and players) was real; there was no consistent wise one, no fool.  As we watched 
them playing ball, the humor was about us receiving their exchange: and then questioning what 
must we do with it.  Put it in our pocket?  Shudder later?  If we caught and returned Nichols and 
May‘s balls, even by laughing, it was because we were willing to find the humor in the ordinary, 
which is really sick.   
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 Cavell writes: ―My point about such statements, then, is that they are sensibly questioned only where there is 
some special reason for supposing what I say about what I (we) say to be wrong; only here is the request for 
evidence competent.  If I am wrong about what he does (they do), that may be no great surprise; but if I am wrong 
about what I (we) do, that is liable, where it is not comic, to be tragic‖ (14).  Of the ―comical,‖ Freud writes: ―The 
comical appears primarily as an unintentional discovery in the social relations of human beings‖ (my italics, 302).   
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Chapter Five: New Hollywood’s Comedy of Remarriage 
 
―We must know other games, college-type types like us.  That can‘t be the limit of our 
vocabulary!‖ 
 — George, Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? 
 
 In the previous chapter, we studied Nichols and May‘s rise to stardom and how their 
comedy disseminated a new awareness of improvisational performance techniques, altering how 
we hear characters‘ recorded dialogue.  In this chapter, we turn our attention back to Nichols‘ 
career as a cinema director.  In High Comedy in American Movies, Steve Vineberg comments in 
his reading of Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice (Paul Mazursky, 1969) that, ―[t]his argument 
over sex is one of the funniest marital squabbles ever put on the screen, and you can hear in the 
banter the influence of Mike Nichols and Elaine May, who practically invented the revue-style 
humor that writers and directors like Mazursky shepherded into the movies in the late sixties and 
early seventies‖ (124).  Nichols and May separated after she wrote a play both for and about 
Nichols: A Matter of Position (1962).  She also directed, and they both starred; but the play 
flopped.
205
   
Nichols soon heard his calling to direct plays: ―It didn‘t feel like a transition.  I was 
coming home in every way… it was as if I‘d been getting ready for it all my life without 
knowing it‖ (Sweet, 84).   When asked about creating scenes with May, Nichols said that, ―by 
and large I would shape them and Elaine would fill them… What she‘s interested in is character 
and the moment.  What I‘m interested in is moving on and giving it a shape‖ (Sweet, 82-83).  
Rehearsing his first Broadway show, Neil Simon‘s play, Barefoot in the Park (1963), he recalls 
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 May went on to perform and write for stage and screen, and to direct the films A New Leaf (1971), The Sunshine 
Kid (1972), Mikey and Nicky (1976) (which makes brilliant use of improvised scenes), and the unfairly maligned 
Ishtar (1987).  She co-wrote Heaven Can Wait with Warren Beatty (Beatty and Buck Henry, 1978), and contributed 
to the screenplays of films such as Such Good Friends (Otto Preminger, 1971), Reds (Warren Beatty, 1981), and 
Tootsie (Sydney Pollack, 1982).   
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thinking: ―This is what I want to do, this is what I‘m meant to do, I finally know what my work 
is‖ (Probst, 113).206   
In our readings of The Graduate (1967) and Carnal Knowledge (1971), we have already 
seen examples of how Nichols‘ cinematic work delves into the same territory Nichols and May 
skewered: American middle-class attitudes toward sex, gender, marriage, and romantic love.  
Nichols and May publicly reunited in 1996 for The Birdcage; he directed her screenplay (based 
on the French cult classic film La Cage aux Folles [Edouard Molinaro, 1978]).  Birdcage reflects 
cultural challenges to traditional ideals of masculinity as well as the rising visibility of self-
identifying homosexual citizens.
207
  Un-credited, May contributed rewrites in 1994 for Nichols‘ 
horror-comedy Wolf, the story of a male New York book editor suffering from (or enjoying) a 
bout of lycanthropy.  And, in 1998, they collaborated on Primary Colors, whose narrative crisis 
is predicated upon the manipulation of presidential candidate Jack Stanton‘s (John Travolta) 
voice on the radio.  The film follows his campaign while his lesbian campaign manager, Libby 
Holden (Kathy Bates), traces the attack back to his opponent, who is desperately trying to cover 
up his own homosexual scandal.  Libby commits suicide, and becomes the movie‘s moral 
compass, when confronted with the fact that Jack will use the information of his opponent‘s 
sexuality to get elected himself.  Both films deal prominently with ambivalent attitudes toward 
masculinity in America in the 1990s.  Later I will focus attention on Birdcage, but before we 
analyze that film, I want to argue that, despite the fact that scholars have failed to note 
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 As I described in the introduction, Nichols worked closely with Simon on the script, making substantive 
revisions. 
207
 I assume the term ―homosexual‖ implies sexual desire—desire with an object-choice—and use ―gay‖ as an area 
in which to discuss the construction of a specific cultural identity lacking a necessary link to sexuality.  The 1990s 
saw a critical trend toward thinking of a person‘s sexuality both in terms of what someone does (with another) and 
that such actions determine what that person is with regards to social legibility.  See Judith Butler. 
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consistency in Nichols‘ corpus, he announced his agenda in his first film: Who’s Afraid of 
Virginia Woolf? (1966).
208
  
Just because Nichols was half of Nichols and May does not mean his movies must 
propagate style of comedy associated with the duo—but they do.  If we look at Nichols‘ 
cinematic oeuvre, it is clear he carried forward with him Nichols and May‘s care for social 
commentary through linguistic play.  He elected to eschew filming improvised performances, 
preferring to adapt his movies from novels and dramatic literature.  However, Nichols‘ films 
maintain an interest in the tenets of improvisational theater, but rather than enacting them before 
the spectator, Nichols utilizes cinema‘s spatial and temporal remove from the spectator to 
ruminate on the methods of improvisation, particularly Viola Spolin‘s linguistic theater 
―games.‖209  Unlike Nichols and May‘s live improvisations before an audience, cinema cannot 
provide the spectator with ―proof‖ of a performance‘s spontaneity (i.e., by incorporating 
audience suggestion to formulate it in front of them).   
As we saw in the last chapter, Spolin‘s theory of improvisation is founded on the process 
of two players‘ mutuality—tossing ―the ball‖ back and forth.  In this chapter, we will look 
closely at two of Nichols‘ films, Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? and The Birdcage, both of 
which feature couples who self-consciously perform for another couple.  Through these 
dramatizations of improvisation games, Nichols invites us to think about the relationship 
between ordinary conversation—albeit by some pretty theatrical people—and what we might 
properly call improvising by following these characters in their homes.  Spolin asks, ―How much 
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 Nichols and May starred as this play‘s protagonists, George and Martha, in a 1980 production. 
209
 See the chapter four for information on Nichols‘ history with Spolin‘s teachings, and a discussion of her theories.   
Virginia Wright Wexman cites Robert Altman for most successfully bringing the performance style rooted in The 
Compass/Second City (and especially Nichols and May) to the screen.  Interestingly, in 1975, Nichols said ―Robert 
Altman is doing what I would have expected me to be doing‖ (Sweet, 86).  Wexman describes the mark of such 
improvisational effects on Altman‘s films as ―ungrammatical sentences, broken-off phrases, unclear diction, and 
overlapping dialogue‖ (190). 
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more certain would knowledge be if it came from and out of the excitement of learning itself?‖  
Her wish for what we know to be inseparable from how we know it emphasizes process, 
method—the action of learning—and is presented in Birdcage‘s and Virginia Woolf‘s depiction 
of its protagonists‘ epiphanies, which take the form of performative utterances (in the sense J.L. 
Austin meant in which the uttering of a particular phrase in the right conditions is the doing of an 
action).   
 If we examine these films with Nichols‘ background in improvisation in mind, key 
features surface that deserve attention because they enrich our experience of both the text and its 
historical context.   In particular, the form of the dialogue in Virginia Woolf and Birdcage 
concurs with the nature of Spolin‘s teachings, and so, we will extend our thinking about recorded 
dialogue from Nichols and May‘s albums into its cinematic incarnation.  Nichols once said, 
―Movie acting was invented less than 100 years ago — movie acting with sound.  You know 
how Harold Bloom says that Shakespeare invented us? It‘s a fascinating idea, and you can go 
quite far with it. You could say that it‘s in talking movies that inner life begins to appear‖ 
(McGrath, 2).  Leo Braudy makes a similar claim:  ―From the first days of sound [in American 
cinema] there has been a thematic preoccupation with the paradox of the actor‘s body—its 
physical presence and its metaphysical absence, its visibility and its invisibility, body and mind, 
action and meditation‖ (215).  Like Nichols, Braudy marks the advent of characters‘ utterances 
as introducing perennial philosophical dilemmas regarding the representation of the human into 
cinema,
210
 but he also marks the 1960s as a key moment: ―[i]t is difficult not to conclude that the 
progress of films from the 1930s to the 1960s has involved a growing repulsion from and 
fascination with the body, especially in its interaction with the mind‖ (217).  Although he does 
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 We are never justified in believing we know what an actor‘s voice ―really‖ sounds like based on listening to a 
character she creates.  Knowing the voice of a star—as author of multiple characters across films—is a different 
matter. 
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not offer a sufficient account of the changes he believes occur in the 1960s, taken together, 
Braudy‘s observations suggest that cinemagoers‘ experiences paralleled contemporary Anglo-
American philosophers who looked to language for a chance at understanding mind.  I hope that 
by beginning with Virginia Woolf, which is not just the beginning of Nichols‘ corpus, but the 
beginning of New Hollywood, I will show how Nichols‘ films‘ changed Hollywood‘s ideas 
about characters‘ language use.  I will then illustrate how altering our ideas about on-screen 
communication precipitated his later film, Birdcage, which reflects changing cultural definitions 
of marriage. 
 
Ornery Language Games: Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? 
Virginia Woolf was released in 1966.  Despite little attention to the text itself by scholars, 
it is considered a lynchpin in the countercultural cinematic movement that led the transition to 
what has come to be called ―New Hollywood‖: a position that lends its aesthetic content 
considerable weight with regard to American cinema history.
211
  At the time, its stars, Elizabeth 
Taylor and Richard Burton, were the most famous couple in the world.  Adapted by Ernest 
Lehman from the 1962 play by Edward Albee, Virginia Woolf follows a night in the life of 
George (Richard Burton), a history professor, and Martha (Elizabeth Taylor), his wife, the 
daughter of the president of the university.  George and Martha have an apparently embittered 
marriage, and on this night things ―snap‖ and they declare ―total war‖ on each other.  Yet, 
despite George and Martha‘s constant bickering, we ought to see Virginia Woolf as a dark 
romantic comedy.  Although their ferocious wordplay suggests malicious intentions, it is also 
proof that they are a good match.  The story occurs mostly in George and Martha‘s home in the 
fictional town of New Carthage, where they host a recently hired biology professor, Nick 
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 See, for example, John Belton, p. 285-287. 
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(George Segal), and his wife, Honey (Sandy Dennis).
212
  The young couple becomes 
instrumental to George and Martha‘s infighting.  The narrative develops through a series of 
verbal ―games‖ orchestrated by George and Martha to hurt each other and their guests.  Martha 
repeatedly attacks George‘s lack of ambition, belaboring Nick‘s status as a biology professor to 
incite internecine rivalries; she makes sexual advances toward the ambitious Nick, who does not 
resist since he wants to ―plow a few pertinent wives‖ in order to ascend the university ladder.  
Over the course of the night, and as the couples become increasingly drunk, secrets are—or 
appear to be—uncovered.  However, the film maintains a veil of ambiguity, and never allows the 
spectator to be certain about the facts of George‘s and Martha‘s pasts.  While we suspect their 
stories might be based in some truth, we cannot help but wonder, at the same time, whether they 
are (or to what extent they are) invented to inspire particular reactions in each other (and their 
guests).  The evening culminates in the revelation that the son George and Martha claimed to 
have is a product of their imaginations.   
Assuming a story about an aging, bitter academic couple is insufficiently interesting, 
critics struggled to interpret the play Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? as an allegory of 
something else, though they failed to reach an agreement; and when the film was released, critics 
did not fare much better.  The difficulty of its ambiguous language prompted many to see it as a 
puzzle to be solved.  Andrew Sarris eventually gave up, proclaiming instead that the film is ―best 
when it doesn‘t Mean anything, but simply Is‖ (Confessions of a Cultist, 26).  Such a struggle for 
interpretation suggests that both the film‘s content and its reception were to a large extent 
―about‖ language and the difficulty of communication.213   
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 For the reader‘s (and writer‘s) ease, I use Nick‘s name as it appears in Albee‘s script, although no one utters it in 
the film. 
213
 This is even reflected in the film‘s production history, and demonstrates Nichols‘ genius for creating a mood on 
set instrumental for achieving his desired effect.  Set photographer Bob Willoughby recalls that ―Albee‘s dialogue 
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Although it was his first foray into Hollywood, Nichols chose to direct the film (he even 
put The Graduate on hold to do so), and kept his adaptation largely faithful to its theatrical 
source. (Taylor also wanted him to direct, and had the clout to ensure he did.)  He felt he had a 
special understanding of his source, and ―lucky to get a chance to protect it‖ (Gelmis, 275).  
Leonard Leff chronicles the process of adapting the play into film, documenting the efforts of 
studio boss Jack Warner and screenwriter Ernest Lehman prior to Nichols‘ involvement to ―open 
up‖ Albee‘s play, to ―have less talk and more action,‖ to decrease the profanity, and to increase 
the clarity (by showing the son to be not only real, but to have hanged himself in the living room 
closet in a flashback) (1981, 454).  Despite having given Hollywood ―the talkie,‖ Warner did not 
want Virginia Woolf to be all talk.  However, once Nichols came on board, things changed; ―[t]o 
him Albee‘s text was sacrosanct‖ (1981, 453).  Warner had told Lehman to remove the film‘s 
profanity, yet he was savvy enough to realize that the play‘s ―notoriety was strongly tied to its 
language‖ (Leff, 1981, 465).  Nichols worked with Lehman on the script for two months prior to 
shooting, demanding he discard previous drafts by returning the action to George and Martha‘s 
home and by doing away with ―explanatory‖ flashbacks (Bottoms, 51).   
Nichols demanded ―virtually total artistic control,‖ and, through a process of seven drafts, 
Nichols ―permanently restored most of Albee‘s dialogue‖ (1980, 44).  Leff asserts that, ―[t]he 
final decision not to observe Production Code guidelines was made for Warner by Mike Nichols‖ 
(1981, 464).  In fact, ―what [Nichols] wanted, Warner gave him,‖ though Nichols did not 
                                                                                                                                                             
was so acid, so bitter, that a number of crew members said, no thanks, and left the first week. I had never seen this 
happen before, nor have I since‖ (226).  However, Nichols tells us he thinks the play is ―seated in the words‖ and 
that it is ―a laugh pretty much every twenty seconds‖ (DVD Commentary). 
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reciprocate; he refused to shoot back-up scenes for those with strong language in case the 
Production Code objected (1980, 44).  And object they did.
214
   
The film‘s graphic and sexual language, including words never before heard on American 
screens, challenged what was ―sayable‖ on screen and made the movie a cultural milestone.  The 
eleven ―goddamns,‖ five ―sons of bitches,‖ seven ―bastards,‖ a ―screw you,‖ ―hump the hostess,‖ 
―up yours,‖ and an assortment of insults involving body parts thrown in for good measure, made 
Virginia Woolf the first film to successfully challenge the Motion Picture Production Code 
established by Will Hays in 1934 (Belton, 285).  Initially, the Code refused to approve it, but 
after a series of threats to release the film regardless of the Code‘s approval—compounded by 
Nichols‘ refusal to change anything, and his calculated resistance to shooting back-up scenes—
Virginia Woolf was granted a Code seal as an exemption from its standard strictures based on the 
belief that it was a ―superior picture.‖  Besides, ―[d]isguising profanity with clean but suggestive 
phrases,‖ Nichols stated publically, ―is really dirtier‖ (quoted in Bottoms, 54).  Jack Valenti, 
head of the Motion Picture Association of America, the organization that upheld the Code, called 
Virginia Woolf ―a flaming arrow into the haystack [of tradition],‖ and tells us that it was this film 
that spurred him to develop the ratings system (the Code would be dismantled only two years 
later, and replaced by the MPAA ratings system).
215
  Having essentially defeated the Code, it 
changed the course of Hollywood cinema, and arguably inaugurated the period called ―New 
Hollywood.‖   
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 Jeff provides an intricately detailed account of the Code‘s struggle with Virginia Woolf.  He explains that while 
earlier films, such as The Pawnbroker (Sidney Lumet, 1964), had attempted to fight the Code, it was only Virginia 
Woolf that had the mettle, and Nichols the backbone, to vanquish it. 
215
 Nichols‘ tells an amusing anecdote about how he eventually won the influential Catholic Legion of Decency‘s 
approval.  He asked his friend Jacqueline Kennedy, renowned-Catholic President Kennedy‘s wife, to sit behind the 
board and repeat ―How Jack would have loved this‖ (Harris, 183).  The Legion decided it could be considered a 
―think film.‖ 
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It was not just the film‘s language that was considered provocative.  According to John 
Belton, the film‘s sexual themes both reflected the trend toward mature content evidenced by the 
growing popularity of non-Hollywood films in America in the 1960s, and initiated the presence 
of such content in Hollywood (287).  Despite the new injunction that no one under eighteen be 
admitted to the theater, Virginia Woolf was a critical and commercial smash.  It grossed more 
than $14.5 million and was nominated for thirteen Academy Awards.
216
  It remains admired; in 
2007, the American Film Institute ranked it number 67 of the 100 Greatest Films.  
Virginia Woolf introduces Nichols‘ attachment to close-ups and long takes (a stylistic 
device we have returned to repeatedly in this dissertation).  Nichols rehearsed for three weeks 
with the cast, blocking on the actual set, before shooting the film in sequence, establishing his 
identity as an actor‘s director (a crucial quality of his auteurism, and a subject we will explore in 
the following chapter).  He was so committed to a claustrophobic and documentary feeling that 
he had the house built with realistic dimensions and walls that did not move.  Warped 
floorboards were put down which prevented conventional studio cameras, and forced thoughtful, 
hand-held shooting, causing the critic for Film Quarterly to extol that the camera work‘s 
―supreme virtue is its intelligence‖ (Bottoms, 53).  It is common for one close-up in the film to 
last well over a minute, and for tens of minutes to elapse before an establishing or three quarter 
shot interrupts the shot/reverse shot pattern of faces talking.  Filmed in black and white, and 
occurring almost entirely in George and Martha‘s living room, the visual austerity of Virginia 
Woolf is a counterpoint to the density of its dialogue.
217
  Their living room is so cluttered that it 
                                                 
216
 Indeed, Virginia Woolf is notable for being the first film whose entire cast was nominated for an Academy 
Award.  Both Dennis and Taylor won.   
217
 Nichols commented on his cinematographic choices in the recent anniversary edition DVD: ―I was already in 
love, from other people‘s work, with not cutting.‖  On filming in black and white, he said that, ―The whole idea of 
movie as metaphor changed with color. Since this play is such an absolute metaphor, I think it really is helped by a 
picture that is an idea of reality.‖  On the dominance of color films now, Nichols said: ―I miss it because [black and 
white] was a restriction, it was a limit… it‘s very hard to work without limits‖ (DVD Commentary). 
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blurs into a background, a hodge-podge of objects.  Similarly, the costumes avoid strong shades, 
swathing the characters in grays which blur into the background, further highlighting their faces; 
while the visuals are effective (and often quite beautiful), Virginia Woolf is nothing if not verbal.   
As in most of Albee‘s work, in which human communication is the central subject, 
language and talking are frequently the topic of the characters‘ exchanges.  Nichols‘ desire to 
maintain both Albee‘s rhythm and commentary on language use made Virginia Woolf the first 
picture ―intentionally shot with overlapping dialogue‖ (O‘Steen, 39).218  Nichols hired then-
unknown editor Sam O‘Steen after established studio editors said they could not shoot characters 
talking over each other. O‘Steen promised he could, and was allowed to sit on the set; he 
invented a complicated system of coding the soundtrack.
219
  Alongside the film‘s release, Warner 
Brothers Records released a deluxe, gatefold two-LP record set which included the entire film's 
dialogue.  This was not a common practice.  
 Nichols‘ direction of the actors seems to have focused on line readings: ―For Richard 
Burton, I actually did act out scenes and read them because he responds through his ear.  When 
he hears something, he grasps the idea within the sound, within the reading‖ (Probst, 115).  
Burton said of Nichols: ―I thought I knew everything anybody had to teach me about comedy.  
From Mike, I learned‖ (Probst, 116). There is much to say about the richness of all four actors‘ 
performances, but we will not be concerned with performance at the level of production.  I will 
focus on the character‘s actions: their self-consciousness of cinematic performance, of creating a 
sense of spontaneity, of using language, and, most importantly, of improvisational techniques. 
                                                 
218
 O‘Steen is referring here to a system he invented for the film which allowed dialogue to overlap even when not 
spoken during the same camera take.  He invented a system of dubbing and coding the soundtrack with numbers to 
match the visual track‘s code numbers.  For his detailed explanation, see p. 44. 
219
 O‘Steen went on to collaborate with Nichols‘ on ten films, including The Graduate, Carnal Knowledge, and 
Catch-22.  He also edited for directors such as Sidney Lumet, Alan Pakula, and Roman Polanski, including both 
Rosemary’s Baby (1968) and Chinatown (1974).  
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As we will see, the film‘s narrative consists of episodes in which George and Martha perform 
scenarios for their guests, Nick (George Segal) and Honey (Sandy Dennis), which they 
announces are ―games.‖  Thus, by ―improvised‖ I am not referring to a style of performance by 
Taylor or Burton, but to the activity of the characters.
220
   
 As I see it, it is no stretch to imagine the intellectual Albee connecting the most 
significant and exciting philosophical and theatrical developments of his day.  We know now 
that Nichols and May‘s rise to fame brought attention to improvisational performance technique, 
and how its unscripted use of language created theatrical language which, in performance, 
functioned as both fiction and spontaneous communication.
221
  J. L. Austin‘s How to Do Things 
With Words was published in 1962, the same year the play appeared.  In his analysis of the play‘s 
production history, Stephen Bottoms also observes a consonance with Austin‘s philosophy of 
performatives, and argues that Virginia Woolf is ―all about performance and performativity‖ 
(5).
222
  He believes that Albee ―plays havoc with the conventional assumption that realistic 
dramaturgy operates to reveal the ‗truth‘ of the situation depicted and of the characters‘ 
motivations.  Instead, he refocuses attention on the impact of performative interaction‖ (6).  
Bottoms successfully argues that this play, more than most, depends upon its performance.  His 
conclusion is relevant to my reading here, as it focuses on the force of performance, emphasizing 
the way meanings of this piece are contingent upon the performance of words by the actors and 
the characters—nowhere more stable than in recorded language.  
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 In choosing to describe the ways George and Martha perform games, and how they use language, I am foregoing 
the space necessary to detail the many jokes and layers of humor suffusing the film.  It is worth nothing, though, that 
one of the consistencies between Henri Bergson‘s and Sigmund Freud‘s theories of comedy is that to tell a joke is to 
create a stage. 
221
 I do not mean to suggest that scripted dialogue is uncommunicative, but, to remind ourselves that improvised 
language is more communicative to performers, who must listen and respond to what has just been said in a different 
way than when they ―know‖ their scripted lines.  
222
 Bottoms also writes that the play ―owes a great deal‖ to the influence of writers like Pirandello, Genet, and 
Beckett (6).  In 1967, Richard Rorty grouped, and named, key developments in Anglo-American philosophical 
thought in his seminal collection, The Linguistic Turn, one year after the film premiered.  
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Marriage Games 
As the film begins, we watch a couple stumbling away from a party; she laughs loudly 
and he whispers that it is rude to laugh at two a.m.  They arrive home where she begins moving 
about tidying and turning on lights, setting the stage.  She speaks the first really audible lines of 
the film, which are, not coincidentally, from another film: Beyond the Forest (King Vidor, 
1949).
223
  She—Martha—impeccably impersonates Bette Davis, spitting out ―What a dump!‖, 
before berating him—George—to tell her the name of the picture to which the line belongs.  
When he is not only unable to do so, but clearly uninterested, she starts in on his behavior during 
the evening: ―You didn‘t do anything. You never do anything! All you do is sit around and talk.‖  
Thus, the first real sign of conflict between the two hinges on the difference between doing and 
talking.  
 She then informs him that she has invited over guests, whom we later meet, Nick and 
Honey.  Already playing verbal games, George and Martha face each other and repeat the word 
―guests‖ five times, tossing it back and forth, as if warming up to play ball—and an iteration of 
Spolin‘s exercise-game ―Echo,‖ in which players repeat one word to each other multiple times.  
George asks Martha several times who this couple is that she has invited over (a couple her 
father, the president of the university, has told her to be nice to).  When he asks, he insistently 
refers to them in both the singular and the plural, a suggestion that George‘s attitude toward 
couples is confused and needs correcting.  Given that George has already been correcting 
Martha‘s grammar, and will continue to correct or comment on everyone‘s grammar—including 
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 In Beyond the Forest, Bette Davis plays a Madame Bovary-esque woman, sexually unsatisfied, bored in her rural 
setting, and married to a doctor.  The resonances between this character and Martha should become obvious 
throughout the chapter, but Martha‘s initial comments establish the connection: ―It‘s from some Bette Davis picture, 
some goddamn Warner Brothers epic [Virginia Woolf is also a Warner Brothers‘ production]… She wears a big 
fright wig all the time.‖  This is amusing and reflexive as Taylor is doing the same.  Martha continues her 
description: ―She‘s a housewife. She buys things… She‘s discontent.‖ 
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his own (―Good. Better. Best. Bested. How‘s that for a declension?‖), his confusion is no case of 
idiom.  Later, he mocks the social limits of what can and cannot be said, when Honey, unable to 
name the restroom, stammers ―Where is your, uh…,‖ George asks Martha to ―show Honey to 
the, uh, euphemism.‖  Martha, too, is especially attentive to language use; when George resorts 
to using clichés, she calls him a ―phrasemaker,‖ and ironically uses incorrect grammar when 
Nick insults her intelligence.   
 In the films‘ early moments, before the guests arrive and it becomes a chamber piece, we 
see George and Martha alone.  This will not happen again until the movie‘s end, after the guests 
leave hours later (screen time and story time are almost identical).  They are clearly out of sync, 
not able to play the same game at the same time.  They rapidly alternate personae, always 
performing some new self.  For example, she attempts to make him laugh with the joke-hit of the 
party, singing ―Who‘s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?‖224 (not, strangely, to the tune of ―Who‘s 
Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf?‖ but to ―Here We Go ‗Round the Mulberry Bush‖), but when he 
does not play along, she quickly turns angry.  She then tries seducing him, but he still refuses to 
play along.  She questions him, and he justifies declining to kiss her by pretending to be in 
danger of becoming so aroused that he would have to take her immediately, despite the guests‘ 
imminent arrival—which makes her laugh.  She begins to play along: ―Fix me another drink, 
lover;‖ but this time, he switches, snarling: ―My god, you can swill it down!‖  She does not react 
to this new attitude, but tries on yet another; talking in a baby voice, she mews, ―I‘m thirsty‖ 
                                                 
224
 The range of significations the name Virginia Woolf carries are surely important to consider, but is too large to 
consider here.  Suffice it to say that her place at the forefront of literary modernism, of writing stories which are, to a 
large degree, about their own language and its limits is particularly salient, as is her (often skeptical) exploration of 
the depiction of characters‘ psychologies in, and through, language.  Matthew Roudané explores these connections 
in ―Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?: Toward the Marrow.‖  
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before turning again to declare, ―Look, sweetheart, I can drink you under any goddamn table you 
want.‖225   
It is in this way that the pair seems never to quite be able to be in compatible characters 
(or moods) at the same time: to be performing in the same scene—the radical changes in voice 
prosody suggest that they are aware of their changes in self-presentation.  They must learn to 
return ―the ball‖ 226 thrown to them, rather than pocket it and return another.  Martha often 
expresses her frustration at George‘s failure to interact by yelling things like ―I swear; if you 
existed I‘d divorce you.‖ And, when describing their son, they disagree over the color of his 
eyes; each refusing to let the other carry on with the game.  It is a clearly failed improvisation; 
each is not returning the ball; both initiate.  
They both know, as we do, that they will be improvising for the guests, and George 
establishes one rule, the rule that becomes the overarching narrative‘s catalyst: ―Just don‘t start 
in on the bit about the kid.‖  While such an ambiguous imperative does not actually inform the 
spectator that the child about whom they will speak to Nick and Honey is fictional (a second-
order fiction, for the spectator), it is a pretty strong clue.  Tellingly, she reacts angrily, 
questioning ―The bit?! What bit?‖, and asserts: ―I‘ll talk about any goddamn thing I want to.‖  
Now speaking has become an act of rebellion (either refusing to remain silent on a taboo subject 
or by refusing the improvisation topic he begins), blurring her earlier distinction between 
speaking and doing.   
 As the couples sit down with drinks, language is the topic of conversation.  George states 
that ―Martha is a devil with language‖ and mocks Nick‘s pedantic attempt to talk about painting.  
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 There was much public speculation that George and Martha provided insight into Taylor and Burton‘s marriage, 
which had a reputation for being filled with fights and booze.  As we will see, this attention echoes the text‘s 
preoccupation with an inability to distinguish ―truth‖ and ―illusion.‖ 
226
 The ―ball‖ is Spolin‘s term for the focus that is shared between improvisational players; that which they exchange 
and which, by exchanging, create a performance. See my discussion in the previous chapter.  
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At key points, we see Nick and Honey from Martha‘s perspective in a two shot that is also a 
close-up; their faces are perceived together, within one frame, heightening our impression of 
them as a unit, a couple.
227
  Despite that, she tries to seduce Nick, compelling George to take out 
a fake gun (it shoots out an umbrella) and frighten the other three (who believe he is going to kill 
her).  Having succeeded in getting a rise out of George, Martha kisses him and puts his hand on 
her breast, at which point, he jerks away: ―Ah, that‘s what you‘re after! Blue games for the 
guests!‖  By naming this game (this activity as a game), George draws our attention to the sexual 
content of their improvisations, exposing the performance as a performance for Nick and Honey, 
and so, undermining its force.  Martha resentfully turns her attention back to flirting with Nick, 
ridiculing George by saying that Nick ―doesn‘t need any props.‖   
Martha decides to change into something more comfortable, and takes Honey upstairs, 
leaving the men together.  George verbally goads and traps Nick, who is generally inarticulate.  
George assures him that he and Martha are ―just walking what‘s left of [their] wits,‖ and we, for 
the first time, sense that George is enjoying himself.  George asks a series of questions that 
indicate his distaste for Nick personally and professionally, but all the while, is indirectly (if 
cryptically) schooling him on marriage: ―Yes, well, if you were married to my Martha you would 
know what it means.‖  Although Nick is confused, George‘s advice is sound: existing between 
two people, marriages have meanings which are only understood from within that interpersonal 
space.   
 Nichols cuts to a shot of Honey on the stairs, overhearing the men‘s discussion of their 
marriages, breathing heavily as if waiting in anticipation of her cue to enter, which she then does.  
It transpires that Martha has indeed told Honey about ―the kid,‖ before Martha herself appears, 
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 Deep focus shots are frequently used so that their faces can be clearly seen together, and hand-held cameras 
ensure the characters‘ faces remain central to the frame, even as they move.   
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framing herself in the doorway in a considerably more revealing outfit, signaling to George she 
is prepared to begin her game of seducing Nick.    
 Critics have understood George and Martha‘s interactions as a series of dissemblings, 
manipulations, or passive-aggressive efforts to veil the truth.  They accuse the characters of 
speaking without saying what they mean, which places the spectator in a bit of a pickle (though a 
fun pickle) as to what can be treated as diegetic ―fact.‖  One thing that is typically the case in 
Hollywood character-driven fiction, though, is that characters must mean what they say; different 
words would mean a different text.  I am not denying the importance of subtext and implication, 
only that we must remember the characters mean that, too.  It is part of how we understand 
dialogue; we understand it to be like our ordinary language, which also implies things.  Critics 
are right that the information we hear about George and Martha‘s past is never trustworthy (this 
is information we need in order to estimate whether the actions we see on this night are unusual, 
and to predict what might happen after the end, and thus to genrify it).   
 In this way, Virginia Woolf calls our attention to the fact that the aural frame of a 
character often appears less clear than the visual one; as spectators, we cannot disregard 
implication, reference, intonation, cadence, etc. as part of what is represented.  Like Nichols and 
May‘s improvised dialogue, Virginia Woolf‘s functions as genuine communication between the 
characters (they respond—emotionally, rhetorically, etc.—to what was just said) and fictional 
(for the characters, and a second-order fiction for the spectator).  For example, we will never 
know how angry Martha is over George‘s career path, or whether or not George killed his 
parents.  One can accept these stories.  George drunkenly tells Nick (with whom he has done 
nothing but toy) a tale of a boy he once knew who shot his mother, and who did not know the 
word bourbon and mistakenly ordered ―bergin,‖ which caused him further humiliation and to 
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drive home drunk, killing his father.
228
  Later, Martha, still in the context of a game-fight, seems 
to know this story, as she claims it was part of a novel he once wrote, a novel which he claimed 
to have been based on himself.  Such corroborations do strengthen the impression of diegetic 
facts existing, however I do not believe the spectator is justified in concluding it must be so.  As 
Martha tells of George‘s novel, George‘s anger hints that his novel was, like most fiction, a 
mixture of truth and invention.  Nevertheless, he screams, ―The game is over!‖, confronting the 
spectator with the notion that this, too, might just be an improvisation.  He reinforces this by 
going on to ask what they will do next, for ―[they‘ve] got to have a game‖:  
Now that we‘re through with Humiliate the Host, for this round anyway, and we don‘t 
want to play Hump the Hostess yet … How about a little round of Get the Guests? ...  
How are we going to play Get the Guests? … Ah, yes.  Martha in her indiscreet way, told 
you all about my first novel—true or false that there ever was such a thing...I preferred 
she hadn‘t, but that‘s blood under the bridge.  But what Martha didn‘t do, didn‘t tell you, 
what Martha didn‘t tell us all about was my second novel. No, Martha. you didn‘t know 
about that. True or False? True or False? 
 
 George proceeds to describe a novel which bastardizes particulars Nick earlier gave George, 
exposing Nick‘s motivation for marrying Honey (her money and hysterical pregnancy).  Other 
similar games tell of Martha sexually abusing their son, and of their son running away—events 
we later come to know did not occur (except as fiction to these characters, second-order fiction 
for the spectator).  A real improvisation requires invention; it is fictional, not autobiographical (at 
least, not explicitly so).   
In the following scene, alone in a diner‘s empty parking lot, Martha and George act out a 
fight that appears to be a turning point in their marriage—though the heightened and abstract 
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 This story ends with the boy not having spoken for thirty years, which, if George is telling a story about his own 
life, suggests much about his desires.  George tells this story as a tragedy, so while a spectator might assume George 
must long for silence after living with Martha, this story begs to differ.  George‘s vocation as professor of history 
resonates with his understanding of telling stories: that how what is said matters, that what gets said matters, and that 
truth and falsity are constructed.  This could also be a reason he is, to Martha‘s unending dismay, ―in the history 
department‖ as opposed to ―being the history department‖ which might suggest a paradigmatic approach to 
historicizing).  
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quality of the exchange makes it easily interpretable as a dramatic (and still cathartic) 
improvisation game.  Martha protests that George has gone too far playing ―Get the Guests.‖  
When he violently defends himself, she exclaims, ―Boy, you really are having a field day!‖  
When he professes to be tired of the games, she reminds him: ―You married me for it!‖  George 
retorts: ―You‘ve moved bag and baggage into your own fantasy world.‖  This is the last straw for 
Martha, who claims something has ―snapped‖ and that she is done trying to communicate, to 
―get through.‖  Her problem is that he‘s not up to the challenge, not up to improvising with her: 
―You can‘t come together with nothing, and you‘re nothing. I looked at you tonight and you 
weren‘t there.‖  He is not present in the moment with her.  The couple declares ―total war,‖ a 
case of doing with words whereby the uttering is to perform an action.  It is tempting read this 
scene as a sincere comment on the evening‘s games going too far (and so, as the revelation of the 
characters‘ ―true‖ feelings), rather than a game about games; but, in this film, we should resist 
such an easy route.  
Since all utterances within an improvisation game are performatives in an Austinian 
sense (they do something and obligate the other), deploying one of Austin‘s canonical examples 
of a performative—declaring war—within the context of a game is a further reflexive device.229  
We are reminded that, in improvisations, utterances function as ―real‖ actions for the performers 
(that is, unscripted, more communicative) and as fictional utterances.  They function both as 
narrative actions within the game (here, the game/fight), and as actions constituting the game; 
they demand one return the ball by responding appropriately (there is also, of course, our 
perception of Taylor‘s and Burton‘s actions).  It is this utterance which precipitates the final 
                                                 
229
 As I mentioned earlier, I do not mean to deny that all utterances are actions of some kind; many kinds do things, 
from conveying basic information to (as we saw in chapter one) meaningful silences.  I would be warranted to 
expect a response from these types of utterances.  Austin, though, succeeds in delineating a privileged class of 
action-utterances where uttering particular words in felicitous contexts is to perform a certain action; he describes 
cases wherein it is necessary to have uttered in order to qualify as having performed the action.  
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events of the film.  Martha goes home to bed Nick, and George formulates a plan to ―kill‖ their 
son.  Underneath the malicious performances with which these acts are committed, we see that 
George enters into the realm of illusion and Martha leaves it; each does what the other has asked 
of them when they established the parameters of the game.   
Martha is a woman sexually and intellectually frustrated; after Nick fails to satisfy her in 
bed, she speaks to him as representative of all men: ―I am the earth mother, and you are all 
flops.‖  George is the ―one man in [her] whole life who has made her happy.‖  Notably, as she 
says this, Martha seems to drop the mask and describe her ―true‖ feelings for George, how she 
wishes to punish him for making the ―mistake‖ of loving her.  Here, and for the only time, her 
back is turned to Nick and her face obscured for us by a screen door, which, in the logic of this 
film, signals sincerity.  At Nick‘s surprise, she asks ―Do you always deal in appearances?‖  She 
explains her love for the one ―[w]ho can keep learning the games as quickly as I can change 
them.‖  But her anger at the world turns to self-loathing and manifests itself in her desire to 
punish George for loving her.  It suggests she wants him to end a game—but of course, that 
would be the end of their marriage.  Their marriage is constituted by, as she reflects on it, their 
mutual and relentless game-playing.    
George enters the scene to woo Martha back from Nick, and is delighted to learn that 
Martha and Nick‘s game of ―Hump the Hostess‖ went unconsummated.230  Martha and George 
now share a contempt for Nick that unites them; Nick becomes their shared ―theater problem,‖ 
and they proceed to assault him.  He retaliates, saying, ―Hell, I don‘t know when you people are 
lying or what.‖  Martha retorts: ―You‘re damn right,‖ and now, for the first time, we see Martha 
and George in a two shot, close-up.  Things quickly turn again when Nick begs Martha to say he 
                                                 
230
 We may remember, too, that Martha did not plan to sleep with Nick from the beginning.  Else why would she 
hide so many clothes under the covers when preparing for the guests arrival?  This bit of business is neglected by 
critics who vilify her actions as thoroughly premeditated.  
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was not a failure in bed; and because she takes pity on him and says he was not, George riles up 
and declares the need for one last game, one he names ―Bringing Up Baby.‖  She protests: ―No 
more games. It‘s games I don‘t want.‖  He gets her agitated until she screams ―What do you 
want?‖ He replies, ―An equal battle, that‘s all.‖ She promises he will get it.   
The spectator saw that earlier, while George (mistakenly) believed Martha to be having 
sex with Nick, he devised a plan: to inform her that a telegram arrived announcing the death of 
their son.  He even began rehearsing breaking the news to Martha.  Hence, this final 
improvisation differs from previous games by becoming a scene.
231
  By this point, we know that 
she must know the last performance will involve the son—that with which George has been most 
concerned all evening.  He began this game at the start of the night when he told her not to say 
anything ―about the kid.‖  Of course, she did mention the child to the guests, and has presumably 
been waiting for the ball to return on this game all evening.  George wins Martha back from Nick 
by, finally, encouraging them to improvise together.  Their performance, which features the 
longest stretch of overlapping dialogue, involves Martha reminiscing about their son—from birth 
to death—while George reads a requiem in Latin.232  When he interrupts her to deliver his news 
about the telegram; his utterance ―kills‖ the child, and she commences to histrionic grieving.   
There are, as I see it, two principal—and irresolvable—ways of interpreting the major 
improvisational game: either the son is an ongoing, private improvisation or he is the invention 
of this evening.
233
  As Martha collapses in grief, Virginia Woolf both literalizes and inverts 
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 Spolin differentiates ―games,‖ which are exercises in reacting spontaneously from ―scenes.‖  A scene is typically 
divined through game-playing, but, more importantly, follows a planned narrative arc.   
232
 This Catholic ritual takes on added significance when we consider the off-screen celebrity of Taylor, who 
famously converted to Judaism before her marriage to Eddie Fisher and who played the Jewish character Rebecca in 
Ivanhoe (Robert Thorpe, 1952). 
233
 Interestingly, in the scholarship I have read on the play (there is no major analysis of the film), no critic considers 
the possibility that the son is a new game; all agree that he must have, as Martha says, ―been born on a night like 
this‖ some 16 years earlier. However, I see no reason that this information is more reliable than any other.  This 
reading is tempting because of Martha‘s reaction to George‘s ―killing‖ the son.  She says, ―You can‘t do that,‖ as if 
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Aristotle‘s description of the cathartic moment as one of emergent knowledge; unlike the 
traditional model where the revelation of information leads to a character‘s (and spectator‘s) 
emotional purging, it is through Martha‘s emotional expression that Nick (and the spectator) 
realizes the true nature of the son‘s inexistence.  According to Bottoms, Albee has said the play 
was written in response to Eugene O‘Neill‘s The Iceman Cometh, combating its notion that 
people ―hide behind false illusions because the truth (if it is knowable at all) is too often painful 
to bear,‖ which has led critics to take Virginia Woolf as an inversion of this dichotomy (12).  
While such a view is tempting, it would be just as incorrect to say that the characters arrive at 
truth in the end; this would require believing information given through games to be factual.  For 
the spectator, the child becomes a metaphor for the space created between George and Martha in 
their games; it is that space that makes a claim on us to interpret, and, by naming it, as their 
progeny, forces us to consider the function of the activity of game-playing as an object (both 
intra-couple and inter-couple).   
 When George gave the rules to ―Bringing Up Baby,‖ it was in the form of a question: 
―Truth and illusion: who knows the difference, eh?‖  ―Bringing Up Baby‖ directly confronts the 
spectator with the unreliability of the referents of characters‘ language.   Discarding the binary of 
true and false (a key accomplishment of Austin‘s treatment of performatives) highlights the 
performative aspect of the utterance in terms of how it is made, its intonation, and its 
interpersonal context.  The spectator knows the words are, in some sense, without referent; for 
example, we know that Martha is ―improvising‖ (or at least lying) as she tearfully describes her 
son, but that doesn‘t make her emotion (or the spectator‘s empathic one) any less sincere.  Still, 
we cannot say that the child is wholly without referent either.  If we take the view that the child 
                                                                                                                                                             
breaking character within ―Bringing Up Baby.‖  However, given the pattern of improvisations within 
improvisations, and the melodramatic nature of this scene, I am unconvinced we can accept any utterance as ―true.‖   
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has existed as a private game for some time, then while we undergo the epiphany that the child 
has never physically existed in George and Martha‘s world, the intensity of her performance of 
grief prevents us from writing the child off as ―just‖ fake or imaginary.  He was, perhaps, all too 
real to the couple.  Her grief is then both seemly and unnecessary.  And even if the child is just 
the major game for the evening, her performance is not about the ―truthfulness‖ of her feelings, 
but a response that is called for by George‘s action; she is returning the ball, playing the scene.234      
Nick sighs, ―I think I understand this.‖ He tells us (and himself) that he has finally 
learned to speak George and Martha‘s language (otherwise, why else would he have not left 
earlier?), and so, he and Honey leave unceremoniously.  George and Martha are left on their own 
again, but before they ―climb those well-worn stairs,‖ George stands by Martha at the window as 
the sun rises outside (which is implicitly juxtaposed with the shot of the moon that opens the 
film).  Martha, still sad, asks if George ―had to [kill the son],‖ and he says ―Yes. It was time… It 
will be better. It will be. Maybe.‖ To cheer her up, George sings ―Who‘s Afraid of Virginia 
Woolf?‖, and Martha admits ―I am.‖  What Martha owns as her fear is the anxiety of not 
knowing what the next improvisation will be.  If ―the bit about the kid‖ has been their private 
game for many years, then her fear of the future, of not knowing what game will come next is 
well founded (they cannot do without games altogether).  Whether the son has existed between 
them for years or for hours, he was a bond; he occupied that interpersonal space, the space of a 
game between performers.  Martha puts George‘s earlier game as a question to him in the final 
moments of the film: ―Truth and illusion, George, you don‘t know the difference?‖  This time, he 
replies, ―No, but we must carry on as though we did.‖  Unlike the critics who see the ending as 
                                                 
234
 If we take a third view and are convinced by Martha‘s performance that her grief is sincere beyond the game of 
―Bringing Up Baby,‖ then we must also believe that she has gone mad and has confused her role and self.  In a way, 
by bringing actor and role closer (unmediated by a script) this is precisely the sort of confusion that improvisational 
performance invites, and which Virginia Woolf asks us to consider. 
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the revelation of the ―truth‖ regarding the child which leaves George and Martha to face a new 
chapter in their lives, seeing the narrative as a consistent series of games suggests that Martha 
and George end up at the end of the evening, in the morning, in the state of not-knowing that is 
the condition necessary to beginning any improvisation.  Rather than deciding on truth or 
illusion, their marriage is founded on the middle ground, on skepticism.  The next day will bring 
new improvisations.
235
    
 
Bringing Up Bringing Up Baby 
In a film this self-conscious about performance and film history, I take the name of 
George and Martha‘s final act, ―Bringing Up Baby,‖ to be highly significant.  It is the title of 
Howard Hawks‘ 1938 classic starring Katherine Hepburn and Cary Grant.236  It was also the film 
that first guided Stanley Cavell to formulate the genre he calls the ―comedy of remarriage,‖ 
consisting of such films as It Happened One Night (Frank Capra, 1934), His Girl Friday 
(Howard Hawks, 1940), Adam’s Rib (George Cukor, 1949), and The Philadelphia Story (George 
Cukor, 1940).  His analysis of Bringing Up Baby concludes that ―the right to happiness, pictured 
as the legitimacy of marriage, is a topic that our nation wished to turn to as Hollywood learned to 
speak—as though our publicly declared right to pursue happiness was not self-evident after all‖ 
(my emphasis, 132).  In these films, ―the central pair are learning to speak the same language,‖ 
Cavell writes; ―talking together is fully and plainly being together‖ (88).  We have seen that 
George and Martha‘s marriage is essentially about talking, about learning to play the same 
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 The feeling of uncertainty infused in the final moments of the film is left with the spectator as the film features no 
end credits. 
236
 One inroad to interpreting Virginia Woolf might be to compare its framing by allusions to two of Hollywood‘s 
biggest stars.  Martha invokes Bette Davis; George invokes Katherine Hepburn.  One could argue that this suggests 
a move from the fiery, histrionic Davis, who excelled at a range of characters (often through remarkable changes in 
her outward appearance), to Hepburn‘s realistic style which achieved depth; she excelled at doing the actions of her 
characters as though they were her, not calling attention to her creations as performed.  
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talking game (so often the source of Nichols and May‘s material, remember).  Cavell writes that, 
in Bringing Up Baby, ―[t]he principals‘ actions consist of, or have the quality of, a series of 
games; the female of the pair likes the games whereas the male plays unwillingly; their behavior 
is a mystery to everyone around them‖ (111).  While the games in Virginia Woolf are of a more 
adult nature than in Bringing Up Baby, the ―baby‖ in each is allegorical. The protagonists of the 
latter film chase after a leopard named ―Baby,‖ the existence of which, for the bulk of the film, is 
a secret that exists between them (and which others doubt).  It bonds them, just as George and 
Martha‘s baby does. 
Bringing Up Baby requires that, by the end, the man, David (Cary Grant), like playing 
games with Susan (Katherine Hepburn)—and this, I believe, could also be said of George.237  He 
must, in Cavell‘s words about David, ―come to the essential insight about himself that he was 
having fun.  I would like to say that they achieve purposefulness without purpose.  It is because 
of this purity of action, I believe, that people sometimes find Bringing Up Baby the hardest of 
these films to take‖ (89).  I think we can best understand what Cavell means by a ―purer mode of 
acting‖ by looking at comments from his earlier work, Must We Mean What We Say; not 
coincidentally, they are thoughts on improvisation and comedy.  Cavell finds improvisation 
interesting in light of the fact that, while its content is not premeditated (except, perhaps, 
unconsciously), it predetermines the unexpected.  It turns the theme of tragedy (that our actions 
will have consequences beyond our intentions) into ―the comedy of making choices whose 
consequences we accept as the very embodiment of our will and sensibility although we cannot, 
in principle, see our responsibility in them‖ (196).  Cavell implies that spontaneous actions are 
less fully intended—which is pleasurable so long as everything turns out alright in the end.  
                                                 
237
 George is also the name of the dog with which Susan and David spend a great deal of time playing games; in fact, 
he is responsible for keeping the pair together when he buries archaeologist David‘s bone (which, in blatant double 
entendre, Susan helps him rediscover).  
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Cavell‘s interpretation echoes Spolin‘s desire for her games (which we examined in the previous 
chapter): their emphasis is to be on the process, not on indicating, but on individuals performing 
together unworried about the aim of the performance beyond its own doing. 
Again recalling Spolin‘s dictates which warn the improvisational actor to avoid 
premeditation in favor of seeking spontaneity, in his first book on cinema, The World Viewed, 
Cavell describes our pleasure in character-driven films in terms of how actions are represented in 
them, providing for the viewer fantasies of ―pure‖ action, of freedom from responsibility, 
accountability and mortality: ―To satisfy the wish to act without performing, to let our actions go 
out of our hands, we must be willing to allow the self to exhibit itself without the self‘s 
intervention.  The wish for total intelligibility is a terrible one. It means that we are willing to 
reveal ourselves through the self‘s betrayal of self‖ (World Viewed, 159).  Virginia Woolf clearly 
moves away from Bringing Up Baby‘s light-hearted games towards an intellectual playfulness.  
The New York Times review called Nichols‘ Virginia Woolf ―the drama of a marriage flooded 
with more consciousness than the human psyche is at present able to bear.  George and Martha‘s 
world is too much with them, their selves are much too clear. It is the price to be paid for living 
in a cosmos of increasing clarity—which includes a clearer view of inevitable futilities‖ (1).  The 
wider cultural reception of Virginia Woolf took the film itself to also be about a failure to come 
to terms with its own implicit content. 
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Virginia Woolf as a Closet Case  
Both the play and film of Virginia Woolf sparked much attention for what were perceived 
as gender crimes and/or homosexual sympathies.
238
  Bottoms tells of an alarming trend in the 
critical reception of the original stage production.  Many critics saw the play as being ―for dirty-
minded females only‖ (101). One reviewer wrote:  
While I cringed and shuddered at the most soiled and fruitiest language I have yet heard 
on a stage, the house was echoing with the shrieks and guffaws of the ―ladies.‖ They 
made such a racket I never did hear any men; perhaps the other men, like myself, were 
more embarrassed than amused and therefore kept quiet… Ladies you may have it. 
Whoop, holler, squeal, yip, shriek and gasp deliciously to the content of your dear little 
hearts. (100)
239
 
   
Addressing critics who find Albee misogynist, John Clum reasons that Albee writes ―more about 
lack of, or loss of, desire than sex… [He] sympathizes with his strong women who are failed by 
the men they married‖ (59).  In the film, Taylor‘s Martha is certainly strong, though some of her 
best lines were removed, including Nichols‘ favorite: ―ABSTRUSE! In the sense of recondite! 
Don‘t you tell me words!‖ (DVD Commentary).  Since the play runs over three hours, there was 
considerable pressure to shorten its duration, but this change could also be seen as a misogynistic 
move to lower Martha‘s intelligence level.  It also makes the story fit in line with the tradition of 
the comedies of remarriage in which the male ―educates‖ the female.   
                                                 
238
 Albee‘s play was voted winner of the Pulitzer Prize for Drama until the board at Columbia University rescinded 
the jury‘s decision.  Ostensibly, their complaint was the play‘s shocking language, but it was widely understood to 
be a homophobic gesture against the play and playwright. 
239
 Sarah Kozloff argues that ―Films that are ‗talky‘ come with the connotations ‗trivial‘ and ‗idle‘ and, ultimately 
‗female.‘  Visual images and physical activity, which in the history of cinema came first (as Adam preceded Eve), 
are associated with masculinity and ‗naturally‘ given precedence‖ (13).  She also points out that directors who used 
literate scripts (e.g., George Cukor, William Wyler, Joseph Mankiewicz) ―have historically been 
underappreciated‖—presumably as ―theatrical‖ or not properly cinematic (14).  In ―Theatre and Film‖ (1969), Susan 
Sontag allows a slightly different perspective.  She believes that ―films with complex or formal dialogue, films in 
which the camera is static or in which the action stays indoors, are not necessarily theatrical—whether derived from 
plays or not‖ (106); we can suppose that after all the prejudice against film dialogue in its early decades, by 1966, a 
verbose script was respectably avant garde. 
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 The play even inspired Howard Taubman‘s 1963 homophobic ―primer‖ on how to detect 
dramas that are ―really‖ about homosexuals (Clum, 142).  Nichols spoke out against the frantic 
American attention to the issue of homosexuality in 1966.
240
  He spoke out, too, against those 
who saw Virginia Woolf as a closeted story about unhappy homosexuals because the couple 
appears to be unable to have a child (if the spectator takes the improvisation as truth), and 
because the dialogue is bitchy and witty.
241
  Mark Harris writes of an essay published in Time 
magazine (which used the word fag liberally in its film reviews) that same year which  
 spoke for and to much of America when it called homosexuality ‗a pathetic little second-
 rate substitute for reality, a pitiable flight from life… it deserves no encouragement, no 
 glamorization, no rationalization, no fake status as minority martyrdom, no sophistry 
 about simple differences in taste—and above all, no pretense as anything but a pernicious 
 sickness. (208)  
 
The next year, Mike Wallace‘s documentary The Homosexuals (1967) appeared on CBS, the first 
network program on the topic.  In it, Wallace assures the viewer that ―[t]he average homosexual, 
if there be such, is promiscuous. He is not interested in or capable of a lasting relationship like 
that of a heterosexual marriage.‖  Looking back, it would seem that, in the context of the 1960s, 
Virginia Woolf reflects a lack of confidence or satisfaction in institutional regulations of 
coupledom.   
The fact that so many saw the film (and play) as really about homosexuals is, of course, 
more revealing of their beliefs than Albee‘s or Nichols‘.  Clearly, a couple performing a 
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 In 1966, Nichols said that he was tired of homosexuality being an issue (Playboy).  Still, in 1976, in the ―Rites of 
Friendship‖ episode of Family (which Nichols produced), the titular family‘s mother says she neither knows a gay 
person nor has ever thought about the issue.  It transpires that the son‘s best friend comes out after he is arrested 
when a gay bar is ―busted.‖  That it remained illegal for homosexuals to congregate suggests the distance between a 
liberal view and the nation‘s praxis—a problem all too entrenched in the study of cinema and academics.  The gay 
character wins the mother‘s tolerance after giving a teary speech explaining that he is still the same person, indeed, 
still a person, explaining that he is ―still allergic to strawberries, still able to sing harmony,‖ etc.  
241
 Tellingly, screenwriter Errnest Lehman refused to consider Bette Davis for the role of Martha (Albee‘s choice) 
because she was known as a gay icon—perhaps a case of protesting too much (Bottoms, 104).  Bottoms points out 
that casting the most famous married couple in the world emphasized George and Martha‘s heterosexuality.  
Nichols‘ cinematic idol, Ingmar Bergman, attempted to produce an all-male version for the European premiere in 
1963.  For more concerning Virginia Woolf‘s reception as homosexually-themed, see Bottoms and Clum. 
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marriage must be homosexual, else why the need for all this hoopla and innuendo, double 
entendre and indirectness?  What must a couple be that desires acknowledgment as a couple 
from another couple?  Nichols claimed that if he had wanted to make a film about homosexuals 
he would have done so.
242
  He did do so thirty years later.   
 
Out of the Closet and into The Birdcage 
The film announced as Nichols and May‘s reunion, Birdcage, is the story of three 
couples: a gay couple whose son wants to marry the daughter of parents whose religious and 
political views condemn homosexuality.
243
  In Northrop Frye‘s description of the paradigmatic 
comedy, a young man seeks to win or wed (whichever comes first) a young woman, and must 
overcome the obstacles posed by the fathers in order to do so.
244
  Birdcage disturbs this model by 
displacing the problem needing resolution onto the stability the traditional comedy assumes prior 
to beginning; since one elder married couple (necessarily heterosexual) does not acknowledge 
the validity of the other couple as a couple, the gay individuals must overcome the daughter‘s 
parents disapproval to prove their status as a couple.   
While the film still concludes happily with the wedding of the young lovers (who are 
marginalized throughout), it is the narrative‘s juxtaposition of elder couples that is the focus of 
the ceremony, and which functions rhetorically to comment on the situation of gay male 
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 Nichols and May performed a scene in which a man sought to plan his male partner‘s funeral on television and in 
Chicago.  Nichols recalls that, ―they said that if we ever did it again, they‘d close the club and throw us out‖ (Sweet, 
82). 
243
 It is difficult to overstate the extent to which The Birdcage was groundbreaking; it demonstrated money could be 
made with sympathetic and comedic gay figures and precipitated the coming out of Ellen DeGeneres, and her 
character, a year later. 
244
 In ―Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child: Comedy and Matricide,‖ Lucy Fischer examines theories of 
comedy, including Frye‘s, which draw on texts with problematic gender politics in order to formulate theories which 
often perpetuate those politics, at least by implication.  
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Americans in the 1990s.
245
   The early 1990s was the period in which the mainstream media 
attended to the issue of gay marriage for the first time, and, predictably, the steadily increasing 
visibility of homosexual couples—and the placing of gay marriage atop the agenda of desired 
rights—impacted cinematic representations of heterosexual marriage.246    
If Nichols was timely with Virginia Woolf in 1966, he was even more contemporary in 
1996.  In the same year of the film‘s release (and reflecting the very real threat homosexuals 
posed to a traditional definition of marriage), the federal government passed the first 
Constitutional amendment to remove rights since Prohibition by enacting the ―Defense of 
Marriage Act‖ (a measure which denied the possibility of the recognition of legal marriages 
between same-sex partners).
247
  At the time, no state had legalized gay marriage, which was cast 
as a religious and moral issue in the media.  The political right prophesied that its legalization 
would spell doom for the nation by fundamentally undermining marriage and the formation of 
the family.  Since the issue was not simply one of a citizen‘s selfhood, but of a relationship 
between individuals (unlike the cases of race and sexual difference, one cannot be homosexual in 
isolation), this was not just another case of the personal as political (as was typically suggested 
by leftists placing it in a history of civil rights), but the interpersonal as political.  After DOMA, 
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 I am not unwittingly failing to include other alternate sexualities.  Over the century, self-identifying homosexuals 
were the most vocal proponents of the movement that led to demand same-sex marriage rights, just as 
homosexuality was the consistent target of conservative voices.  To speak of a broader queer movement would be in 
danger of skewing history. 
246
 The 1960s anxiety sparked by the perception of ―homosexuals‖ enjoying the bitterness of marriage in Virginia 
Woolf and the fights against gay marriage in the 1990s (both within the Birdcage and in its historical context) were 
less directed at homosexual behaviors than the notion of homosexual marriage—often regarded as a limit case of the 
wider cultural move that began in the 1960s away from institutionalized marriage as the only acceptable form of 
coupling.  It was not until 2003 that the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that laws banning sodomy were an 
unconstitutional violation of privacy.  See Wright Wexman, Steve Neale, and my own ―What a Difference a Gay 
Makes: Marriage in the 1990s Romantic Comedy‖ for more on how changes in courtship and coupling practices, 
such as cohabitation outside of marriage, affected cinematic representations of heterosexual romantic relationships. 
For more on American cultural attitudes towards homosexuals in the 1990s, see Dawidoff.   
247
 DoMA significantly curtailed the movement for marriage equality and recognition of gays and lesbians as a 
legitimate minority until the media profiled the murder of Matthew Shepard two years later.  
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the couple guarantees individual citizenship (particularly salient for a government built on 
granting individual rights).   
In this context Birdcage became the first gay-themed film to be a blockbuster hit,
248
 
marking the return of Nichols the social commentator who can also draw a crowd.  As we will 
see, the film has strong ties to Virginia Woolf, a connection reflected in Nichols‘ feelings about 
the film‘s success: ―My reaction, instantaneously, was, ‗Fuck you, bastards.  You thought I 
couldn‘t do this anymore.  Well, look at this!‖ (Nachman, 353).  As I wrote in the introduction, 
following Birdcage, we have the return of the stylish, elitist Nichols in the guise of films like Wit 
(2001), Angels in America (2003), and Closer (2004). 
 Birdcage is undeniably a farce (that classically underappreciated genre by cinema), a 
genre in which timing is crucial, and Birdcage comes complete with, among other things, 
mistaken identities, people getting caught in curtains, people failing to show up for occasions, 
and the wrong person showing up at the wrong time—who is, of course, really the right person at 
the right time.  But, like Virginia Woolf, Birdcage offers us only the semblance of spontaneity.  
Nonetheless it continues Nichols and May‘s history of fashioning comedy out of American 
attitudes toward Jewishness, gender, and taboo sexual themes: in this case, homosexuality.   
Unsurprisingly, improvisational performance is a major concern of the film at the level of both 
form and content.  Nichols has been open about his use of improvisation during rehearsal and 
filming, though, while shooting, he instituted the rule that ―the actors would do the written script 
[which included material improvised during rehearsals] until [he] was satisfied, and then they 
                                                 
248
 It earned $187 million worldwide and was the seventh highest grossing American film of 1996 (Shooting*, vi).  
This is notable, too, for the film was rated ‗R‘ despite having no violence and little strong language.  It is also worth 
noting that, true to Nichols‘ history, the performers of The Birdcage were more celebrated than its director.  It won 
the Outstanding Performance by a Cast award from the Screen Actor‘s Guild—its highest honor.  
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would get a chance to improvise it‖ (Shooting Script, xii).  Still, he confirms that the majority of 
some scenes in the finished product were improvised before the camera (xii).   
As we noted above, in a media based in reproduction, for an improvisational performance 
to be properly called improvisational, the spectator must somehow know that the events were 
unscripted.  In the theater, this knowledge is typically gained by telling the spectator it is 
improvised, and then allowing the spectator to witness the evolution of the scene on stage (and 
perhaps further evinced by inviting audience participation).  We might praise the filmmakers, 
then, for seamlessly integrating the scripted and unscripted.  Robin Williams and Nathan Lane 
were called upon to both improvise and to ―reinvent‖ the scripted moment to give us the 
impression of spontaneity.  Here, the actor works to create the illusion of spontaneity; it is the 
actor‘s tool, rather than just the unavoidable product of interacting with other actors.   
Birdcage opens with a helicopter shot swooping over the sea into Miami, positioning us 
to enact, via the camera, the archetypal immigrant‘s trip to America over water, particularly as, 
during the 1990s, Miami drew national attention to immigration.
249
  We arrive at the eponymous 
nightclub, owned by Armand Goldman (Robin Williams) and his partner, Albert (Nathan Lane).  
Following Nichols‘ habit of announcing his theme in the first aural images of a film,250 a troupe 
of drag queens performs to the anthem, ―We Are Family‖ as we tour the club with Armand in a 
long take (it‘s a busy night, enhanced by a table of Kennedys).  We then meet Albert in the 
throes of lovable diva mode, locked in his boudoir, undergoing what we suspect is a fairly 
routine breakdown.  Like Martha, Albert‘s first lines allude to a female character from cinema 
history, this time it is Moira Shearer‘s heroine in The Red Shoes (Michael Powell and Emeric 
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 Immigration to Miami was a high-profile issue and provoked several federal debates and policy changes, 
including the 1995 decision which stated that any Cuban immigrant who made it to shore in Miami could remain 
legally. 
250
 So far, we have seen this is the case with The Graduate, Carnal Knowledge, and will be the case in Postcards 
From the Edge (1990), and Angels in America (2003) in chapter six.  
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Pressburger, 1948).  He declaims: ―Victoria Page will not dance the dance of the red shoes 
tonight.‖  Professing to be unable to go on due to an assortment of grievances, we learn Albert‘s 
anxiety stems from the suspicion that Armand is stepping out during the evening‘s show.   
Like Anthony John (Ronald Coleman) in George Cukor‘s A Double Life (1947), Albert 
frequently confuses his offstage and onstage personae, referencing himself as female.
251
  In this 
way, Albert plays with ―truth and illusion‖ through Starrina, who is also a comic performer; she 
tells jokes and sings comic songs (written for the film by Stephen Sondheim).  His gender 
camping often takes the form of doting on the couple‘s Guatemalan houseboy, Agador Spartacus 
(Hank Azaria), and is reminiscent of the Jewish mothers in Nichols and May‘s sketches.  
Eventually, Albert agrees to go on as Starrina, which allows him to use the full range of 
expressivity afforded by the typical male voice, including those pitches culturally deemed 
―feminine.‖252  Onstage, his first duty is to welcome a (necessarily heterosexual) couple 
celebrating their fiftieth wedding anniversary.  (What better way could there be to reaffirm one‘s 
marriage than by going to a gay bar?)   
Backstage, or rather, upstairs at their home, Armand does appear to be having an affair.  
He meets a man, and pours him wine on their rooftop terrace, poolside.  We soon realize, 
however, that this man, Val (Dan Futterman), is Armand‘s son.  Knowing Albert ―would get 
hysterical,‖ Val asked to meet Armand alone to tell him that he wants to get married.253  The film 
cuts to Val‘s fiancée, Barbara (Calista Flockhart), breaking the news to her politically 
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 Nichols mentions this film when talking about a character overtaking an actor in 1978 (Sweet, 80).  
252
 Edmund Shaftesbury, in his seminal Lessons in the Art of Acting (1889) and Lessons in Voice Culture (1891), 
based his prescriptions for actors‘ vocalizations on his perception of cultural codes associated with the pitch of the 
voice; in particular, the lower pitches connote profundity.  While every voice can sound low in the context of that 
voice, since the male voice is typically able to achieve registers lower than females‘ we can surmise the implicit 
content here.   
253
 Having been raised by Albert and Armand—Val says ―I‘m the only guy in my fraternity who doesn‘t come from 
a broken home‖—it is strange that Val calls Armand ―Dad,‖ but Albert by his first name.  Or worse, when Albert 
has a cake made to celebrate Val‘s homecoming, he requests the icing inscription to refer to him as ―Auntie Albert.‖  
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conservative parents, Kevin and Louise Keeley (Gene Hackman and Dianne Wiest).  In true 
Nichols and May style, Mrs. Keeley‘s first question is ―who are his people?‖  Knowing that she 
cannot say that Val‘s parents are homosexual men—and that this is knowledge whose source the 
film need not explain—Barbara lies, saying that Val‘s farther is a ―cultural attaché,‖ which elicits 
an immediate response from her father: ―Not the ones who funded the Mapplethorpe exhibit!‖  
Kevin is a senator, a representative of the American people, and that this is his response signals 
that homophobia is the primary anxiety for this conservative family (and a preoccupation that 
saves Barbara from having to lie about Val and Armand‘s Jewish ethnicity), an impression 
reinforced when we discover that Kevin has founded the ―Coalition for Moral Order‖ with 
Senator Eli Jackson.   
We see one of Senator Keeley‘s television appearances.  He vociferously debates on the 
subject of same-sex marriage by exchanging platitudes with his opponent (again reminiscent of 
Nichols and May‘s comedy, e.g. ―Dr. Wasserman and Professor Cole‖), though neither 
ideologue allows the other to speak, and so, the show is simply cacophony.  Kevin and Louise 
watch from home.  She says, ―It‘s  a wonderful program,‖ and he agrees: ―[i]t‘s the most 
intelligent show on television.‖ After watching himself snarl phrases like ―Morality is political‖ 
as though they were self-explanatory, a phone call informs the Keeleys that Jackson has just been 
found dead in the bed of an underage African-American hooker.  This is an anti-conservative 
trifecta of sorts, given that the reputation of the conservative party in 1990s America was largely 
racist.
254
  Kevin yells, ―I‘m ruined,‖ and the couple begins a rant that paints them as hypocritical 
in light of the views regarding privacy and morality he advocated on television.    
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 This reputation was not unfounded.  The most senior conservative Senators, such as Strom Thurmond and Jesse 
Helms, were vocally racist.  For example, Thurmond opposed legalizing interracial marriage in his home state of 
South Carolina in 1998—another case of interpersonal politics, though marriages had long been performed between 
individuals of different races regardless of the lawbooks. 
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Louise figures that Barbara‘s wedding can repair the damage Jackson‘s scandal has done 
to her husband‘s career: ―A white wedding is family and morality and tradition!‖  She convinces 
Kevin by explaining that the event will be a contrast: ―It‘s love and optimism versus cynicism 
and sex!‖, parroting the social conservative saw that to be right and proper includes the refusal to 
be sexual.  So, with the farcical clash of cultures set, the Keeley family decides to meet their 
daughter‘s fiancé and family (whom they are told are heterosexual), leaving snowy New 
Hampshire for sunny Miami—where they are shocked by the sexually free and ethnically diverse 
population.   
 Meanwhile, Val has asked Armand to pass as straight, and, believing Albert‘s behavior 
so effete as to be unpassable, he requests Armand ship Albert off for a few days.  Despite 
Armand‘s initial refusal because he ―knows who [he is],‖ guilty over having given Val a difficult 
childhood by virtue of knowing who he is, he agrees. Albert soon realizes what is going on and, 
touchingly, hilariously, histrionically, exits.  Armand goes after him, and hatches a new plan: to 
present Albert as a straight uncle by relying on their performance-related skills. He says, ―Of 
course you can pass as an uncle.  You‘re a great performer.  I‘m a great director.‖   
The scenes that follow, until the dinner, are essentially versions of the basic ―How To‖ 
game which was a favorite of The Compass players.  Armand attempts to teach Albert ―how to 
act like a man‖: how to spread mustard like a man, how to walk like a man, how to shake hands 
like a man, etc.  Hence, Armand‘s direction of Albert is both inside and out, but always revolves 
around the Spolinian ideal of acting as doing; ―Uncle Al‖ will appear if Albert does things as a 
straight man does them.  But what is most interesting about these scenes is how often the pair 
(and Armand is doing some learning here, too) realize that in order to perform an action 
appropriately, they must learn to re-hear their own voices, to say something to themselves as 
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―men.‖  For instance, even if you pierce the toast spreading mustard, a ―man says to himself‖ that 
he ―can always get more toast.‖  In Making History Matter, Robert Dawidoff writes: ―It is 
necessary for the gay to imagine the society in relation to the self.  To be gay and to have the 
closet in you is to have to know more about society than society knows about itself‖ (85).  This 
has implications for language use as well; Dawidoff emphasizes that it is the performance of 
language that becomes paramount: ―The [American] homosexual had to discover that one‘s 
native language was not one‘s own.  It could not be trusted as an instrument of desire or assertion 
of self-definition… One had to rely on interpretation and tone; for gay people, inflection was 
required‖ (85).255 
 
Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner 
The film plays with an essentialist view of sexual orientation, and the sort of body 
language assumed to betray one‘s sexual identity.  Val and Armand deem Albert ―even more 
obvious‖ when he wears his conservative suit (albeit with magenta socks, for, as he explains, 
―one does want a hint of color‖).  Val threatens the tools of the performer‘s expressivity, as he 
orders Armand, also a performer attempting to pass in this case: ―Don‘t walk if you don‘t have 
to. Don‘t gesture! Don‘t talk… unless you have to.‖  But the characters‘ homosexuality is not an 
essential fact; after all, the premise of the film (a gay man having a son) results from Armand 
having slept with Katherine (Christine Baranski) (and the two flirt when we see them 
together).
256
  It is, though, offered as something that cannot avoid being acknowledged.  Like the 
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 Among others, Wylie Sypher sees the ―double occasion‖ of dual/incompatible meanings as fundamental to the 
nature of comedy.  This is a connection that strikes me as fruitful, but that space prohibits examining here. 
256
 The case can easily be made that the film suggests we think of the characters‘ sexuality as something else they 
perform, in common with Judith Butler‘s recommendation (she also relies on Austin‘s notion of performatives).  
 268 
nature of improvised performances for a spectator, gay identity exists as knowledge: it must be 
said.    
Aside from the efforts to make Albert passable, Val and Armand arrange for Val‘s 
biological mother, Katherine (whom Val has not seen in his twenty years), to participate, but 
when she is delayed Albert steps up as ―Mrs. Goldman‖—not knowing Val and Armand have 
decided to also pass as gentiles by adopting the sound-alike ―Coleman.‖  The Keeleys arrive in 
Miami, shocked at the scantily clad men and women populating its streets.  Kevin takes to 
Albert/Mrs. Coleman, objecting to Armand‘s attempts to quell the political topics before she can 
speak.  The humor here emerges because Kevin has been shutting Louise up all evening, 
reminiscent of Nichols‘ description of spectator‘s reactions to An Evening, where they failed to 
recognize themselves in the improvised types on stage.
257
   
 Albert wins Armand back, and thwarts him from performing marriage with Katherine, by 
posing as Mrs. Coleman.  Albert/Mrs. Coleman and Senator Keeley launch into a series of 
debates on contemporary social issues (prayer in schools, gays in the military, abortion, drugs, 
AIDS).  Albert/Mrs. Coleman espouses many attitudes, some even more damningly conservative 
than the Senator‘s, which prompts Val to explain the opinions of his ―mother‖ as satire in the 
tradition of Jonathan Swift—another reflexive remark in the context of this moment.258  The 
dinner scene also puts into relief the fact that, for actions to count as ―improvised,‖ they must be 
intentionally performed as such—a knowledge that the Keeleys cannot acquire and share with 
Armand and Albert until they are told.  Although the Keeleys participate in the conversation, 
presumably without planning what to say, it is Albert who is improvising.    
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 In his extemporizing, Albert/Mrs. Coleman claims to be from Grover‘s Corners, the setting of Thornton Wilder‘s 
classic American play Our Town, and which comments on the trenchant heteronormative trajectories toward 
marriage for American youths.  Wilder calls for a bare stage, and utilizes actor‘s mime techniques for a set, so, 
perhaps it, too, reminds us of An Evening.   
258
 May has expressed her admiration for Swift before, stating ―that‘s the way you have to go‖ (Rice, 67). 
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After disasters with the food and several near-outings, the group becomes a family 
(complete with singing around the piano), which is, of course, when Katherine arrives 
pronouncing herself Mrs. Goldman.  This forces Armand and Albert to come out of the closet.  
Albert de-wigs and Armand, who has been angry and distressed by Albert‘s performance as Mrs. 
Coleman, now lays claim to him (albeit in objectionably gendered terms): ―This is my wife.‖  
Albert‘s convincing spontaneous performance as Mrs. Coleman perfectly demonstrates his 
insight into heterosexual conventions, especially linguistic ones (since his costume is relatively 
unconvincing—his wig even goes askew at one point; it is Mrs. Coleman‘s talking that matters).  
At first, Mr. Keeley is too preoccupied with the revelation of their Jewishness to comprehend 
that they are also both men, comically protracting the moment of realization that their statement 
has made a claim on him to respond.   
The Keeleys attempt to flee, but the paparazzi, pursuing the Jackson story, have found 
them.  They want nothing less than to compound the scandal by being seen exiting the home of 
homosexuals.  So, Albert and Armand dress the Keeleys up as drag queens, ensuring their safe 
passage out of iniquity.   The Keeleys immediately perform characters suitable to their drag 
personae, and even improvise with patrons of The Birdcage as they sneak out.  Albert and 
Armand teach the Keeleys to go into the closet, to pass, in order to negotiate a hostile society.  
Apparently, this lesson proves sufficient to change the Keeleys‘ minds about Armand and Albert, 
for Barbara and Val are wed in the next scene.  Although Barbara and Val stand up, it is really 
the two older couples that are ―joined together‖ in a ceremony led by both a priest and a rabbi.  
The visual rhetoric of having the two couples, one on each side of the aisle, demands the 
spectator consider what is denied the homosexual couple, and, juxtaposes with the earlier scene 
of the couple‘s legal union: sitting on a bench, by the sea, with no one around, they signed 
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palimony papers and held hands—a non-social event.  Yet, despite this moment, Armand still 
locks Albert away when the Keeleys arrive.  And while Albert says that he does not care about 
who owns what, he clearly cares about who Armand presents as his companion to other couples. 
Albert and Armand come to find out they are married because another couple comes to 
acknowledge them as such.  It is knowing the acknowledging gaze that repairs Albert and 
Armand‘s relationship.   
Birdcage climaxes with Albert and Armand‘s coming out, identifying themselves as 
homosexuals, demonstrating that—despite its seemingly constative nature—uttering this content 
in this context is an action.  Indeed, in the context of America in the 1990s, it is the social and 
political action.  But in order to end, the film also had to teach Kevin a lesson or two.  He had 
been marked as un-self-aware since he was unable to recognize his own language as stale and 
specious on television.  Because he is an American senator, elected by citizens such as Armand 
and Albert, this fault must be resolved.
259
  Dawidoff discusses the consistent intellectual history 
of American thinkers, from Ralph Waldo Emerson and Thomas Jefferson to Eleanor Roosevelt 
and Henry Adams, who advocated self-knowledge above all other values, who believed it 
―necessary to pursue one‘s individuality in a way that did not separate one from the common‖ 
and, indeed, that one owed it to one‘s self to better the world and to see others as one‘s self (17).  
In this sense, America‘s treatment of the act of coming out as homosexual (a proclamation of 
self-knowledge, which is regarded by others as an act of self-awareness, even self-discovery) is 
ironic; in this case, self-knowledge is dangerous.   
 
 
                                                 
259
 There is no shortage of potential living correlates for the character of Senator Keeley.  Perhaps most obviously, 
the Senate majority leader at the time, Trent Lott, reveled in declaiming homosexuality both a sin and an illness.  
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Comedies of Remarriage, Squared 
Like Nick and Honey, the Keeleys are not punished for their confusion or 
preconceptions.  The culprit is the social framework that demands secrecy and requires 
characters to perform.  And, like Virginia Woolf, Birdcage tells the story of a couple reunited 
through playing improvisational games, and I think we can profit from viewing it, too, in the 
tradition of Hollywood remarriage comedies.  Cavell makes the case that remarriage comedies 
are not only highly entertaining and much-loved classics of American cinema, but that they are 
thoughtful entries in the nation‘s intellectual history.  He labels these films comedies of 
remarriage, because the primary concern of each narrative is ―not to get the central pair together, 
but to get them back together, together again‖ (2).  This insight allows Cavell to engage the 
syntax of a genre, and argue that such works reveal anxiety about the state of marriage during 
decades of their production (the 1930s and 1940s) in which divorce posed a new, and real threat.  
One of the legacies of these films, for Cavell, is that they imagine marriage to be not simply 
synonymous with love, but with becoming human (a notion uttered explicitly by characters in 
several works in the genre).  He describes the protagonists‘ journey as  
the progress from narcissism
260
 and incestuous privacy to objectivity and the 
acknowledgment of otherness as the path and goal of human happiness; and since this 
happiness is expressed as marriage, we understand it as simultaneously an individual and 
a social achievement.  Or, rather, we understand it as the final condition for individual 
and for social happiness, namely the achieving of one‘s adult self and the creation of the 
social. (102) 
 
Cavell interprets marriage as the creator of the social and the mature individual, an institution 
which defines their relationship as intrinsically reciprocal.  
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 Interestingly, the films Cavell engages were produced as the sexual theories of Sigmund Freud were gaining 
popular ground in the United States.  Freud often described the roots of homosexual desire in narcissistic terms.  If 
Cavell‘s description of the social role of marriage is correct, this connection reinforces why homosexuals would 
necessarily be denied access to it. 
 272 
 Besides having this fundamental feature of remarriage comedies in common, I want to 
briefly describe other consistent aspects before addressing an important way Virginia Woolf and 
Birdcage differ from the classic members of the genre.  Since the men in remarriage comedies 
tend to instruct and guide the women toward the ―right‖ romantic partner (typically himself), 
Cavell argues that, ―an essential goal of the narrative is the education of the woman, where her 
education turns out to mean her acknowledgment of her desire, and this in turn will be conceived 
of as her creation, her emergence, at any rate, as an autonomous human being‖ (Cavell, 84).  The 
classic comedies of remarriage have the misogynistic and patronizing consistency of having the 
woman call the man, albeit sarcastically, ―professor.‖  This trope begins with a scene in It 
Happened One Night where Peter Warne (Clark Gable) instructs Ellie Andrews (Claudette 
Colbert) how to properly dunk a doughnut.  It is hard not to be reminded of this scene when 
watching Armand tutor Albert on how to spread mustard.  In 1968, Mary Ellman cited ―the 
student‖ as a prominent feminine stereotype in literature.  She includes Martha in this category, 
but as a new instance, ―the wife in [Virginia Woolf] abuses her husband-the-professor,‖ and so, 
she tests her given role‘s injunction to comply (122).  In this light, Martha mocks George by 
utilizing a tongue-in-cheek literalization of the trope of calling the man ―professor.‖  Still, 
coming less than thirty years after Bringing Up Baby, Virginia Woolf remains complicit with 
Hawks‘ film‘s desire to tame and ―educate‖ the woman.   
Being so concerned with performance, Virginia Woolf and Birdcage fittingly amend the 
role of the male ―professor‖ by placing George and Armand in the role of director.  Even when 
Armand spends time teaching Albert how to act like a man, they are both aware it is strictly 
performative; the knowledge conferred is on the right way to perform, not the right way to be.  
Armand is, of course, the director of Albert‘s routines within the diegesis, but he is also the one 
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who declares the need for theater games and is the director of them; he decides when to rehearse 
for the Keeleys and how much (we also see him leading literal rehearsals for the cabaret show).  
In Virginia Woolf, George clearly ―directs‖ the scene ―Bringing Up Baby,‖ but he is also 
constantly organizing the evening, and naming the games (in this sense, he is also still a 
professor, doing the evening‘s history)261: ―Get the Guests, Humiliate the Host, Peel the Label, 
Snap the Dragons‖ and more.   
There is another level at which these narratives concern education, and this is between 
the couples.  Birdcage concludes with the revelation that Albert and Armand (as a couple) must 
teach the Keeleys how to be a couple: by educating the Keeleys in the art of drag, and how to 
closet themselves from society‘s prying eyes (in the guise of the paparazzi‘s cameras).  This 
enables the Keeleys to undergo a process of self-discovery and to seek acknowledgment of 
themselves as a couple from Albert and Armand (and the children).  Likewise, to quote Nichols 
about Virginia Woolf, ―Nick and Honey appear to be close, a happy young couple, and George 
and Martha appear to be enemies, but of course it‘s the other way around‖ (DVD Commentary).  
Through George and Martha, Nick and Honey learn from the secrets of their marriage, and leave 
with the knowledge they must confront the previously unquestioned ―truths‖ of their 
relationship.   
Nichols‘ two films repeat another typical device of the remarriage comedy: having the 
couple travel to a (seemingly) Utopian space to work things out.  Cavell calls this locale, 
deriving it from Shakespeare‘s romantic comedies, a ―green space‖ (which is usually 
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 Albee‘s major grievance with the adaptation was the loss of historic-political commentary that his three hour-
long play contained.  Undoubtedly, Albee‘s text entails more commentary on the confrontation of traditional 
humanistic values with modern technology. 
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Connecticut).
262
  In the dark comedy of Virginia Woolf, George and Martha escape the peaceful 
campus, set in New Carthage, to have their showdown in the empty parking lot outside the diner 
(the one exterior location Nichols added to adapt the play into a film).
263
  In Birdcage, the 
Keeleys go to Miami, and Albert and Armand sign palimony papers by the sea, in a space the 
film does not even define.  Even though the characters in Birdcage seek this space, Nichols 
erodes the notion that such a space exists.  Their problems either infiltrate this space, or are not 
worked through; there is no outside to ideology here.  
Cavell analyzes the frequent arguments and quarrels of the couples in comedies of 
remarriage as ―[s]o essential… to the genre of remarriage that it may be taken above all to pose 
the problem: What does a happy marriage sound like?‖ (86).  Nichols‘ two films pose this 
question, too.  As we have seen, talking certainly dominates both films, and the fact that the 
couples begin singing frequently further calls attention to their voices.  George and Martha 
singing ―Who‘s Afraid of Virginia Woolf‖ is a leitmotif, and Albert and Armand sing whenever 
the occasion presents itself.  Also, the wittiness of Nichols‘ films‘ language is often the result of 
its ambiguity, of saying one thing and meaning another (which threatens the notion of 
representational language)—there is perhaps no stronger example than George and Martha‘s 
―child.‖  Like Nichols and May‘s comedy, the diegetic games, and their humorousness for us, 
rely on playing with how ordinary language is used (these are no jokes with punch lines).   
Cavell sees the narrative of Bringing Up Baby as a process of David and Susan 
approaching linguistic fluency, arguing that, ―[i]n [comedies of remarriage] talking together is 
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 I pointed out resonances with the comedy of remarriage in chapter one with The Graduate.  Ben and Elaine meet, 
talk, break up, move to a green space (UC Berkeley), and reunite.   
263
  Nichols contributed to the draft of the screenplay which introduced the road house (Leff, 1981, 462).  Ancient 
Carthage was conquered by Romans, suggesting we consider what is overtaking this culture.  In ―Theses on the 
Philosophy of History,‖ Walter Benjamin invokes Gustav Flaubert‘s statement: ―Few will be able to guess how sad 
one had to be in order to resuscitate Carthage‖ (256).   
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fully and plainly being together, a mode of association, a form of life, and I would like to say that 
in these films the central pair are learning to speak the same language‖ (PH, 88).264  However, 
and this is the major development, while in Virginia Woolf and Birdcage, couples also need to 
learn to speak the same language (evidenced by playing the same game) together, it is not 
enough.  Nichols, rather than saying communication occurs because two people are using 
language, demonstrates that language is shared because communication is occurring—and so, 
anther couple is required to listen to the protagonists communicate.
265
  Nichols offers us a picture 
of language (not just its use) that is not just interpersonal, but inter-couple.  They must do so in 
front of another couple.  They must perform their games, and receive acknowledgment by an 
audience who can validate their performance, their language use, their togetherness.   
Echoing Sills‘ description of improvisation as a search for community, Cavell observes 
that ―since improvisation requires shared conventions, [it] supposes that you can create a living 
community at a moment‘s notice‖ (MWMWWS, 204).  This is precisely what is not done in 
Virginia Woolf and Birdcage—though improvisation games are the central couple‘s method for 
creating community.  The films are not improvisations, but about improvisation.  Unlike Nichols 
and May‘s live improvisations, in which the audience could participate (and control) the scene, 
acceptance or rejection is the only option open to the Keeleys, to Nick and Honey, and to us.  
Like on screen improvisation, which can only perform spontaneity, homosexual couples can only 
perform marriage.  It is only the Keeleys descending on Albert and Armand that compels them to 
perform a married couple, and so, come to see themselves as married.  Why else would this 
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 Cavell is, as is typical, drawing on Wittgenstein‘s Philosophical Investigations.  In it, Wittgenstein wrote, ―I shall 
call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, a language game‖ (4e).  Discussing 
ways pieces of a language signal or function, Wittgenstein intended language-games to highlight ―the fact that the 
speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a life-form‖ (10e).  Wittgenstein also wrote that ―to imagine a 
language means to imagine a life-form‖ (7e). 
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 This is a view of language and communication which has found a strong voice in philosopher Donald Davidson.   
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couple, having raised a child together, not yet have made legal arrangements conjoining their 
lives?  It is on this night that Armand claims Albert (in either an attempt to be legible to the 
Keeleys or an offensive bit of gender humor) as his ―wife.‖  It is only by the recognition of this 
other couple that they (can) come to see themselves as married, to acknowledge what was, prior 
to their acknowledging of it.   
 
American Couples 
Cavell believes that the comedies of remarriage are among the best films Hollywood ever 
produced, and I believe his admiration results from their concern with cinematic characters‘ 
language use, performance, and how cinema‘s aesthetic nature bestows upon ordinary language a 
special distance from which to consider its existence in our own lives.  On Bringing Up Baby, 
Cavell describes a sentiment that reverberates in Nichols‘ films: ―It is as though you know you 
are married when you come to see that you cannot divorce, that is, when you find that your lives 
simply will not disentangle.  If your love is lucky, this knowledge will be greeted with laughter‖ 
(127).  Birdcage and Virginia Woolf are clearly comedies of remarriage; however, their stories 
do not follow those who come to understand that they should get married again, but those who 
come to understand (through the acknowledgment of others) what they were already doing.   
Another reason Cavell values the remarriage comedies is what he perceives as their 
participation in an American intellectual tradition valuing self-awareness extending back to 
Emerson and Thoreau.
266
  Virginia Woolf and Birdcage wear their nationalism explicitly on their 
sleeves in other ways.  Birdcage depicts Miami as the home of freedom which the Keeleys must 
be reminded is the ―real‖ America.  As we know, Spolin‘s improvisational theory grew out of her 
desire to help immigrants assimilate into American culture, just as Nichols and May‘s (and 
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 Cavell returns to comedies of remarriage in Cities of Words: Pedagogical Letters on a Register of the Moral Life.  
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Sills‘) focus on Jewishness and gender were timely looks at negotiating difficult and changing 
attitudes in American culture.
267
  Agador‘s constant presence, whether mocking or tending to 
Albert and Armand, provides a background suggesting of America‘s immigrant culture (where 
communicating via spoken language is not a given), and heightens Birdcage‘s value in achieving 
a successful linguistic interaction—and with Agador‘s accent and lisp, communication is not 
easy.  Nichols, after all, arrived in America not knowing English, but clearly worked to become 
its master by the time of Nichols and May.   
 It is hard to ignore that George and Martha are named after the nation‘s first First Couple, 
who also remained childless.
268
  It is George‘s status as a professor of history (we hardly see him 
more pleased than when he says, ―I am preoccupied with history‖) that he uses to attack Nick‘s 
position as scientist: ―the ants [meaning the people-cum-clones who doggedly believe scientific 
theory] will take over the world… I know something about history. I know when I‘m being 
threatened!‖  Later, after Nick can only reply angrily ―Up yours,‖ George takes on the voice of 
the founding father: ―You take the trouble to construct a civilization, to build a society based on 
the principles of, uh, of principle. You make government and art and you realize that they are, 
must be, both the same….What does the trumpet sound?  The new generation? Up yours.‖  This, 
George‘s last tirade against Nick, resonates with the principles of individualism and 
                                                 
267
 Nichols clearly conceives of immigration in aural terms.  He recently told the New York Times: ―I‘ll tell you the 
most extreme example of immigrant‘s ear in all of Western civilization. My grandfather, Gustav Landauer, was 
quite a well-known writer in Germany. He was also very political, and he was part of the two-week provisional 
Weimar government after the kaiser fell. When the government fell, he was taken to the police station and beaten to 
death. His best friend, who was also in the government, escaped, made his way to Sante Fe, changed his name to B. 
Traven and wrote The Treasure of the Sierra Madre. That‘s the ur-immigrant story‖ (McGrath, 1). 
268
 Albee has intimated that he named Nick after Nikita Kruschev, which would suggest a Cold War allegory 
between American and Soviet spirits (Cohn, 148).  Also, there is historical work showing that Washington selected a 
series of his favorite soldiers to share his bed.  Similarly, the work done chronicling that Jamestown, America‘s 
premier settlement, allowed two males a commitment ceremony (in a church), to share a home, and to adopt children 
as their own, see Sexual Revolution in Early America by Richard Godbeer and Gay Roots and Gay Roots Volume 2. 
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representation trenchant in American discourse—it is thus significant that this biologist, accused 
by George of ―wanting to make everyone the same,‖ goes unnamed.269   
While the game-playing structure might have precedent in Hollywood cinema through 
instances like Bringing Up Baby, characters like the foul-mouthed George and Martha, and 
openly gay Albert and Armand, do not.  At the time, spectators of Virginia Woolf and Birdcage 
could not confidently predict the characters‘ fates, and this aleatory quality reinforces the sense 
of spontaneity upon which improvisational performance relies.  The impression that anything 
might happen is reminiscent of Paul Sills‘ assertions about the importance of allowing the 
improvisational actor freedom, to ―go into the possibilities of human development‖ (Sweet, 17).  
For Sills (as for Spolin), improvisation can function as therapy for the performer, an enactment 
of the talking cure.  Sills describes this aspect of his theory in terms of American ideals of self-
discovery; quoting Samuel Adams, he speaks of the importance of feeling liberated and free to 
self-explore lest people move toward cynicism, denial, apathy, or other reactionary behaviors 
(Sweet, 17).   
That both couples are re-joined by a climactic performative utterance demonstrates not 
just a case of an utterance constituting an action, but of a story in which such an utterance 
expresses knowledge about one‘s self (perhaps even to one‘s self) and, at the same time, makes a 
claim on others.   Birdcage‘s ―coming out‖ performative best exemplifies this as related to an 
American mythos, because, since coming out is a proclamation of self-knowledge, staying in the 
closet is both demanded and prohibited by a society which prizes self-knowledge.  Dawidoff 
believes that, ―The closet begins with the suppression of self in the awareness of how others 
                                                 
269
 When thinking about George and Martha as national progenitors, it is tempting to see the shocking dissolution of 
their son, the patriotic heir apparent, as a metaphor for the trauma of John F. Kennedy‘s assassination in 1963.  
Certainly, Nick and Honey (and us, to the extent we identify with them as guests in this house) are stupefied by the 
son‘s ―death,‖ and struggle to make sense of the impact.  
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view the self‖ (87).  To see Virginia Woolf as a closeted film requires seeing the film as a self, 
one with awareness of its being viewed.  Perhaps its reflexivity, its tale of coming to knowledge, 
even invites this displaced projection. 
Nick and Honey learn that George and Martha‘s language is fictional (within the diegesis, 
it lacks a referent), but that they must still acknowledge it.  We learn the same lesson; we must 
acknowledge them as communicating, or face denying our own criteria for recognizing language.  
Moreover, it is the unspoken—made metaphor by the non-existent child—that succeeds not just 
in reuniting the pair, but in proving to Nick and Honey that they share an interpersonal bond, that 
they are a couple, and so, deserve the rights of individuals; for, as we learned in the last chapter 
from Spolin and Wittgenstein, to have language one must have someone to speak to, and to use 
language demonstrates a mind (and there are no minds without individuals and no individuals 
without minds).   
Just as many critics and spectators have been tempted to delimit the meaning of George 
and Martha‘s word games, Cavell writes that the ―critical problem in approaching these 
characters [in Bringing up Baby], or the problem in describing them can be put thusly: If we ―do 
not note the other side of their words and actions, then we shall never understand them… But if 
we do note the other side of their words and actions, we shall lose our experience of them as 
individuals, we shall not see their exercises of consciousness‖ (118-119).  Thus, our difficulty in 
objectivizing or subjectivizing characters ―is a way of defining the epistemological problem of 
other minds‖ (119).  Virginia Woolf challenges Cavell‘s assumption that we can listen to 
characters‘ dialogue as though it were the ordinary language of other people.  True, both groups 
speak English, and both rely on syntax and context to communicate.  Still, as we learned in the 
last chapter through our look at Nichols and May, characters‘ language in mass-reproduced 
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media is language represented, nothing is left unsaid (which does not mean there is no implicit 
meaning).  Cavell argues that when we learn to speak a language, we learn the appropriate 
contexts for constructing utterances in particular ways, and so, people must mean what they say.  
However, we should not take from this that people say everything they mean to say; this ability 
is the privilege of fictional creatures (a quality Cavell does not address).  We would be wrong to 
say that George and Martha neglected to tell Nick and Honey earlier that they do not have a 
biological child.  If something goes unsaid, it is not Nichols‘ failure as a director to name it; it is 
his intentional—and favorite—method of depiction through absence.    
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Chapter Six: Nichols and The Streep Paradox  
 
―Nobody‘s in [Nichols‘] league with actors.‖—Orson Welles 
 
 In the introduction, I named Nichols a cinematic actor‘s director.  I extrapolated this 
claim not only from his previous experience as a performer and theater director, but also his 
consistent use of highly verbal scripts, close-ups, and long takes, which may grant the actor more 
freedom and control than a heavily-edited movie.  More important for us, as spectators of his 
films, is his emphasis on character (which is, of course, inseparable from all other elements of 
the film, but especially the work of the actor).  In the chapters that followed, I have analyzed 
Nichols‘ films by attending to the constitution of their populations, and have been interested in 
how they bring together divergent senses of performance: the theatrical (in which actors create 
fictions for spectators), the metafictional/diegetic (in which characters self-consciously self-
present for other characters), and the etymological (in which people do things).  For example, I 
stressed the theatrical doings of actors, such as Nicholson‘s blank stare, the diegetic doings of 
characters, such as Benjamin Braddock‘s silences, and the way that the improvisation of Nichols 
and May highlights the simultaneity of actors‘ and characters‘ doings.  In this final chapter, I will 
look at Nichols‘ most reflexive films about performance, which broadens my scope to include 
both the diegetic representation of cinematic performance and Nichols‘ own relationship with 
actor Meryl Streep.  Throughout the bulk of this dissertation, I have dwelled on (or taken my 
cues from) Nichols‘ early career.  By focusing on his films with Streep, this chapter will bring 
together Nichols‘ interest in thinking about performance with an account of the stylistic shifts in 
Nichols‘ latter decades.  
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 Lee Hill writes:  
In spite of a puzzling lack of sustained critical study, Nichols has continued to influence a 
new generation of film directors.  Sam Mendes, Wes Anderson, Spike Jonze, Steven 
Soderbergh, Whit Stillman and the Coen Brothers have all rescued irony from the tarpit 
that has become post-modernism.  Anyone seriously wanting to learn about film acting 
would be remiss not to watch at least one Nichols' film.
270
   
 
Even if, as Hill points out, Nichols has not received much love from critics and scholars over the 
years, the same could not be said of the actors who appear in his films.  They have racked up 
countless Academy Award nominations, and sometimes have been surprising choices (such as 
Melanie Griffith, Candace Bergen, and Ann-Margret).  Steven Spielberg once observed that, 
―[Nichols] tends to get actors to give him their finest hours‖ (Lahr, 278), and well-respected 
talents have indeed delivered some of their best work for Nichols, such as Sigourney Weaver in 
Working Girl (1988), Emma Thompson in Wit (2001), and Jack Nicholson in Carnal Knowledge 
(1971).   
 Nichols does not mince words when it comes to his own authority during filming, but he 
also openly privileges the actor‘s artistry:  
I am very demanding of the crew because it seems to me that the crew is performing a 
difficult but controllable task, and that the actor is the special person in the situation, 
more special than anyone, including the director… The actor is to be nourished, and the 
actor‘s fears, it has always seemed to me, are very real. (Probst, 115)271 
   
Nichols rehearses extensively before every picture.  After performing for Nichols in Catch-22 
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 Others refer to Nichols as an actor‘s director, too: for example, editor Sam O‘Steen (36) and critic Gavin Smith 
(27).  Nichols‘ contemporaries John Cassavetes, Sidney Pollack, and Sidney Lumet followed similar trajectories as 
Nichols.  Both Lumet and Pollack studied acting with Sanford Meisner.  Cassavetes taught Strasberg‘s Method in 
New York City before an improvisatory exercise inspired his first film. While all four gained reputations as actor‘s 
directors, and returned to acting post-directorial success, Nichols‘ initial success as a performer is unparalleled. 
271
 We should not confuse his treatment of actors with a general treatment of staff or his standards of 
professionalism.  He fired his assistant director from Virginia Woolf? by hanging a noose from the rafters 
(Willoughby, 229), and the director of photography on Day of the Dolphin told him during filming that it was ―too 
late‖ to apologize for his behavior (Lahr, 257).  He is also prone to misanthropic statements in interviews, such as 
this one: ―The most useful thing is if your enemy doesn‘t know he‘s your enemy… Never let people see what you 
want, because they will never let you have it.  Never let anybody see what you feel, because it gives them too much 
power‖ (Lahr, 253).  It was widely rumored in 2006, that Streep‘s arch-bitch Miranda Priestly in The Devil Wears 
Prada (David Frankel, 2006) was based upon Nichols 
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(1970), Orson Welles proclaimed that, ―Nobody‘s in his league with actors‖ (Gelmis, 266).  
Emma Thompson, star of Primary Colors, Wit, and Angels in America (2003), takes his rehearsal 
process, where he ―talks about the state of the world and the human condition,‖ very seriously 
(McGuigan, 64).  Similarly, Julia Roberts has said, ―[Nichols‘] rehearsal process was like a 
school of human behavior,‖ (Jensen, 33).  Dustin Hoffman said in 2007 that, ―I‘ve made 
whatever it is, 30 odd movies since [The Graduate], and I can‘t remember another experience 
that comes close to matching what we were able to learn in rehearsal… and the care even just in 
the shooting day‖ (The Graduate DVD Commentary).  It has been said that, with his actors, 
Nichols ―does not instruct but suggests a human quality or impulse‖ (McGuigan, 64); still, in 
1988, Nichols, along with his University of Chicago classmates, Brian Sills and George 
Morrison, founded The New Actor‘s Workshop in New York City, a two-year acting 
conservatory founded upon a combination of performance improvisation and Stanislavsky-based 
training, where Nichols still teaches a master-class.   
 The notion of a cinematic ―actor‘s director‖ brings with it peculiar connotations; it is not 
obviously an insult or compliment, yet it feels related to an evaluative stance, suggesting 
something about the sort of films to expect from such a filmmaker.  We know not to posit, for 
example, that Jean-Luc Godard is an actor‘s director, although he uses actors centrally in his 
films (and presumably worked closely with them).  Is it because he is not prone to realism?  The 
relatively realistic auteur Alfred Hitchcock famously recommended his actors be treated like 
―cattle,‖ while the anti-realist Robert Bresson called his actors ―models.‖272  Alongside our 
investigation into Nichols and Streep‘s partnership, this chapter seeks to better understand what 
we mean by the term ―actor‘s director.‖  Is it a back-handed intimation that the director is too 
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 For more on the complexity of Bresson‘s use of this term, see Doug Tomlinson‘s ―Performance in the Films of 
Robert Bresson: The Aesthetics of Denial.‖ 
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―theatrical,‖ and thus not properly ―cinematic‖?  Is it a means of recuperating the artistry proper 
to the actor back under the rubric of the director‘s work in order to avoid having to bifurcate 
notions of authorship?  Or is it a description of a certain mode of cinematic storytelling, in the 
tradition of, say, Erich Von Stroheim, George Cukor, or Jean Renoir?   
 In his essay on the relationship of the theater and cinema, André Bazin says, ―It is no 
chance matter than some of the best filmmakers are also the best stage directors‖ (WC, 123).  He 
describes an American cinematic tradition in which we might clearly place Nichols: ―The 
importance of depth of focus and the fixed camera in the films of Orson Welles and William 
Wyler springs from a reluctance to fragment things arbitrarily and a desire instead to show an 
image that is uniformly understandable and that compels the spectator make his own choice‖ 
(―William Wyler, or the Jansenist of Directing‖ [Wyler], 92).  Here, what might be called 
―theatrical‖ is presented as allowing more choice for the spectator, not just regarding where to 
place her attention, but a freedom from manipulative framing or editing syntax.  Nichols has 
been open about his devotion to another American director who favors long takes and deep 
focus, George Stevens, calling A Place in the Sun (1951) his Bible.
273
  Similarly, Bazin does not 
call the films of Wyler or of Jean Cocteau (to whom we will later return) ―theatrical‖ in a 
pejorative sense, but rather says they are ―evidence of a development of cinematographic 
intelligence‖ (What is Cinema?, Vol. I [WC], 69).  In words we might well apply to Nichols, 
Bazin praises Wyler as an actor‘s director particularly, because, in his films, ―the action is 
expressed first by the actor.  Like a director in the theater, Wyler conceives of his job of 
enhancing the action as beginning with the actor‖ (―Wyler,‖ 18).   
 Bazin admits that, in order to appreciate Wyler‘s realistic aesthetic style, he had to 
―pretend first that it was an absence of style‖ because Wyler‘s ―one and only concern is to make 
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 See Jensen, Gelmis and The Graduate DVD Commentary. 
 287 
the viewer understand the action as precisely and fully as possible‖ (―Wyler,‖ 17).  We will later 
also have reason to compare Nichols to Cukor, a classic American ―actors‘ director‖ who is often 
taken to operate in a style in which ―nothing calls attention to itself‖ (Phillips, 66).  Cukor once 
wrote that, ―In my case, directorial style must be largely the absence of style‖ (Battle, 210).  I 
laid out in the introduction that after Nichols‘ break from directing films in the 1970s, he 
returned with an altered style which perplexed critics who embraced the overt stylistics of his 
early work.  Bazin, though, argues that Wyler, by refusing to sublimate the novelistic or 
theatrical from his films, paradoxically makes ―all the more apparent the cinematic phenomenon 
in its utmost purity‖ (―Wyler,‖ 18).  We might well be reminded of Nichols‘ preferred method, 
which I quoted in the introduction: ―It‘s like you describe the space around something and the 
thing in the middle that is not referred to is apparent as a result.  It‘s what they say about 
[Giorgio] Morandi, that he paints the space between the bottles‖ (Rose, 1998). 
 As we now know, Nichols burst onto the cinematic scene in America in 1966 with Who’s 
Afraid of Virginia Woolf? and The Graduate (1967), effecting changes basic to the emergence of 
New Hollywood.  After Carnal Knowledge, Catch-22, and The Day of the Dolphin (1973), 
Nichols directed his most underappreciated film, the gender satire, The Fortune in 1975.  He 
believed it to be his best work, and when it flopped, he stopped making movies and returned to 
the New York theater scene.
274
  Then, in 1983, he directed Silkwood.  While this film was 
generally well-received, stylistically, it is more conventional than his earlier work.  It shares his 
earlier work‘s deliberate pacing, long takes, deep focus shots, pensive music, etc, but the takes 
are not as long; there is simply more cutting and fewer close-ups.  As I detailed in the 
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 There, he directed some important plays, such as David Rabe‘s treatise on the Vietnam War, Streamers, and the 
Trevor Griffiths play Comedians, about a working class school for aspiring comedians. 
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introduction, the two decades of critical reception following Silkwood consist of critics 
frequently attacking him for ―selling out.‖275   
 Silkwood began his revolutionary partnership with Streep.
276
  She has chosen to work 
with Nichols more than any other director, and it was Streep who, in fact, drew Nichols back to 
movie-making.  Streep biographer Iain Johnstone tells us that Nichols was ―anxious to work with 
Streep‖ (80), and also, that ―No director has had a greater influence on Streep than Mike 
Nichols‖ (165).  Nichols himself proclaims that, ―Meryl‘s got to be one of those phenomenon, 
like [Greta] Garbo, that happen once in a generation‖ (PE, 123-124).   
In this chapter, we will look at the four films Nichols and Streep made together: 
Silkwood, Heartburn (1986), Postcards From the Edge (1990), and Angels in America.
277
  We 
will look briefly at the first two before concentrating on the latter which are, I will show, 
reflexive of cinematic performance and character.  Their reflexivity does not merely expose their 
characters‘ constructedness (i.e. that Streep exists and was acting during filming), but actively 
invites us to think about the function and design of performance in the constitution of cinematic 
humans—which is, as we will see, also a large component of Streep‘s star persona.  Using the 
tools of expressivity and communication, the actor does things which are then inferred by the 
minds of spectators following a narrative as a character.  Reflexive performances make us aware 
of the way acting works, asking us to think about experience, the structure of actions, and the 
nature of expressivity.  
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 See the introduction for a more detailed history of how Nichols was charged with being apolitical or overly 
entertaining during the 1980s and 1990s. 
276
 Nichols has only worked as often with one other actor, Jack Nicholson.  Carnal Knowledge established 
Nicholson‘s enduring persona as a male chauvinist, which he extended to other films, such as Terms of Endearment 
(James Brooks, 1983) and Heartburn in the 1980s, before films like Wolf (Nichols, 1994) address shifts in 1990s 
cultural ideas of masculinity.  Their relationship also merits a study.  
277
 That Angels was produced by the HBO cable television network makes it not as technically ―cinematic‖ as other 
films I have addressed in this chapter.  However, Angels utilized cast and crew established in cinema (most of whom 
Nichols had worked with before), a budget of over $60 million, and was even released in a handful of theatres 
following its initial airing.   
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  It seems particularly easy to confuse issues in an art form in which the artist and the 
instruments of the artist converge.  As Streep says, ―We are the violin, we are the piano, the 
architect‘s paper, the sculpture. It‘s our own bodies, and it‘s very hard not to [confuse the actor 
and the performance]‖ (Tichler and Kaplan [TK], 303).  Streep has staked her career on refusing 
to be typed, a move that can be construed as a challenge to the classical Hollywood star system.  
Unlike the terms ―Humphrey Bogart‖ or ―Katherine Hepburn,‖ ―Streep‖ is obscure; it lacks a 
clear referent.  We will explore the paradox of the persona of having no persona, for it is 
precisely this reason that is cited when she is publicized as the most widely acclaimed actress of 
her generation.
278
  It might, then, occur to us to imagine Streep to be emblematic of a popular 
version of postmodernism: the star without starness.  I am not yet ready to dismiss Streep‘s 
complexity so easily, and so, I will look at how her projects with Nichols comment on her career 
and provide insight into changes in American social history and notions of individuality.   
On the one hand, besides the depth and emotional complexity with which she imbues the 
characters she invents, Streep seems to represent that old bourgeois self many of us still wish we 
had access to: if she can determine so many other selves, surely she is free herself.  Who else but 
a master of her own agency could depict so many others‘?   However, on the other hand, she 
seems to offer a fantasmatic space apart from selfhood, presenting a model of constant change.  
Throughout this dissertation, I have frequently turned to Stanley Cavell‘s work, yet I have so far 
avoided his most well-known claims about cinematic performance: that Hollywood stars create 
awe-inducing ―individualities,‖ unique and consistent personae (understood by the spectator as 
ways of being).  Rebutting the breadth of Cavell‘s assertion, Noel Carroll writes that, ―there are 
film stars who transform themselves from role to role—chameleons who do not imprint their 
own personality or being on their character: Laurence Olivier from yesteryear comes to mind, 
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 Indeed, as Ken burns puts it: ―Some say she is the greatest actress of a generation. Others say of all time‖ (1). 
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while today one thinks of Meryl Streep‖ (56).279  Even when stars like Bogart and Hepburn 
selected slightly unpredictable roles, as in The African Queen (John Huston, 1951), their 
performances were more chatoyant than chameleonic.  Carroll accurately describes Streep‘s 
reputation; unlike the highly visible presences of classic stars, Streep is often thought to 
―disappear‖ into her roles.  But is she the exception that proves the rule?280  Obviously, she is 
visible on screen, so what subtends the cultural impetus to agree otherwise?  As we will see, 
Carroll‘s use of the term ―chameleon‖ as metaphor to describe Streep‘s persona is ubiquitous in 
her critical reception.  Hence, part of the aim of this chapter, and part of the value of her and 
Nichols‘ films together, is to open up a space in which to analyze her reputation and its picture of 
selfhood.   
 When asked how she selects projects, Streep recognizes that, ―[a play or film] is always 
seen in the context of its time… That‘s how we receive it as an audience‖ (292).  She follows 
this by pointing out that, ―[t]he time in which you live calls for certain kinds of voices to be 
heard‖ (TK, 292), suggesting her concern for plot, theme, and the ―politics‖ of theater and 
cinema.  Raymond Durgnat posits something similar: ―the stars are a reflection in which the 
public studies and adjusts its own image of itself… The social history of a nation can be written 
in terms of its film stars‖ (137-8).  Marcia Landy ―regard[s] the genealogy of star images as 
integrally tied not only to social history but also to considerations of relations between politics 
and aesthetics‖ (xii).  What is it, then, about the last three decades of America‘s social history, its 
politics and aesthetics, that cried out for Streep‘s voice?   
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 Grant tells us of a traditional view that privileges Hollywood‘s genre system, and so, takes the notion of a 
cinematic actor‘s ―core self‖ to be a welcome by-product, the result of a genre system that repeated types of roles, 
and so, typecast actors in them.  I want to point out that the idea that we, as spectators, are aware of a consistent 
persona is not the same thing as typecasting.  A star can play different sorts of character types while still being 
herself highly visible.  
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 There are, of course, many actors that disappear into their roles, but they have historically been deemed 
―character actors,‖ rather than ―stars.‖  I doubt anyone would deny that Streep is a star.  Rudolf Arnheim‘s ―In Praise 
of Character Actors‖ is a place to look for more on this distinction.   
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The Avoidance of Streep 
 Prior to working with Streep, Nichols had already begun challenging Hollywood stardom 
as far back as Virginia Woolf when he cast Elizabeth Taylor, at the time the world‘s most famous 
(and famously beautiful) actress, completely against type.  The nation was shocked and Taylor 
earned the highest praise of her career and an Academy Award (Gussow, 95).   Nichols is awed 
by Taylor‘s ―understanding of film acting‖ (Virginia Woolf DVD Commentary), and defines a 
film actor by Taylor‘s example: ―She‘s a film actress.  By that I mean you can see in her face 
what she‘s thinking.  She has a very good instinct for the causes of a character‘s behavior‖ (first 
emphasis mine, Playboy, 71).  He describes filming a scene, ―and I‘d see it the next day and it 
was like fifty percent better. There were all these things that you couldn‘t see six feet away, but 
they were there‖ (Virginia Woolf Commentary).  Similarly, Streep‘s magic is not just changing 
her visible exterior.  Nichols recently posited: ―This is what Garbo was such a master of: actual 
thoughts that had not occurred before that particular take. And you can see this taking 
tremendous leaps with [Marlon] Brando and [Montgomery] Clift and then with Streep‖ 
(McGrath, 2009).   
 Nichols‘ valorization of Streep‘s manner of showing the process of thinking invokes 
complex terms related to depicting mindedness and to psychological realism.  As I sketched in 
the introduction, several key theorists in the 1970s aligned psychologically realistic acting with 
passivity-inducing illusionism, calling it ―transparent‖ and counterposing it to the political aims 
of epic theater as delineated by Bertolt Brecht.
281
  James Naremore posits that ―the typical 
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 ―Transparent‖ also the term used to describe classical Hollywood filmmaking style, and is especially pejorative 
for writers who believed so strongly that cinema is, primitively, a visual medium.  For more on the history of this 
opposition, see the introduction.  Transparent acting does not, or, at least should not imply a lack of skill, since 
actors are never the character they are playing (even if autobiographical).    
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dramatic film regards acting as an artful imitation of unmediated behavior in the world‖ (18).  
Defined this way, naturalistic acting is seen as relying on the spectator‘s sensitivity to her social 
contemporary (and normative) behavior, and, as I articulated in the introduction, has frequently 
been theorized in opposition to Brechtian styles of acting, which purport to educate, rather than 
deceive, the spectator by illuminating their conditions of production.  This binary allows for the 
view that, ―naturalistic representation narrows the instrumental range of performance; by 
concealing the fact that actors produce signs, it disguises the workings of ideology‖ (Naremore, 
49).  Obviously, such disguising is itself ideological, and unable to ―hide‖ some more ―real‖ 
ideology lurking behind it.  And since any style is equally present to the spectator, the notion that 
naturalism parades around in extra-ideological drag with the power to stand between the 
spectator and ideology has always seemed suspect to me.  As I also indicated in the introduction, 
another difficulty with this binary is that the concept of ―psychological realism‖ has been 
associated with naturalistic styles, partly because the impression of character psychology brings 
with it the idea of the individual (a disagreeably bourgeois idea for many Brechtian devotees).  
This view leads to the assumption that non-naturalistic modes avoid featuring characters with 
individual psychologies.  In this chapter, I distinguish between naturalism and realism (or 
psychological realism), since a film‘s capacity for depicting characters with legible emotions, 
motivations, and intentions, in short, with rich psychologies, is compatible with both naturalism 
and Brechtian styles.   Even Brecht sometimes intimated that living within ideology is a 
psychological phenomenon, which is why we should not conflate naturalistic performance styles 
with psychological realism, nor should we simply set them both in opposition to a Brechtian or 
alienating style.
282
   In fact, at the same time that Streep emerged on the cinematic scene, Annette 
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 Granted, Brecht wrote enough polemics to justify various interpretations.  On one hand he frequently calls 
―introspective psychology‖ bourgeois (50), creates charts opposing socially responsible ―epic theater‖ from 
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Kuhn and Mark Nash observed that Brecht‘s ideals are endemic to Hollywood, for, ―the star 
system [is] a space within cinema where the contradictions of naturalistic presentation are both 
manifested and contained, and where a dislocation analogous to epic acting, separating actor and 
role, is manifested‖ (quoted in Kouvaros, 166).  However, if Streep is a different sort of star, it is 
unclear she participates in this system.  
 At the moment, I am less interested in how we should read Streep‘s persona than in how 
people have done so.  Given her penchant for a particular three-note whimper, frenetic hand 
movements, hair-touching, and the like, it strikes me that the public has willingly participated in 
the preservation of Streep‘s projected subjectivity.  Rare indeed is the tabloid story about Streep, 
and this is surely not out of respect (or some integrity on their part to not invent scenarios) but 
the lack of a market.  Streep is thus free to create pictures while remaining ―absent.‖  Before we 
look closely at Nichols‘ and Streep‘s collaborations (and since it is partly the work she 
completed before Nichols that inspired his return to cinema), I think a brief biography of her is in 
order.  
  Streep graduated Vassar in 1971 (where she was taught by Jean Arthur), and from the 
prestigious Yale Drama School in 1975.  By 1978 she had won a Tony (for Tennessee Williams‘ 
27 Wagons Full of Cotton), an Emmy (for Holocaust), and was nominated for an Oscar (for The 
Deer Hunter [Michael Cimino, 1978]).
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  She won the latter in 1979 for her turn as Joanna, a 
depressed mother who leaves her husband and child in Kramer vs. Kramer (Robert Benton, 
                                                                                                                                                             
―dramatic theater‖ in psychological terms (37), declares that ―[m]ankind‘s highest decisions are in fact fought out… 
in the ‗external‘ world, not inside people‘s heads‖ (196).  On the other hand, we can read much of writing 
generously and emphasize his view that particular modes of realism can lay bare ways ideology has been 
internalized psychologically, —so long as they do not endorse the notion of an ―eternal human‖ way of being (see 
―Alienation Effects in Chinese Acting‖ and ―The Popular and the Realistic‖).  
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 At Vassar, Streep majored in costume design, an interest she has not lost.  Echoing the terminology of Erving 
Goffman, and conveying a certain middle-class bias, she admits: ―I‘m sort of a notorious pain in the butt for any 
costume designer because I have so many opinions about how my people should present…I feel very strongly that 
we make decisions about what we‘re giving to the world or what we‘re withholding from the world by virtue of 
what we put on our bodies and what we choose to say and not say‖ (Johnstone, 191).    
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1979), a role Streep altered considerably from its scripted origin.  Most significantly, she wrote 
Joanna‘s effectively restrained and unrepentant courtroom monologue, convincing director 
Benton to allow the character to be more complicated than the cruel caricature originally 
envisioned.  As Cavell notes in Pursuits of Happiness, ―the force of Streep‘s performance‖ 
emends the history of female characters by giving us an idea of what may happen if Nora were to 
return (however briefly) at the end of A Doll’s House.  Molly Haskell calls the courtroom scene 
―a quintessential Streep moment,‖ because it is atypical for female characters in Hollywood; 
Joanna has uncommon depth, sexuality, and intelligence.   
 Significantly, Streep‘s first leading film role was Anna, an actress playing a repressed 
woman in Victorian England, in The French Lieutenant’s Woman (Karel Reisz, 1981), an 
adaptation of the 1969 novel by John Fowles.  At screenwriter Harold Pinter‘s request, Nichols 
had been hired to direct, but relinquished the project due to a scheduling conflict (Pfaff and 
Emerson [PE], 61).
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  During the course of filming, it becomes more and more difficult for 
Anna (and the spectator) to separate herself from her role.  Pinter had no reservations about 
Streep playing the British woman: ―Meryl‘s superb.  She is quite a remarkable actress with 
vivacious and singular vibrations‖ (PE, 64).  Time‘s Richard Corliss declared that ―With this 
performance, Streep… provides new life to a cinema starved for shining stars‖ (PE, 65).  David 
Denby wrote that she ―presents a persona that is practically a movie in itself‖ (PE, 65).    
 Streep next won the coveted role of Sophie Zawistoski, a Polish concentration camp 
survivor, in Alan Pakula‘s Sophie’s Choice (1982).  Not only did she win another Academy 
Award, but this performance is widely regarded as one of the finest by any actress in cinematic 
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 Later, Nichols was working with Pinter on The Remains of the Day (1993), before again having to give up the 
project.  He chose to remain as producer and selected James Ivory as director. Ivory decided to replace Streep with 
British actress Emma Thompson, which is rumored to have angered Streep, and to account for the fact she and 
Nichols did not make another film together for a decade.  
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history, and cemented her status as an actress of unparalleled talent.  Her third leading role was 
in Silkwood.  Since this period in the early 1980s, Streep has never been off the screen for long, 
and never stopped pushing the boundaries for representations of women in Hollywood.  She 
went on to invent interesting (and often ambiguous) characters in such films as David Hare‘s 
Plenty (1984),
285
 Out of Africa (Sidney Pollack, 1985), The Bridges of Madison County (Clint 
Eastwood, 1995), and Dancing at Lughnasa (Pat O‘Connor, 1998).   
 In their comprehensive compilation of the first decade of Streep‘s critical reception in, 
Eugene Pfaff and Mark Emerson demonstrate that Streep had already absorbed America‘s 
attitudes toward cinematic performance and was ―widely acknowledged as the most admired 
actress of her generation‖ (PE, 122). They note that, ―Her picture has appeared on the cover of 
Time, Newsweek, Life, and Rolling Stone; scores of magazines tout her as ‗the finest actress of 
her generation‘ and ‗the Woman of the ‗80s.‘‖286  Typically, even when certain stars are 
celebrated for their dramatic range, as Streep is, discussions of their stardom necessarily fall back 
into positive descriptions of their personae (seen as similarity across roles and based on data 
from biographical or publicity sources).  Haskell, who has written most deeply about Streep, 
concludes that while Streep can be both beautiful and plain, she has succeeded in sidestepping 
the question of looks altogether—no small achievement—by exchanging the lure of youth and 
beauty for ―the virtue of talent and will power… for the ‗aura‘ of longevity and endurance‖ (50).  
Now, over three decades into her career, critics have exhausted the range of superlatives in 
describing her talent.  From her expert turns in The Hours (Stephen Daldry, 2002) and 
Adaptation (Spike Jonze, 2002) to the recent Doubt (John Patrick Shanley, 2008), and 
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 Hare, who also wrote the screenplay for The Hours, directed Nichols‘ only film performance in The Designated 
Mourner (1997). 
286
 This feat is all the more remarkable in light of her decision to only make films in Los Angeles in the 1980s so 
that she could maintain her presence at home until her youngest child reached adolescence. 
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blockbusters like Mamma Mia (Phylida Lloyd, 2008), and her celebrated impersonation of Julia 
Child in Julia and Julie (Nora Ephron, 2009), Streep‘s stardom has never been more secure.287   
 She has been nominated for more Oscars than any other performer, besting Katherine 
Hepburn‘s twelve nominations with her current fifteen.  Indeed, Streep has often been compared 
to Hepburn, another actress known for crafting a feminist persona out of her atypical beauty, 
bearing, and intelligence. Pfaff and Emerson write that ―[Streep] has given unparalleled 
dimension to women‘s roles, extending them beyond stereotypes into intricate, sensitive 
performances‖ (4).  In a more recent profile, Christine Spines points out that ―she made her way 
without ever playing a single pliant girlfriend or damsel-in-distress‖ (33).  ―No one could accuse 
Meryl Streep of playing to the galleries or pandering to the lascivious appetites of a male 
audience,‖ writes Haskell, who celebrates Streep‘s success at ―playing women who are outside 
the normal range of audience sympathy‖ (43).288  Haskell makes much of Streep‘s insistence on 
playing women who are both intelligent and sexually complicated, and cites Streep characters 
such as Lindy Chamberlain in A Cry in the Dark (Fred Schipisi, 1988) as evidence that Streep 
has ―delighted in playing unconventional, even unpleasant women, and who has made a fetish 
out of not giving the public what it wants and expects from a star‖ (44).  This is decidedly not 
like Hepburn, who maintained a very strong persona across her films (and even pandered to the 
more conservative era‘s taste in The Philadelphia Story [Cukor, 1940] by playing a character 
berated for the sophisticated qualities audiences expressed dislike for in Hepburn).   
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 Indeed, the boffo success of The Devil Wears Prada‘s (David Frankel, 2006) and  the earnings of Mamma Mia! 
(Phyllida Lloyd, 2006), which made it both the highest grossing musical and British film ever, have inspired 
distributors to create a ―Streep slot‖ for a Streep film every summer.  She has enjoyed a similar position in the 
winter for ―serious‖ films for years (Spines, 32).  
288
 Interestingly, in her review of Out of Africa, Haskell calls Streep ―un-chameleonlike,‖ a fact which prevented her 
from successfully playing Blixen (Isak Dinesen): ―There‘s a fundamental temperamental clash: Streep‘s ego (and 
genius) as an actress is to submit completely to another character; Dinesen‘s was to assert, rule, behave 
outrageously, in order to become, completely, herself‖ (PE, 115).  It seems Streep is such a chameleon that even 
when she fails, she must be evaluated in those terms; she can even become, momentarily, not a chameleon.   
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 Streep has her detractors, of course.  Andrew Sarris, who (as Haskell puts it) prefers his 
―women with a sense of abandon,‖ objects to Streep‘s work as ―technical‖ (50).  Likewise, 
Pauline Kael finds Streep overly calculated.  Streep‘s critical nemesis, Kael charges Streep with 
insufficient naturalism, and for not falling in step with traditional stardom‘s recommended style 
of personification.  Streep once responded by deriding Kael‘s ―[desire] to believe that the person 
that she sees [on the screen] is that person‖ (Hollinger, 93).  Haskell summarizes decades of Kael 
enmity toward Streep: ―Kael… wrote cruelly that [Streep] acted only from the neck up, that by 
focusing everything on an accent or a toss of the head, she in effect, decorporealized herself‖ 
(Haskell, 2008, 34).  Although it is not taken to suggest Streep‘s consistencies, critics have noted 
the fact that Streep is constantly touching her hair, fluttering her hands, twitching her head, etc. 
(Hollinger, 91).  For this reason, Haskell calls Streep‘s cinematic work ―busy in the extreme. 
[One even hears] the sound of wheels clicking as her mind calculates its next move in compiling 
a ‗brilliant‘ performance‖ (47), perhaps referring to Hepburn‘s famous pronouncement that 
Streep is her ―least favorite modern actress.‖ (Berg, 176).  Hepburn complained that she could 
see ―the wheels turning inside [Streep‘s] head‖: ―click, click, click‖ (Berg, 176).  Reinforcing 
Nichols‘ recognition of Streep‘s special skill for representing thinking, Haskell argues that with a 
Streep performance ―we feel the thinking process‖ (48), that ―to the extent that [Streep] has 
deflected attention from the body to the head, it‘s never been just in the interest of accents or 
gimmicks: it‘s because the lady thinks.  Her characters often have more than one idea in their 
heads at a time‖ (2008, 34).   
 However, despite such praises, Haskell is ultimately bothered that we spectators do not 
have access to the ―real‖ Streep, accusing her of ―hiding in the spotlight‖ (47).  It seems that 
Streep‘s efforts to concoct characters different from one another, and different from whatever we 
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might imagine ―Streep‖ to be, inspire as much anxiety as adoration.  ―The aura of the old stars 
radiated out of a sense of self, a core identity projected into every role,‖ Haskell writes, 
―[h]owever varied the performances of Bette Davis, say, or Katherine Hepburn, or Margaret 
Sullavan, we always felt we were in the presence of something knowable, familiar, constant‖ 
(45-46).
289
  According to Haskell, even though Davis stretched the bounds of type farther than 
others, ―she was always Bette Davis… who makes us respond to the fire within,‖ whereas 
―Streep, chameleon-like, undercuts this response… Instead of merging with her roles, [she] 
metamorphoses, changing herself completely, tying up all the loose ends so that she is perfectly 
hidden, an exemplary preceptor of the middlebrow injunction against ‗playing oneself‘‖ (46).  
Pfaff and Emerson, too, sum up their book by naming her a ―chameleon‖; throwing up their 
hands, they claim the term reveals her unknowability (PE, 122).
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 The metaphor of the chameleon is mobilized, as by Carroll, to assert that Streep is 
something like an anti-star; yet, the metaphor is ambiguous.  If this metaphor alleges that she is a 
cipher of character, it simultaneously writes off her very real presence, though perhaps her 
minimal presence provides just the doubt necessary to say we know a character.  Critics typically 
use the chameleon tag, as Haskell does, to communicate Streep‘s unique ability to metamorphose 
into different characters.  It also implies a desire to hold onto the existence of a core self—the 
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 Haskell singles Streep out among her Hollywood contemporaries, claiming that actresses such as Diane Keaton, 
Susan Sarandon, and Glenn Close maintain ―core personalities… around which signature adjectives cluster [which 
is] integral to our moviegoing fantasies, to the unconscious transaction whereby stars become extensions of 
ourselves‖ (2008, 36-38).  It seems to me that Streep somehow escapes adjectives; she works in adverbs, privileging 
the work of creating individualized characters, each of whom perform their tasks differently.   
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 In The Actress: Hollywood Acting and the Female Star, Karen Hollinger begins her look at contemporary female 
Hollywood stardom with Streep.  Hollinger‘s take on Streep‘s career is problematic for a number of reasons.  
Perhaps most egregiously, she explicitly refuses to grant any significance to Streep‘s comedic roles.  Hollinger sets 
out to formulate a workable persona for Streep (despite her reputation in the industry as ―the only woman in 
Hollywood who could do any script‖ [94]), and argues that Streep‘s latter decades have given us a consistent type: 
mother.  As evidence, Hollinger cites Dancing at Lughnasa, Marvin’s Room (Jerry Zaks, 1996), The Hours, and One 
True Thing (Carl Franklin, 1998).  Aside from that fact that in the former film, Streep does not even play a mother 
(but a sister), I do not believe that anyone who has seen these films is likely to perceive a type.  As we all already 
know, the world is full of very different kinds of mothers, a fact these films exhibit plainly. 
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idea being that Streep hides within each character somewhere, out of the range of our perception.  
Chameleons alter their skin color based on their context; lacking a ―true‖ (that is, constant) 
exterior appearance, they use their physical mutability for protection.  Dubbing Streep a 
chameleon suggests that watching her might be exciting, yet disturbing, for the chameleon 
metaphor emphasizes visuality in a medium often taken to be primarily visual, and implies that it 
is not an exterior appearance that she lacks (the camera can never lie), but a ―true‖ self, a 
personality-referent.  We might well surmise that Streep‘s lack of star persona—her 
―unwillingness to reveal, or surrender, the self,‖ as Haskell calls her ―essence‖—is fundamental 
to our desire to keep watching her: that it is precisely her withholding that involves us, that 
inspires us to want to understand what makes the characters she embodies do the things they do; 
to wonder how they are different or similar from us.  Streep is aware of the phenomenon: ―What 
[the public responded to] fed into what I wanted for myself—which was not to be typed‖ (quoted 
in Hollinger, 73).
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  She claims that ―the great worth [of acting] is giving voice to characters that 
have no voice‖ (Hollinger, 73-74).  So, let us now turn to the characters she and Nichols voiced 
together.   
 
Silkwood 
 As I mentioned above, Nichols abandoned cinema for seven years before he was pulled 
back, and with a changed aesthetic.  Regarding his decision to make Silkwood, Nichols said:  
For me, it was a reawakening. And part of that was the miracle of Meryl. She's stunning. 
I remember Kurt Russell said to me one day, ‗Are you always this light on your feet with 
the camera?‘ And I realized I was different, that before the long break, I had stopped and 
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 When asked about a role in which she felt she was unsuccessful, Streep singled out Brooke in Still of the Night 
(Robert Benton, 1982): ―The noir femme fatale is essentially a type, and I was bored by her.  There was so much 
attention to lighting and how my hair looked and being sleek and gorgeous, but what do I do?  What do I convey?  
What‘s the person about? What‘s the inner life? It‘s not about the inner life, dear.  It‘s all about being misconstrued.  
You think the woman‘s this, but she‘s not. But what is she? No one cares. She looks great‖ (Tichler, 297).   
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figured out how to shoot every scene, endlessly sometimes. But it had become part of me, 
like grammar becomes part of us. It was the beginning of me exploring a more fluid, less 
conscious approach to movies.‖ (Jensen, 1)   
 
Nichols directly credits Streep‘s artistry for the stylistic changes in his own.  Streep praises 
Nichols‘ preparation level: ―A lot of directors are still dealing with the text when you‘re on the 
set. Mike has done all that beforehand, so when you get on the set you feel it‘s a secure world 
where all the architecture is in place. You can jump as hard as you want and the floor won‘t give 
way‖ (McGrath, 2009).   She also echoes Nichols‘ sense of cinematic freedom, asserting that 
film acting allows more freedom of movement than stage acting.  ―There are more surprises 
allowed in film,‖ she says, and, unlike in the theater where other actors and technicians need you 
to do the same thing night after night, ―[y]ou can change staging‖ (TK, 298).  Clearly, a Nichols 
and Streep production is not governed by a will to reproduce a particular text that exists prior to 
filming.  Nichols is literally willing to follow where Streep wants to go, to share authorship.   
 Those who claim that Nichols‘ ―later work ruffles no feathers‖ (Lahr, 283) fail to take 
into account Nichols‘ knack for being relevant to volatile contemporary American social 
debates—a timeliness evident in films like Working Girl, The Birdcage (1996), and Charlie 
Wilson’s War (2007).  Silkwood operates in this vein.  It is based on the true story of Karen 
Silkwood, a worker at a Kerr-McGee nuclear power plant who was mysteriously killed in a car 
accident while challenging the company‘s policies (most crucially, there may have been 
evidence of the company tampering with photographic evidence of flaws in nuclear materials).  
As the title suggests, the movie considers the value of an individual.   
 Karen suffers increasingly from radiation poisoning as she investigates the threat of 
potential nuclear disaster—which cannot be distinguished from corporate greed.  The film 
portrays Karen as a willful, sexual, fun-loving, smart-ass who lives with her lover, Drew (Kurt 
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Russell) and lesbian friend, Dolly (Cher)—both of whom also work at Kerr-McGee (a 
―scandalous‖ ménage, according to critics).  Dolly was leaps and bounds ahead of previous 
attempts to offer a sympathetic homosexual figure on screen—leading the efforts to increase the 
visibility of homosexual Americans in the early 1980s.  Haskell contends that, ―[i]n the annals of 
female camaraderie, there is no moment more touching than [Streep‘s] scene on the front porch 
with Cher, when the two fight and then teasingly make up‖ (49).   
 As Karen awakens to the possibility of a corporate cover-up, we watch her, roused by a 
purpose, alienate those close to her—particularly men who are unable to comprehend a woman 
of intelligence and initiative.  Her commitment to opposing Kerr-McGee‘s negligence even costs 
her custody of her children.  She gets involved in the worker‘s union (while remaining quite the 
individual) and takes her information to the federal government (and has an affair in 
Washington), only to die before she can hand over the documents that would prove misconduct.   
 Even before its release, the film was celebrated by anti-nuclear groups, unionists, and 
feminists.  Predictably, it was also denounced by pro-nuclear groups.  Widespread attempts to 
halt the development of nuclear technology have decreased since the 1980s, but Silkwood‘s 
scenes of Karen‘s sleuthing in the offices of Kerr-McGee now seem as much about the onset of 
the personal computer in the workplace as nuclear technology; her rebellion is against the 
technological-managerial class as the new bourgeois class.  It sustains a smart commentary on 
gender roles of the time, too, particularly in blue-collar Oklahoma, the workplace, and in public 
education.  Silkwood pushes the envelope for representing a woman with a complicated 
sexuality, without stepping into clichéd territory (one scene, in which Karen receives oral sex in 
the kitchen, received much attention).    
 302 
 Rather than impressing film critics‘ tired eyes with new stylistics and/or targeting 
cinematic aesthetic traditions (and the power structures they, for those in the know, reveal), 
Nichols began to target cultural-political consciousness, using film pragmatically to effect 
change.
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   In this respect, Silkwood is a success.  And while the visual track may not be as stark 
as Carnal Knowledge‘s extended frontal close-ups, most critics found the film to be one of the 
year‘s best (PE, 94-97).  Reminiscent of a 1930s ―social problem‖ film, Silkwood tells its story 
through one woman‘s experience, avoiding the polemicism of other anti-nuclear movies.293  
Vincent Canby, film critic of the New York Times, praised Nichols: ―Silkwood may be the most 
serious work Mr. Nichols has yet done in films… Perhaps for the first time in a popular movie 
has America‘s petrochemical-nuclear landscape been dramatized, and with such anger and 
compassion‖ (PE, 86-87).   
 Nichols‘ direction is particularly strong, doing what he says he does best—articulating 
his message through implication.  It is clear that Karen hates her job at Kerr-McGee.  Her 
frustration at the company‘s wrongdoings is inseparable from her frustration at her own 
complicity and failures (as she, for example, loses custody of her children to their father).  She 
tries to figure out why she is working there, and is excited to discover not only that she may not 
be relegated to working there forever (that she might be good at something else), but that she 
might discover a reason to justify leaving.  As Karen‘s body becomes more and more poisoned 
(and Streep‘s subtle physicality cannot be underestimated here), it is clear to us that she is dying 
of cancer at the hands of the corrupt corporations who are in the pockets of the nation‘s 
government bureaucracy; yet she frequently celebrates America.  Whether it is the nuclear plant, 
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 We should not underestimate the excellent work of cinematographer Miroslav Ondrícek or the haunting, pastoral 
score by Georges Delerue. 
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 Streep is highly politically active, supporting causes from women‘s rights to education reform., but she has been 
especially involved in nuclear disarmament (Hollinger, 85).  The real Silkwood‘s father sued Kerr-McGee; the U.S. 
Supreme Court the case ruled in his favor, awarding him $10 million. 
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with its large, alien contraptions, or Washington, D.C., Karen‘s environment draws our attention, 
powerfully contextualizing her, and threatening to overwhelm her figure (creating a fatalistic 
sensibility akin to film noir).
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   From her insistence on watching parades or taking photos in 
front of the Washington memorial, the grim realities of her situation are measured against the 
backdrop of her patriotism, enabling an implicit dialectic by which the spectator can judge her 
behavior and consider the function of the socio-political institutions she admires.  
 Haskell calls Karen one of Streep‘s greatest heroines, and describes her, as do several 
other critics, as ―gum-chewing,‖ a commonality that speaks to Karen‘s working class identity, I 
believe also demonstrates the impact Streep endows seemingly natural gestures (that she blows 
and pops a bubble with her gum in one scene may also resonate in a story about our terror of 
nuclear explosions) (2008, 40).  Other critics, such as Roger Ebert, who devoted a paragraph to 
the small, seemingly habitual gesture of Karen shaking her watch, waxed lyrical about Streep‘s 
detail-filled performance.  Perhaps in a story about personal liability and corporate responsibility, 
even small actions which appear unintended take on added weight, and this development in her 
technique is an aspect we will return to later.    
 Though a handful of critics wanted a more journalistic film, Silkwood inaugurated what 
Streep and Nichols would become known for. John Simon praised it: ―Rather than illustrate a 
thesis or engage in political grandstanding, Nichols and the cast have created a whole way of 
life‖ (PE, 95). Streep‘s performance was widely regarded with awe.  Kael was even impressed by 
the moment Streep/Karen mocks a sexist co-worker by flashing a breast.  Much was made over 
her appearance: her short hair, her deterioration as her body is hollowed out.  It inspired the critic 
for The New Yorker to hail that, ―[m]ore than any other actress today, Streep is a master at 
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 See Paul Schrader‘s ―Notes on Film Noir‖ for more on film noir‘s depiction of protagonists within urban 
landscapes. 
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making dramatic physical changes‖ (PE, 95).  Still, critics did not fail to note the abundance of 
humor that Streep always finds and brings out in a role, calling her performance ―as funny as it is 
moving‖ (PE, 95).295  It would seem that Streep‘s elaborate gestures, her humor, and her physical 
transformation all serve to both deepen the characterization of Karen, and call attention to 
Streep‘s own work.  We might surmise, then, that her style, at least here, when working with 
Nichols, is something other than a typical naturalist performance, which might explain why, 
despite her multiple Oscar nominations (and she was nominated for Silkwood), she has not won 
another since working with Nichols.   
 What the critics‘ attention to Streep‘s physical gestures and her chameleon image fail to 
capture is the significance of her vocal performances.  As we have seen, since his days on radio, 
Nichols has been consistently concerned with the sound of people.  Thus, I take it to be 
important that Karen is killed singing; Silkwood ends with the silencing of her voice.  The best 
scene of Nichols and Streep‘s next project, Heartburn, also features her singing.  Heartburn is an 
adaptation of a novel/memoir, this time by Nora Ephron, who also wrote the screenplay for 
Silkwood.
296
  Though Streep‘s theatrical career in New York began in comedies, and we have 
seen it noted that Streep brings humor to any role, the story of Heartburn—in which she plays 
Jewish writer Rachel opposite Jack Nicholson‘s philandering Mark—is her first official 
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 The fact that Streep finds humor in supposedly serious roles is a trait that has not dissipated over time, and often 
befuddles critics, such as a reviewer of Doubt who notes that funny approach stands apart from her naturalistic 
colleagues (Johnstone, 210). 
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 Heartburn is based on Ephron‘s marriage and divorce from Watergate reporter Carl Bernstein. Ephron, the 
daughter of screenwriters (they wrote such films as Carousel [Henry King, 1956] and Desk Set [Walter Lang, 1957]) 
worked as a journalist before writing for television and film.  She has since enjoyed a successful career as a writer 
and director of such films as Sleepless in Seattle (1993), You’ve Got Mail (1998), and Julie and Julia (2009), which 
also stars Streep. 
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comedy.
297
  The film did not repeat the success of Silkwood; the largest critical objection was 
that the movie was not sympathetic enough to Mark, that it did not explain why he had an affair.  
  Nevertheless, Nichols‘ direction of Streep‘s performance received praise, particularly her 
gestures: ―a querulous eyebrow or subtle grimace, simultaneously inhabiting and commenting on 
her role‖ (PE, 118).  The scene in which she sings received much positive attention is the one in 
which Rachel tells Mark that she is pregnant.  The newly married couple, amidst the rubble of a 
home being renovated, sits on the edge of a bed with a box of pizza and sings all the songs they 
can think of with ―baby‖ in the title.  The impression of spontaneity achieved by Streep and 
Nicholson (the scene was largely improvised), and the pathos of the scene (it is simultaneously 
joyous and tragic), were enough for some critics to value the film itself.  Of working with Streep, 
Nicholson said, ―She‘s my idol… There‘s nobody out there that far in the movies. Nobody‖ 
(Johnstone, 92-93).   
 
Postcards From the Edge 
 Streep and Nichols‘ third film together, Postcards from the Edge, is another comedy, but 
this time it was critically and commercially successful.
298
  It is Nichols‘ most explicitly reflexive 
film, and points toward both Streep‘s and Nichols‘ reputations by following a Hollywood actress 
who plays characters totally unlike herself (and who gives especially aural performances), and an 
―actor‘s director.‖  Harkening back to Nichols and May routines of children and their passive-
aggressive, overbearing mothers, Postcards‘ follows recovering drug addict and actress 
Suzanne‘s (Streep) relationship with her mother, the aging Hollywood musical star—and 
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 Those who work with Streep, from Cher and Ephron to Robert DeNiro, frequently cite her wit and humor as her 
most vivid qualities. See PE, 90, 91, 103, 116.  
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 Streep was nominated for an Academy Award for her largely comedic performance—a rare feat—though she 
maintains the psychological depth associated with melodramatic characters. 
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alcoholic—Doris Mann (Shirley MacLaine).299  Nichols adapted Postcards from the rehab-to-
riches novel/memoir by Carrie Fisher (who also wrote the screenplay), who had a highly 
publicized history with drugs and whose mother, Debbie Reynolds, was a legend of the 
Hollywood musical having starred as Kathy Selden in Singin’ in the Rain (Stanley Donen and 
Gene Kelley, 1952) and Tammy in Tammy and the Bachelor (Joseph Pevney, 1957).  Although 
she has appeared in many films, Fisher remains best known for playing Princess Leia in George 
Lucas‘ Star Wars (1977) franchise.  Fisher, Nichols‘ friend, sent the galleys of her book to him, 
and he saw a potential film, although not as written.  The book dwells on Suzanne‘s drug 
recovery, and the difficulties of dealing with men—whether they are agents or dates—in Los 
Angeles. Nichols wanted to draw on Fisher‘s life, but to focus on her relationship with her 
mother, which he knew of first-hand (Johnstone, 100).  In fact, in the first screenplay draft, 
Suzanne and her mother did not even share a scene (Johnstone, 101).
300
  The movie, however, 
intertwines Suzanne‘s attempts to become a working actor again with her relationship to her 
mother.   
 Postcards begins with a shot of the ocean.  The camera zooms out and pans left to reveal 
women moving through a line of people to board a plane home from some tropical country.  One 
woman, named Vicki, is summarily removed from line, beaten and interrogated by soldiers.  
Vicki, we surmise, is some sort of spy and fights back, declaring, ―All you‘ve got is money.  And 
there isn‘t enough mommy in the world to further a cause like yours… Fuck!‖  As Vicki and her 
captors realize she misspoke (―mommy‖ vs. ―money‖), they burst into laughter.  Vicki collapses 
into the soldiers‘ arms, laughing, before looking straight into the camera and apologizing.  As the 
camera tracks back, we learn we have been watching the filming of a scene for a movie starring 
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 The wonderful and prolific Hollywood character actor, Mary Wickes, also features in Suzanne‘s family tree by 
playing her grandmother.   
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 Nichols‘ declined Debbie Reynolds‘ offer to play ―herself‖ (Johnstone, 101).   
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the woman playing Vicki, Suzanne Vale.  The director, Lowell (Gene Hackman) 
compassionately takes the blame, saying it is ―[his] fault for trying to do it without any cuts.‖  
His remark directs our attention to the almost three minute long duration of the opening shot, one 
that does not just establish that this film will be about making movies, but functions as an inside 
joke by alluding to Nichols‘ own penchant for shots of extended duration.  Suzanne also 
complains about ―having to say all those words‖—another allusion to Nichols‘ movies, which 
privilege spoken words (such as Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?, Wit, and, as we shall see, 
Angels in America).  Suzanne takes a short break, and Lowell hears her taking drugs; when she 
returns, he tells her: ―You fuck up my movie… I‘ll kill you before you kill yourself, and I‘ll do a 
better job cause you‘re so out of it, you‘ll probably even botch that up.‖     
 As Postcards‘ opening titles appear on the screen, the ocean reappears, but this time, the 
camera zooms back and pans right to reveal a lavish home, and Suzanne comatose in bed after a 
drug overdose.  Lowell‘s prediction seems to have come true.  This cinematographic ―mirroring‖ 
provides a visual metaphor for the story‘s investment in contrasting fiction and reality, cinematic 
acting and ―acting in real life,‖ suggesting that we can compare them, but, as the ocean appears 
identical in each shot, we may never truly distinguish between them.  Suzanne ends up in a 
rehabilitation clinic where she participates in therapeutic role-playing exercises, and where she 
learns that she must think about the relation between her self and her actions: ―the behavior 
might be [suicidal],‖ she initially protests, ―but I was certainly not.‖   
 After she is released, Suzanne and her mother visit her agent, Marty Wiener (played by 
Borscht Belt comedian Gary Morton), who informs her that no insurance company will cover her 
while she films a new movie unless she moves back home with her mother (who must pledge to 
be responsible for her).  Suzanne and Doris constantly talk over one another (their long scenes of 
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overlapping dialogue provides much of the film‘s humor and adds to the film‘s litany of 
Nicholsian devices, e.g., in Virginia Woolf?).  Doris recounts the trials and tribulations of having 
a meeting while Louis B. Mayer was on the toilet (a story Nichols borrowed from Fisher‘s step-
mother, Elizabeth Taylor, who reports it happened to her), while Suzanne protests the idea of 
living with her mother.  Their bickering culminates when Doris attributes Suzanne‘s self-
deprecating humor to her ―generation,‖ and Suzanne, who resents being so reduced, retorts that 
―[she does not] have a generation.‖  Marty promptly tells her to get one.  Thus, while Doris 
openly claims her membership to the generation of classic Hollywood stars, Suzanne, like 
Streep, does not lay claim to an identifiable group of cinematic actors purporting to share a 
stylistic.  Their familial conflict is also a professional one.  We will see that Suzanne‘s quest to 
successfully perform (which is also Lowell‘s quest) becomes both the film‘s aesthetic and its 
subject.  When Suzanne, as Vicki, misspeaks, both Postcards and the diegetic film grind to a 
halt, and it will only be when that mistake has been repaired—when she learns to successfully 
create a character—that Lowell‘s film will be finished, and that Postcards can end.   
 Suzanne agrees to move back home with Doris, who has planned an elaborate surprise 
party for the occasion, much to Suzanne‘s dismay and Doris tells her to ―sing one of your old 
songs from my act.‖  Unlike the traditional star Doris, who performs by being herself, ―Suzanne 
was in the business of seeming—of entertaining people with her ways of seeming real‖ (my 
italics, Fisher, 112).  Like so many other of Nichols‘ protagonists, Suzanne must play a role 
despite her frustration at its demands (we might remember the party poor Ben was thrown by his 
parents in The Graduate).  Following Suzanne‘s meek delivery of Ray Charles‘ ―You Don‘t 
Know Me,‖ the crowd of party-goers (whom Doris has chosen, like Ben‘s parents) clamor for 
Doris to sing.  After a bit of mock-protestation that it is her ―daughter‘s night,‖ she belts out a 
 309 
piano-thumping, leg-baring number about her career, ―I‘m Still Here,‖ which thrills the diegetic 
crowd but only affirms the demise of her stardom to the film‘s spectator by protesting too 
much.
301
  The star of such films as That Marvelous Mrs. Markham, Doris is ever the diva, unable 
to conceive of herself as anything but a star of the old-fashioned variety; she never stops 
entertaining.  When she speaks, even alone with Suzanne, she mugs to an imagined audience, 
and when fighting with Suzanne, Doris asks, ―How would you like to have Joan Crawford for a 
mother? Or Lana Turner?‖ 
 Suzanne begins working on an action film playing a sexy cop, and directed by Simon 
Asquith (Simon Callow).  Postcards implicitly contrasts Simon with Lowell, the director of the 
film Suzanne threatens to ruin in the opening scene.  As we will see, Lowell is the ―good‖ 
director, the one who cares deeply about his film and his actors (and the fact that the long 
opening take is both in Lowell‘s and Nichols‘ movie encourages us to draw a parallel between 
them), while Simon is the ―bad‖ director.  On her first day of shooting (a pun made explicit as 
Suzanne, as the cop, is often seen ―shooting‖ back at the camera), Suzanne arrives on set and is 
informed there will be no rehearsals.  As she is being tied to a cactus and told there are live 
snakes in the shot, Simon swoops down from a crane and blurts out, ―Hello darling! Great day 
for it! You look glorious! Big kiss!‖ before ascending away.   
 Like the opening scene, which wrongfoots the spectator by not signaling itself as a 
diegetic movie set, Postcards utilizes reflexive devices, but is careful to reflect on the process of 
fictional filmmaking; it never fully exposes itself as constructed.  For example, we watch an 
entire scene play out between Suzanne and Jack—her love interest who is ―giving her his best 
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 In another level of reflexivity, the film refers to MacLaine‘s own legendary career during this song, whose 
original words have been changed to allude to her public espousal of reincarnation: ―I‘m feeling transcendental. Am 
I here?‖  Though maybe less explicit, what better way to allude to Streep‘s lack of recognizable persona than to sing 
―You Don‘t Know Me‖?   
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lines‖—as they walk along a suburban street only to see the houses suddenly carted away, 
revealing a parking lot.  However, this disruption of the mise-en-scène does not interrupt the 
characters‘ actions or disorient us in a particularly threatening way, and although spectators 
might be tempted to think that it gives us the ―real parking lot‖ behind the set, the comedic 
timing of the ―revelation‖ feels so meant that it thwarts our ability to determine if the parking lot 
we see is ―real‖ or another set for this film.  Thus, Postcards‘ reflexivity is not in the service of 
positing an extant ―truth‖ by attempting to convince the spectator that revealing cinematic spaces 
as constructed or fictional will provide her access to ―reality.‖   
 On her second day of shooting, Suzanne is met by the ―holy trinity‖ of producers, each of 
whom complain about her first day‘s performance.  Postcards satirizes the advice given by those 
who do not understand the craft of acting; the producers offer such vague statements as ―You‘re 
holding back.‖ and ―Enjoy it more.‖  One goes so far as to share the secret that, ―in comedy, it‘s 
a rule: inflections go up at the end of a line,‖ which Suzanne immediately derides by asking 
―That‘s a comedy rule?‖ as her voice rises.  Suzanne then overhears Simon and the costume 
designer discussing her body, worrying that if she lies down ―her tits are gonna move off into her 
armpits.‖  By the time Suzanne arrives on set, she angrily confronts Simon.  Simon, who has 
pompously told her to ―just have fun with it,‖ excitedly responds to her fury: ―But this is it! 
That‘s it! That‘s her! That‘s the character; that‘s the quality I‘ve been looking for, now what 
you‘re doing!‖  Suzanne screams, ―But Simon, this is not relaxed! This is incredibly upset!‖  
Simon then leads her back to her mark, telling her it will all be all right if she will ―just be 
[herself].‖  Suzanne is unable to perform her next scene, which calls for her to dangle from a 
ledge and in which she should, in fact, be incredibly upset.   While Postcards‘ revelation of 
mise-en-scène as mise-en-scène is typically amusing, this scene reverses the trend by showing 
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the creation of a set.  Suzanne lies flat on the set of a building, arms extended over head to 
appear as though she is holding onto a ledge set piece.  However, the rear projection screen is 
blank, so the illusion does not work for us.  Later on, when she returns to filming this scene, the 
spectator sees the mise-en-scène constructed (the rear projection is activated to provide the street 
scene ―below‖ Suzanne).  Despite rendering the illusion obvious, when Suzanne, upset, can only 
mutter a half-hearted, ―Help,‖ before throwing her hands up in exasperation and letting go of the 
ledge, her movement shatters the cinematic illusion and provides one of the film‘s biggest 
laughs.  
 This scene is possibly a dig at the Method school of acting which recommends its actors 
use their own affective experiences to achieve realism in their performances.  Insensitive director 
Simon was invented for the film (like all the filmmaking scenarios), and the casting of Simon 
Callow is significant.
302
  Callow is also a scholar of stage and screen acting in his own right.  He 
notes the historical importance of performances, such as Marlon Brando‘s in On the Waterfront 
(Elia Kazan, 1954), associated with the Method (as developed by Strasberg, and despite the fact 
that Brando did not study with him, but with Stella Adler), but derides its effectiveness, 
suggesting that Brando‘s style strives to appear merely like ―not acting.‖   Postcards was 
Callow‘s first appearance in Hollywood film, which he describes as ―ideal‖ (SA, 302).  
According to Callow, Nichols called him the day after seeing him in Alan Bennett‘s play Single 
Spies, and ―vow[ed] to never make another film without [him] in it (my italics, SA, 302).  Callow 
admits that, ―it was a Chinese box of a Pirandellian puzzle, this part‖ (SA, 304), but heralds 
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 Callow‘s theoretical (and biographical) examinations of acting, Being an Actor (1986) [BA] and Shooting the 
Actor (2003) [SA] testifies not only to his learnedness and training, but also to the energy and insight that acting 
requires. Originally trained in the Stanislavski method, the theatrical method which has had more influence on stage 
and screen acting than any other in the 20
th
 Century, Callow summates that, ―Stanislavsky is based squarely on the 
concept of Action: that everything in a play is done in order to achieve a want of some kind‖ (BA, 19).  The 
performer prepares by formulating reasons the character‘s actions in an effort to depict intentionality to the 
spectator.    
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Nichols‘ ability to trust his actors, which ―radiates its way out to the actors, empowering and 
liberating them.‖  Callow finds this perfectly predictable as ―the man is, after all, one of the most 
brilliant performers in the history of comedy, and his conversation is a form of directing by 
example, so perfect is his phrasing and timing‖ (SA, 303-304).  Furthermore, Callow contrasts 
Nichols with directors, such as Milos Foreman, who announce ―there shall be no acting‖ on their 
sets (SA, 16).  He writes that, "[t]o approach a character with the negative thought that one 
mustn't act is impossible‖ (SA, 67), for to deny the actor the possibility of acting is to deny her 
existence.   
 Suzanne‘s ―Help!‖ scene also alludes to Denis Diderot‘s famous paradox, which holds 
that in order for an actor to move her audience, she must remain unmoved herself (assuming that 
an actor who gives herself over to the inner life of a character produces unstable and inconsistent 
performances, often inappropriately calculated for the arena of the performance).  For Diderot, 
―the great actor undermines the belief that we can distinguish between being and acting‖ 
(Kouvaros, 73).  Suzanne is indeed in need of help; having attempted suicide, she feels unloved 
by her mother, struggles to resist the lure of drugs, and has just had her professional life 
excoriated by those criticizing her talent and physical appearance.  However, she is unable to 
deliver a convincing imitation of helplessness, or rather, she does deliver a gesture of 
helplessness (throwing her hands up and whimpering), but it is not the right gesture of 
helplessness.  This substitution of Suzanne‘s gesture for the metafictional character‘s is 
analogous to the substitution of parking lot for suburban houses, except here, the difference is 
located in our perception of the action‘s motivation.  
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Existing Through Sound 
 After discovering that her agent has absconded with all of her money, Suzanne has it out 
with her mother, confessing her years of resentment for Doris‘ bad parenting.  Doris, predictably, 
refuses to take the blame and the two yell at each other in rather clichéd dialogue.  That this 
mother-daughter showdown occurs on the stairs of their house calls to mind Thomas Elsaesser‘s 
observation of this trope in the history of Hollywood family melodramas, such as Imitation of 
Life (Douglas Sirk, 1959) and Mildred Pierce (Michael Curtiz, 1945), films which also feature 
mothers and daughters who perform for a living, who compete for the affections of men, 
audiences, and each other (Grant, 386).  Upset by this showdown, Suzanne swallows (and 
vomits) pills before heading to a looping session for Lowell‘s film, where her story of finding 
herself—of figuring out how to separate from her mother, and be the actress she wants to be—
can finally be resolved.   
 That Suzanne works through her problems in this space resonates with Fisher‘s novel: 
―Suzanne identified herself in her voice.  She was as close as she ever got to being whoever she 
was when she was talking.  She existed through sound‖ (172).  Significantly, the ingénue 
Fisher‘s mother Debbie Reynolds played in Singin’ in the Rain offers her voice up as that of a 
beautiful, but vocally unfortunate, star, and whose future career is threatened when that star tries 
to force her to continue doing it.  However, for the musical‘s ballads, Reynolds‘ own voice was 
replaced by another, and it seems that the sins of the mother have been visited upon 
Suzanne/Fisher, who must reconcile the disruption of her own voice and image.   
 Suzanne arrives at the looping session to be confronted by Lowell and her flubbed 
―mommy‖ line.  She sets out to dub the line, to repair the appearance of unity between her 
character‘s mind and body (which, in this case, requires Suzanne to diminish the aural traces of 
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her own psyche and, though still her with her own voice, to speak words proper to the character).  
After she successfully replaces ―mommy‖ with ―money‖ (now a commentary on Suzanne‘s 
transitioning identity from daughter to working actress), she watches the playback, and, abashed, 
begins to cry—both pleased and frightened by the idea of no longer having her ―mommy‖ hang-
ups to blame for her actions.  Lowell notices the tears and attempts to console her.  He asks her: 
―You‘ve gone back and fixed the past, what could possibly be the matter?‖  Lowell‘s question 
reminds us that we, as spectators, typically assume we are seeing an actor‘s best takes—unlike at 
the theater where visible mistakes can be integrated, ignored, or papered over, but never undone.  
But it is not just being granted the fantasy of repeating one‘s actions, of changing the 
consequences of the past, which compels Suzanne‘s tears.  Lowell‘s counsel is reminiscent of 
psychoanalysis, and inspires Suzanne to realize her responsibility for her own choices, as well as 
her feelings about her mother.
303
  She tries to tell him what it was like growing up in Hollywood 
with a star-mother, confessing to him: ―I just can‘t feel my life.‖  Lowell tells her to grow up and 
reject the cycle of parental abuse, to live her own life.  When she responds positively, he accuses 
her of liking his advice ―because it sounds a little like movie dialogue.‖  She admits that is her 
pathology: ―I don‘t want life to imitate art, I want life to be art.‖   
  This scene makes the aural constitution of a cinematic character perspicuous, for despite 
her convincingly rebellious facial expression in the shot, her verbal slip renders it unusable—
since it is a realist film being made.  And in realist film, the aim is to create a figure that is 
convincingly human, who is present to the events of the narrative; the flawed visual image can 
remain, but not the flawed aural one.  If we see the version with ―mommy‖ in it, we know 
Suzanne is not acting, that she has failed at her task.  Contradicting Simon‘s advice (and the 
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 While I hesitate to affix the biographical to the textual, we might recall that Nichols originally set out to become 
a psychoanalyst at the University of Chicago (Gussow, 96). 
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Method‘s notion of drawing on the actor‘s own life experiences), being herself equals failing to 
perform.  Unlike the filming of Simon‘s movie, the exposure of the mechanics of filmmaking in 
the looping session does not underscore the artifice of cinematic acting for the spectator, but 
convinces us that a successful performance is an art, a result of an actor acting, being in another 
way than her ―real‖ self.  By reuniting body and voice, Suzanne creates the image of a moment, 
of a present in which Vicki is present, and reminds us of the pretense of acting, of its 
inauthenticity.   
 After Suzanne corrects ―the past,‖ Lowell informs her that he has another job for her, 
relying again on her vocal talents by casting her as a Patsy Cline type figure.  This unexpected 
windfall for Suzanne is complemented by the long shot that follows in which we see her embrace 
Lowell in front of her revised performance.  She whispers to him, ―Thank you, God.‖  That the 
actor‘s director, Lowell, creates the role for her (we do not learn of a writer) and becomes ―God‖ 
for her is faithful to Postcards‘ overarching metaphor of cinematic acting as living.  The final 
scene begins with Suzanne in costume, having her country-western style hair and makeup 
touched up.  The shot pans over to Lowell in the director‘s chair and her mother Doris amidst the 
crowd of crew members.  Suzanne takes to the soundstage and a clapboard displays the title of 
the film, Blue Rodeo.
304
  She starts, in a strong Southern accent, to sing a song (and there is no 
dubbing here) called ―I‘m Checkin‘ Out.‖  The refrain—―I‘m checkin‘ out of this heartbreak 
hotel‖—may at first suggest the exchange of heartbreak for happiness, but as the song ends, 
Lowell says, ―Cut. Print.‖ We then see another clapboard, upside down, but here the title of the 
film is not Blue Rodeo, but Postcards From the Edge, with Mike Nichols listed as director and 
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Michael Ballhaus as cinematographer.
305
  Thus, the film ends as it begins: Suzanne is making a 
movie for Lowell.  In the light of this framing device, and given the equation of Lowell with 
God, the lyrics take on funereal connotations.  If Suzanne‘s initial, failed performance for Lowell 
resulted in a failed suicide attempt, she now seems to be a success in both respects.
306
  Unlike 
Suzanne‘s suicide as the opening credits rolled, she now has an adoring audience to witness her 
act of self-effacement as this country western singer.  After the clapboard sounds the end of the 
film, and the final credits roll, logic would dictate Suzanne could not persist, but ―God‖ grants 
Suzanne an afterlife, for she begins a lively, gospel reprise of ―I‘m Checkin‘ Out.‖  Perhaps, 
though, this scene is an appropriate ending for a film about Streep‘s talent for portraying living, 
thinking beings, for what signals a character‘s mortality more than the prospect of death?   
 
The Voice of Streep 
 Reminding us that an actor need not be more identical to her character than singer to 
song, the country-western singer Suzanne plays in Blue Rodeo hardly resembles the Suzanne we 
have come to know.  In this sense, Postcards‘ diverges from many Hollywood classics like Show 
People (King Vidor, 1928), Morning Glory (Lowell Sherman, 1933), Stage Door (Gregory 
LaCava, 1937), and Singin’ in the Rain which offer representations of actors learning what it 
means to successfully perform.  In each of these films, the actor successfully performs when 
acting ―like herself,‖ that is, when closing the gap between character and actor.  Postcards 
contrasts Suzanne‘s triumphant transformation with Doris‘ stardom, which it labels old-
fashioned.  In the end, Doris is resigned to watching from the sidelines in the end, making way 
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 Ballhaus is also Martin Scorsese‘s frequent collaborator, and was cinematographer for fifteen of Rainer Werner 
Fassbinder‘s films, another director known for exploring the work of performing.   
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 Shel Silverstein, poet and children‘s author, was nominated for an Oscar for writing this song for the film.  
Suicide is a frequent subject in Silverstein‘s work.   
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for Suzanne to sing.  Jean-Louis Commolli describes how, as spectators of classical Hollywood, 
we know that, ―it is [the actor] and it is not, always and at the same time; we believe in it and we 
do not, at the same time‖ (Kouvaros, 74).  Nevertheless, Doris (like the narratives of these classic 
films) encourages her audience not to worry about this distinction and to enjoy a seamlessness 
between actor and character; she reinforces the epistemological desire to know the ―real‖ star by 
attending to the presence of the star‘s persona.  Suzanne‘s character choices encourage her 
audience to believe that it simply cannot know the difference.   
  Leo Braudy writes that, ―the film actor… works on his self-image, carries it from part to 
part, constantly projecting the same thing—‗himself‘‖ (423).307  André Bazin considered the 
classical Hollywood star system‘s promise of the presence of a star in relation (if not opposition) 
to Italian neorealism, which, by essentializing particular qualities (usually an actor‘s class 
background) purported to heighten a fictional films‘ realism by employing ―real‖ people who 
were ―really like‖ the characters of the story.308  Bazin further applauds neorealism‘s 
documentary-like perspective on the grounds that its employment of ―real people‖ as actors 
guarantees authenticity: ―In these films, the very concept of actor, performance, character has no 
longer any meaning. An actorless cinema? Undoubtedly‖ (What is Cinema, Vol. II [WCII], 56).  
Hence, both the classic star system and neorealism require versions of believing the actors play 
themselves, that the characters are ―really like‖ the actors playing them; both rely on the 
assumption that a spectator perceives a ―core‖ personality.  A major difference between the 
ideals of these two casting systems relies on essentialism and the spectator‘s knowledge.  Bazin‘s 
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 This resonates with Strasberg‘s declaration that, in the Method, the ―actor performs himself‖ (Bartow, 8).  
Besides blurring the line between documentary and fiction, this fusion of the actor and her role may explain the 
Method‘s adoption by Hollywood, whose star system, after all, classically invited such equation.     
308
 We should wonder at the assumption that an actor who grew up, say middle class, understands her classness—
and how to depict it—better than others.  I fear it assumes a level of self-awareness most people do not demonstrate 
(or the class system might have changed long ago). 
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theorization of the effects of neorealism involve the spectator having knowledge of the actor‘s 
background so that she can essentialize the person through that knowledge, and then perceive an 
overlay of types on screen.  The Hollywood star system, on the other hand, revels in the 
individualities created by the star; unlike audience members who guard their social differences, 
stars stake their fortune on being unique (which, if they ascend to stardom, ironically becomes a 
type).  I am reminded again of Singin’ in the Rain‘s scenes of film spectators who boo the actor 
who plays a villain or believe that the on-screen couple are in love off-screen.   
  Streep appears to take neither of these roads; the spectator knows little of her ―authentic‖ 
experience and she, according to Carroll, does not present the spectator with a consistent 
individuality.  Streep‘s avoidance of being typed could be seen to offer the spectator the fantasy 
of a self beyond the realm of representation, or, conversely, of a refusal of the idea of a core self 
altogether.  In the last chapter, I quoted Nichols saying that ―Movie acting was invented less than 
100 years ago — movie acting with sound.  You know how Harold Bloom says that Shakespeare 
invented us? It‘s a fascinating idea, and you can go quite far with it. You could say that it‘s in 
talking movies that inner life begins to appear‖ (McGrath, 2).  I paired Nichols‘ thought with a 
similar claim from Leo Braudy, who offered the view that American cinema‘s preoccupation 
with ―the paradox of the actor‘s body—its physical presence and its metaphysical absence, its 
visibility and its invisibility, body and mind, action and meditation‖ is predicated on the advent 
of sound (215).  James Naremore, too, notes that, ―since 1927 [regarded as the year ―talkies‖ 
emerged] all forms of actorly expression—gestures, movements, facial grimaces, and especially 
voices—have been rendered in the tones of everyday conversation, more or less conforming to 
the usage of the movie audience‖ (47).  As we saw in Postcards‘s climactic looping scene, the 
technological synchronization of aural to visual image does not simply augment the drama of the 
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visual or the naturalism of the performance.  While much has been written about the spectral 
visual presence of an on-screen human, the looping scene reminds us of the aural absence of the 
performer, too. 
 Bazin‘s notion that there are no ―wings‖ at the cinema (referring to how the theatrical 
spectator may choose to remind herself that a character walks off-stage while the frame of the 
screen is harder to attend to) is at least as accurate in the case of the spectator‘s aural experience, 
which surrounds her.  He thinks it is the verbal quality (―which refuses to let itself be captured in 
the window of the screen‖) that inspires some to rank theater aesthetically higher than the visual 
cinema (WC, 107).  Speaking of the plays of great writers (Racine, Shakespeare, Moliere), Bazin 
asserts that, ―[w]hat is specifically theatrical about these tragedies is not their action so much as 
the human, that is to say the verbal, priority given to their dramatic structure‖ (my italics, WC, 
106). For Bazin, the dramatic element is that which exists in theater and cinema, and which can 
be transposed between them.  It should not surprise us, then, that Streep, who draws such 
attention to her characters‘ verbal lives, has been so valorized for creating deeply vivacious, 
robust characters.   
 Streep has been more celebrated for her linguistic talents than any other skill, and more 
than any other actor.  Streep does not simply pronounce scripted words differently with each 
character; every Streep character speaks with a different linguistic melody, rhythm, intonation, 
pitch, etc.  She is known for performing more recognizable accents and dialects than any other 
cinematic performer in history.
309
  Although Streep never repeats a hairstyle and her costuming 
is always thoughtful (typically, she works with legendary costume designer Ann Roth), her 
characters are more readily distinguishable aurally than visually.  She has served spectators‘ ears 
through articulating flawless accents, from Irish (Dancing at Lughnasa) to New Zealander (A 
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 For more on Streep‘s reputation for performing accents, see Hollinger, 90. 
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Cry in the Dark) to period Danish (Out of Africa [Sidney Pollack, 1985]).  Her American 
characters are also aurally diverse, from her upstate New York mother in One True Thing to the 
breathy drawl of her character in She-Devil (Susan Seidelman, 1989).  In Sophie’s Choice, Streep 
not only delivered her English dialogue in a staggering Polish accent, she spent months actually 
learning Polish, so that Sophie could grow out of that form of life.  In the scenes in which she 
speaks to her German Nazi captor, her German dialogue has an impeccable Polish accent.  She 
tells us that, ―[she] wanted to feel that [she] could live inside the language‖ (TK, 293).  
Johnstone informs us that, ―Streep wanted her character to think in Polish and let her diction and 
expression come from that‖ (xii).  Besides vocal prosody, her performances are replete with 
effects designed to give the impression of a character coming to her words in the moment; she 
employs ungrammatical phrases, frequently corrects herself, stops sentences short, mumbles, 
pauses, verbally trips over her words, etc.
310
    
Michel Chion states that American actors attend to vocal accents especially, citing Streep 
as an example (172-173).  Chion claims that, ―[i]n France, hardly any actors modify their voices‖ 
(173).  On a similar note, British actress Diana Rigg once professed that, since the written text is 
so important due to England‘s superior writers, British actors undergo a great deal more vocal 
training than Americans, resulting in robust voices unable to compete with the American actor‘s 
―capacity for subtext‖ (Probst, 69).   Since ―the viewer cannot predict what voice… Streep might 
have in the newest film,‖ Chion argues, ―the audience becomes aware of the voice as an entity 
distinct from the body, even when it comes from the very center of the image‖ (173).   
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 Classic Hollywood American actresses like Bette Davis and Katherine Hepburn typically steered clear of accents.  
Davis was never able to tame her clipped rhythm, while Hepburn struggled mightily with her distinctive New 
England tones (as her attempt at a poor Appalachian faith-healer in Spitfire [John Cromwell, 1934] exemplifies). 
Performers like Garbo and Ingrid Bergman liberally applied their Swedish accents to English-speaking characters.  
Sometimes narrative explanation was offered, though the spectator was typically aware of their Swedish origins. 
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 Streep, though, has grown weary of the attention to her voice.  In a discussion with 
Nichols and the cast of Angels in America, an interviewer asked Emma Thompson, ―was it 
intimidating to do all those characters in front of the queen of accents?‖ (Ansen and Peyser [AP], 
1).  Streep immediately protested, and although she professed to appreciate the reputation that 
built up around her vocal prowess she copped to hating such praise: ―It‘s like saying, ‗I really 
like you because of your feet‘‖—at which point, Nichols chimed in to remark, ―[t]hat‘s a very 
good simile‖ (AP, 1).  Given that feet are the classic objects of fetishization, perhaps Streep 
suggests that isolating her vocal performance disavows its relation to other aspects of her 
performance style, and, more importantly, the knowledge of its product (the character).  She may 
also be objecting to the focus on her voice as a way of disavowing the fact that voices (or any 
sounds) are not properties of on-screen objects and, that multiple voices can ―belong‖ to one 
body while still remaining ―of‖ that body.   
 Just like Debbie Reynolds‘ performance in Singin’ in the Rain attested (at the level of 
narrative and production), Postcard‘s looping scene confronts the spectator with this potential 
trauma.  Suzanne‘s realization, ―I just can‘t feel my life,‖ is also an expression of dissociation 
(which according to Johnstone is the line that made Streep want to do the film [98]).  With this 
climactic scene and its story of an actress who plays characters unlike herself, I do not think it is 
a coincidence that Postcards is the one film which critics and audiences think may provide a 
glimpse of the ―true‖ Streep (DVD Commentary; TK, 294).  Streep has said that, ―Suzanne is 
very insecure and doesn‘t feel authentically herself.  She‘s more like the vernacular me than any 
character that I‘ve played.  Her insecurities are mine‖ (my italics, Johnstone, 98).  It led one 
interviewer to ask her whether people ever see ―her,‖ or, because she is always acting, only see a 
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character.  Streep replied, ―I would say you always see me‖ (TK, 294).  To that we should add 
that we always hear her.   
  Through his comedy team with Elaine May, Nichols‘ career is also rooted in vocal 
characterizations.  Indeed, he has stated that his two favorite acted moments in the history of film 
are when Garbo in Camille (George Cukor, 1936) exclaims, ―He's the youngest and handsomest 
man at the table‖ [Marguerite (Garbo) is speaking and catches herself mid-sentence with a little 
laugh], and when Meryl Streep in The French Lieutenant's Woman falls down, and then giggles‖ 
(Murray, 1).  By showing characters with such intense feelings that they will not be contained, 
these virtuosic moments are not just emotionally resonant; Streep and Garbo, by indicating 
spontaneity, call attention to their characters‘ thought processes.  It is as if the actions surprise 
even the characters.  Combining Bazin‘s association of the verbal and human elements with 
Aristotle‘s view that humanness starts with laughter and the fact that other animals are never 
embarrassed about what their bodies do, what could be more human than being embarrassed 
about one‘s laughter?   
 Camille‘s director, George Cukor, is widely regarded as Hollywood‘s quintessential 
―actor‘s director.‖311  Postcards alludes to another Cukor film.  Suzanne detects that Jack is 
being less than sincere and calls him out: ―Didn‘t Jimmy Stewart say that in a movie once?‖  He 
did, and the film was Cukor‘s The Philadelphia Story,312 the story of a woman berated for her 
(apparently justifiably) proud self-presentation.  Just as Nichols‘ films feature characters who 
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 Gene Phillips‘ book, George Cukor, chronicles Cukor‘s extensive career and widely celebrated reputation for his 
films‘ actors‘ performances. 
312
 Nichols once said that ―[o]ne of [his] favorite lines in any movie is in The Philadelphia Story: ‗The time to make 
up your mind about people is never‖ (Smith, 29).  This coincides with Nichols‘ belief (and advice to actors) that one 
of their principal tasks is to ―make the case‖ for their character regardless of their own judgments.  Jules Feiffer once 
said that, ―If movies hadn‘t changed so radically, what Mike would have been, perhaps should have been, is the 
successor to a director like George Cukor—working in romantic comedy with urbane wit and style.  But those times 
changed  (Lahr, 282-283).  Postcards also refers to the work of Jean Renoir, known for his poetic realism, through 
posters conspicuously placed in the mise-en-scène.  
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―perform‖ at some point, so Cukor‘s protagonists are typically compelled to ―perform‖ within 
the narrative—most often to (attempt to) capitulate to gender expectations while breaking down 
class barriers. Naremore discusses Hollywood‘s penchant for protagonists who struggle to self-
present in this manner, who ―act persons who are acting‖—a feature he deems 
―metaperformance‖ (72).  Closely reading Camille, he concludes: 
Thus, we could say that realist acting amounts to an effort at sustaining opposing 
attitudes toward the self, on the one hand trying to create the illusion of unified, 
individualized personality, but on the other suggesting that character is subject to division 
or dissolution into a variety of social roles. (72) 
 
For Naremore, a realist performance style relies on the possibility of performing unintentional 
actions: those which bubbles up from below and break through the surface of expressive 
coherence.  If realist acting, then, entertains us with a self split, the figure is triangulated by our 
perception of an actor‘s artistry.  In Postcards, Streep performs a character struggling to 
convincingly self-present and a character working to convincingly perform a character (in the 
diegetic films); thus, the film contrasts self-presentation and cinematic performance.  Streep, it 
seems to me, adds a third layer to the on-screen figure in the form of her own commentary 
running alongside Suzanne.  Streep is adept at just that style of performance that I quoted 
Nichols as valorizing in the introduction; he thinks that great actors both live their parts and 
simultaneously observe them.  They are ―inside and outside at the same time‖ (The Graduate 
DVD Commentary).  
Here, Nichols claims that to perform a character in a realist manner is not at odds with 
simultaneously commenting on the character (and the type of person the character intimates).  
This would seem to veer closely to the Brechtian-inspired formulations of politically 
―progressive‖ stylistics I described in the introduction as hostile to Hollywood‘s traditional style 
of realist performance, which was thought could lull the spectator into a passive and unaware 
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state.  However, Nichols, like Postcards and Camille, indicates that, this sort of cinematic acting 
never implied that notions like potentiality and contradiction were at odds with a workable 
notion of realism and personal identity.   
 
Angels in America: Characters Cracking Open 
 Streep and Nichols‘ fourth, and final, project together is Angels in America, which further 
comments on Streep‘s chameleonic reputation and destabilizes the spectator‘s perception of her 
identity.  Angels is set in 1985, and based on the Pulitzer Prize winning play which premiered on 
Broadway in 1993 [though it was first performed in 1990]).
313
  In the afterword to the source 
play, author Tony Kushner relates his Brechtian and Marxist views, asserting that, ―[a]nyone 
interested in exploring alternatives to Individualism and the political economy it serves, 
capitalism, has to be willing to ask hard questions about the ego, both as abstraction and as 
exemplified in oneself‖ (138).  He also concludes that, ―Marx was right: The smallest divisible 
human unit is two people, not one; one is a fiction.  From such nets of souls societies, the social 
world, human life springs. And also plays‖ (158).314  Angels is set in the 1980s, which witnessed 
AIDS, a rise in corporatism, globalization, and an increased attention to identity politics.
315
  
Kushner‘s claims return us to my introductory chapter, where I laid out Nichols‘ interest in 
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 Several critics claimed that due to its apocalyptic tone and representation of millennial anxiety and national 
trauma, Angels ―speaks to us more urgently than ever in the new [era] ushered in by 9/11‖ (Frank Rich, 1). Also, see 
McGrath.  Indeed, this is the thurst of Deborah Geis‘ article on the adaptation of the play to film.  I would not 
dispute that that day impacted the nation‘s self-consciousness, or that Angels is not relevant to that change.  
However, I do not count myself among the ―us‖ for which an enemy external to the nation renders Angels more 
urgent, symbolic, meaningful, or affecting than the knowledge of the years of epidemic and AIDS-related deaths of 
over twenty million Americans prior to its broadcast.   
314
 Angels extends this notion in complicated ways through its metaphorically charged corporealizations of social 
institutions, from government to law to religion to medicine.  As Roy, pleading with Joe to manipulate Washington 
politicians‘ influence on judges, sputters: ―This is gastric juices churning! This is enzymes and acids!  This is 
intestinal, is what this is: bowel movement and blood red meat.  This stinks.  This is politics, Joe.  This is the game 
of being alive.‖ 
315
 By ―identity politics,‖ I mean a contemporary politics which sought inclusion for certain previously defined 
categories of people along pre-established criteria, typically derived from definitions of race, class, and gender, but 
which eventually included markers connoting sexuality. 
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cinematic humans and in their behavior as expressive of the social, of the interpersonal as 
behavioral—and for behavior as the space of the interpersonal—calling attention to the 
phenomenon of expressivity, its role in communication, and, ultimately, the possibility of 
knowing other people.  Angels demands that we think about the confluence of these concerns, as 
well as others we have highlighted in subsequent chapters, such as the relation of stage and 
screen performance, to the use of silence, the influence of the 1960s social movements on more 
recent identity politics, representations of American masculinity, Jewishness, and the depiction 
of male homosexuality in American cinema.  For these reasons, it seems fitting to conclude with 
a look at this film.  
 Streep hails Angels as ―the crowning achievement of [Nichols‘] career…‖ (Goldfarb and 
Giles [GG], 1).  We might say the same of Streep‘s performance in it, for it best demonstrates 
her chameleonic persona by allowing her to play four characters within a single text.  She plays 
more roles than any other actor in the film: depicting a male rabbi, a Mormon mother (Hannah), 
an angel (more specifically, the angelic delegate from Australia), and a ―real‖ historical figure, 
Ethel Rosenberg.
316
   In a speech at the American Film Institute ceremony bestowing Streep with 
a Life Achievement Award, Nichols said 
When a great actor occurs, it changes several generations because human behavior is 
redefined. For other actors, Meryl is not only a life-giving force for those lucky enough to 
work with her since it immediately increases one‘s talent a thousand percent simply to 
look at her in a scene, but she also defines what is possible for an actor as an artist, as a 
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 Commolli‘s essay, ―Historical Fiction—a Body Too Much‖ presents the special difficulties in thinking about 
stars‘ depictions of historical persons.  He recognizes the importance of doubt/misrecognition of actor as character: 
―The ‗I know very well‘ irresistibly calls for the ‗but all the same,‘ includes it as its value, its intensity‖ (Kouvaros, 
167).  Though, it seems (unbeknownst to us) that even fictional characters may be performed as though based on 
real ones, for Streep has intimated that ―the rabbi embodied my father… I did go to Williamsburg and had some 
kreplach, you know, ‗to prepare‘‖ (Johnstone, 173).  Streep‘s lineage consists of Spanish Jews who adopted the 
Dutch word ―Streep‖ (meaning a straight line) as immigrants.  She also formed her rabbi by listening to ―tapes of 
people from different parts of Latvia and [listening] to them speaking about their lives… He‘s a wonderful 
character.  It was no work to do that.  It was just me‖ (Tichler, 306). It is tempting to posit relationships between 
these characters based on the fact that they are all played by Streep (and may even lead us to call her performance 
something like a collage).  I will not consider this approach to interpreting the text here.   
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parent, as a citizen.  Meryl creates, has created, and continues to create a series of unique 
human beings each with a soul, sometimes, as we‘ve seen as many as four people at a 
time.  
 
Perhaps because she plays more characters than in Angels that any other actor, or simply because 
she is Meryl Streep, she was often treated as the film‘s lead actress.317  Her performance is 
nothing if not virtuosic.  Her rabbi is probably her most extreme demonstration of chameleonic 
ability, and she consistently toes the line between tragic and comedic.  Playing multiple 
characters, all with different physicality and accents, allows us to further reflect on Streep‘s 
reputation as a shape-shifter (which may have ironically dampened the disruptiveness of the 
technique, as the audience has come to expect such changes from Streep).  
 Angels takes a hard look at America at the end of the Twentieth Century, centering 
around the condition of gay men during the onset of the worst epidemic America has ever 
known: AIDS.
318
  Gay men were first and most affected by AIDS.
319
  Kushner‘s play was radical 
in its subject matter, yet managed to reach a wide audience.  The play swept the Tony Awards of 
1993 and 1994 (its presentation in two parts qualified it both years), and critics raved: ―Some 
visionary playwrights want to change the world. Some want to revolutionize the theater. Tony 
Kushner… has the promise to do both.‖ (Rich, 1).  Susan Sontag deemed it ―a marvelous play, 
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 She, for example, reaped awards as a lead rather than supporting actress despite not having noticeably more 
screen time than other actresses.  This may be attributed, too, to the fact that the previous year was a banner one for 
Streep with her fascinating turns in Adaptation, (Spike Jonze, 2002) and The Hours (Stephen Daldry, 2002).  But it 
was for Angels that she won an Emmy and Golden Globe, propelling her into the most commercially successful 
period of her career.   
318
 Space prohibits this piece serving as a comparative study of the film and play, not because the similarities and 
differences are not interesting or potentially significant, but because it is a topic best left for its own paper.  I do 
want to point out that both Nichols and Robert Altman immediately saw the cinematic nature of the play.  As 
Altman says, ―the scenes are written like film scenes, so he‘s written it like a movie and put it on a stage‖ (Geis and 
Kruger, 228).  The play was passed around to directors like Robert Altman and Paul Hogan before Nichols came on 
board.  Altman gave several interviews about his plans for the project.  For one, see ―On Filming Angels: An 
Interview‖ in Approaching the Millennium.  HBO‘s broadcast was the most watched cable film/event of the year, 
and Angels was nominated for 21 Emmys, winning 11 (in all the major categories, losing only to other nominees in 
the same category.  It also dominated the Golden Globes.   
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 In both the film and its historical reception, the term ―gay‖ denotes homosexual; they were used interchangeably, 
and I will follow suit.  We might, of course, prefer to distinguish between the ideas of sexuality as property, basis of 
identity, and desire for an object choice.  
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which has made more of an impression on everybody than any play by an American in many, 
many years‖ (177).320  Harold Bloom immediately included it, as the final entry, in his canon in 
1994.  John Clum called Angels ―a turning point in the history of gay drama, the history of 
American drama, and of American literary culture… Characters thought dead miraculously 
appear.  The real and the dream merge.  Seemingly disparate actions are analogous.  Comedy and 
tragedy alternate and, at times, coalesce‖ (Johnstone, 169).   
 As Clum‘s comments suggest, Kushner‘s ―gay fantasia on national themes,‖ is not just a 
celebrated text; it is also a deep one.  In many respects, the inspiration for Angels is Walter 
Benjamin‘s reading of Paul Klee‘s Angelus Novus in Theses on the Philosophy of History.321  At 
one point, Streep‘s Hannah lets rip a scream that is at once perfectly terrifying and perfectly 
amusing, conveying Klee‘s angel‘s monstrousness and heavenliness.  David Savran observes that 
Klee‘s ―well-intentioned angel of history‖ is not unlike Benjamin himself, writing in Europe in 
1940, ―between the past, which is to say ‗catastrophe,‘ [which, for Benjamin, signifies human 
history] and an unknown and terrifying future‖ (17).    We can extend this, too, to Kushner‘s 
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 Sontag was an important public voice for AIDS in the 1980s.  Her ―The Way We Live Now,‖ was one of the first 
fiction piece to address the disease in 1986.  It is composed of telephonic conversations, gossip, and hearsay in 
which the reader is inundated with names of everyone but the dying man , evoking the fear that was not just the 
result of unthinkable death, but induced by confusion about the disease itself.  For more on this subject, see William 
Haver‘s The Body of This Death: Historicity and Sociality in the Time of AIDS.  In 1991, Nichols founded Friends 
Indeed (with Carnal Knowledge actress Cynthia O‘Neal), an AIDS care organization.  Postcards‘ longest shot (and 
remember that in the opening scene Nichols owns long takes as a marker of his style, his voice), Suzanne confronts 
a woman about whether she slept with Jack.  The woman‘s immediate response is, ―I thought you were from some 
sort of celebrity AIDS notification service.‖  This reference to AIDS was rather progressive for commercial cinema.  
In an interview for The Advocate, Nichols was asked why Hollywood had yet to make a film about AIDS.  He 
replied, ―In Hollywood it takes ten or fifteen years‖ (Greco, 68).  Longtime Companion (Norman René) was the first 
film to reach a wide audience dealing with the subject in 1990 (and also featured Mary-Louise Parker, who stars in 
Angels).  HBO‘s groundbreaking And the Band Played On (Roger Spottiswoode) did not air until 1993.   
321
 Here is the thrust Benjamin‘s description of Klee‘s painting: ―A Klee painting named ―Angelus Novus‖ shows an 
angel looking as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating.  His eyes are staring, 
and his mouth is open, his wings are spread.  This is how one pictures the angel of history.  His face is turned toward 
the past.  Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon 
wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet.  The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has 
been smashed.  But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the 
angel can no longer close them.  This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while 
the pile of debris before him grows skyward.  This storm is what we call progress.‖ (―Theses,‖ 257-258) 
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situation as a self-identifying gay writer living in New York City as AIDS descended.  The two-
part play was trimmed slightly to create an almost six hour TV miniseries which Nichols 
directed.  While I ultimately want to look at this operatic text through the window of Streep and 
the performance-related concepts she invokes, it is something of a mosaic; hence, I will try to 
provide a sketch of complicated political issues raised by the film while still bearing in mind our 
larger attempt to elucidate the historical position of Streep and Nichols‘ films. 
 In AIDS and Its Metaphors, Susan Sontag writes of the apocalyptic atmosphere during 
the advent of AIDS in the 1980s.  Though she states that no sort of person would go untouched 
by the disease, it was, at that time, primarily regarded as a source of panic for male urban 
homosexuals and the social liberals who loved them.  Intravenous drug users and those in need 
of blood transfusions were also at risk, but popular attention—and blame—gravitated towards 
male homosexuals (a sentiment still with us; it remains illegal for people who so identify to 
donate blood.)  This was in no small part a result of very loud and influential political and 
religious leaders, such as televangelist Jerry Falwell and Senator Jesse Helms, who envisioned 
AIDS as proof that God was finally seeing to the task of exterminating the most perverse group 
of Americans, and thus morally cleansing the nation by punishing it for beginning to wonder if 
homosexuals should count as citizens.  President Ronald Reagan‘s communications director, Pat 
Buchanan, decreed AIDS to be ―nature's revenge on gay men.‖  Thus, the nation‘s response to 
the disease shed a bright light on the political importance of identity politics; it showed that 
laying claim to a particular identity could cost you the right to life. 
 The government‘s disdain required gay men to fight to be acknowledged as citizens, and 
AIDS was quickly placed in the service of socio-political conservatives preaching ―against all 
that is called, for short (and inaccurately), the 1960s‖ (Sontag, 151).  After our look at The 
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Graduate in chapter one, perhaps we should not be surprised to learn that silence was again 
politicized.  Activist groups began to advertize the slogan ―Silence=Death,‖ partly a form of 
attacking Reagan, who committed one of history‘s most meaningful silences (and toyed with the 
line between epidemic and genocide) by refusing to even mention AIDS in public until 1986, 
after five years and tens of thousands of American deaths, much less devoting any resources to 
stemming and researching the disease.   
 Sontag relates that AIDS created the paradox of a victim who was also guilty (99).  
Paradox or not, it gave new urgency to the gay liberation movement that had begun in the late 
1960s and created a new sense of identity among homosexual men.  She compares the cultural 
discourse surrounding AIDS to that of cancer: ―For several generations now, the generic idea of 
death has been a death from cancer, and a cancer death is experienced as a generic defeat.  Now 
the generic rebuke to life and to hope is AIDS‖ (112).  Sontag sees the replacement not just of 
cancer‘s broad applicability with AIDS‘ specificity, but of the view of those afflicted.  Cancer 
patients were individuals, each of whom felt ―a betrayal by one‘s body;‖ they asked, ―Why me?‖ 
(112).  AIDS, however, created a ―community of pariahs,‖ who were all too certain how they got 
it—and since it was assumed to be not just a result of sex, but of promiscuity, of anal intercourse, 
in short, of ―perversity,‖ acquiring it was judged especially harshly (114).  In fact, Sontag tells 
us, ―[t]he illness flushes out an identity that might have remained hidden from neighbors, 
jobmates, family, and friends‖ (113).  Thus, AIDS was understood to be a consequence of illicit 
actions, precipitating a change in attitudes toward sex; for those who recognized the danger, it 
meant a distrust of one‘s basic desires.   
 The potential imbrications of sexual and suicidal desires, in turn, affected ideas of 
personal experience—and cinematic actors depict human experiences.  Bazin argued that the 
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cinematic actor is forever reacting to his environment: ―the screen man is no longer the focus of 
the drama, but will eventually become the center of the universe‖ (106).  As I quoted in the 
introduction, Nichols has avowed that, ―A director creates behavior‖ (Playboy, 72) and that his 
favorite question to ask is ―what is this really like?‖ (Rose, 1998).  Angels indicates ways we can 
connect these shifts in American thinking about desire, the consequences of desire, economics, 
and selfhood to the contemporaneous culture that embraced Streep‘s manner of depicting human 
agency.   
 
“I’m Not Good With Bodies” 
  Angels follows two central couples, Prior Walter (Justin Kirk)
322
 and Louis (Ben 
Shenkman) and Joe (Patrick Wilson) and Harper (Mary Louise Parker).  Suffering from AIDS in 
the 1980s in New York, Prior is chosen by jealous and disorganized angels who have been 
abandoned by God to ―preach stasis.‖  Louis, an articulate, intellectual ―word processor‖ for the 
Department of Justice, capable of expounding about politics for minutes on end, is unjust to 
Prior, and abandons Prior after he falls ill, unable to withstand the horrors of seeing his lover 
deteriorate.  Louis repents: ―I‘m not good with bodies.‖  Arguably, this, Louis‘ transgression, is 
the one judged most harshly by the film.  In the end, when Louis asks to be taken back by Prior, 
he is refused.   
 Prior‘s best friend, Belize (Jeffrey Wright), is an African-American nurse who is the most 
compassionate character in the film; he is an AIDS nurse who is assigned to care for the 
monstrous Roy Cohn (Al Pacino).  The historical Cohn was one of ―the first public victims of the 
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 David Savran points out that, ―Prior‘s very name designates his temporal dislocation, the fact that is he at once 
too soon and belated, both that which anticipates and that which provides an epilogue (to the Walter family, if 
nothing else, since he seems to mark the end of the line).  Prior Walter also serves as the queer commemoration of 
the Walter that came before—Walter Benjamin—whose revolutionary principles he both embodies and displaces 
insofar as he marks both the presence and absence of Walter Benjamin in this text‖ (18).   
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AIDS virus, an object lesson to the gay male community of the perils of internalized self-hatred‖ 
(Freedman, 93).  Angels‘ Cohn is haunted by the ghost of Ethel Rosenberg, whose death was 
caused by his machinations (and of which he is proud).  He functions as representative of a 
socially conservative politics eager to let countless die if power can be had.  Belize claims to be 
Cohn‘s ―negation,‖ and grants him forgiveness (―where love and justice meet‖).  Cohn has as an 
employee, Joe, a Republican who has ghost-written some of the most conservative legislation of 
the time.  Joe and his wife Harper are Mormons who have left Salt Lake and moved to New 
York.  Struggling to maintain his faith‘s requirements, Joe is a closeted homosexual, and his 
dissembling disturbs Harper; hence, she is addicted to ―little blue pills.‖  Eventually, Joe leaves 
Harper for Louis, though the relationship between the guilt-ridden liberal and the nonchalant 
reactionary cannot last.  Joe‘s mother, Hannah, rushes to New York after Joe ―comes out‖ to her, 
where she meets Prior and forms an unlikely bond with him.  This broad sketch indicates the 
interweaving of the film‘s plot lines, comingling which is reinforced by the repetition of actors 
across roles.  
   On stage, ―doubling‖ actors is common (historically stemming from budgetary 
concerns), and is more easily camouflaged as the body is not seen in the close-up detail cinema 
affords.  In the case of Angels, ―doubling‖ is misleading, not only because the actors often play 
more than two characters, but also because of the term‘s implicit ties to the device‘s theatrical 
history, which might underestimates its cinematic distinctiveness.  Jeffrey Wright also plays the 
angelic delegate from Europe and Harper‘s tour guide to her hallucinations, Mr. Lies.  Emma 
Thompson plays a homeless woman, Prior‘s nurse Emily, and the Angel (the ―Continental 
Principality of America‖).  Kirk not only plays Prior, but a leatherman in the park (which may be 
 332 
Louis‘ guilt-ridden projection), and Shenkman, besides Louis, plays the angelic delegate from 
Oceania.  Streep has said:  
The fact that people doubled and tripled in more than one part was one of the things that 
really had an impact on me when I saw the play, and I knew that there was something in 
that, that they weren't just saving money on the cast. There was some clue in there on 
how to read the whole play, some secret or something about what Tony Kushner feels 
about our common humanity. (GG, 2) 
 
Similarly, Tony Kushner thinks that, ―One of the smartest things Mike did was to not resist the 
essential gestures of the play—like the doubling [of roles by actors]‖ (GG, 2).323  
In an attempt to point toward the device‘s complexity, and since some actors play more 
than two characters, I will refer to it as ―overlapping‖ rather than ―doubling‖ (this terms also 
avoids the connotation of duplicity).
 
 In the history of American cinema, this use of performers in 
multiple roles is rather rare, and invites us to reconsider not only the relation between stage and 
film performance, but between the presence of the actor and the illusion of character.
324
  From 
Strasberg to Uta Hagen, the most pervasive theorists of cinematic acting, particularly in America, 
encourage aesthetic realism through techniques thought to heighten the illusion of seamlessness, 
for the spectator, between actor and character.  Angels, though, undermines our ability to 
evaluate performances as naturalistic—indeed we can never really be sure whether or not much 
of what we see is simply the result of Prior‘s fevered dreams.  Harper‘s hallucination, Mr. Lies, 
seems portrayed over-the-top, while Belize is portrayed in a realist mode. Shenkman‘s Louis is 
done in realist style.  Who can say what is naturalism for an Angel?   
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 Incidentally, Kushner himself appears in the film.  When Louis asks the rabbi about forgiveness after his 
grandmother's funeral, the two rabbis sitting with her are played by Kushner and author Maurice Sendak (who also 
collaborated on the book Brundibar with Kushner).  
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 The technique of using an actor in multiple roles is perhaps most associated with virtuosic comedic 
performances, such as the Monty Python corpus, or the work of comedic stars like Peter Sellers (Nichols has 
reportedly worked on a remake of Kind Hearts and Coronets [Robert Hamer, 1949] with Elaine May for years, 
though it has never gone into production).  In Shot/Countershot, Lucy Fischer points out a particular use of this 
device in women‘s melodramas made by Hollywood during World War II in which female identical twins are 
played by the same actress.  United through their oppositeness, Fischer shows how the sisters‘ complementarity (for 
example, as good and evil) reveals larger social attitudes (stemming from assumptions of woman‘s ―duality‖).   
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The formal redundancy of repeating actors focuses our awareness on the specific actions 
making up this character—that the actor is talking in this way instead of that, moving her hands 
this way instead of that, walking this way instead of that.
325
  Of course, we are greatly aided by 
narrative context and differences in costume, make-up, accents, gait, etc.  The technique 
simultaneously deepens our awareness of both the formal constitution of character and the 
actor‘s work.  We cannot reference Streep‘s performance in this film as we would another.  And 
although the rabbi is a caricature, the caricature is convincing.
326
  Similarly, her Ethel Rosenberg, 
a ghost returned from the dead seeking vengeance, could not be accurately described as realistic.  
While Hannah is perhaps the most naturalistic figure, she is also the funniest.  Like the film (and 
real people), each of Streep‘s characters is both funny and tragic.   
 At first glance, it may seem obvious that Nichols‘ decision to overlap roles suggests a 
potential multiplicity with regard to identity that could supplant the impression of a single 
autonomous subject.  Such a subject would be problematic for the avowedly socialist Kushner, as 
he could be charged with retaining ties to the kind of self-centeredness said to underpin 
American capitalism.  One question we might immediately ask of Nichols‘ adaptation is whether 
the technique of overlapping works the same on screen as it does on stage.  Beyond the fact that 
some characters are supernatural, that some are based on historical figures, and that some are 
simply highly strung, we might still say of them that they are portrayed in a psychologically 
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 We might think, too, of a film like Luis Bunuel‘s That Obscure Object of Desire (1977) or Todd Haynes I’m Not 
There (2007).  By having one character played by multiple actors, these films invert the relationship of Angels‘ 
actors and characters.  Here, rather than look for differences effected by one body, we infer consistency across 
several.  In 2009, Nichols, lamenting the constraints of Hollywood‘s increasing obsession with speed and profits, 
admitted that, ―[i]t‘s painful and hard to remember now how long and how carefully we worked… It can be done 
[now], of course, but it‘s just much harder — unless you‘re Buñuel, and I think about him pretty much every day. 
You have to look for a way to free yourself, and he had the best conceivable way: he just jumped to the surreal‖ 
(McGrath, 1).  Discussing his life in the 1980s and 1990s and spending ―part of every week going off to a memorial 
service,‖ Nichols also confessed, ―I, all my life, have thought about death most of every day‖ (Greco, 68).  We 
might well be reminded of his childhood flight from Nazi Germany, but also of his attachment to creating through a 
structuring absence. 
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 Apparently, it was possible to imagine meeting such a rabbi.  Anecdotes about Kushner and the crew‘s 
unawareness that Streep was on set when in costume as the rabbi abound.  
 334 
realistic manner.  They are all emotional, rational figures; we are never really confused as to any 
character‘s motivation for her actions, and those motivations are typically legible to other 
characters.  As I described above, psychological realism is not (and not at odds with) a 
naturalistic or Brechtian style of performance.   Typically, though, the Brechtian or reflexive 
mode allegedly urges the spectator to consider her own historical situation (as opposed to the 
nefarious illusion of a ―transparent‖ character).  Alternately, it has been argued that the 
presentation of psychologically realistic characters, who are thus necessarily individuals to some 
extent, obscures attention to broad social issues.
327
  Angels‘ overlapping of roles and 
performance styles serves as a place to investigate tensions between social and individual 
responsibilities, and social and individual histories.   
Angels‘ source play wears its Brechtianism on its sleeve, prohibiting blackouts that 
prevent the spectator from seeing scene changes, and recommending that ―[t]he moments of 
magic… are to be fully realized, as bits of wonderful theatrical illusion—which means it‘s OK if 
the wires show, and maybe it‘s good that they do‖ (5).328  Kushner‘s stage directions are 
reflected in the film‘s spectacular, but less-than convincing, animated digital effects.  After the 
success of Virginia Woolf in 1966, Nichols visited Berlin ―where he saturated himself in the 
Berliner Ensemble,‖ and ―mused over Brechtian theory,‖ which he said, ―has nothing to do with 
theater as magic, rather with theater as bread‖ (Gussow, 99).  Sontag asked publicly: ―How 
ambitious is Mike willing to be?  He‘s one of the few people in this country who could direct 
[Bertolt] Brecht properly‖ (Gussow, 98).  Angels demonstrates a more nuanced understanding of 
Brecht than the film scholarship I addressed in the introduction, which drew strict binaries 
between Hollywood (and its style of performance) and ―political cinema.‖  Brecht advocated 
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 See, for example, Peter Wollen‘s essay on Godard‘s Vent d’Est.  
328
 The first day of filming Angels, Kushner asked Streep to star in his new translation of Brecht‘s Mother Courage 
(the production premiered in 2006). 
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social commentary, combining ethics and politics.  While he attended greatly to economic 
inequity, and hoped social commentary could shed light on those issues, it was not for him the 
only means of encouraging self-awareness.  The fact that, for Brecht, living within an ideology is 
a psychological condition is not lost on Angels. 
 
A Whole Kind of a Person 
 We might think that overlapping roles in Angels attempts to illustrate that its characters‘ 
highly politicized identities are matters of performance.
329
  Prior screams, ―I am a gay man and I 
am used to pressure!‖ to the approaching Angel.  Belize lectures as a representative of African-
Americans; Louis does the same as a Jewish-American.  Clearly, Angels calls the essentiality of 
identity into question by overlapping roles; beginning with Streep‘s male rabbi, the film 
announces the idea that gender and ethnicity can be performed (at the level of casting, not the 
diegetic level like the above examples).  But what does it mean to say such categories are 
performed?  That a gap exists between a reality and fiction, bridged by actions we can think of as 
theatrical?  Or that they are simply the results of doings, completed like any action?  Of course, it 
can be both.  We have emphasized the importance of understanding actions in Nichols‘ films in 
both senses throughout this dissertation, from Benjamin Braddock‘s silences in The Graduate to 
Susan‘s facial expressions in Carnal Knowledge to George and Martha‘s utterances in Who’s 
Afraid of Virginia Woolf?.  Angels also gives us scenes of interpersonal actions (rare is the scene 
with more than two people—which makes the ending, where Hannah, Prior, Belize and Louis 
congregate, stand out all the more).   Angels, though, is not just asking us to think about the 
body‘s codedness and corresponding legibility; it pairs thinking about identity as performance 
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 This was a timely notion, given that Judith Butler‘s Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity 
was published in 1990.  It offers a view of gender and sexuality based on acts, which extends to thinking about such 
categories as culturally-guided performances. 
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with a sense of individual accountability.  Bringing both senses of performance together suggests 
that these characters‘ actions are still intended—they mean their Jewishness, gayness, African-
Americanness, etc.  (This is the root of the incessant fighting between Belize and Louis; Belize 
perceives Louis to be pitting the Jewish experience against the African-American one.)   
The challenge of seeing the on screen body as both individual and of a kind is established 
from the film‘s opening.  Angels begins with a Jewish funeral ceremony, a scene 
commemorating the mortality of the body, but not the soul.   After confessing he does not know 
the deceased, the rabbi says he does know this:  
She was not a person, but a whole kind of a person. The ones that crossed the ocean, that 
brought with us to America the villages of Russia, Lithuania.  And how we struggled. 
And how we fought for the family, for the Jewish home.  Descendants of this immigrant 
woman: you do not grow up in America.  You and their children and their children with 
the goyish names, you do not live in America.  No such place exists! Your clay is the clay 
of some Litvak shtetl, because she carries that old world on her back, across the ocean on 
a boat, and she put it down on Grand Concourse Ave…. or in Flatbush.  You can never 
make that crossing that she did, for such great voyages in this world do not anymore 
exist.  But every day of your lives the miles that voyage from that place to this one you 
cross.  Every day!  You understand me? In you, that journey is.   
 
Here, the American‘s body is collective, both past and present. The rabbi explains the collective 
Jewish identity as temporal, transitory, changing, a ―journey‖ and ―voyage,‖ not a static property.  
When the rabbi declares that, ―No such place [as America] exists,‖ his voice echoes as a voice-
over across a montage of ―real‖ photographs of immigrants arriving in New York.  The black-
and-white photographs function as icons of the women who carried the old world on their backs, 
but this montage also complicates his words.  As records of reality, the photographs show, 
beyond a doubt, that ―such a place‖ does exist—we are seeing it.  The use of photographs in this 
scene does (at least) three things: it establishes dialectics as the film‘s ruling principle; it informs 
us people matter, and that we must to attend to their representation, for they are history; and it 
tells us that film‘s indexical nature will be questioned.   
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 Jonathan Freedman writes of Kushner‘s ―epic-comic-tragic-fantastic drama‖ that, ―[n]o 
other text since Sodome et Gomorrhe in A la recherché has given such sustained and sympathetic 
attention‖ to ―the place where figurations of the Jew meet figurations of the sexual other, the 
deviant, the queer‖ (91).  Freedman informs us that, in the history of Western literature, the Jew 
has long been an emblem of alterity, and that this scene establishes that ―the archetype for the 
transformation of identity, which is the mark of queer experience and survival in the play, is the 
wandering, rootless, shape-shifting Jew who never finds a home‖ (92).  Who better to play the 
rabbi, then, than shape-shifting Streep?  
 Freedman, though, is worried about the play‘s assimilationist conclusion (which is 
retained by the film), for the ―fate of the Jew, like that of the queer, is to be eternally other even 
in the utopian land that proclaims itself a haven for all aliens.  [Yet, at] the end of the play, Prior 
proclaims, ‗We will be citizens,‘ underlining his own alienness even in the quest to overcome it‖ 
(Freedman, 92).  For Freedman, the text‘s ―vision of utopian identity‖ fails to do justice to its 
muse, Benjamin‘s ―Theses,‖ by relinquishing valuable modes of difference in favor of 
assimilation, rather than ―a utopian … politics inspired by but not limited to the definitionless 
difference culturally inscribed by the figure of the Jew‖ (92).  Freedman sees a combination of a 
Christian theme that stresses rebirth with a Shakespearean one that stresses ―regeneration 
through the creation of a new, redeemed community‖ (97-98).  I believe that Freedman 
underestimates the disruption of overlapping roles and overestimates the film‘s conclusion, 
which does end positively, but with those left standing debating about political issues (such as 
the state of Israel) with no clear resolution.  Progress here is just as messy as it is for Benjamin.   
 The rabbi‘s speech on Jewish identity also resonates with Sontag‘s description of the 
effect of AIDS which ―imposes on an act whose ideal is an experience of pure presentness (and a 
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creation of the future) a relation to the past to be ignored at one‘s peril.  Sex no longer withdraws 
its partners, if only for a moment, from the social.  It cannot be considered just a coupling; it is a 
chain, a chain of transmission, from the past‖ (160-161).  We might also hear echoes of Sontag‘s 
classic assertions in ―Notes on Camp‖: ―Jews and homosexuals are the outstanding creative 
minorities in contemporary urban culture… The two pioneering forces of modern sensibility are 
Jewish moral seriousness and homosexual aestheticism and irony‖ (290).  Angels is peppered 
with campy quotes, particularly from Prior, who, when moved by Hannah‘s kindness, quotes 
Blanche‘s final line from A Streetcar Named Desire and sings ―Wouldn‘t It Be Loverly‖ from 
My Fair Lady when afraid of the Angel‘s approach.  Camp, though, is not just Prior‘s tool for 
negotiating a hostile world; references contribute to the surrealist flavor of some scenes, such as 
when Prior dances with Louis in his bedroom, which opens up into a Busby Berkeley style set.  It 
is at once ―fabulous,‖ a fever dream and a ―dance of death.‖  I would like to turn, though, to the 
film‘s most avowedly surrealist scene, which is also crucial to understanding its commentary on 
cinematic performance, characters, and bodies.   
 
Cocteau in the Land of Oz 
Mostly bed-ridden, Prior is visited by the Angel‘s heralds who are his eponymous 
ancestors, two Prior Walters (Michael Gambon and Simon Callow) prior to him by many 
generations who inform him he is a prophet and to expect an angel.  When the angel arrives,
330
 
she explains to Prior that the movement of humans is responsible for great suffering in heaven.  
Human progress—migration, science, forward motion, imagination, exploration—causes quakes 
in heaven.  She testifies that, ―Our maker, our master grew weary of us, our songs, our 
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 The angel is described as hermaphrodite and having eight vaginas.  Since the role is played by Emma Thompson 
and appears female in the film, I will refer to the angel with the feminine pronoun to ease discussion.   
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fornications.  Seeking something new, God split the world in two, and made you, human 
beings… Uni-genitaled. Female, male. In creating you, our Father-lover unleashed his sleeping 
creation‘s potential for change. In you the virus of time began!‖  Fascinated by the movements of 
humans, God began to neglect his angels until, on April 18, 1906 (the day of the great San 
Francisco earthquake), ―He left.‖  The Angel charges Prior with the responsibility of saving 
heaven by preaching ―stasis‖ to the world.   
 Angels confronts the angel‘s jealousy of human movement at the formal level, engaging 
cinema‘s ability to represent duration, change, movement, and the projected present of 
something past—which extends into thinking about the ways in which the concept of death is 
written into the medium.  In the scene I would like to examine, Harper is having a valium-
induced hallucination, while Prior has fallen asleep reading a book titled Cocteau (the well-
known biography by Francis Steigmuller is seen in close-up).
331
  Prior walks through a hallway 
lit by chandeliers held by arms, past mantles held up by moving heads—an homage to and 
reincarnation of Cocteau‘s La Belle et La Bête (1946).  The scene also makes many allusions to 
The Wizard of Oz (Victor Fleming, 1939), a film told through the doubling of actors.
332
   Reality 
and fantasy remain relatively discrete in The Wizard of Oz, though, whereas the dead, 
hallucinatory and heavenly appear to many as real in Angels.  As a parallel text, The Wizard of 
Oz‘s ultimate commendation of rugged individualism (after all, we always had the power to get 
home, we just had to learn it ourselves) undergoes a severe revision in Prior‘s advice to the 
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 Janet Coleman informs us that Nichols has been an avowed fan of Cocteau‘s work since he began his career 
performing at the University of Chicago and The Compass (53).   
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 Nichols once told an interviewer that he thinks there are two movies that ―tell us pretty much what movies are‖: 
The Wizard of Oz (which he saw when he first arrived to America), which he describes as a fantastic and 
adventurous search for knowledge, and Casablanca, which he believes has its flaws but is a basic ―story of giving 
up what you love for something more important‖ (McGuigan, 64). In another kind of overlap, The Wizard of Oz is 
also referenced in Cukor‘s The Philadelphia Story.  
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angels.  He rejects his appointed mission and tells them that if God ever dares to return to ―sue 
the bastard.‖   
 Adorned in drag make-up and satin robe, Prior studies himself in a mirror, bemoaning his 
large hands, shouting ―Beast!‖ before seeing Harper‘s approach reflected in the mirror.  She is 
Beauty in a diaphanous, flowing gown, which contrasts with Harper‘s usual clothes as much as 
Prior‘s drag get-up.  Seeing one another first through mirrors, Prior and Harper are positioned as 
spectators of each other.  One is hallucinating, the other dreaming, but their visions are 
mysteriously embodied in the same time and space.
333
  Indeed, the pair are confused that they 
can exist in each other‘s fantasy worlds: 
Harper: I don't understand this. If I didn't ever see you before, and I don‘t think I did, then 
I don't think you should be here in this hallucination because in my experience the 
mind—which is where hallucinations come from—shouldn't be able to make anything up 
that wasn't there to start with, that didn‘t enter it from experience from the real world. 
Imagination can't create anything new can it? It only recycles bits and pieces from the 
world and reassembles them into visions. Am I making sense right now?  
 
Prior: Given the circumstances, yes.  
 
Harper: So when we think we've escaped the unbearable ordinariness and, well, 
untruthfulness of our lives it's really only the same old ordinariness and falseness 
rearranged into the appearance of novelty and truth. Nothing unknown is knowable. 
 
That they exist in a dreamlike world reminiscent of Cocteau‘s film marks this space as cinematic.  
It is in this domain that, although Prior does not mention his illness, Harper knows and 
comments on it.  In response to Prior‘s amazement, she says, ―Oh that happens. This is the very 
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 Angels perhaps also alludes to the work of Achim von Arnim.  William Calin describes this sort of ―‗modern‘ 
situation‖ in the novels of von Arnim, in which ―two characters who never communicate when awake do so in their 
common dreams.  Truth and insight are derived from each person‘s dreams and from  the unconscious‖ (59).  In the 
story ―Die Majoratsherren‖ (1820), a boy dreams of the beautiful Esther, locked inside the Jewish ghetto, who 
comes to him in a series of ―performances‖ in his dreams; in the first she wears a gown covered with eyes and 
―becomes his death angel‖ (Hoermann, 117).  Nichols once said, ―[a] movie is a dream.  And so any moment in a 
movie is about whom this particular moment is happening to, whose experience any moment is given‖ (Smith, 28).  
It is helpful to connect it to his later writing: ―I think that metaphor is in trouble… We need metaphor as we need 
stories…If we have, as de Tocqueville predicted, become pure market forces then we need to do CPR on metaphor 
pretty fast.  Dr. [Martin Luther] King knew that an improved reality begins with a dream.  In dreams begin 
responsibilities‖ (Huffingtonpost.com).   
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threshold of revelation. Sometimes you can see things like how sick you are. Do you see 
anything about me?‖ Just as Beauty and the Beast could see each other‘s inner goodness, Harper 
tells Prior: ―I see something else about you. Deep inside you, there‘s a part of you, the most inner 
part entirely free of disease. I can see that.‖  He sees that she is ―amazingly unhappy‖ and reveals 
that her husband is ―a big homo.‖  Like the story of La Belle et La Bête, and drag performance, 
this scene speaks to the problem of knowing other people visually, by attending to their body.  
The scene gives us a moment in which interpreting ―truths‖ about others is possible, but 
magical—exceptional and inexplicable.  After Harper leaves, Prior observes, ―People come and 
go so strangely here,‖ alluding again to The Wizard of Oz and reinforcing the space of the scene 
as cinematic.  It is also in this space that the first sign of the Angel‘s coming appears: Prior hears 
a glorious voice command ―Look up‖ and he looks up to see a feather fall from the ceiling of the 
Roman Pantheon (a space which is both a place of worship and a tomb).   
 In this scene, Prior and Harper perceive each other‘s inner states or qualia; the space 
between Harper and Prior—the ―threshold of revelation‖ of consciousness—is a space whereby 
each can ―see‖ into the body, straight into the not-body of the person (not beyond, the percepts 
are immanent, not transcendent).  It is the dream-like cinematic space (i.e. for spectator and on 
screen figure): the idea of the interself.  If this scene exceeds our ability to understand how they 
see one another‘s ―inner self,‖ what is our own logic of perception that allows us to believe we 
do so at the cinema?  ―Nothing unknown is knowable‖—they tell each other what they already 
know, but perhaps have difficulty bringing to consciousness.  Each of them dreaming, Prior and 
Harper demonstrate deeply internalized ideologies of perception.  There is little more politicized 
knowledge in Angels than knowing one is healthy or that your husband is ―a big homo.‖   
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 Cocteau is central to Bazin‘s comparison of the cinematic and theatrical in his look at 
films adapted from theatrical sources.  Cocteau succeeds in communicating the ―dramatic 
essence‖ of a play cinematically (WC, 93), and in doing so provides Bazin with evidence that 
distinguishing between theater and cinema based on notions of the actors‘ presence or absence is 
misguided, for ―it is no longer as certain as it was that there is no middle stage between presence 
and absence.  It is likewise at the ontological level that the effectiveness of the cinema has its 
source‖ (WC, 97).334 By comparing the screen to a mirror with a delayed reflection—making 
temporal dislocation the issue of putting the actor before the spectator—Bazin decides that ―[i]t 
is false to say that the screen is incapable of putting us ‗in the presence of‘ the actor‖ (WC, 97).  
Still, at the movies, we know we are not in danger of ever being seen by the actor (in neither 
place are we typically in danger of being acknowledged by the characters), and although drama 
exists in both arts, Bazin distinguishes between theater and cinema by claiming that in the former 
it ―proceeds from the actor, in the cinema it goes from the décor to man‖ (WC, 102).  Bazin 
imagines a proactive stage actor who is ―at once [the play‘s] cause and its subject,‖ while on 
screen, the actor is essentially reacting to her context (WC, 106).  If the cinematic actor is always 
already situated within a context, what are the implications for our understanding of the art form?  
How is a spectator to understand multiple actors and characters in relation to one another?  Is 
each actor ―décor‖ for the other?  The meeting of the minds and bodies of Prior and Harper—
revealed in conversation—plays with the possibility of seeing others as pure objects, as totally 
knowable.   
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 Bazin is implicitly responding to classic view that as spectators in the theater, we are in the presence of a 
character, while the cinema gives us the presence of the actors, see for example, Siegfried Kracauer and Rudolph 
Arnheim.  Benjamin‘s view falls in line here, too; but for him, neither the actor‘s performance in the studio or its 
reproduction count as art (―Work of Art,‖ 110). 
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 It could be argued that overlapping roles functions to highlight the physical presence of 
the actors who overlap.  In an effort to account for the custom of many actors playing one role 
over time in the theater, and the way the spectator of cinema is faced so strongly with the 
appearance of the actor‘s body, Cavell writes that, ―[f]or the stage, an actor works himself into a 
role; for the screen, a performer takes the role onto himself‖ (The World Viewed [WV], 27).  He 
believes the stage actor works to meet the demands of a part, whereas ―[t]he screen performer 
explores his role like an attic and takes stock of his physical and temperamental endowment‖ 
(WV, 28).  We might, at first, take Cavell to be overemphasizing the importance of the actor‘s 
physical body and to be devaluing the work screen actors do to alter that physicality (accents, 
make-up, gait, etc.).  However, I hear in Cavell‘s wording an allusion to the occasion of Sherlock 
Holmes‘ first appearance, in Sir Arthur Conan Doyle‘s A Study in Scarlet, in which he educates 
Watson on his views of mind and memory: ―You see, I consider that a man‘s brain originally is 
like a little empty attic, and you have to stock it with such furniture as you choose‖ (9).335  
Furniture, for Holmes, consists of beliefs, concepts, memories, etc. that he wants to constitute as 
himself; Cavell, then, recommends that cinematic actors imagine their roles as minds first, and 
that it is from the mental that they create the stock which will convey the physical nature of the 
character.  In this light, Cavell not only aligns the cinematic actor‘s artistry with a burgeoning 
literary modernism, but suggests that the film actor understands his body to communicate a 
mind, and that the on screen actor‘s body conveys mental attitudes.  Streep makes a similar point 
about her own technique.  She recalls learning, through reading sonnets, ―that a thought is a 
breath and a breath is a thought… You have to make the breath last through the entire thought‖ 
(TK, 291). 
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 Although the science-loving Holmes uses the word ―brain,‖ I think it is clear that the object to which he refers is 
more generally known as the mind. 
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Likewise, McGinn claims: ―The screen actor is working with her mind, primarily; the 
body functions as a kind of necessary intrusion on this intimacy with the audience‖ (96). He 
believes cinema is inherently intimate, a nature that gives heightened power to the screen actor 
whose naturalism arises from the fact that,  
If [the screen actor‘s] mind is in the right place, her body will communicate what it needs 
to… she must act as if her body were the stuff of her soul.  She must, in other words, 
overcome the mind-body dualism that is our human lot.  The essential point is that the 
body should be recognized to enter a new state of being once it reaches the screen. (97) 
 
McGinn, clearly writing in and about a contemporary, post-Streep Hollywood, indicates the body 
as little more than a speed bump along the road to the mind, but perhaps the body felt a little 
more ―intrusive‖ at the height of the AIDS confusion.  His words parallel the Angel‘s leitmotif.  
Before she makes love to both Prior and Hannah (the only two pleasurable sex scenes in a film 
so concerned with sex) she repeats insistently: ―The body is the garden of the soul.‖  Here, 
bodies are construed as places to visit, to grow things, and in which to play.  The body is the 
space of possible activities, and once active, can affect (and play well with) others.   
 Repeating its actors is not the only means by which Angels destabilizes its characters‘ 
bodies, as a clear source of identity.  As in the scene between Prior and Harper, the trope of 
AIDS‘ power to transform the body through disease also challenges corporeal identity.336  For 
example, when Roy Cohn is being diagnosed by his doctor, the frame is intermittently and 
suddenly occupied by shots of magnified cells, a very different representation of his body than 
him sitting in his chair, and one which challenges the relationship between body and identity.  
Similarly, when Louis takes Joe home with him from the park, he explains to Joe what sex is by 
breaking bodies down into minerals, molecules and smells.  Much attention is paid to Prior‘s 
body, too.  Besides his lesions, he undergoes several physical exams which scrutinize his nude 
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 We might think back to Prior‘s perception of himself as a ―beast,‖ or even connect this thematic to Nichols‘ 1994 
film Wolf, about a man with a case of lycanthropy. 
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body, he has difficulty breathing, walking, etc.  Joe and Harper also appear naked; Joe strips 
himself (―flays himself‖ in Mormon parlance) to prove his love to Louis, and Harper forces Joe 
to look at her naked figure to prove his lack of desire for her.   
Cocteau‘s surrealistic oeuvre is full of angelic references, and Prior and Harper‘s shared 
dream scene is particularly reminiscent of his notion in Orpheus: ―Mirrors are the doors through 
which death comes and goes. Look at yourself in a mirror all your life, and you'll see death at 
work.‖  Like Karen Silkwood‘s and Camille‘s, the garden of Prior‘s soul is withering, reminding 
us that ―AIDS is progressive, a disease of time‖ (Sontag, 109).  But, as Hannah tells Prior: there 
is ―nothing more human than that,‖ pointing to a way of thinking about AIDS as metaphor for 
the human condition.  Just as one who looks in a mirror and sees death in the body of the living, 
this scene, which reflexively introduces the problem of seeing death in the body of the living 
(e.g. Prior‘s changing body), of seeing stasis in motion, culminates in the introduction of the 
angel, the Continental Principality of America.  Angels links corporeal identity, death, and 
movement with an American national mythos.   
Unfortunately, while Cocteau‘s Orphee enjoyed his own death in Orpheus (after all, one 
cannot look in the mirror and see someone else‘s death), AIDS is presented as a shared death.337  
In the 1980s, ―homosexual‖ and ―gay‖ referred as much to who someone was, what they were, as 
to what they did; it was common to say that men had sex with men because they were 
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 Cocteau is widely acknowledged as a queer filmmaker, and, in a topic that I hope to explore elsewhere, Angels 
belongs in a tradition of queer American cinema which began in the 1960s (just as the first aggressive moves were 
made for the acknowledgment of gay and lesbian citizenship).  Walter Metz pinpoints the start of this cinematic 
movement in New York City with works such as Kenneth Anger‘s Scorpio Rising (1963), Flaming Creatures (Jack 
Smith, 1963) and Blond Cobra (Ken Jacobs, 1963).  Scorpio Rising and Blond Cobra both explore connections 
between cinematic images, male homosexuality, and death.  From its prescient first moments, when it presents 
visual images of a graveyard juxtaposed with aural ones telling us, ―This is New York City.  The city of 
opportunity… enjoy the benefits of democracy‖ to its characters‘ debates over whether God has abandoned man or 
is just ill, I believe the case can be made that Blond Cobra has especial influence on Angels.  Also, beyond 
contemplating ―an existential despair that germinates from the inability of its subjects to find a satisfying sexual and 
interpersonal expression in the midst of a repressive culture,‖ Blond Cobra (like the Berkeleyesque scene Angels) 
works in a camp mode to create a sense of ―the decay of beauty toward death‖ in homophobic culture (Metz, 247-
248).   
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homosexual.  Angels raises the question very early of whether homosexuality is an essential 
identity, and one immediately legible to others.  When Louis and Joe first meet, their exchange 
becomes confused over whether or not Louis can more accurately detect Joe‘s homosexuality or 
his Republicanism—calling out that what we might deem Streep‘s chameleonic ―camouflaging‖ 
is usually derogated as ―passing‖ when ―real‖ people do it.  Roy orders his doctor not to divulge 
his AIDS status because people might think he‘s gay (despite the fact everyone knows he sleeps 
with men, which further comments on the visibility of gayness).  As Roy says,  
Where does an individual so identified [as homosexual] fit into the food chain, the 
pecking order? Not ideology or sexual taste, but something much simpler: clout… A 
homosexual is somebody who knows nobody and who nobody knows, who has zero 
clout. Does this sound like me, Henry? 
 
Thus, homosexuals are those that lay claim to a politicized identity, who take political 
responsibility for their actions by speaking about them.  Even rhetoric about the transmission of 
AIDS was cast in terms of responsibility.  AIDS was given by someone to another; the disease 
was not the culprit, the carrier was.  Having sex was communicating yourself, your body, to 
someone.   
  
Angels Un-American 
 Prior eventually journeys to heaven, which in the film‘s world, looks a great deal like the 
underworld of Orpheus.  When he confronts the angelic committee, he rejects stasis in favor of 
future possibilities and presents this position precisely on the grounds of humanness and 
attachment to the body:  
But still. Still bless me anyway. I want more life. I can't help myself. I do. I've lived 
through such terrible times and there are people who live through much worse. But you 
see them living anyway. When they're more spirit than body, more sores than skin, when 
they're burned and in agony, when flies lay eggs in the corners of the eyes of their 
children– they live. Death usually has to take life away. I don't know if that's just the 
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animal. I don't know if it's not braver to die, but I recognize the habit, the addiction to 
being alive. So we live past hope. If I can find hope anywhere, that's it, that's the best I 
can do. It's so much not enough. It's so inadequate. But still bless me anyway. I want 
more life. And if [God] comes back, take him to court. He walked out on us, he ought to 
pay.  
 
Prior wins the right to return to dying, and through Prior, Angels’ ultimate mandate is to embrace 
movement, change, progress—one it acknowledges as fraught with contradiction and tension.  It 
is important to bear in mind that when God deserted the world, he left San Francisco, an 
American city whose location on the Western coast signifies the nation‘s belief in progress and 
manifest destiny.  Prior cannot be shaken from his desire for ―more life‖ (the Hebrew word for 
―blessing,‖ means ―more life‖), for more time degenerating in his body.   
 In the film‘s final moments, as Prior approaches the camera, and us, he seems to take on 
the mantle of prophet (though not appointed by heaven): ―This disease will be the end of many 
of us, but not nearly all. And the dead will be commemorated, and we'll struggle on with the 
living, and we are not going away. We won't die secret deaths anymore. The world only spins 
forward. We will be citizens. The time has come.‖  Prior‘s assertion points out that citizenship 
(like sexuality in this text) is not a property; it must be fought for and won: enacted.  The 
paradoxical principle underlying AIDS, offered by Angels, is that AIDS emerged just gays as 
acquired some meager social visibility by claiming an identity as gay citizens.  Thus, surviving 
becomes an act or political rebellion (and America is a nation founded by rebelling). 
 Prior is not alone in this scene; Louis, Belize, and Hannah are with him, suggesting a 
new, multicultural queer family.  Critics (writing about the play, but whose claims remain 
relevant to the film) have objected to this ending, arguing that its attachment to notions of 
progress and modernity sink into an uninteresting espousal of liberal pluralism. I believe such 
views fail to appreciate that these characters are not isolated from, or merely tolerating, one 
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another, but actively, vociferously debating political issues with each other.  Janet Reinart asserts 
that, ―While for Brecht socialism figured as a horizon of concrete possibility, for Kushner, in an 
age in which the grand narrative of Marxism is bankrupt, the leap catapults him into identity 
politics and a relative detachment from economic and social structural change.  Backing off of 
Marx, however, produces a kind of liberal pluralism or benign tolerance, a promise but no 
program‖ (242).338  But Reinart‘s criticism of Angels is, in fact, its point: Angels does not 
consider the human as just a product of histories of economic and social force (which threaten its 
humanity).  It grapples with an American mindset unwilling to forgo the possibility of action; 
rather than consider the structure and the human‘s place within it, it seeks to place the human at 
the center of theory, reclaiming the possibility of change arising from people: Prior intends to 
become a proper citizen.   
 Harper also addresses the spectator in a direct address final speech.  Aboard an American 
Airlines flight, she talks of her vision in which the souls of the dead rise up to patch the hole in 
the ozone layer before taking on the role of the Angel of History, telling us that, ―In this world, 
there is a kind of painful progress.  Longing for what we‘ve left behind, and dreaming ahead.‖  
David Savran notes that Angels follows Benjamin in suturing the Jewish notion of Messianic 
time to the Marxist concept of revolution, and so, reimagines ―proletariat revolution not as the 
culmination of a conflict between classes, or between traditional institutions and new forms of 
production, but as a ‗blast[ing] open‘ of ‗the continuum of history‘‖ (16).  Angels puts this point 
in the mouth of Ethel Rosenberg.  She says ―History is about to crack wide open,‖ echoing 
Benjamin‘s description of nature‘s immutability as the ―cracking open of natural teleology‖ (The 
Arcades Project, W7, 4).  Thus, given our noetic eye on performance in this look at Angels, I 
want to focus on Kushner‘s emphasis on action: that ―we‖ do history. Presenting characters as a 
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 Others, such as Savran and Freedman, echo this assertion. 
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problem of demarcation (between illusion and reality, character and actor, individual and type, 
male and female, etc.) culminates in the film‘s end, when Prior includes us, as spectators, with 
himself and the other characters as a ―we.‖  Is he referring to those dying of AIDS?  
Homosexuals denied equal rights?  Individuals subject to history?  This ambiguity is reminiscent 
of the ―we‖ that calls the storm blowing Klee‘s Angel of History away from the pile of detritus 
(that is, history, which he is looking back on) progress.     
 In conversation with Kushner, Sontag‘s vision of America stems from a belief that 
―Americans are very devoted to the idea of hope,‖ which she perceives at work in Angels 
(Vorlicky, 174).  She says:  
This is a society built on the notion of a new life, the second chance, the frontier, start all 
over again, be reborn, you can always change yourself, if you want it to be so you can 
make it so—all those ideas of improvement and self-remaking, which usually involve 
breaking away from one‘s own individual history or past, or some collective history or 
identity such as the country or culture you came from. (Vorlicky, 172) 
 
Skeptical, Sontag admits that, ―in some sense the basis of all action is a degree of optimism‖ 
(Vorlicky, 173).  Angels encourages us to see performance in light of its specifically American 
appeal, as an art designed to capitalize on exploring the ―frontier‖ of the self‘s cultural 
malleability, its possibility for change.  ―If you don‘t know where you‘re going, can you move?‖, 
Kushner asked in an interview, adding, ―You can‘t stay back. The fundamental question is: Are 
we made by history or do we make history—and the answer is yes‖ (Leonard, 1).  Since 
cinematic actors constitute characters through actions, they creates the impression of a life, a 
personal history, through actions.  The film‘s final conundrum, uttered by Streep/Hannah before 
Prior blesses us,
339
 offers no answer: ―You can‘t live in the world without an idea of the world.‖  
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 Hannah has, in this scene, undergone a makeover and resembles the ―real‖ Streep at this time much more than 
she did in the dowdy Mormon costume. 
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Not unlike the overlap of roles, this conundrum is a place where self and ideology, theory and 
action merge.   
 From its focus on AIDS as a gay man‘s disease in the 1980s to the opening scene‘s 
arrangement of Jewish-Americans‘ bodies as both individual and collective, past and present to 
Prior and Harper‘s perception of each other‘s inner truths to Prior‘s round trip to heaven, Angels 
conjures images of modernity in order to comment on the cinematic representation of history, 
action, and selfhood.  I would like to return to thinking about how overlapping roles fits in with 
this aim, as well as the insistent Americanness of the film, and how these ideas help us think 
about Streep‘s own reputation for transforming herself across roles.  In an essay chiefly 
concerned with performance, Cavell takes a moment to reflect on the tragic connections between 
American capitalism‘s demand that its people always want more and the fact that America 
(which he calls ―the anti-Marxist country‖) was discovered, that its ―present is continuously 
ridiculed by the fantastic promise of its origin and its possibility,‖ eventually noting that, ―Since 
it had a birth, it may die. It feels mortal‖ (―The Avoidance of Love,‖ 344-345).  Cavell‘s 
elucidation of America as mortal coincides with Angels‘ diagnosis that it is ill, encouraging us to 
connect the film‘s messianic and Benjaminian themes to deeper national, and civic resonances in 
Prior‘s character.  Cavell‘s observations also suggest a way to interpret Angels’ manifesto to 
reject the instructions of the Angel, the ―Continental Principality of America‖: if America ―feels‖ 
mortal and yet, as the rabbi tells us, is non-existent, it has the metaphysical status of a character.  
It is not eternal, like the Angel, but mutable, like Prior.   
 The Angels beseech Prior to ―preach stasis,‖ because they blame human efforts to 
achieve ―progress‖ for God‘s abandonment of heaven and his angels (who copulated ceaselessly 
until he left, requiring they stop playing and start working).  Similarly, William Calin writes that, 
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―[m]odernity is made manifest in a number of cultural conditions, including the development of 
technology, the media, propaganda, advertising, and, ideologically, the myth of progress 
accompanied by the rejection of tradition‖ (131).  ―Modernity began,‖ according to Martin Jay, 
―when the world could no longer be construed as a meaningful and legible text written by God,‖ 
thereby challenging the idea of the ultimate textual authority, and ―[a]s God increasingly became 
a mysterious Deus absconditus…the nascent modern subject, withdrawn from a no longer 
transparently meaningful cosmos, came to rely on the fragile reed of experience, however 
defined, as the only bridge from interior to exterior reality‖ (263-264).  However, Jay also 
suggests that in the period Angels represents—which is also the context of Streep‘s emergence—
the concept of experience changed: in the ―mantras of identity politics,‖ begun in the 1960s but 
particularly stark in the 1980s and 1990s, ―experience is often taken to be a non-fungible 
commodity‖ (6).  Hence, past assumptions that ―experience involve[s] an integrated, coherent, 
and more or less autonomous subject, possessed of consciousness and the ability to act in the 
world,‖ persist, and rather than rethink the concept of experience, in ―contemporary identity 
politics…group subjects replaced individual ones‖ (264).340   Politicized identities bore markers 
of certain kinds of experience, which suggested a particular sort of consciousness and a 
proclivity for certain kinds of actions.   
 Angels is clearly invested in the perception of individual bodies as members of a 
collective identity (bearing a history)—as best exemplified in Belize and Louis‘ extensive 
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 Dubbed the ―decade of greed,‖ the 1980s also gave rise to a corporatism that affected the value of individuals, 
this time not in opposition to the group, but to that of the corporation (in many ways legally as a person, 
―corporation‖ is etymologically rooted in the body).  Jay writes of the concept of experience‘s ―pride of place‖ in 
American intellectual history by ―at least one of its most powerful intellectual movements‖: pragmatism, a 
movement coincident with cinema (268).  He situates pragmatism‘s origins as a reaction to liberal ideology of 
Lockean individual property rights and the emergence of a corporate-based liberalism (270).   
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debates on the identity politics of race and ethnicity.
341
  But having actors play multiple roles 
also suggests that Angels is invested in the mutability of bodies, and so, of the collective 
identities predicated upon them—an aim which reflects on realist styles of cinematic acting, and 
which plays dangerously in a capitalist context by presenting images of bodies that belie Locke‘s 
assumption that individuals own their bodies.  McGinn writes that, ―If we thought that for every 
body there was a unique mind, fixed and invariable, then acting would be an impossible project.  
Acting requires the notion of multiple minds expressed by a single body‖ (95). Since no one can 
posses a single identity without others (for instance, one cannot just be gendered and not raced, 
too), the terms of identity politics require not just an idea of a shared experience (or at least the 
projection of a shared experience by those excluded from a specific identity), but of multiple 
experiences.  This point is made explicit in the film as the Angel repeatedly refers to herself as ―I 
I I I,‖ a repetition that forces the spectator to consider the possibility of multiple sources of 
experience and the seeming paradox of a pluralistic self (whether supernatural or not).
342
    
 
Reverence for Life 
 Angels comports with Nichols‘ and Streep‘s previous challenges to the classical star 
system, again reflecting on Streep‘s star persona.   In Angels, Streep says ―I I I I‖ in a different 
way: her performance of four selves housed in one body (and who are never dominated by the 
presence of ―Streep‖).  Bestowing each character with depth and continually demonstrating a 
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 The film also adds a line not in the original play regarding the identity politics of gender.  Hannah insists to Prior 
that, ―Being a woman is harder [than being a homosexual male].‖   
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 Though I have not seen this allusion remarked on, I believe the text refers to Doris Lessing‘s The Golden 
Notebook (1962).  Lessing‘s heroine is fascinated by ―the roles we play, the way we play parts‖ (138).  This 
character, who struggles to reconcile her identities as a woman, Marxist, communist, writer, lover, mother, activist 
with her growing cynicism (and possible madness) culminates in a relationship with a man that could ―work‖ in the 
sense that they share similar internal contradictions (and an understanding of them).  The borders between the 
mental and social break down, and climaxes in her attempt to understand her ego and that of her boyfriend‘s, by 
repeatedly writing of the ―I, I, I, I‖.  This device begins on p. 496 and its use on p. 537-539 is especially relevant. 
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thinking process, she suggests the possibility of retaining an individual self while being 
immanently connected to other people.  Overlapping roles in Angels highlights the specific 
actions of each character (the spectator never forgets the intra-textual history of the on-screen 
body), and furthermore, resonates with the film‘s larger emphasis on remaining present, to want 
―more life.‖  Nichols believes that performance styles which aim to depict characters ―in the 
moment‖—which we might well connect with Streep‘s talent for characters who appear thinking, 
thoroughly present to their contexts—demonstrate a ―reverence for life,‖ adding ―of course, 
movies love that‖ (VW Commentary).    
 In conventional stardom, the strong presence of the star, best exemplified by a Hepburn 
or a Bogart or an Eastwood, can dampen the impression of the on-screen character‘s ―I.‖  We 
still understand the on-screen figure‘s actions to be motivated by the narrative, but less so than in 
a Streep film.  Without offering the sense of a ―core personality‖ across characters (either across 
films or within Angels), we do not expect a Streep character to behave a particular way; there is 
no guessing what he or she might do, as may be the case in a Bogart or Hepburn picture.
343
  This 
is, I believe, related to what Nichols meant when I earlier quoted him as saying: ―This is what 
Garbo was such a master of: actual thoughts that had not occurred before that particular take. 
And you can see this taking tremendous leaps with Brando and Clift and then with Streep‖ 
(McGrath, 2009).  Even Hepburn‘s objections to Streep—that she could see her thinking—
foregrounds how Streep‘s characters are constantly weighing their choices, pondering their 
actions, their responsibility, accountability, morality (which is not at all unlike what we are doing 
as spectators of the story).  In this regard, Streep‘s presentation of characters‘ mental activities is 
not in the service of escapist illusionism, and if it appears natural—people do think, after all—
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 This is not, of course, to deny that there are films which provide exceptions to Hepburn‘s and Bogart‘s personae, 
though they still worked in relation to them. 
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that does not prevent its being an object of contemplation for the spectator.  Streep‘s depth and 
complexity of character is like a long take, both theatrical and cinematic, giving the spectator 
freedom to choose where to place her attention, how to evaluate, interpret and categorize what 
she sees, just as Bazin said of Wyler and Welles and we might say of Nichols.   
  In his forward to the recent book Actors at Work, Nichols articulates his view of 
performance through an anecdote from his experience with Streep on Angels: ―I asked Meryl, 
‗How the hell did you ever think of making Ethel Rosenberg funny?‘  She said, ‗Well, you never 
know what you‘re going to do till you do it.‘  I don‘t know a better lesson in acting‖ (x).  ―One 
thing is clear,‖ Nichols divulges of actors, ―they do not know how they do it and they don‘t want 
to know‖ (ix).344  Nichols clarifies that  
this doesn‘t mean there‘s nothing to be learned from great actors.  There are things they 
can tell you.  The other actor is everything.  In connecting with the others on the stage 
with you, you are halfway there, and as Phil[lip Seymour] Hoffman points out, if you are 
looking Meryl Streep or Vanessa Redgrave in the eye, you are more than halfway there. 
(x) 
 
Nichols directed Streep and Hoffman in 2001 for his acclaimed production of Anton Chekhov‘s 
The Seagull for Public Theater in Central Park.
345
  In chapter four, we saw that Nichols emphasis 
on mutuality and interaction has roots in practices endemic to improvisational theater, and, over 
the decades, Streep has frequently reinforced the view that an actor must start blank (the state of 
an improvisational performer when a scene begins).  She echoes Nichols here, too, repeatedly 
declaring that the other actor is ―everything‖ (TK, 301-302).   
 Streep points out that, from the performer‘s perspective, the director is  
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 Nichols provides another anecdote which suggests not just that actors do not want to know, but that they cannot: 
―I once congratulated the great French actor Marcel Dalio on a brilliant take in a movie I was directing [Catch-22], 
and he said, ‗Well, I was saying to the makeup man, ―If you are an actor, you have to pray every day for a small 
miracle, because you can‘t make it come‘‖ (x). 
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 Like Postcards and Angels, The Seagull is a funny, tragic, and reflexive text about acting and the figure of the 
actress. 
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not in there.  No matter how much they want to be, they‘re not in that encounter. They 
can change the sort of question that you‘re asking of the other person in the scene.  Mike 
Nichols is the most brilliant at that.  He reads what it is that the encounter is.  He reads 
what you‘re asking—not literally, but what you‘re asking. (TK, 302)  
 
When trying to remember Nichols‘ specific advice over the years, Streep struggles, because she 
tries to incorporate it without fixating on it (for fear it will preoccupy her in the scene). She says: 
―Actors want to know [the advice given], and then they don‘t want to know it‖ (TK, 302).  Here, 
Streep‘s language, like Nichols‘ above, recalls Marx‘s famous definition of ideology: ―They do 
not know it, but they are doing it‖ (Zizek, 28).  Streep and Nichols suggest that this theory of 
performance embodies the form of the process of ideology; ritually enacting how it works.  For 
Marx, the inescapable ideological context threatens a subject‘s humanity.  Elizabeth Anscombe 
echoes this idea by proposing that if we cannot properly articulate our intentions, we cannot be 
said to be properly human, for lacking the capacity to mean something means lacking the 
capacity to be ethical (and the necessary mindedness).   
 The fact that Streep fills all her performances with actions not clearly required for the 
narrative to move forward (which is not to say that they do not contribute to the narrative, for our 
perception of these characters, and their actions, would be altered if they were omitted) takes on 
a new significance in this light.  Nichols claims that, ―[y]ou can never explain or describe what 
makes a great performance‖; he says, ―It's little details‖ that count (Murray).  Like the laugh that 
is one of Nichols‘ favorite cinematic moments, or her nervous tics and whimpers, hair touching 
and fluttering hands, Streep is known for her detailed characters, characters who do not 
necessarily intend each of their actions—even the presence of verbal accents is not something we 
would say the character means to do.  Of course, as spectators, we perceive such actions as 
meant by Streep as part of her effort to constitute each character. 
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 Promoting Postcards in 1990, Nichols was asked about Streep‘s reputation for 
transformation, and recalls that, ―[w]hen we were shooting Silkwood, I saw a screening of 
Sophie’s Choice and I was stunned because I thought we were filming the real Meryl, but the 
person on the screen in Sophie’s Choice was also the real Meryl. I will never get used to it‖ 
(Spitz, 1).  Nichols does not suggest that Streep‘s ability to appear her ―real‖ self while 
performing other characters marks a resistance to singularity in favor of group identities; rather, 
she has multiple ―real‖ selves.  Streep, though, attributes her accomplishments to Nichols; saying 
that ―[he] makes the soup and pours all the ingredients in. I'm just one of them.‖  When asked 
about her method, Streep repeatedly refuses the question, claiming not to have one, that ―[t]he 
best actors start blank‖ (Spitz, 1).  This may remind us of Nichols‘ background in improvisation, 
where actors literally start blank, that is, without a script or knowledge of the events to come.  In 
fact, Streep has expressed her devotion to improvisation, exclaiming ―[t]hat [the impression of 
spontaneity] is the only thing that‘s worth looking at… So you get all ready before the first 
reading and then… forget it‖ (Hollinger, 92).  If this is not exactly a method, it is certainly an 
approach.  Even more in line with Nichols‘ performance background—and investment in the 
interpersonal—is her declaration: ―I don‘t feel I exist until I‘m with someone else in a scene‖ 
(Hollinger, 92).   
 Streep‘s polymorphous performance in Angels reflects her larger chameleonic status in 
another way by having her function as a structuring absence.  Like Prior, she seems not to seek 
divination in the heavens.  Streep takes risks, makes it seem like anything is possible; a mass of 
potentiality, she personifies the sort of American optimism described above.  Unlike the scene 
between Prior and Harper, which suggests the cinema allows us the fantasy of accessing another 
mind, of treating another as object, scenes with stars tend to counteract it by their highly visible 
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presence, complicating the on-screen body‘s ―inner life‖ which is narratively determined as the 
character‘s.  Given the public‘s desire lack of knowledge about Streep‘s own life (or her 
resistance to being objectified), she appears to us to possess more subjectivity than other stars.  
At the same time, this allows us to view her characters objectively; that is, we may know them 
more fully than other stars‘ characters.  She may go as far as any actor can go toward 
disappearing behind her characters while remaining a star, and disavowing her presence as 
Streep might be fun, but the fact remains that—despite the ubiquitous critical insistence that she 
is chameleonic—we are still aware that we are watching Meryl Streep.  She is undoubtedly a 
star.  Even calling her a chameleon suggests that there is a core, something underlying and 
consistent; after all, it is only the exterior of a chameleon that changes.  However, unlike the 
majestic Garbo, Streep does not solicit awe in the guise of uniqueness; she seems just as subject 
to society as we are, just as mired in ideology.   
 The idea that stardom relies on the fantastic presence of a consistent, and core, self—
operative  in beliefs like Cavell‘s that Hollywood stars offer up individualities, ways of being—
suggests that the Hollywood star system models the old injunction to be true to oneself.  Streep 
has avowed that, ―[she knows] how to pretend to the point of belief‖ (TK, 289).  Streep‘s ability 
to inhabit other selves, ever-new points of view by ―pretending to the point of belief‖ models a 
modern idea of a way of being as clearly as the consistent star personae of yore: by positing that 
one is always becoming who one is.  Perhaps she co-opts becoming as a brand of individuality, a 
sign of her genius which awes us.  
 Streep is celebrated precisely because she removes an authorial signature.  On the other 
hand, Nichols‘ decision to vary his style and subject matter—to find ways of suiting his style to 
the subject matter—has resulted in his critical derogation.  I do not want to argue that we should 
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open the door to bestowing the mantle of authorship to all directors, but perhaps we should not 
only look for them in terms of, say, one overarching visual style or generic consistency.  Nichols 
has been a filmmaker at the forefront of liberal opinion, engaging in the salient social and 
political issues of the day through films that are provocative, witty, visually interesting, literate, 
and entertaining for over forty years.  Just as his films of the 1960s and 1970s, his work in the 
1980s and 1990s remains as relevant to the concomitant changes in thinking about identity and 
the place of the individual as defined through interpersonal stories.  Looking back over his long 
career, Nichols recently declared: ―If you want to be a legend, God help you, it‘s so easy. You 
just do one thing. You can be the master of suspense, say. But if you want to be as invisible as is 
practical, then it‘s fun to do a lot of different things‖ (McGrath, 2009). 
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Conclusion: Of Middle Brows and Middle Grounds 
 
 
In 1997, Nichols performed the role of Jack in The Designated Mourner, David Hare‘s 
film adaptation of Wallace Shawn‘s play.  While Nichols originated the role on stage in London 
a year earlier, Jack is Nichols‘ only cinematic performance, and I believe his decision to play the 
part is revealing.  The film consists of a series of long monologues in which the three 
characters—Jack, his wife, Judy (Miranda Richardson), and her father, Howard (David de 
Keyser)—sit and speak in direct address.  Editing allows subtle changes to occur in the mise-en-
scène, but the film chiefly retains its theatrical flavor.  In a way, it is almost like a skeletal 
version of a Nichols‘ film; all that is left are the long takes, facial close-ups, and a dense script 
featuring characters talking over one another, mocking language use even as they use it.  
Significantly, Hare‘s film, a tragedy, does not share Nichols‘ affinity for portraying characters 
interacting. 
 Howard is a fairly important ―highbrow‖ (to use the film‘s term), and Judy, having grown 
up in his social circle, is comfortable there.  Jack, on the other hand, stands apart from the 
intellectual crowd, and struggles to understand his own ambivalence.  In this world, the 
highbrows (―anyone who can read John Donne,‖ as Jack puts it at one point) are being 
systematically executed, until eventually, it is only Jack who is left to be the fellow designated to 
mourn—designated because even though he is not one of them, he is still the only one left to 
remember them.  Throughout the film, Jack claims to envy and despise the highbrows.  
Nevertheless, in the end, and without denying his antipathy, he still feels a responsibility to them.  
He mourns them; but immediately afterwards, he goes outside to affirm the ―unbelievable 
physical pleasure…of an early evening breeze.‖  
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Throughout this dissertation, I have consistently located Nichols at the (and as the) origin 
of New Hollywood.  However, The Designated Mourner reminds us that we may also see his 
position at the cusp of old and new in another way.  We have noted that he has at least as much 
in common with ―old Hollywood‖ directors, like George Cukor, William Wyler, George Stevens, 
and Howard Hawks, as he does with those that followed his emergence: the ―film school 
generation‖ of Steven Spielberg, Francis Ford Coppola, Martin Scorsese, etc., that admired him.   
Still, Nichols was the ―only star director of the moment‖ (Gussow, 95) in the late 1960s, 
a time when cinema, and the concept of a cinematic director, was being revolutionized in the 
public‘s mind.  He thus defined new American auteurism even as the doors he opened would 
soon close on him. As film styles became more explicitly political (verging on the didactic) or 
even antihumanist, Nichols quickly fell behind from the forefront of progressive cinema.  
William Calin ascribes much of the academic antihumanist postmodernism to the student revolts 
of the 1960s—which is ironic given that this was the cultural event in which The Graduate 
(1967) so palpably participated (143).  Nichols seems never to have sought to replicate the high 
modernism of his ―personal pantheon of film directors…like Bunuel, Renoir, Bergman, Fellini, 
Welles,‖ but neither did he try to duplicate the blockbuster formulae that arose in the latter 1970s 
as part of the New Hollywood system (Gelmis, 266).  Nor did he ever give up his attachment to 
psychological depth in favor of the wave of postmodernist irony (and frequent cynicism) 
exemplified by filmmakers such as the Coen brothers, Marc Forster, Spike Jonze, David O. 
Russell, and Steven Soderbergh, all of whom cite Nichols as influential. 
Instead, Nichols sustained his interest in characters and what goes on between them.  Just 
as Jack takes to task those who luxuriate in the intellectualization of high modernist pleasures 
rather than conceiving of art as being in dialogue with its contemporary issues of social justice 
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and social responsibility, we have learned that—despite critical vituperations and 
misapprehensions—Nichols was not at all apolitical.  Nichols‘ films—from their long takes and 
facial close-ups to their mechanically reproduced silences and use of stars—make their points 
cinematically.  In order to comprehend the narratives of Nichols‘ films, the spectator must attend 
to the language of film.  Indeed, Nichols turned the nation‘s youth on to film language, 
compelling them to close read the editing, cinematography, mise-en-scène, and sound of The 
Graduate, a fact which made the advent of the new auteurs of the 1970s ―not only necessary but 
inevitable‖ (Lewis, 279).  By putting film form in the service of portraying characters‘ 
motivations and intentions, he made film fun to think about, and this may be his most lasting 
influence on American film culture. 
Seeing Nichols as an outsider—not despite but because of his mammoth early successes 
in theater and cinema—perhaps resonates with his biography, first as a Jewish child growing up 
in Nazi Berlin, and then as an immigrant, growing up brainy, poor, and hairless.  Whatever his 
motivation, Nichols‘ films consistently follow outsiders, from the oddly Jewish Benjamin 
Braddock, the women of Silkwood (1983) and Working Girl (1988), the homosexuals of The 
Birdcage (1996), to the convergence of these categories in Angels in America (2003).  When he 
tells the story of someone with power and privilege, as he does in Carnal Knowledge (1971), he 
is on the side of those injured by that power.  David Desser observes that Nichols‘ characters all 
share one thing: ―[s]ome critical part of their makeup, a segment that can be neither changed nor 
ignored, forces them to function outside the conventional flow of middle-class, white, straight, 
Christian American life‖ (291). 
 As time has passed, the most respected, or at least noted, films of Nichols‘ corpus remain 
his early work: Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf (1966), The Graduate, and Carnal Knowledge.  
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While I hope that Angels in America and a film I was not able to discuss, Wit (2001), soon join 
this coterie, there was a particular burden, it seemed to me, to address Nichols‘ early works.  
They are the ones named in histories of American cinema as watersheds.  Since I was partly 
motivated to write this dissertation by the fact that everyone agrees Nichols‘ films are 
―important,‖ but no one seems to think that they are important enough to write specifically about, 
part of my methodological burden was to refrain from imposing their reputations on the texts, but 
rather, to allow them to speak for themselves.  Besides learning about (and from) the films, I 
hoped to gain a fuller picture of their social historical appeal than the broad strokes extant 
historical chronicles provided.   
In this way, rather than beginning with claims about Nichols‘ achievements in speaking 
to political issues or in addressing social types, my primary method has been to closely read the 
films, and then to understand the social historical responses to them.  Surely not any film with 
taboo language would have cracked the Production Code in 1966, for example.  And there must 
have been something about The Graduate that struck a rebellious chord with a coddled 
generation.  How can we know what the reception of a film means until we understand the 
claims the film makes—and how it makes them—upon its spectator?  
One thing that we discovered is that if The Graduate tells us anything, it is that successful 
communication is not constituted by the lack of disagreement.  Ben needs someone else to speak 
his same silent language (and whether or not he finds that someone in Elaine is still up for 
debate).  He needs someone to acknowledge that he is expressing himself.  Nichols‘ characters 
must learn to be responsible for making their expressions legible to others, and for responding to 
the expressions of others.  The metaphor of Viola Spolin‘s ball, which must be tossed mutually 
back and forth between two people to create a scene, is applicable across Nichols‘ films—and it 
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is also relevant to the relationship of the film and the spectator.  As we judge other characters for 
not listening to or seeing Ben‘s actions, the film‘s conclusion turns that judgment back on us: if 
Ben‘s expressions fail because no one is there (save us) to read them, when do ours succeed?  
It is not just the silences of The Graduate which display Nichols‘ capacity for grounding 
his films in a tension between violating and conforming to expressive regulations (tensions 
which bring together the films‘ formal and narrative aspects).  In Carnal Knowledge, Jonathan‘s 
villainy is exhibited by his stoicism; Nichols and May mocked men who over-emote (such as the 
doctor who dramatically professes his love during surgery).  In Virginia Woolf, George and 
Martha must learn to control their histrionics, just as Albert and Armand must learn to own theirs 
in The Birdcage.  And, the legend of Streep, which states that she expresses everything but 
herself (or rather that such withholding is her expression of self), demands the spectator 
negotiate the impression of the nation‘s most celebrated female film star with her status as a 
chameleon.   
Thus, Nichols‘ cinema is about the ethics of spectators watching and listening to people.  
The spectator of a Nichols film is invited to consider social and philosophical questions about 
her own actions in interpersonal contexts: what power or what responsibility does she have to 
self-present?  Nichols‘ genius is that he accomplishes this as he entertains us, as we experience a 
witty and engaging story with its own specific issues.  It is through his pleasurable style that he 
impels the spectator to consider what it means to express: how it can be that a concept which 
seems to be the province of the self—my expression, my expressing—actually requires someone 
else to acknowledge it, for it to apply (even if that ―other person‖ is oneself as in cases of self-
reflection).  Or, as is the case in Virginia Woolf and The Birdcage, it might require the 
acknowledgement of a couple, since marriage requires two people engaged in expression. 
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To think about authorship is also to consider a person‘s actions: to ask questions about 
responsibility, intention, and accountability.  My broadest argument in this dissertation has been 
for the serious study of Nichols‘ films.  Since I saw it as my job to make the case for his cinema, 
it was necessary that I organize his films around central concepts.  But I mourn the differences, 
complexities, and nuances lost.  Like a successful classic Hollywood studio director, Nichols 
enjoyed the freedom to try his hand at different styles, themes, and genres.  He began his 
cinematic career as a pivotal director in the history of mainstream American cinema, and his 
subsequent films reflect significant developments in American culture, braiding together changes 
in cinema, such as the aesthetic innovations of the European New Wave cinemas; in philosophy, 
such as the theories of language espoused by J.L. Austin and Stanley Cavell, and in theater, such 
as Spolin‘s theory of improvisational drama.  
Part of my purpose was also to understand why Nichols‘ corpus has not been analyzed by 
scholars of film.  Now, after elucidating the many ways Nichols self-consciously engages our 
ideas about cinematic dialogue, character, facial expression, and performance, I believe his 
interest in the on-screen human figure to underlie his neglect.  We can appreciate that this 
interest allowed him to bridge the old and new, since Hollywood film remained a character-
driven cinema.  To think about Nichols is to deliberate about what a cinematic character is by 
considering both what it does and how it does it.  This is also, then, to think about a concept 
fundamental to American cinema, and one that provides a window through which to consider 
how this notion has been posited—and how it has changed—over almost fifty years.   
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